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
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REVOLUTIONARY RE-INTEGRATION: A COMPARISON OF THE FOUNDATION OF POST-LIBERATION POLITICAL SYSTEMS IN NORTH VIETNAM AND CHINA

## A Thesis

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School

of Cornell University

in Partial Fulfillment for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

by

David William Penn Elliott

January, 1976

# Biographical Sketch

David William Penn Elliott was born in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1938. He received his B.A. in History at Yale in 1960 and did graduate study at the Woodrow Wilson School of Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia in 1961-62. Military service took him through a year of Vietnamese language training at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California, in 1962-63, and then to Vietnam where he served as an interpreter-translator from 1963-65. Joining the Rand Corporation in 1965, he was a research analyst in Vietnam until 1967. For nine months in 1967-68, he studied Chinese in Taiwan. In the Fall of 1968, he returned to the United States to begin graduate studies in Political Science at Cornell University. Field research was conducted in Vietnam in 1971-72, and Hong Kong in 1972-73, and the dissertation completed in residence at Cornell in 1974-75. During the 1975-76 academic year, he has been a Visiting Assistant Professor in Cornell University's Southeast Asia Program.

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The many friends, teachers and colleagues that have contributed to my capacity to deal with a large and complex subject cannot be adequately recognized without implying accountability for the inevitable shortcomings of this work, which must remain the sole responsibility of the present writer. The Vietnamese friends who unstintingly gave of themselves are owed a debt that is beyond my ability to repay. One can only hope that the following pages reflect, in some small measure, the realities of the social transformation and the amazing strength of cultural and historical verities that have proved so tragically difficult for outsiders to grasp.

The most personal debts are the most difficult to adequately acknowledge. Let it only be said that the intellectual and personal contributions
of Mai Elliott to this dissertation, and her forbearance during the ardors
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# REVOLUTIONARY RE-INTEGRATION

A Comparison of the Foundation of Post-Liberation

Political Systems in North

Vietnam and China

The struggle between the proletarian revolutionary line represented by Chairman Mao, and the counter-revolutionary revisionist line of Peng Teh-huai and his partners in the anti-Party clique at the Lushan Meeting was a life-and-death struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and between the socialist road and the capitalist road. It was a big struggle of vital concern to the future and destiny of our great motherland.

Peng Teh-huai's anti-Party activity at the Lushan meeting was by no means accidental, nor was it an isolated incident. It was a wild, desperate onslaught by the dying bourgeoisie against the flourishing socialist cause of the proletariat.

The sinister boss behind this counter-revolutionary attack was none other than the top Party person in authority taking the capitalist road.

Peking Review, No. 35, August 25, 1967

In the face of this enormous and imposing force of the people, I felt very small, but I was full of selfconfidence, like a small tree standing in a vast and ancient forest. In struggling against the enemy, I had come to fully realize that we had to have the strength of the whole forest in order to be able to stay the force of the strong winds and storms. As I thought about the protection and support of the people, about the enormous efforts that the revolution had expended in educating and nurturing me, about the countless comrades and beloved people - some of whom I had mentioned but whose names I could never exhaustively enumerate - I felt more intimately bound, more so than ever before, to the road I had taken and had pledged to follow until my last days. was the road for which I would sacrifice everything for the future of the revolution and for the interests of the masses. For me, there was no other road to take.

Mrs. Nguyen Thi Dinh, <u>No Other Poad</u> <u>To Take</u>

Two roads diverged in a yellow wood, And sorry I could not travel both And be one traveller, long I stood And looked down one as far as I could To where it bent in the undergrowth;

Then took the other, as just as fair, And having perhaps the better claim, Because it was grassy and wanted wear; Though as for that the passing there Had worn them really about the same,

And both that morning equally lay In leaves no step had trodden black. Oh, I kept the first for another day! Yet knowing how way leads on to way, I doubted if I should ever come back.

I shall be telling this with a sigh Somewhere ages and ages hence: Two roads diverged in a wood, and I -I took the one less traveled by, And that has made all the difference.

Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken

### INTRODUCTION

## COMPARING REVOLUTIONS

This is a study of leadership that examines the impact that political culture and historical circumstances have had in shaping the post-Liberation policies of the People's Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. As a study in leadership, the focus is necessarily on the political elites of the two revolutionary movements. It should be stressed at the outset that this orientation does not reject the importance of the larger society in which the elites operate or assert that they are necessarily "elitist." The political leadership of each revolutionary movement is seen as a logical, though not inevitable, outgrowth of the deeper historical, social and economic factors that established the relevance of the ideals and actions of prominent revolutionary figures to the needs and aspirations of their countrymen.

The basic proposition of the analysis that follows is that the unique and contrasting situations of China and Vietnam which led them to adopt different courses after gaining state power through revolutionary action had deep cultural and historical roots. The pattern of the revolutionary movement in the pre-Liberation period played a major role in establishing the framework for the politics of the subsequent period of socialist construction. History, political culture, and intractable facts of human geography channelled each revolutionary movement into a distinctive mold. China's vast size and

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regional diversity requires the use of symbols as an important method of political integration and communication. The larger-than-life figure of Chairman Mao and the importance of ideology in the PRC stem from this need. Vietnam's slender base of natural resources, small administrative scale and history of foreign occupation help to explain why Ho Chi Minh, the intimate, low key reconciliation figure was perfectly suited to the Vietnamese view of the exemplary leader, and why the Vietnamese have stressed learning skills from other countries as a means of regaining and preserving their national independence.

Although Mao and Ho are prominent elements of this analysis, the concentration is not on the drama of their political biographies, but on the ways in which they represented larger social and cultural themes. Mao's famous struggle with his father and his enlistment of his mother as part of a "united front" presages and re-capitulates the dominant theme of the Chinese modern experience; class struggle and social revolution. It is a striking illustration of the Confucian precept that the first and most important lessons of governance are learned in the family. Ho's revolutionary career was a continuation and development of his father's legacy of anti-colonial struggle. His great achievement was the revitalization and realization of the basic values of his society, rather than a rejection of them.

These contrasting orientations indicate different weights attached to the two fundamental components of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory, the anti-imperialist and the anti-feudal tasks. Both elements played an important role in each revolution. But in comparative perspective, Vietnam's revolution chiefly pursued its "anti-imperialist" mission of expelling the French colonial regime, while China's revolution gave greater emphasis to its "anti-feudal" task of social revolution. This contrasting emphasis continued into the post-Liberation period. While China was embarking on successive mass mobilization campaigns, Vietnam pursued a gradualist "step-by-step" policy of social transformation, aimed at re-integrating a society shattered by colonial rule.

The comparative study presented in this paper does not attempt a comprehensive factual or analytic treatment of the widely diverse topics that form the basic components of the argument. Successive sections dealing with the paths of revolution, state structure, concepts of leadership, policy styles, and political socialization and educational systems are not intended to be an encyclopedic checklist for the comparison of the two political systems. These topics were selected for discussion and analysis because they illustrate the major premise of this study; that the past, present and future orientations of each revolution have a distinctive inner logic.

The original impulse behind the search for the reasons underlying the noticeably different policies and orientations of the leaderships of the PRC and DRV came in the mid-1960's when the contrast between the respective revolutions was most sharply drawn. China's inner-directed policies of radical social mobilization and emphasis on the continuation of class struggle were the unadulterated pursuit of the "anti-feudal" mission, while Vietnam's single-minded pursuit of the

expulsion of foreign invaders was the concentrated manifestation of the "anti-imperialist" task. Subsequent research revealed that the contrast had not always been as sharp and unambiguous. There were, in fact, notable similarities in the policies of each regime during the early post-Liberation period, and there were close parallels in the pre-Liberation revolutionary struggles in each country. The principal conclusion drawn from the following analysis, however, is that while the similarities are numerous and important, the main distinction lies in the fact that Vietnam determinedly adhered to a consistent revolutionary course, while China's revolutionary history is characterized by a "struggle between the two lines." Eventually this struggle was refined into archtypal positions, one labelled "Maoist", the other "Liuist" or, simply, "revisionist."

For the purposes of this analysis, the historical accuracy of expost facto interpretations of each nation's history is not as important as what the motives underlying revisionist Party history reveal about the nature of the respective revolutionary movements. Whether Mao was "right" and Liu "left" at various historical junctures is not as important as the fact that there was a right and left with two distinct policy lines throughout most of the revolution, and that the often precarious co-existence of two lines later had momentous consequences with regard to the leadership of the CCP. Similarly, whether Vietnam's revolutionary movement was always as unified as subsequent Party declarations assert is less important than the uncontestable fact that since the inception of the DRV there has been a remarkably

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durable unity among the Party leadership.

For Vietnam, the revolutionary course that has subsequently become known as "Maoism" was not adopted at any stage of the revolution. Indeed if Vietnam's revolutionary course were to be characterized in Chinese terms, it would be closer to the revisionist "Liuist" line. But, of course, the Vietnamese revolution cannot be adequately analyzed in terms that are an outgrowth of China's own distinctive situation. Although Vietnam learned from and, to an extent, emulated China's revolution, the task of this analysis is not simply to document these borrowings, but to show how both the borrowings and the rejections of the Chinese experience are logical consequences of Vietnam's own pattern of revolutionary development.

In terms of comparative analysis, the approach employed here might be termed "modular." The Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions are analyzed in separate topical sections, but the main goal is to demonstrate the inter-relationships between the various facets or analytical "modules" of <u>each</u> revolution and compare the resultant <u>patterns</u> of inter-relationship rather than describing each separate aspect in detail. During the course of the analysis the Chinese and Vietnamese experiences are alternately presented and compared. But it is not merely the accumulation of points of comparison that is sought, but the inter-connectedness of all aspects of the two revolutions.

China's revolution was, in essence, a search for a political formula that could integrate its wide diversity while simultaneously pursuing a policy of social transformation that would increase its "wealth and

power" and restore it to a position of international respect and prestige. Vietnam's goals were more modest, and its revolution aimed at re-integrating a society that had been disrupted by colonial occupation, and re-affirming the traditional ideals of the scholar-patriots who fought to maintain Vietnam's independence. Because China's revolution was primarily oriented toward social transformation, and carried out by leaders representing a wide variety of class backgrounds and age groups, its revolution was replete with episodes of internal struggle and policy clashes. Vietnam's leadership came from a more homogeneous group in terms of both social background and age. Despite incidences of factionalism in the early period of the revolution, the dominant anti-imperialist theme of the revolution reinforced inner unity and relegated social transformation to a secondary position. first part of the dissertation attempts to amplify these themes, document the formation of the revolutionary leadership and the factors that shaped their political outlook, and describe the different "paths of revolution."

The second part attempts to illustrate how the paths of revolution influenced the distinctive concepts of the nature and institutional structure of the post-Liberation state. Basic differences in the administrative geography of China and Vietnam further illustrate the forces of diversity and the difficulties of integration in China's vast territory in contrast to the much easier task of integration in North Vietnam, equivalent in size to a single province of China. The sharper class struggle in China's pre-Liberation revolution reflects

the greater diversity of its social forces and the necessity of defeating an initially more powerful domestic opponent by emphasizing the benefits of social mobilization to China's dispossessed workers and peasants. Vietnam's less complex class structure and clearly defined external enemy made it easier to unite a broad section of the population under the leadership of the Communist Party, which rarely encountered an equally powerful indigeneous opposition. As a consequence of its small size and high level of goal consensus, Vietnam opted for a state structure that was based on the legalistic and bureaucratic Soviet model. China initially adopted this model, but soon found it unsuited to its regional, social and political diversity, and adopted a "Maoist" strategy of national integration that was political rather than legal in its guidelines, and ideological rather than organizational in its operations.

A third part analyzes the concepts of leadership and the policy styles of each system. Ho Chi Minh and Mao Tse-tung reflect traditional leadership ideals, and exemplify the different leadership qualities that led to success in their respective revolutions. Ho was a reconciliation figure, considerably older than his closest colleagues, and thus played a moderating and adjudicating leadership role in a political system whose policy style was incremental and pragmatic.

Mao's leadership role was that of an integrative symbol of the magistral power and authority of the Party and state. At the same time, he was of the same age group as his colleagues and became the pre-eminent leading figure only after a prolonged and bitter struggle. The conflict

between the role requirement of uncontested prestige, and the actual record of real or imagined challenges to this authority, led to purges and upheavals within the Party and help to explain the radical policy shifts that have characterized the PRC since Liberation. The DRV's incremental approach in policy making and implementation is the combined result of Ho's leadership style and the nature of a revolution in which social transformation played a secondary role. This part concludes with a case study of the cooperativization programs in China and Vietnam to illustrate these contrasts.

Finally, the analysis concludes with a comparison of the role of political socialization and education in each country in training revolutionary successors, in an attempt to determine whether the contrasts will continue after Vietnam's reunification completes the anti-imperialist task, and socialist construction becomes an undisputed priority, and whether China's "Maoist" programs will survive Mao. The analysis is brought to full circle by examining those aspects of traditional society which supported or hindered the development of the revolution, the extent to which the revolution has transformed this society, and the ways in which post-Liberation society will affect the transmission of the preferred values of each regime.

Since there has been greater congruence between the values of traditional Vietnamese society and the goals of Vietnam's revolution, it is likely that the traditional agents of socialization, family and peer groups, will be able to ensure that revolutionary ideals will be imparted to succeeding generations. Unlike China, whose attitude 12

toward tradition has been ambivalent and often negative, the Vietnamese view their revolution as being in a mainstream of "transmitted
tradition" (truyen thong) that dates back to the formation of the
Vietnamese nation. Because China's revolutionary objectives are often
at odds with its past, particularly the Confucian tradition, the
school system plays a more prominent role in inculcating values than
the Vietnamese schools, which concentrate on imparting expertise.

There is thus a direct connection between the nature of Vietnam's revolution and its post-Liberation structure and policies. A relatively homogeneous society, united in a struggle against foreign domination, established a legalistic and bureaucratic state structure, pursued gradualist policies determined in a pragmatic style, and let the natural social mechanisms transmit revolutionary ideals, while the school system pursued a policy of training a future generation of "experts." China's revolution broke sharply with its past, and evolved as a bitter civil war in which social mobilization policies were the key to victory. After Liberation, the Russian model of the state structure was discarded because it was felt to encourage the emergence of a new ruling strata divorced from the masses. The Soviet approach was then seen as incapable of being effective in political integration because it created an excessive gap between the rulers and the masses, and betrayed the ideals of the revolution that had been shaped in struggle during the pre-Liberation period in Kiangsi and Yenan. Because the emphasis on social transformation was the dominant revolutionary theme, traditional social mechanisms were seen as inadequate in the task of molding a new generation, and the schools along with organized peer groups assumed a heavy burden in transmitting desired political values to a generation of "revolutionary successors" whom the regime would .

prefer to have "red" first and "expert" second.

The comparative themes are presented in a sequence that attempts, to be both a thematic and chronological examination of the political systems of Vietnam and China. The first part on the paths of revolution attempts to answer the question, "How did it begin?" The second, analyzing the nature of the state and its organization responds to the question, "How does it cohere?", while the third part on leadership and policy styles inquires, "How does it work?" A final part on socialization and education asks, "How will it endure?"

There are many vexing analytic problems. Although the main comparative question has been the relationships between the respective patterns of development of the two political systems, the question of how they were related at specific chronological junctures cannot be ignored. China's revolution was chronologically in advance of Vietnam's in all respects but seizing state power, and even here foreign intervention not only ousted the DRV from its position of national leadership but deprived it of half Vietnam's territory when it finally won independence for North Vietnam. This cardinal fact completely overshadowed China's lesser problem with its irredenta of the single province of Taiwan, and kept the "anti-imperialist" theme at the forefront of DRV decision making at a time when China was able to concentrate its energies on socialist construction.

Whether or not Vietnam would have pursued different policies if its entire territory had been liberated is an unanswerable question. In the event, they pursued the basic policies of land reform and cooperativization in about the same sequence and intervals as did China. But the manner in which the programs were carried out was diffewent, particularly in the cooperativization program, which is analyzed as an illustration of the distinctive policy styles of each system. China's cooperativization program was launched several years prior to Vietnam's and offered valuable experience for Vietnam's subsequent pro-Yet after the Great Leap, which had no counterpart in Vietnam, the policy problems in agriculture of the two countries occurred in closer synchronization, despite the fact that one program was retrenching while the other was developing. The same problem arises in comparing educational systems, which can be compared in terms of the initial patterns of development of the systems, China in 1949 and Vietnam in 1954, or in terms of the immediate impact that new programs, such as China's work-study system, had in Vietnam. There are thus two time frames of comparison involved in the analysis, between equivalent but temporally unrelated stages in the two revolutions, and contemporaneous influences between systems at different stages of development.

Another difficult comparative problem is the sequence and alternation between the discussion of each case. As with the problems of temporal comparisons, the rule of thumb has been the guide of simple convenience. Whether one point was treated in alternation, or several

points consecutively presented in a discussion of one country depended largely on the complexity and logic of the sequence of issues.

It is left to the reader to determine whether this has been adequately handled.

Finally, there is the problem of sources. Given the imbalance between the prodigious scholarly attention that has been devoted to China, and the woefully underdeveloped field of Vietnamese studies, it seemed logical, in fact incumbent, to focus the primary research on Vietnam. This approach was also dictated by the wide range of topics included in this comparative study. It would have been impossible to adequately cover such a broad range of subjects for both countries, and folly to ignore or duplicate the important research that has been done on China in the last decade. Thus, a wide variety of English language secondary sources on various aspects of the Chinese revolution and political system were gratefully utilized and these were supplemented by conversations with knowledgeable authorities on China during an invaluable year spent in research in Hong Kong.

In the case of Vietnamese materials, DRV sources were extensively used except in cases where other sources had special relevance to the topic at hand. The Party daily, Nhan Dan, was the basis of most information on the policies and programs of the DRV, and for much valuable biographical and historical data as well. Other DRV publications such as memoirs, Party histories and special studies in education, economics, agriculture and the like were also used. Over fifty interviews were conducted with defected North Vietnamese in Saigon during late 1971 and

early 1972. Several of these have prompted many of the ideas that are presented in this analysis, and have made a far more substantial contribution to the understanding of North Vietnam's political system than the scattered references to them indicate.

Cumulatively, the interviews played another role of prime importance. The conversations with former participants in the DRV political system, done under adverse conditions in an atmosphere that would seem to inhibit an objective appraisal of the positive aspects of the DRV, confirmed the essential accuracy of the analysis in the Party press, particularly the frank and revealing investigative reports in <a href="Nhan Dan">Nhan Dan</a>. The points criticized in these articles were criticized by the interviewees and the positive judgements generally supported by the interview data. With this reliability check accomplished, more extensive use could be made of the documentary material which had the dual advantage of being more detailed and more authoritative.

Since this is primarily a study of leadership, the "objective" appraisal of each stage in the revolutions of China and Vietnam was not as important as an understanding of how the leaderships of both countries viewed their revolutions and why they analyzed it in the way they did. And, as noted, this study does not try to offer definitive explanations for the "real" reasons for the success of the respective revolutions or the invisible hand that determined their post-Liberation policies. This concentration on the vision and motivation of the revolutionary leaders does, however, have a direct relevance to these "deeper" questions, because in both cases success is persuasive evidence of the

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relevance of the visions of Ho, Mao and their colleagues to the problems of their times.

But there is a still more important conclusion to be drawn, and one which can only be suggested, given the limitations of our current understanding of the revolutionary process. That is that the leaders, although men of vision, are products of their society and their times. Unless the vision they articulate strikes a deeply responsive chord in society and is congruent with the ingrained cultural patterns of a nation, the political result will be flawed and precarious.

Revolutions are usually associated with great social and economic upheavals and violent clashes between classes competing for political power. But revolutions can have their conservative side as well.

Vietnam's revolution was fundamentally a continuation of a deeply rooted tradition of scholar-official resistance to foreign domination, and was seen in those terms by its leaders, who made revolution in the name of upholding traditional ideals. The revolutionary process in Vietnam can best be described as revolutionary re-integration, since it restored the social cohesion that had been destroyed by the disruptions of colonial occupation.

Mao's revolutionary vision proved to be the timely and correct antidote for a China debilitated by the weight of immobilizing tradition,
and unable to cope with its entry into the modern world. The liberation
and re-integration of China is certainly one of the momentous events of
the twentieth century, and an extraordinary feat of leadership and
social mobilization, accomplished under circumstances of extreme difficulty. But because of its ambivalence toward its past and its own

misgivings about the reliability of future generations of "revolutionary successors," the degree to which Map's vision has struck a response from the depths of China's political culture must remain an open question. This is the fundamental point of difference between the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions, and explains why, in Vietnam, the Maoist path is "the road not taken."

PART ONE

PATHS OF REVOLUTION

#### SECTION I

### PRELUDE TO REVOLUTION

At first glance the communist led revolutions of China and Vietnam seem to be cast in the same mould. Both countries were overwhelmingly agrarian societies with inequities in landholding, both were Confucian civilizations crumbling under the impact of contact with modern Western institutions and technology, and the monarchy, traditional symbol of political authority, had been discredited in both countries by its inability to cope with the transformations brought on by contact with the West. From a comparative perspective, however, the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions show important differences. It is the thesis of this study that these differences in the paths of revolutionary development resulted in different approaches to political organization and leadership in the post-Liberation state in the People's Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

The most obvious and important contrast was that Vietnam's twentieth century revolution was primarily an anti-colonial independence struggle, sustained by traditional ideals while China's struggle was basically a social revolution, involving an attempt to define a new pattern of political authority. It has become a commonplace of contemporary scholar-ship that modern revolutionary movements are shaped in the reverse image of the forces that opposed them, and provided the social and political impetus for their emergence. Vietnam's revolution can be seen as a reaction to French colonial rule, first expressed in the form of a

patriotic movement to restore the legitimate monarch, as well as the continuation of a long tradition of opposition to foreign domination. In China the situation was more complex, for its revolution was a rejection of a ruling dynasty that had never been accepted as authentically Chinese, and against the aspects of traditional society that had weakened the Middle Kingdom and exposed it to the humilitation of impotent concessions to superior technological cultures of the West.

Perhaps the most important paradox of the contrasting orientations is the fact that the leaders who led Vietnam's predominantly anti-foreign revolution to victory, were cosmopolitan men who were conversant with foreign languages and cultures, while the dominant leaders of China's revolution emerged within the context of traditional Chinese society, which they turned against and vowed to destroy. Ho Chi Minh and Mao Tse-tung are the symbols of the contrast; Ho receiving a rudimentary French education and pursuing his revolutionary career abroad for three decades as an agent of the Comintern, while Mao remained in China throughout the revolution, knew no foreign languages and strongly opposed external guidance of the CCP.

With a few notable exceptions, little attention was paid to the Vietnamese revolution by the Comintern. Ho saw the international movement as an important aid to the Vietnamese anti-colonial struggle despite Moscow's lack of attention to Vietnamese problems. Mao eventually came to see Comintern direction as a threat to his conception of the road to be followed for China's revolution. Ho felt that it was necessary to use international support for nationalist ends by using the French

Communist Party to attack colonial rule from the Metropole. Mao felt threatened by Moscow's intervention in a situation it did not fully understand. Thus although nationalism and anti-colonialism played a more important role in Vietnam than in China, Vietnam was more receptive to the internationalist aspect of the Communist movement.

China's revolution was not simply the story of Mao's ascendancy to power however. There were other, contradictory, historical threads.

During the Cultural Revolution it became fashionable to reconstruct CCP history as a struggle between two lines, one represented by Mao, the other by Liu Shao-ch'i. Whatever the accuracy of this revised interpretation of Party history, which is also designed for contemporary political uses, it does illustrate two important facts about the Chinese revolution. First, the existence of different lines within the Party is a reflection of China's inner-directed social revolution. The strife within the Party is a reflection of the conflicts within Chinese society as a whole and, second, the career of Liu Shao-ch'i does reflect an archtypal pattern of a different political orientation, one which co-existed with Mao's line, but was later rejected.

For the Vietnamese there was only one road, which was the pursuit of national independence. The background of the top Vietnamese Party members, their revolutionary experience, and the conditions under which they operated more closely paralleled Liu's career than Mao's. To the Vietnamese, it was not a matter of copying the Chinese experience or consciously selecting a "Liuist" outlook. And it was certainly not a case of innate "revisionism" among Vietnamese leaders. Ho and other

Vietnamese leaders were products of their own background and environment, and did what was necessary to achieve their revolutionary goals in the circumstances confronting them. But, for these reasons, for Vietnam's revolutionaries the Maoist path was "the road not taken."

# Traditional Society and Modern Nationalism

Unique historical and social conditions offer a partial explanation of the divergent courses of the two revolutions. Related to them is the vitally important objective factor of size. China's huge territorial expanse posed quite different problems for those who sought to exercise authority over it and transform it than in North Vietnam - once a provincial administrative unit of Imperial China. Sun Yat-sen once called China a "loose sheet of sand" and early Chinese revolutionary movements had to cope with strong countervailing forces of provincial autonomy. Joseph Levenson noted the shift from culturalism to nationalism in China and pointed out that modern nationalism was forced to create a new view of China as one nation state among others, rather than a universal "all under heaven" empire. The corollary of this proposition, he said, was that "China must be undivided, that only in its wholeness can it be a nation." Levenson adds that a major task of one of China's first nationalist leaders, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, was to "dramatize the idea of one China, the sum of its parts, if he was to make China distinguishable

Joseph R. Levenson, <u>Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China</u> (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 114.

as one part of a sum."2

China's national identity during the pre-revolutionary period at the turn of the twentieth century consisted of three basic elements; a feeling of cultural unity, the political symbol of the monarchy, and a growing perception of China by a new generation of intellectuals as a nation state threatened by external forces. As Levenson points out, China's "culturalism" was incapable of providing a unifying symbol for a rapidly changing China, or even a comprehension of the changes it was undergoing. The monarchy was a divisive rather than a unifying symbol. Although conservatives looked to the throne as the protector of the eternal verities of Confucian culture, the occupation of the seat of power by a semi-alien race seriously undermined its utility as an integrating political force. Moreover, the emerging modern nationalists felt that the backwardness and venality of the Manchu Court was the root cause of China's weakness and humiliation by foreign powers.

It is thus not surprising that an important element of the rising nationalist movement began to feel that while imperalism was the immediate source of China's parlous condition, the central target of revolutionary activities should be directed against the debilitating encumbrance of the Manchu Court. Although China was humiliated from without, this was possible mainly because of its inner decay. This

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup><u>Ibid</u>. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao felt that "the Chinese people seem to be rather parochial localists than nationalists, and he approved of K'ang Yu-wei for his insistence that China is indivisible and for his opposition to the advocates of provincial autonomy." Ibid.

was a theme which was to characterize the entire twentieth century revolution in China, and to have important consequences in the post-Liberation period as China's opposition to external revisionism became increasingly transformed into fear of being undermined by the influence of this pernicious doctrine within China itself.

China's nationalist opposition to the Manchus had three main components. One was the advocates of provincial autonomy who increasingly rejected the legitimacy of the Court as ruler of all China. This political force, while of vital importance in understanding the 1911 Revolution and the disintegration of the Chinese Empire that followed, is of marginal interest viewed from the perspective of China's successful Communist revolutionary victory in 1949. A second component was early nationalist figures coming from the traditional ruling strata of the literati.

Foremost among these early nationalist figures was Liang Ch'i-ch'ao who, while castigating the literati as "worms on the people, grubs on the nation" was, nevertheless, a member of this group. He attacked republicanism and generally refused to turn his nationalism against the Manchus. As Levenson characterized him,

Liang Ch'i-ch'ao was one of the literati. He wrote for them and his intellectual need was theirs. This being so, he was absolutely committed, as the class was generally, to the concept of China as a monolithic structure. When the great contest was seen as cultural, China against the West, not as economic, peasantry against gentry, China had to be whole, and the fission of Chinese society could not be acknowledged.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup><u>Ibid</u>., p. 158.

<sup>&</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 167.

26

Liang's type of conservative nationalism "takes class-consciousness as its feared and hated opposite, a wedge in Chinese culture, a knife to social peace."

For the third component of the early nationalist movement, whose most prominent spokesman was Sun Yat-sen, it was the Manchu Court that was the immediate target of the revolution, and China's internal social problems became increasingly important to Sun and his followers. Self strengthening, according to Sun, could not be accomplished by institutional reforms within the framework of Manchu rule. The Manchus had weakened China and the monarchy was a disintegrating institution. The way to oppose external aggression was to strengthen China by revolution. Sun and his followers felt that the Manchu domination showed "the white man that Chinese racial (national) power was 'immature' and encouraged his aggression" and that within China itself, if the Han race was unable to "oppose a single race" then "how will we have the majestic power to rule the various races?" The decision of Sun and other young nationalists to direct their revolutionary activities against the Manchus

<sup>5&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

The contrast between the Liang's appeal for national unity and Sun's revolutionary concerns is evident in their differing estimates of the Chinese-ness (and, hence, legitimacy) of the Manchu Court. Levenson writes, "To counter the Sun party's branding of the Manchus as ineradicably foreign intruders, Liang insists that the transfer of power in the seventeenth century is not properly described as a transfer from Chinese to Manchus... (and that) there has been a Chinese government since the rise of Ch'in, and that is the government in China today." Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>Cited in Harold Z. Schiffin, <u>Sun Yat-sen and the Origins of the Chinese Revolution</u> (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 295.

"temporarily deflected the nationalist thrust from its original collision course with the West." As Harold Schiffin's study of the period observes, "It was not that the young nationalists forgot their anti-imperialist grievances, but that they despaired of winning such a clash and became reconciled to a holding action in foreign relations. An internal political revolution, they may have hoped, would provide China with the international stature and respect that would automatically remove her from the path of imperialist designs." Unlike the Vietnamese chafing under an excess of colonial authority, the Chinese after 1911 were confronted with the necessity to reintegrate their rapidly changing society into a new order. 10

For the Vietnamese, the "imperialist designs" of the French were a <u>fait accompli</u>. Since 1884 all of Vietnam had been subjected to direct French colonial domination. And while the monarchy was bitterly assailed for its irresolution and ineptitude in allowing the country to be seized by foreigners, it was not the major target of nationalist

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup><u>Ibid</u>., p. 298.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup><u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 298-299.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>In a study of Li Ta-chao, the first leader of the Chinese Communist Party, one author writes that, "The Chinese intellectuals of the second decade of the twentieth century were faced not with the power of an authoritarian state but with overwhelming political chaos and social disintegration. Although many were in revolt against the remaining restraints of the Confucian past, they were also motivated by a quest for order and unity." Maurice Meisner, Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism (New York: Atheneum, 1970), p. 13.

agitation. Indeed, it initially served as a rallying point for the patriotic scholar-gentry who provided the social and intellectual foundation of Vietnam's twentieth century revolution. The early resistance to French colonial rule took the form of a "Royalist" (Can Vuong) movement, whose social and political center was in the provinces that later produced a preponderant number of the founders of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. 11

The fact that the Vietnamese monarchy did not become the divisive symbol in the early nationalist movements that it did in China is central to an understanding of the differences between the two revolutions. It meant that the Vietnamese movement had a continuity with tradition, and was not divided against itself. And it illustrates another crucial distinction; the Vietnamese did not have to move from culturalism to nationalism, but had a strong historical legacy of national identity which was still politically relevant in an age of modern nationalism and revolution. The Vietnamese thought of their monarch not as the symbol of an imperial cultural ecumene but as an intimate protector figure. Vietnamese monarchs were not inflated to supra-human dimensions as integrative symbols, as in China. The Viet-

David Marr has calculated that thirteen of the thirty-two recorded "risings" of this movement against the French occurred in the three Central provinces of Thanh Hoa, Nghe An and Ha Tinh alone.

<u>Vietnamese Anticolonialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971)</u>, p. 47.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>The Vietnamese and Chinese concepts of leadership are discussed in more detail in Section III.

namese concept was that the "'King' did not always mean the actual incumbent of the throne but rather a ruler who would be worthy of that title. The monarchy was therefore an idealized institution not tarnished by any accidental deviation from the ideal." 13

China had historically been the center of the East Asian political universe while Vietnam had been the periphery. Centuries of foreign threat and domination had sharpened Vietnamese awareness of its national boundaries, bracketed as it was by the colossus of China to the North, and Southeast Asian kingdoms to the south and west. Sandwiched between two cultural worlds, Vietnam's national identity was formed from an early period. It was not merely a pale reflection of China, or another turbulent Southeast Asian kingdom, but a national state with defined (but expanding) frontiers from at least the 11th century. Thus the sense of national identity was not dependent on the institution of the monarchy or, as it turned out, the monarch himself.

Weakened by its failure to cope with the colonial intrusion, and undermined by French manipulation, the monarchy gradually faded into obscurity. One strand of the nationalist movement attempted to use the monarchy as a political symbol, but this effort failed and was finally interred long before the actual death of the exiled pretender Prince Cuong De in Japan, where he was still waiting for a return to Vietnam. The utter failure of the French attempt to revive

Truong Buu Lam, <u>Patterns of Vietnamese Response to Foreign Intervention: 1858-1900</u> (Yale University: Southeast Asia Studies Monograph Series, No. 11, 1967), p. 10.

the role of the monarchy after 1945 showed how completely the political legitimacy of the monarchy had been eclipsed during the period of French rule. But, unlike China, the issue of the monarchy was not the root cause of fundamental splits in the early nationalist movements.

The issue simply faded away.

Because the role of the Vietnamese monarchy was not a catalytic issue in the early nationalist movements, no major revolutionary group felt it necessary to make a complete break with the past. <sup>14</sup> Indeed, the Vietnamese anti-colonial struggle continued throughout as a movement that reaffirmed traditional values. David Marr's assessment of the Can Vuong (Royalist) Movement is that:

To the degree that the Can Vuong was a disembodied monarchism it was not within the mainstream of Vietnamese tradition which empowered the physical king with both spiritual and temporal functions. Nevertheless, certain ideals would be nurtured by the Can Vuong and passed on without break to subsequent generations, including a deep sense of reciprocal leader-follower responsibility, violent resistance in the face of hopeless odds, ruthless self-denial, and glorification of death to a principle. 15

The principle, of course, was resistance to foreign domination, which had provided the central political and cultural theme for Vietnamese history for at least two thousand years.

The idea of a "transmitted tradition" (truyen thong) is indispensible in understanding the Vietnamese revolution. It is a tradition

The significance of the art -monarchical views of Phan Chu Trinh is discussed below.

<sup>15</sup> David Marr, <u>Vietnamese Anticolonialism</u>, p. 52.

of emulating the past exploits of the exemplars or culture heroes of Vietnamese history. These exploits are almost exclusively related to the central theme of Vietnamese history — the resistance against foreign domination. This theme, elaborated by the historical data of centuries, provided an epic myth which stirred Vietnamese, rallied and united them in periods of external threat. Thus, as David Marr concludes, the importance of the Can Vuong movement was not measured in terms of its failures or even its temporary impact in frustrating the French occupation. Rather this movement "provided crucial moral and spiritual continuity to the long struggle against the new foreign invader." 16

The history of the modern Vietnamese nationalist movement has centered around the transmission of these ideals to successive generations. The concept of generation employed here is one in which genealogical and political generations have intersected and overlapped. The Can Vuong generation, born in the 1860's and 1870's, came into their political prime at the end of the century. Although there was a brief flourishing of nationalist activities in the first decade of the twentieth century, the next major stage in Vietnamese political development came with the birth of revolutionary nationalism in the mid-1920's among youths and students, which produced most of the prominent DRV leaders of the post-Liberation period. The third stage was the August Revolution of 1945 which produced the young generation of political activists that helped bring the DRV into power, and

<sup>16&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid.</sub>, p. 76.

provided the mainstay of the Resistance war against the French.

Linking these successive generations were inter-generational figures who "provided crucial moral and spiritual continuity," and who preserved, sustained and developed the tradition of Vietnamese independence. The main intergenerational links in this chain were Phan Boi Chau, Phan Chu Trinh, and then the towering figure of Ho Chi Minh. Their political careers have been extensively documented elsewhere, and need only be summarized here. 17 Phan Boi Chau was initially a monarchist, briefly converted to Pan Asianism, and an ardent advocate of clandestine organization and violent overthrow of French colonial rule. Phan Chu Trinh was anti-monarchist, an advocate of acquiring Western knowledge, and a reformist. Yet the contrasts in political orientation were not of great importance precisely because they were intergenerational figures who linked up larger social and political movements rather than leading them. fell to the succeeding nationalist generation to achieve a synthesis of their views.

Sun Yat-sen foreshadowed the split between the socially conservative literati and the emerging forces comprised of <u>declasse</u> elements like Sun who himself came from a peasant background. Sun's anti-Manchu views were of great importance because they helped shift the direction of the early Chinese revolution inward, while Phan Chu Trinh's anti-

<sup>17</sup> The comprehensive account of Phan Boi Chau and Phan Chu Trinh is David Marr's Vietnamese Anticolonialism.

monarchical views only defined the problem and were not accompanied by extensive social mobilization. All Vietnamese revolutionary figures, including Ho and both Phan's, with minor exceptions, came from the scholar-official class. The major distinction was not between traditional elites and newly emerging social and political forces, but between members of the scholar-official class who collaborated with the French and those that did not. 18

In the long term perspective of the development of modern Vietnamese nationalism, the shared anti-colonial views of the two Phan's provided a bridge over the gulf that separated them in their attitudes toward reform and revolution. Phan Boi Chau's "ten great joys" is remarkably similar to the National Liberation Front's "ten point program" a half century later. 19 And despite his modern attitudes on eliminating dependency on Chinese characters and advocacy of modern ideas on democratic ideals and popular education, Phan Chu Trinh felt these measures

Marr points out that one of the legacies of the Can Vuong movement was, "demolishing among the people the lingering sense of respect and legitimacy granted on collaborating scholar-gentry" (p. 83), but adds that Phan Boi Chau placed "repeated stress on the position of the top scholar-gentry as the moral fulcrum, the arbiters, good or evil, of popular attitudes and behavior." (p. 116), while Phan Chu Trinh "called passionately on the scholar-gentry in the villages, still the most educated and respected figures among the people, to turn their ears to the new winds, their eyes toward the future, and help those who were sinking into despair and rouse those who were dreaming." (p. 175).

The details of Phan Boi Chau's "ten great joys" are listed in Marr, <u>Vietnamese Anticolonialism</u>, pp. 137-139.

were necessary precisely because French colonial rule had corrupted traditional ideals. 20 Both men came to oppose various aspects of Vietnam's traditional social and political order. Trinh's iconoclasm was "extremely important in stimulating large numbers of Vietnamese to liberate themselves from the traditional culture as defined by the mandarins, thus clearing the way for the general acceptance of modern nationalist sentiments," while Chau's increasing perception of the exploitative links between the conservative mandarins and the French colonials ultimately led him to "condemn much of the old social and political order, not primarily because it inhibited Vietnam's growth and development, but because it was helping the French to sustain their presence." 21

## From Rebellion to Revolution: The Nationalist Transformation

The synthesis of the divergent strains of modern nationalism represented by the two Phan's was accomplished by another intergenerational figure, Ho Chi Minh. Ho came from the same scholar-gentry background as the Phan's, and was influenced by both of them. As a young boy at

In his letter to Governor General Beau, Phan Chu Trinh stated that "everyone believed the French were tacitly encouraging the terrible parisitism of the [collaborating] mandarins as a way of turning the Vietnamese people against each other, weakening them and hence making them easier to rule." He pointed out that since the establishment of French rule, "progressive emasculation of the court had given local mandarins carte blanche over the people, often in covert alliance with individual court officials and aided additionally in their exploitative sorties by the countrywide degeneration of traditional values." Ibid., p. 160.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., pp. 200-201.

the turn of the century, Ho grew up in near proximity to Phan Boi Chau's birthplace in Nghe An, and as a young revolutionary in China in the 1920's he established contact with the remnants of Chau's revolutionary band. In the interim, Ho turned down an invitation from Chau to study in Japan and went to France instead, where he came into close contact with Trinh. The failure to gain a hearing from President Wilson on his petition concerning self-determination for Vietnam eroded Ho's enthusiasm for the reformist politics of Phan Chu Trinh and his discovery the following year that only the Third International was interested in opposing colonialism settled his political course of action. A period of training in Moscow in 1923-24 gave him a grasp of the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism.

In the mid-1920's, the political careers of the two Phan's came to an end with the arrest in 1925 of Chau and the death of Trinh in 1926 following his return to Vietnam. The first great political contribution of Ho Chi Minh to the Vietnamese revolution was to synthesize the legacies of these two dominant figures in modern Vietnamese nationalism. From Chau, Ho inherited a deep sense of respect for Vietnam's traditions and appreciation for the exploits of the scholar-official

Ho's official biography suggests that his disillusionment with both Phan's came even prior to his departure from Vietnam in 1911. "Phan Chu Trinh only requested the French to carry out reforms. (No) concluded that was wrong, and amounted to begging compassion from bandits. Phan Boi Chau hoped that Japan would help kick out the French. That was very dangerous, and amounted to 'escorting the tiger out the front door while bringing the panther in through the back door'." Tran Dan Tien, Nhung mau chuyen ve doi hoat dong cua Ho Chu Tich (Anecdotes on Chairman Ho's Life and Activities) (Hanoi: Van Hoc, 1970), pp. 10-11.

patriots who opposed the French colonial occupation. Ho also found a nucleus of clandestine organization of Chau's young followers in Canton, which he transformed into the Revolutionary Youth League, the progenitor of the Indochinese Communist Party. From Phan Chu Trinh, Ho learned an appreciation of the popular and democratic side of modern nationalism, which provided the basis for Ho's understanding of the importance of mass support. Trinh's advice to learn from the West was heeded by Ho throughout his career. It was Ho's cosmopolitanism that made him an effective and successful nationalist revolutionary.

In 1925 and 1926, many of the basic elements that shaped the Vietnamese revolution came together, with Ho at their nexus. The Chinese influence came through Ho's operations in Canton and the help of the Chinese Communist Party, as well as from non-Communist left-KMT figures such as Liao Chung-k'ai, with whom he had close connections. The Comintern connection came through Ho's service as Borodin's interpreter. The connection with the Vietnamese old-style revolutionaries came through Ho's contacts in China with the Tam Tam Xa - a group of revolutionary exiles left leaderless by Chau's arrest. The connection with the new force of student nationalism came as demonstrations against the arrest of Chau in 1925 and a commemorative demonstration at the death of Trinh in 1926 prompted French reprisals which sent many of students into exile in Canton, where they joined the Thanh Nien (Youth)

 $<sup>^{23}</sup>$ Ho is quoted as telling an acquaintance in Saigon, "I want to go overseas and see France and other countries. After seeing how they do things, I will return and help our compatriots." <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 11.

organization led by Ho.

The was during these two years that the linkage between old and new revolutionary movements took place. The key transformation in the nationalist movement within Vietnam came with the emergence of a new revolutionary consciousness among students. The most important catalytic event in the transformation of the modern nationalist movement and, indeed, the development of the Communist Party in Vietnam, is also one of the most neglected aspects of Western scholarly accounts of the Vietnamese revolution. The student demonstrations protesting Chau's arrest, and commemorating Trinh's funeral produced most of the important leaders of the Communist Party in Vietnam, and placed its stamp on an entire generation. Not until the August Revolution of 1945 did a similar social upheaval produce an equivalent consciousness among Vietnam's youths of belonging to a distinct political epoch and political generation.

China's May Fourth Movement of 1919 left an ambiguous legacy, however. Sun Yat-sen "had supported the student and new culture movements on political grounds, but had never completely agreed with the new literature and new thought on nationalist grounds. This ambivalent attitude of Sun's toward the movement often led in later years to controversial and confusing situations within the (KMT) party." <sup>24</sup>

Conservatives in the KMT emphasized the nationalist elements of the

Chou Tse-tsung, The May Fourth Movement (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), p. 343.

movement, while radicals responded to its "emancipating" new thought and its break with tradition. As Chou Tse-tsung's study of this movement concludes, "most of the intellectual reformers questioned the capacity of the traditional heritage in general, and the old ethics in particular, to aid national salvation. The history of the latter part of the nineteenth century had proved that tradition cannot make China strong and independent. It is in this sense that, to the reformers, traditionalism is less useful for the purposes of nationalism than is iconoclasm." 25

Mao has frequently noted the importance of the May Fourth Movement in the development of the Chinese revolution. In his view it marked the dividing line between the old bourgeois democratic phase of the revolution, and the post-May Fourth phase in which the political guidance of the bourgeois democratic revolution "no longer rested solely upon the bourgeois class, but upon the proletariat." This movement was the central focus of an entire political generation. As Mao later recalled, "those who founded the Party were all young people who had participated in the May Fourth Movement and been influenced by it."

Nevertheless, the influence of the May Fourth Movement on the course of China's revolution was not always uniform or direct. The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>Ibid., pp. 345-46.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 351.

Stuart Schram, ed., <u>Chairman Mao Talks to the People</u> (New York: Pantheon, 1974), p. 96.

dual themes of anti-imperialist and anti-feudalism were implicit in the movement, although they were not fully developed until after 1920. 28 The conservatives responded to the first and the reformists to the second. And, it is significant that, according to Chou Tsetsung, "the anti-feudal idea was probably voiced earlier than the anti-imperialist conception by some intellectual leaders in the new thought movement even before the May Fourth Movement." Finally, the actual Incident which galvanized the movement affected most directly those in Peking and other large cities where there was Western and Japanese presence, though the social and intellectual consequences had a nationwide impact. Still, it should be noted that only five of the twenty-six members of the 1956 CCP Politburo had directly participated in this movement. 30

In Vietnam, the 1925-26 student movement had different origins and different consequences. Like the May Fourth Movement, it was a protest against the arrogance of a foreign power. But the Chinese student movement had been directed against leading Chinese political and intellectual figures who were held responsible for their humiliation. Confucian values were denounced as obfuscating and immobilizing, and Chinese intellectuals put their faith in Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy

<sup>28</sup> Chou Tse-tsung, The May Fourth Movement, p. 354.

<sup>29 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>., p. 355.

<sup>30</sup> Donald W. Klein and Anne B. Clark, <u>Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism</u>, <u>1921-1965</u> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 1065, 1091.

and, increasingly, in revolutionary agitation. Similarly, the

December 9th movement of 1935 marked the turning away from the

Kuomintang by a significant portion of an entire generation of in
tellectuals who saw that only the Communists had an effective program

around which those dissatisfied with the KMT's political bankruptcy

could unite.

For the Vietnamese, the colonial rulers were the main target of agitation. This was because the indigenous supporters of the colonial regime were never seen as a crucial political factor. Whatever betrayal of national interest the collaborateur elements represented had taken place decades earlier. The demonstrations started in 1925 as a protest against the arrest of Phan Boi Chau. A large demonstration was organized in Saigon in late March 1926 to greet the leader of the Constitutionalist Party (representing the Saigon bourgeoisie) on his return from France where he had gone to intercede for more indigenous participation in Indochinese affairs. Although the influence of the bourgeois leaders was shortly thereafter eclipsed by colonial repression and the radicalization of the Vietnamese revolutionary movement, a DRV historian who witnessed the events of this period concluded that "this great demonstration still retains its own character, and its meaning was to underline the firm resolution of the people in the struggle for

Tran Huy Lieu asserts that there were 600,000 people mobilized in this demonstration, which would make it the largest organized political activity of the period. Tai lieu tham khao lich su cach mang can dai Viet-Nam (Research Materials for the History of the Modern Revolution in Vietnam) (Hanoi: Van Su Dia, 1955-1958), Vol. IV, p. 98.

freedom and independence."32

At this critical juncture, Phan Chu Trinh died, and the demonstrations and funeral observances in his honor spread far beyond the confines of Saigon. This catalytic event marks one of the major turning points in modern Vietnamese history. Many of the students who were awakened and introduced into politics in these demonstrations were expelled from school, and subsequently became intensely involved in revolutionary activities. Most of the LDP Politburo came from this group. Tran Huy Lieu describes the development of this movement in the following terms:

The funeral observances of Phan were viewed as a national mourning. The mourners not only manifested their sympathy for this distinguished scholar (chi si) but also demonstrated their own convictions. Thus the funeral observances were transformed into a mass movement. Particularly among the students. The French ruling gang forbade the students to mourn the venerable old man. As a result the student strike movement boiled up (noi day) from South to North and became a struggle movement of the students opposing the oppression of the colonialists. 33

The spontaneous upsurge of nationalist emotion occasioned by the arrest of Chau and the death of Trinh stood in marked contrast to the indifference with which Vietnamese received the news of the death of Emperor Khai Dinh in 1925. The French seizure of the small residue of authority enjoyed by the Court shortly after his death failed to

<sup>32&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

<sup>33&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid.</sub>, p. 100.

stir any deep emotion. The fierce attacks directed at Khai Dinh and the monarchy several years before had been redirected toward other targets. The Court by this time had become irrelevant to Vietnamese nationalists.

Vietnam's nationalist student movement introduced a new political vocabulary which reflected the transformation of nationalist concepts. At the outset of the student movement, political terms like "down with," "colonialists," "imperialists" were not yet in common use. The word in general currency indicating political opposition to the French was the traditional "cach mang" or "changing of the mandate" which soon came to have a distinctive modern connotation of "revolution." At the same time, Ho Chi Minh was developing the new political vocabulary in the Thanh Nien newspaper of his Revolutionary Youth League in Canton. 36

Shortly after the death of Phan Chu Trinh, the French Resident Superieur in Hue tried to revive the prestige of the Court by ordering the celebration of a "National Day" commemorating the assumption of power of the Nguyen dynasty. Like the attempt to "play the Bao Dai card" over twenty years later, this attempt at manipulation of political symbols failed because as a captive of the French, the monarchy had been drained of political appeal. Cf. the account of "National Day" by Nguyen Vy, Tuan, chang trai nuoc Viet (Tuan, Son of Vietnam) (Saigon: Published by Author, 1969), pp. 443-450.

An indispensible account of this period is a slightly fictionalized memoir by a prominent non-Communist intellectual figure from Central Vietnam, Nguyen Vy, <u>ibid</u>., which contains a wealth of information on student social and political attitudes of the period. The discussion of political vocabulary is on p. 401.

A good account of the history of the Revolutionary Youth League can be found in Huynh Kim Khanh, <u>Vietnamese Communism</u>: <u>The Pre-Power Phase (1925-1945)</u> (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1972), pp. 69-83. This is one of the few available analytic accounts of this important journal by a scholar who has read the entire run of 208 issues.

One of the first programmatic statements of modern revolutionary ideas available inside Vietnam was Ho's <u>The Revolutionary Road</u> (Duong Kach Menh) written in 1926. <sup>37</sup> A DRV account of the period notes that "for the large number of revolutionaries at the time the Party was being established, the means to go abroad were not available. When the movement had expanded <u>The Revolutionary Road</u> was a very widely used primer. At that time, <u>The Revolutionary Road</u> along with the newspaper <u>Thanh Nien</u> were sent back into the country, and people hand-copied them so they could read them to others." <sup>38</sup>

Unlike the situation in China where newspapers, polemics and overt propaganda disseminated the various political currents of the time, the newspapers in Vietnam were heavily censored and explicit political commentary muted. This was particularly true in North Vietnam, generally the case in Central Vietnam, while in South Vietnam views of leading Vietnamese nationalists like Nguyen An Ninh were disseminated to a minority of urban intellectuals through the medium of French language newspapers. 39 Because of the restrictions on public political debate,

Thanh observes that this document was built upon a solid base of traditional anti-colonial patriotic propaganda, but also went beyond earlier appeals in presenting itself as a "guide to revolutionary actions, a handbook for the Vietnamese anticolonial revolutionary." While it was not a fully mature Marxist work, it was the first modern analysis of political conditions in Vietnam, as well as why and how to make a revolution. <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 61, 62.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup>Thep Moi, "3-2: Duong Kach Menh," <u>Nhan Dan</u>, January 21, 1975. This is part of a lengthy series of articles on the period leading up to and including the founding of the Indochinese Communist Party in February 3, 1930. Much of this is based on Tran Dan Tien's standard biography of Ho, but there is also significant new material.

Nguyen An Ninh was a prominent nationalist of the period.

covert channels of communication became the major means of political discussion and organization. <sup>40</sup> This necessarily directed the spread of revolutionary ideas through existing social networks.

As might be expected, these networks were primarily those in areas with a strong tradition of scholar-official patriotic activities, particularly in North and Central Vietnam. These networks were linked up in a variety of ways, primarily by the students concentrated at regional and metropolitan centers, but in contact with friends at home and in other areas. Illustrative of the workings of these inter-linked social networks was the 1927 student "Western Clothes" movement that grew out of the 1925-26 agitation. Galled by French slurs on Vietnamese as a "dirty race" (sale race) and the common French view of educated Vietnamese in traditional costume as rustics, the Vietnamese students responded in a psychologically revealing manner. Overnight a student movement of wearing Western style (but home-made) clothes swept the country. It was intended as a provocative act of defiance and an assertion that the new generation of educated youth was willing to challenge the French on their own terms, but in a Vietnamese way. A

<sup>40</sup> A comprehensive study by Huynh Van Tong, <u>Lich su bao chi</u>
<u>Viet-Nam</u> (The History of Newspapers in Vietnam) (Saigon: Tri Dang,
1973), says that, "After the years 1925-26, the political situation
in the country became stirred up, and a number of revolutionary newspapers were secretly circulated in the country. Although distribution
was limited to the revolutionary groups, their influence still was
able to spread out among some schools and among the people, and sowed
the seeds for the revolution that was about to break out." p. 178.

participant in this movement describes its evolution:

The starting point of the movement to wear Western clothes was the students of the Quoc Hoc school in Hue. 41 The movement to use home-made cloth came from the students in Qui Nhon. To be historically accurate, these two movements came out of the influence of the "Western" life-style movement that had first begun to develop strongly in Saigon, from the time Phan Chu Trinh returned from France, and in North Vietnam from the time Phan Boi Chau was arrested in Shanghai and sent back to Hanoi. [This was done] by word of mouth, because almost all the countrywide movements of that time were started by word of mouth, certainly not by the transmissions of "Annamese" newspapers. 42

The description of the spread of a quasi-political movement illustrates the workings of the social networks that were also used for revolutionary activities and organization.

A frequently presented image of the formation of Vietnam's

Communist movement is that of a disparate group of political agitators

returning from abroad and roaming the country to organize their foreign

inspired movement into constitutent "cells" of a modern revolutionary

party machine. A related aspect of early revolutionary organization

is the factional disputes and strong regional orientation of the

various factions that later were unified under the aegis of the Indo-

<sup>41</sup> One of the most famous secondary schools of the period, attended by youths running the gamut from Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap to Ngo Dinh Diem.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup>Nguyen Vy, <u>Tuan</u>, <u>chang trai nuoc Viet</u>, p. 498. Vy claims that throughout the pre-war revolutionary period, newspapers played a passive role and that "at no time during the surging upheavals of 1925-27 did 'Annamese' newspapers play a vanguard or active role in leading the people." <u>Ibid</u>. It should be noted that during the 1930's, especially during the Popular Front period of legal political activity, newspapers played an important role in political agitation.

chinese Communist Party. Both these images are accurate, but incomplete descriptions of the origins of the revolutionary movement. An organizer in the Thanh Nien and early ICP member, recalled that the Vietnamese were criticized by the Comintern in late 1929 for excessive sectarianism resulting from the use of social networks for recruitment.

Up to that time, most of our work consisted in finding people with anti-French views and an established patriotic zeal, and clandestinely asking them to join the group to become revolutionaries. Our task of investigation and propaganda at that time only consisted of finding good people and recommending them for study abroad, so that they would then return and find other people among their friends, relatives and acquaintances to recommend for study abroad, and so on. Working in this chain of contacts manner, we had to be extremely concerned with preserving secrecy. Except for other comrades, and people with the potential to become our comrades, we didn't let anyone know we were involved in revolutionary activities and had a revolutionary organization.<sup>43</sup>

Not only was the development of a revolutionary organization limited by the need for secrecy, but the class composition of the revolutionary movement was influenced by this reliance on existing social networks, which naturally tended to be homogeneous in terms of class backgrounds. The revolutionary movement was fragmented precisely because it arose first among widely scattered social networks, generally of youths from scholar-official backgrounds in the most traditional areas of Vietnam, particularly in the Central and Northern regions. The revolutionary

Anghia, "To chuc va phat dong phong trao dau tranh o Nam Ky sau khi Dang ta vua moi thong nhat ra doi" (Organizing and Mobilizing the Struggle Movement in South Vietnam After Our Unified Party Had Come Into Existence) Nghien Cuu Lich Su, No. 67, October 1964, p. 59.

impulse was not transmitted from external sources, but arose out of the social context of the scholar-official patriotic tradition among the youths who participated in the student agitation of the 1920's.

## Unification of the Revolutionary Movements

The initial development of the Indochinese Communist Party was largely the result of the linking up of these regional clusters of patriotic youths, and their subsequent intellectual transformation, which gradually led them to embrace Marxism and the Third International. That they should embrace Marxism as the most convincing explanation of their colonial predicament, and remedy for it, is hardly surprising. 44 All three major revolutionary movements, the Youth League of Ho, the Tan Viet in Central Vietnam, and the Viet-Nam Quoc Dan Dang (VNQDD), were initially quite similar in orientation. One scholar states that, "the three post-1925 political parties originated from the very same cultural and social-economic roots as the earlier literati-led movements" and that they "represented a continuity of the same Vietnamese anti-colonialist tradition, which went back at least to the initial resistance against the French aggression."

There were, of course, important differences between the parties.

Huynh Kim Khanh's study effectively documents the point that all major revolutionary groups, including the VNQDD, advocated a two-stage revolution, and acknowledged the duty to support the international revolution of "oppressed people of the world." Vietnamese Communism, p. 32.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

The VNQDD (centered in Hanoi) had a distinct social composition, consisting of civil servants, small businessmen, landlords and local officials, and soldiers, in addition to the students and teachers who were the main force of the Tan Viet and Vietnam Youth League groups. 46 The Tan Viet group, based in Vinh and upper Central Vietnam, was an amalgam of the old and new, including former literati political prisoners as well as revolutionary students from the area. The Youth League was also a combination of old and new, formed from the remnants of Phan Boi Chau's clandestine overseas group by Ho Chi Minh.

Most of the revolutionary youths who ultimately emerged as the leadership of the Indochinese Communist Party came from a similar social background and from a few major regional areas. One group came from Nam Dinh in the North, including Truong Chinh, Le Duc Tho, Tran Huy Lieu, and some second level leaders such as Dang Viet Chau. A second group came from the Phan Boi Chau's Nghe Tinh (Nghe An and Ha Tinh provinces) area in North Central Vietnam which produced the strongest peasant uprisings in 1930-31. They were Ho himself, Tran Phu (the first Secretary General of the Party) as well as a host of other important ICP leaders. Yet another group came from the area of mid-Central Vietnam from Quang Ngai to Quang Binh. These included

<sup>46</sup> Gouvernement General de l'Indochine, Direction des Affaires Politiques et de la Surcte Generale, Contribution a l'histoire des mouvements politiques de l'Indochine Française, Documents, Vol. No. IV, "Le 'Dong-Duong Cong-San Dang' ou 'Parti Communiste Indochinois' (1925-1933)".

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup>Cf. biographical data in appendix.

Pham Van Dong, Le Duan, and Vo Nguyen Giap, among others. Saigon and various province towns in the Mekong Delta were also centers of revolutionary activities, but did not provide the same context for the traditional social network in which the youths of the Center and the North participated. Most of these regional social networks were centered around a major school, as might be expected in a predominantly student oriented movement. 48

The social backgrounds of the young ICP leaders, their deep roots in the scholar-official tradition, the relatively uniform age and experience of this political generation and their relationship with the leader of Vietnam's revolutionary movement, are distinct features of the Vietnamese case. Moreover there was no significant organized competition to the revolutionary groups because the colonial regime had rendered most nationalist activities illegal, thus strengthening the political influence of clandestine revolutionaries. Colonial repression combined with a lack of clear political direction basically eliminated the VNQDD, the only nationalist group that offered any serious alternative to the Marxist organizations, after the Yen Bai uprising of 1930. Finally, because of Vietnam's relative insignificance on the

A8 Nguyen Vy comments that the College du Protectorat (Truong Buoi) served Hanoi, while Nam Dinh and Hai Phong had their own middle schools. Nghe Tinh had the College de Vinh which Vy calls a "nest of revolution" following the tradition of Phan Boi Chau and Nguyen Ai Quoc - "who no one then knew was a Communist." The Quoc Hoc served the Hue area, and Central Vietnam from Thanh Hoa to Quang Ngai, while the smaller College de Qui Nhon had most of its students from Quang Nam, Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh. Vy says that at the time there was a phrase in popular circulation, "Nam Nghia Nghe Tinh" (Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Nghe An, Ha Tinh) which were reputed to be the foremost revolutionary provinces. Tuan, chang trai nuoc Viet, pp. 473-474.

50

world revolutionary stage, the Vietnamese movement was not hampered by misinformed Comintern interference. Ho himself represented the Comintern and was able to direct the Vietnamese revolution as he saw fit, with the major exception of the 1930's.

In China, the first decade of revolutionary agitation took a quite different course. Comintern political guidance, directed by outsiders who responded more to the ill-informed advice from Moscow than the local realities, played a major role in shaping the original direction of the revolutionary movement and, in the early 1930's, the Comintern representative attempted to install a Soviet sponsored leadership. Related to the Comintern manipulations was the problem of the appropriate united front strategy which preoccupied the CCP throughout the pre-Liberation period. The root of the united front problem was that the CCP was not the dominant indigenous political force until the 1940's, and at crucial points had to contend with the KMT for national political leadership and to cooperate with it to achieve common goals. Two examples of this collaboration were the Northern Expedition of 1926 and the post-1935 anti-Japanese united front. Yet the united front initially created obstacles to the expansion of the CCP ranks and caused conflict within the Party as well.

Throughout the Chinese revolution, the problem of the united front forced CCP leaders to confront the question of how much

There were, of course, occasional Comintern critiques of Ho but none that seriously undermined his leadership. Ho's relations with the Comintern will be discussed in the following section.

aspect of the revolution, defeating the foreign supported warlords and unifying China, and how much stress should be placed on the social (anti-feudal) revolution. The CCP was restricted in expanding its influence among the peasants by the Comintern desire to avoid alienating the KMT. The CCP dilemma was particularly acute at the time of the Northern Expedition against the warlords in 1926-27, and led to some dissension within the CCP.

The problem was phrased aptly in early 1927 in terms of whether priority should be given to extending or deepening the revolution. Communists oriented toward the national revolution tended to go along with Chiang's plans in 1926 to press military unification and the consequent enlargement of the scope of the revolution. Those oriented toward the social revolution, on the other hand, feared dissipation of the revolution if it expanded too much before it had completed its tasks in the base area, and they feared the compromises the search for military "allies" would require. 50

The Comintern, reflecting Stalin's preoccupation with the national interests of the Soviet Union and his struggle with Trotsky consistently urged the CCP to subordinate the social revolution and its own political interests to maintain the national alliance with the KMT and to accept its program. As a result, the CCP was severely crippled by Chiang Kai-shek's 1927 betrayal in Shanghai. This episode undoubtedly had a deep and lasting effect on the CCP view of Soviet advice and sponsorship, as well as on the question of sacri-

James Pinckney Harrison, <u>The Long March to Power: A History of the Chinese Communist Party</u>, 1921-72 (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 81.

52

ficing its own program and power base to preserve a dubious alliance with its political rival.

A related problem was the wide range of regional disparities in the early development of the CCP. The strong revolutionary movement in Kwangtung and Kwangsi in the early 1920's favored not only CCP development but that of the KMT as well. CCP organizations in Kwangtung were crushed during the suppression of the Canton Commune uprising of late 1927, along with the strong semi-autonomous peasant movement of P'eng P'ai in the nearby districts of Hailufeng. The Anyuan workers' movement which provided the foundation of Mao's Kiangsi base areas after the 1927 KMT repression was itself crushed by successive "encirclement" campaigns in the early 1930's. The Shanghai movement with its proletarian support was crippled by the massacres of 1927, while the Peking movement under the watchful eyes of the warlords had no autonomous force of its own. Scattered movements elsewhere, such as the indigenous revolutionary leadership in Yenan, only later became significant factors on the CCP road to power.

But the CCP leadership was divided both geographically because of the vast distances between revolutionary bases, and by the variety of political lessons that emerged from these divergent experiences. Studies of the "ecology" of the development of the CCP have found the situations in which the Communist movement flourished and the explanations for their success so diverse that no single theory can provide a comprehensive explanation of it. Similarly, the social and

<sup>51</sup>For example, Roy Hofheinz, Jr., "The Ecology of Chinese Communist Success: Rural Influence Patterns 1923-45," in A. Doak Barnett, ed., Chinese Communist Politics in Action (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969).

53

regional backgrounds of the CCP leaders, while falling into several broad categories, appear to be far more diverse than in Vietnam. 52 In many ways, the Chinese revolution is as complex and diverse as the society from which it grew.

The main internal conflicts and policy debates that marked the history of the Chinese Communist Party were not exclusively the product of this diversity. Periodic struggles within the Party were partly due to the nature of the revolution itself. Because China's revolution was essentially a social revolution in which the CCP contested with the KMT for the authority to put its social program into action, the revolution had an inward focus from its inception. And, as suggested above, Sun Yat-sen had set an earlier precedent for putting the "anti-feudal" mission above the "anti-imperialist" mission by his decision to attack the Manchu regime rather than support a selfstrengthening reformist program. Similarly, Comintern efforts to keep the revolution focused primarily on the target of imperialism nearly destroyed the CCP, and the leaders who survived kept this lesson in mind. And, finally, even if the CCP leaders had wanted to pursue single-mindedly anti-imperialist united front policies, the constant threat of extermination by the KMT made it impossible for them to ignore the task of building a social base that would ensure their survival.

 $<sup>^{52}</sup>$  The social composition of the Chinese and Vietnamese post-Liberation Central Committees will be discussed in a following section.

For the incipient Vietnamese Communist Party, the problem was different, for the reasons mentioned above; prominence of the anticolonial goal of expelling the French as the prime task of all revolutionary groups, absence of an effective nationalist opposition, the widely accepted leadership authority of Ho Chi Minh, the benign neglect of the Comintern, and the uniformity of background and experience of the emerging revolutionary leadership. Also important was the fact that the revolutionary movement was mainly outer-directed, toward the expulsion of the French. The goal of social revolution was important, but it was largely a means to the larger end of gaining Vietnamese independence, and healing the psycho-cultural wound of "mat nuoc." The majority of the early Vietnamese revolutionaries came from the "poor but honest" 54 non-collaborating scholar-official

David Marr, discussing the Royalist movement, writes that, "the primary intellectual theme of this new anticolonial generation may be succinctly expressed in one Vietnamese compound: mat-nuoc. Superficially it means to lose one's country. But there are at least three levels of significance, ranging from the simple loss of sovereignty, to the much more serious loss of one's ethnic identity or 'soul' (which, however, may be 'regained'), to the ultimate and most tragic deprivation - the physical extermination or absorption of an ethnic group." Vietnamese Anticolonialism, p. 96.

<sup>54&</sup>quot;Nha Nho thanh bach," the "pure and clean" or "poor-but-honest" Confucianist scholars was a term used to describe the non-collaborating members of the scholar-official class. They were, in social science terms, "downwardly mobile," but this was by their own choice. The reason they were poor is because they had refused to accept the type of employment from the French that their status and achievements would have entitled them to in the pre-colonial era. See Christine White, "McAlister's Vietnam," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, April-July 1970, pp. 96, 97.

class. This social and family milieu indelibly shaped their views both during and after the revolution. They saw revolution not as a rejection of the past but an affirmation of their national heritage. Yet they were modern in outlook, and subscribed to the ideals of equality and mass welfare, while still being conscious of having received a "transmitted tradition" (truyen thong) from earlier generations and previous epochs, and of their responsibility as custodians of this tradition for future generations. 55

The rising generation of Chinese revolutionaries saw the past as a debilitating burden, a legacy that had sapped the vitality of China and left it helpless in the modern world, and a political weapon used by their KMT opponents to combat the spread of revolutionary ideas. For the Vietnamese, the "transmitted tradition" had a particularly powerful appeal for both the remnants of the non-collaborationist elite and the peasants whose standard of living was declining under colonial rule. The problem was not the burden of the past, but of the betrayal of the country's old tradition of Vietnamese independence, a tradition that was all the more significant to a country that had been repeatedly invaded and colonized throughout its history.

The Chinese case, Li Ta-chao expressed a similar concern about the future of China, and voiced the fear that "our country will be destroyed and our people will not produce another generation." Meisner, Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism, p. 10. But the chief threat to China's survival was seen as being internal - in Meisner's words, "the spectacle of the cynicism and corruption that characterized Chinese political life under the Yuan (Shih-k'ai) regime..." Ibid.

As the second stage of both revolutions unfolded in the 1930's, the distinctive problems of each revolution became even clearer. The Japanese threat and the re-emergence of the problem of the united front once again posed the question to the CCP of reconciling the anti-feudal and anti-imperialist struggles. French repression, succeeded by a brief Popular Front interlude of legal political activities, followed by renewed repression as World War II approached, also decisively influenced the Vietnamese Communists' view of the role of social revolution in nationalist struggle. And, as the following section will attempt to demonstrate, the Chinese and Vietnamese parties arrived at a different resolution of this problem based on the dissimilar challenges they faced.

#### SECTION II

### REVOLUTION AND REPRESSION

For China and Vietnam, the 1930's were difficult years. But many of the factors contributing to the difficulties subsequently aided the victory of the revolutionary movements in both countries. Even in adversity, however, the two revolutions took somewhat different paths. In China, the CCP entered the decade with its proletarian base seriously weakened, its urban strength neutralized, and involved in a series of leadership crises and policy disputes. The leadership struggles of the 1930's injected a divisive element into the CCP and the consequences were felt for years afterward. The policies pursued by Mao, who rose to power during the period, left a deep imprint on leadership doctrine and became important after the first post-Liberation decade. In Vietnam, the revolutionary movement was crushed after the repression of the peasant uprisings of 1930. During this decade, Ho Chi Minh remained outside Vietnam and did not exercise direct control of the revolutionary movement there and, as a result, was not tarnished by its failures in this period. A succession of Party Secretary Generals were arrested and killed by the French during the 1930's, and the movement did not enjoy great success until the period of the Japanese occupation. In contrast to the bitter struggle which led to Mao's ascendancy in the CCP, Ho Chi Minh was from the start the dominant figure in the Vietnamese revolutionary movement. His absence from Vietnam during this difficult period,

and the neutralization through death or arrest of most of the top incountry leadership by the end of the decade, made the circumstances of
his return to Vietnam to assume direct control of the movement especially
propitious.

Scholarly controversy over the role played by Japan in creating the conditions for the revolutionary success of Asian nationalist and communist movements has focused on an issue which is central to the comparative analysis of the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions. The basic point in dispute is the extent to which social mobilization strengthened the revolutionary forces and propelled them to victory. An alternative explanation of the success of the revolutionaries is that the brutality of the Japanese occupation awakened the forces of peasant nationalism. the communists were the only effective military force opposing the Japanese, it is argued, this vast reservoir of support shifted to their cause by default. A variant of this argument has been advanced to explain the success of the Vietnamese communists, stressing the hostility of the peasants toward the exploitative Japanese military occupiers, and the favorable circumstances which the Viet Minh found themselves in at the end of World War II as the only major political force in Indochina that had actively supported the Allied cause.

# <u>Nationalism and Social Mobilization: The Anti-Imperialist and Anti-Feudal</u> Tasks

The issue of the relative importance of social mobilization and peasant nationalism is of direct relevance to a major theme of this study, the connection between the "anti-feudal" and "anti-imperialist"

tasks of the Vietnamese and Chinese revolutions. The previous section has attempted to demonstrate that the greater diversity of people and situations in the early Chinese revolution and its inward focus on the basic ills of Chinese society resulted in a wide variety of outlooks and inclinations within the CCP of the period. These were reflected in major shifts in policy and leadership, and the primary commitment to the social revolution. In Vietnam, the predominant focus on the external target of French colonial rule and the social and generational uniformity of the early Communists resulted in more continuity in revolutionary strategy, and greater cohesiveness among the leadership. "Peasant nationalism" is therefore not an appropriate designation of the traditional anti-foreign nationalist sentiment that was shared by the Vietnamese youths from non-collaborateur scholar-official backgrounds, as well as the peasantry who ultimately became the main force of the revolution. It was not the Japanese depradations that awakened their nationalism (though they decisively aided it in the critical period of the 1945 August Revolution). This nationalism was the legacy of a country which had a long history of opposing foreign domination. The trauma of the "loss of country" (mat nuoc) prepared the ground for violent nationalist opposition to the French, and it was under the leadership of the successors to the scholar-official led Can Vuong resistance movement that this was most effectively carried out.

In China, the Japanese occupation came earlier and had an even more disruptive effect than the cataclysmic but relatively brief occupation of Indochina. Yet the major successes of the Chinese

Communist Party in the 1930's were in the areas least afflicted by the Japanese presence. During the early 1930's there were seven important base areas, most of which were located in Central China, far removed from areas of Japanese encroachment in the coastal areas of China. Although the CCP declared war on Japan in 1932, the question of opposing Japan did not become a major issue for several years, while in the base areas, prior to the Long March of 1934-35, mass mobilization and social reform was seen as the key to the survival and expansion of the revolutionary movement. As one study of the period observes:

The Kiangsi Soviet period is particularly important in the history of the Chinese Communist movement, because it was there that the Chinese Communist leaders acquired for the first time in their struggle for power, control over a definite geographical area and population consisting of approximately three hundred <a href="https://doi.org/10.1001/journal.org/10.1001

For the first time, the CCP had to grapple with complex problems of large scale peasant mobilization, land reform, and administering a large area.

These problems contained an inherent potential for conflict and division. They were, in essence, manifestations of the class struggle and social revolution which played the dominant role in CCP policies. Until Mao defeated his political rivals and emerged as the dominant

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Ilpyong J. Kim, "Mass Mobilization Policies and Techniques Developed in the Period of the Chinese Soviet Republic," in A. Doak Barnett, Chinese Communist Politics in Action, p. 79.

CCP leader in 1935, the revolutionary movement was torn by bitter factional struggle. While Mao was at the center of the intra-party conflict, his policy positions were not always based on political views that in later years came to characterize a "Maoist" approach. Indeed, throughout his early career, Mao frequently found himself to the right of many of his political opponents, as in the 1923-26 period when he advocated greater cooperation with the KMT. In the early 1930's Mao was again on the "right" on the question of land reform and the peasantry.

Land reform played a key role in the mass mobilization efforts of the Kiangsi Soviet period. The extent to which a policy of trying to gain the deepest base of political support should take precedence over the united front policy of striving to gain the broadest base of political support was symbolized by Party policy toward the rich peasants. Mao, who had taken a strong stand against rich peasants in the Chingkangshan base area prior to moving to Juichin, the subsequent capital of the Kiangsi Soviet, took a "soft" position on the rich peasants, compared to the more extreme confiscation measures proposed by the "twenty-eight Bolsheviks" newly returned from training in Moscow. <sup>2</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Some scholars have argued that the anti-rich peasant policy was "closely associated with the consolidation by the twenty-eight Bolsheviks as the most powerful leadership of the CCP." <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 92. Kim concludes that the anti-rich peasant policy was not primarily motivated either by economic considerations or by factional struggles, but that "available evidence suggests that, in a basic sense, the anti-rich peasant policy was a logical development and extension of the policy of mass mobilization." Ibid.

While it is difficult to make explicit connections between the factional disputes that characterized the CCP in the early 1930's and the policies pursued by the Party during that period, it seems likely that issues of power and policy were difficult for the CCP leaders of the time to disentangle. It is, nevertheless, clear that the politics of social revolution played the decisive role in consolidating communist power in the Kiangsi period, and until the military incursions of the KMT suppression campaigns, the CCP enjoyed considerable success in developing the revolutionary movement in the base areas. 4

Although Mao subsequently asserted that the returned student leadership had opposed the idea of a broader united front with "intermediate

Kim is probably correct in asserting that there was a broader area of agreement between Mao and the "twenty-eight Bolsheviks" than is apparent from polemical historical accounts after Mao's rise to the leading position in the CCP and that policies were advanced with a view toward expanding the CCP movement in the most effective manner. There is little reason to doubt, however, that factional clashes between the "internationalist" urban oriented returned student group and the rural based Maoist group shaped the polemics on issues such as land reform and united front tactics, and were issues in Mao's struggle against the returned students.

A detailed survey of the development of the CCP observes that "the Chinese Communists, especially after 1929, achieved more and more success in mass mobilization and the recruitment of local activists into youth, Party, and military organizations. This proved to be their most significant achievement and the key to all other work. Alone it was not enough, primarily because of military imbalances, but after the abandonment of the southern Soviet areas, when the invasion of Japan deflected Nationalist pressure, these same techniques provided the new life blood that carried the Communists to victory in the late 1940's. Already from mid-1930 on, the CCP claimed to have organized several million peasants, 1.6 million in youth organizations, and 800,000 in mutual aid organizations." James Pinckney Harrison, The Long March, p. 206.

elements" the evidence suggests that he preferred a "deeper" to a "broader" base of support, and this was implicit in the mass mobilization policies he favored. "The land classification campaign should be able to light the flames of class struggle among the two million peasants in the area," he said in 1933, "and eliminate completely the remainder of the feudal elements." He added that the poor peasants and farm laborers should be "the foundation and vanguard for the land classification campaign."

The problems of China's revolutionary movement were the result of success, however modest it may have seemed at the time. The CCP was governing an area of nearly 30 million people. In Vietnam, the surveillance and repression of the colonial government in the 1920's and early 1930's restricted the growth of the revolutionary movement. At the time of the 1930 Unification Conference there was a total of 211 Vietnamese Communists, 54 of whom were outside the country. The first

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Cited in Kim, <u>Chinese Communist Politics</u>, p 95.

<sup>6&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid.</sub>, p. 96.

<sup>7</sup>Thirty Years of Struggle of the Party (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960), Vol. I, p. 24. This book is a compilation of contributions of different individual authors. A later text, Ba muoi lam nam dau tranh cua Dang (Thirty-Five Years of Party Struggle) (Hanoi: Su That, Vol. I in 1965, and Vol. II in 1971), is considered more authoritative because it was done by a collective research group of specialists on Party history under the direct guidance of the LDP Central Committee. Cf. Hoang Trung Thuc, "May dieu thu hoach sau khi nghien cuu tap I 'Ba muoi lam nam dau tranh cua Dang'" (Some Points Gathered After Researching Volume I of 'Thirty-Five Years of Party Struggle'), Hoc Tap, No. 91, October 1966, p. 50. The figures on early ICP membership (which are probably based on French Surete reports) are eliminated from the later compilation pending further investigation.

major revolutionary mass movement, the 1930 peasant uprising in the two provinces of Ha Tinh and Nghe An, caught the fledgling ICP doctrinally and organizationally unprepared.

Many questions remain concerning the causes of this unsuccessful but important uprising. Most accounts agree that in spite of the fact that it occurred in the traditional revolutionary stronghold of Nghe Tinh, which produced a high proportion of the ICP leaders, it was a largely spontaneous peasant movement, which the ICP joined after it was underway. The complex social and economic aspects of this movement are as yet too little understood to allow a confident summary of its origins. In the context of the development of the ICP, however, three important facts stand out. The first is that the ICP did not have a clearly formulated policy on land reform until the movement was already in progress. Second, the "anti-feudal" aspects of the ICP land program were considerably more muted than in the case of the CCP program and, third, the main object of the peasant demonstrators was not a radical redistribution of the land, but a fair distribution of the communal lands in line with the traditional ideal of equal access for all registered villagers.

A DRV study of the land question in the Nghe-Tinh Soviet period (1930-31) notes that prior to the founding of the ICP there had been no attention paid to the land question by revolutionaries operating in the area. 8 No analysis was made of the land problem and no mention

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>Vu Huy Phuc, "Van de ruong dat trong phong trao Xo-viet Nghe-Tinh," (The Land Question in the Nghe-Tinh Soviet Movement), Nghien Cuu Lich Su, No. 108, March 1968, p. 9.

made of confiscating land at the founding meeting of the ICP, and it was not until the First Plenum of October 1930, when the Nghe-Tinh movement was already underway, that an attempt was made to formulate a policy on land. By the time the Party leaders finally broached the subject, they had already been overtaken by events. The peasants, acting largely on their own, aimed their wrath at the local notables who had undermined the traditional system of distributing communal lands. It was not so much a radical upsurge among the peasantry demanding a sweeping restructuring of economic power as an indignant protest directed at the representatives of a system which had destroyed the traditional mechanisms of social equity.

Peasant wrath in the Nghe-Tinh movement was aroused by the colonialists and the supine "Southern Court" at Hue (which had theoretical administrative control in Central Vietnam). The immediate target of peasant agitation was the local notables who were viewed as "the visible representatives (dai dien cu the) of both the imperialists and the feudalists." The watchword that guided the struggle movement was the restoration of communal land rights, a demand which was primarily

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>It was recognized at the First Plenum that the ICP needed to go beyond the earlier selection of only the "great landlords" as targets of a land revolution, but "by this time the revolutionary movement in Nghe-Tinh was turbulently expanding and had reached its peak, which was the establishment of the Soviets. Thus, it could be said that the idea of confiscating the land of the entire landlord class and distributing it among the poor peasants had not yet been thoroughly grasped by Party members and the masses when the Soviets were established." Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

aimed at the local notables. Thus, concludes this DRV account, "antifeudalism and anti-imperialism were tightly bound together in the land question" and "that was the thing that caused the peasant struggle over land to become completely blended into the struggle against the colonial authorities and the Southern Court, and completely blended in with every national independence movement that had successively emerged from the time the French seized our country."

Peasant goals in the movement were supported as much by traditional ideals as by revolutionary ideology. The demands for redistribution of communal lands which launched the movement were "reformist" in essence. DRV historians assert that they became "revolutionary" only in the context of the expansion of the movement into the realm of political power with the formation of local Soviets. But though the Party called for confiscation of land from the landlords, in addition to redistribution of communal lands, this did not happen on a large scale. Out of the 259 Nghe-Tinh villages on which records are available, only 18 of these confiscated landlord property, while 158 set up Soviets and 153 redistributed communal lands. 13

<sup>11 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>. While the point at which the Party assumed leadership of this movement is not entirely clear, its directives did not substantially differ from the original peasant demands. The Central Vietnam Committee of the ICP issued a directive in October 1930 which advocated "Confiscation of communal lands in the hands of local bullies and landlords, and distribution among the poor peasants, reduction of rents and abolition of debts." Ibid.

<sup>12&</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>., p. 12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 17.

### The Crucible of Revolution

French repression of the Nghe-Tinh Soviets and other outbreaks of opposition to the colonial regime not only crushed the uprisings but shattered the ICP as well. Most of the leading cadres were arrested or killed, not only in North and Central Vietnam but also in the South, which had not been directly affected by peasant agitation. As the Party's official history notes, after the Second Plenum of the ICP in Saigon (March 1931) all the members of the Central Committee were arrested, but the "resolutions of the session, however, reached a number of localities and erroneous viewpoints were corrected." With the Party in shambles and its leadership in jail, this was small consolation.

The interlude between 1931 and 1936 when an amnesty granted during the Popular Front period secured the release of ICP political prisoners had an indelible effect on the Vietnamese Communist leadership. At a time when the CCP was faced with a bewildering variety of military, political, and economic problems, and engaged in polemical and factional activity, the ICP was learning the importance of solidarity and organizational discipline in Vietnam's jails. In many ways this experience

<sup>14</sup> Thirty Years of Struggle of the Party, p. 37. The revised Party history supplements the earlier explanation given for the defeat of the Nghe-Tinh Soviets in Thirty Years, which ascribed it to the fact that the Soviets were set up in only a few areas, enabling the French to concentrate on smashing these isolated pockets of rebellion. Ibid., p. 52. Bon muoi nam hoat dong cua Dang (Forty Years of Party Activities) (Hanoi: Su That, 1972), however, stresses that the uprising was premature and insufficient attention was paid to creating a "broad united front" (which, of course, was not yet Comintern policy). Ibid., p. 53.

was comparable in impact on the post-Liberation leadership of the DRV to the legacy of the Long March on the Chinese leaders. In China, too, some sections of the Party had to learn the discipline of clandestine organization, and the enforced solidarity of prison survival. As later events were to show, the conclusions drawn from this experience were not fully appreciated by Maoists who learned different lessons from Kiangsi and Yenan. Thus, the diversity of the revolutionary experiences of Chinese leaders sowed seeds of divisiveness which bore fruit in the post-Liberation period, most notably in the Cultural Revolution. 15

On the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the founding of the Party, Ho Chi Minh remarked that "thirty-one of the comrades who are now in the Central Committee were given altogether 222 years of imprisonment and deportation by the French imperialists before the [August Revolution] ... Turning what was a bad thing into a good thing, our comrades made up for the years in prison in getting together and studying theory." One prominent early ICP member recalls that Poulo Condore (Con Son) "was the very school to inculcate upon you an indomitable spirit. Through unity and organization, we gradually changed the dark regime of the jail." Unity and organization were to become

As will be noted below, Liu Shao-ch'i and others were attacked during the Cultural Revolution for undesirable leadership practices which were ascribed, in part, to their experience in operating in enemy controlled zones.

<sup>16 &</sup>lt;u>Nhan</u> <u>Dan</u>, January 7, 1960.

<sup>17</sup> Hoang Quoc Viet, "Our people, a Very Heroic People," in A Heroic People: Memoirs from the Revolution (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1965), p. 169. Viet was a leading figure in the pre-August Revolution period. The volume of memoirs cited is replete with stories that illustrate the unifying impact of the jail experience of ICP leaders.

Communist, in response to revolutionary conditions that were similar to those of the Vietnamese, a milieu of suppression and enforced clandestinity. The Cultural Revolution attacks on Liu's book came primarily from segments of the Party that had operated in the more open mass mobilization atmosphere of Kiangsi and Yenan.

From all accounts of the prison experience, the theory that was studied was a quite general grounding in Marxism-Leninism. There is little evidence that polemical arguments took place, except between ICP and VNQDD members. One of the important results of the prison experience of the early 1930's was that the ICP won many new recruits from the ranks of the VNQDD who were incarcerated with them, and began to recognize that they did not have a comparable theoretical or organizational revolutionary program. Yet another consequence of the high rate of imprisonment of ICP leaders was that all of the Party Secretary Generals of the 1930's died in prison. Although depriving

 $<sup>^{18}\</sup>mathrm{A}$  rare exception to this is the case of the ICP prisoners in Ban Me Thuot, mentioned below.

The Party history recounts the 1931-32 struggle in the Hanoi prison against the "erroneous political tendencies" of the VNQDD, which "won the agreement of many prisoners who were not yet communists and a number of left-wing members of the (VNQDD). After these discussions, the differentiation with the (VNQDD) became more clearly evident." Thirty Years of Struggle, p. 42. One of the most prominent VNQDD members who was converted was the Party's chief historian, Tran Huy Lieu.

They were Tran Phu, Le Hong Phong, Ha Huy Tap and Nguyen Van Cu. Le Hong Phong who, like Tap, was trained in Moscow, was the Comintern representative to the ICP and in overall charge of the movement from 1932 to 1939. He briefly took direct charge of the ICP in 1938. Thong Nhat, July 21, 1961.

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the Party of skilled leaders, the demise of the Party figures who led the movement during the greatest period of weakness and errors in policy line also meant that there were no symbols of past failures to complicate the change of policy direction. China's Li Li-san, Wang Ming, and Chang Kuo-t'ao had no counterparts in Vietnam.

Moreover the relationship of the Comintern to the ICP was quite different from its disastrous connection with the CCP. The primary reason was that it had a Vietnamese leader of stature, Ho Chi Minh, as the principal Comintern representative rather than a foreigner. <sup>21</sup> And

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>Because Ho's duties extended to all of Southeast Asia, most of the direct liaison work with the ICP in the 1930's was done by Le Hong Phong. There is even some evidence that Ho may have been briefly out of favor during the tumultuous Stalinist shakeups of the mid-1930's. Ho had been reprimanded by the Comintern in 1931 for the lax security measures contributing to the arrest of many leading cadres of the ICP that year, although Ho was in Hong Kong at the time. Huynh Kim Khanh, Vietnamese Communism, pp. 216-217. Ho arrived in the Soviet Union in late 1933 after a year's imprisonment in Hong Kong and did not leave until 1938. The basic source on Ho's life during this period is Nguyen Khanh Toan, "Gap Bac o Lien Xo (1933-1938)" (Meeting Uncle in the Soviet Union (1933-1938)), in Bac Ho hoi ky (Memoirs About Uncle Ho) (Hanoi: Van Hoc, 1960), pp. 121-128. Le Hong Phong and a separate group of Vietnamese arrived in the Soviet Union in late 1934, which Phong was "responsible for in Party matters." Ibid., p. 124. Toan says that Ho was "responsible for both the old group and this group," but notes that Phong was elected to the Comintern Central Committee when the ICP was officially admitted to that body in 1935, while Ho was not. Ibid. Although most biographies list Ho's subordinate Le Hong Phong as being elected an alternate delegate to the 7th Comintern Congress in July 1935, one account lists him as being elected a full delegate to the Congress, while Ho was merely an alternate. T. Lan, "Vua di duong, vua ke chuyen" (Telling Stories as We Journey), Nhan Dan, July 30, 1961. Phong returned to Vietnam in 1936, but Ho was not allowed to leave until 1938, and occupied with a succession of academic studies that did not seem to lead in any clear direction. As Toan notes, Ho stayed behind while the other Vietnamese returned to Vietnam and, "While the movement in the country and in the world was reaching a high tide like that, how could Uncle calmly sit down with his studies?" Bac Ho hoi ky, p. 127. Ho's relatively low profile during the mid-1930's may have been the consequence of byzantine Comintern politics of the period. Phong was removed from the picture by arrest, and Ho returned at the end of the 1930's to shape the future course of the Vietnamese revolutionary movement.

while there were "returned students" from Moscow taking direct charge of the ICP during the 1930's, Ho himself was the original "returned student," and the Vietnamese movement was not split over the question of Moscow trained and "native" Party members as in China. Also important was the fact that Ho and other ICP leaders were largely left to their own devices, as Vietnam did not play an important role in the Comintern's view of the international scene. As in China, the Comintern tendency was to urge cooperation with the non-Communist groups even before this had become general Comintern policy. 24

Although the period of the 1930's is one of the best documented eras in Party history, its legacy on the post-Liberation DRV was not as decisive as the decades that preceded and followed it. The flamboyant polemics between the Trotskyists and the ICP in Saigon during the mid-1930's have attracted much scholarly attention, but the most visible ICP members in the South played a marginal role in the later

The official Party history notes that during the "low ebb" of the Party in the early 1930's, "the Soviet Communist Party trained many leading cadres for our Party. Comrades Le Hong Phong, Ha Huy Tap and many others were trained in the Soviet Union, and they returned to China and France seeking means to contact the comrades at home to restore the movement." Thirty Years of Struggle, p. 46.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>The Comintern, of course, strongly criticized the Party's failure in 1930-31, and issued detailed advice to the ICP on how to revive the revolutionary movement, notably in a lengthy 1933 letter from "Orgwald" to the ICP. For a discussion of the Comintern role during this period, see Charles B. McLane, <u>Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia</u> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 142-165.

<sup>24&</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>., p. 164.

period. The Party's headquarters was located in or near Saigon throughout most of the period, and of the claudestine branch of the Party in the South only Le Duan, the current Party First Secretary, survived to rise to prominence. Most of the current leadership of the Lao Dong Party were in jail until the Popular Front amnesty of 1936. In terms of the Party's own development, the jail experience was the outstanding feature of the 1930's. The subsequent actions of the released ICP members during the Popular Front (1936-39) were likewise important, but primarily for the contacts and image established by the ICP among intellectuals during this period of relatively open political activity in the cities.

For Vietnam, the jail experience coalesced and tempered the future DRV leadership, and left a lasting appreciation of the lessons of survival, solidarity and organizational discipline. In the case of the CCP, the Long March shaped the vision that was to guide the CCP in later years, and provided the central unifying experience for the Party until the Cultural Revolution. The key lesson of the Long March was significantly different from the Vietnamese experience. It was that success can only be achieved by following the programs and policies of Mao Tse-tung, which had proved to be a correct remedy for the shortcomings of the Moscow inspired leadership.

Jail in the 1930's and the student movement of the previous decade had been the formative experience for the early ICP members who became leaders of the DRV. In China, there was a greater diversity of age and revolutionary experiences. The Long March was the main unifying event that placed its stamp on the future leaders of China. A "very

high" Party official told Edgar Snow in 1960, "There were 50,000 of us at the start of Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolution in 1927. After the killings there were only 10,000 left. Today there are about 800 of us - survivors of all the years in between. By and large the country is being run and for some years will still be run by those 800."<sup>25</sup>

The Long March was China's great national epic, and symbol of the CCP's revolutionary determination. But while the post-Liberation leadership came largely from "the 800" who survived this ordeal, it is open to question whether it fused them into a political generation as cohesive and homogeneous as that of the Vietnamese revolutionary leaders. There was, as noted earlier, a significant age spread between the various members of "the 800." And the march itself was symbolic of the internecine strife with the KMT as well as the bitter intra-Party struggle in which Mao emerged as the leader of the Chinese revolutionary movement.

Edgar Snow, based on his rich and intimate knowledge of the CCP leaders, observed that, "It was Mao's ability to analyze the experience common to his generation - rather than the uniqueness of his own experience - plus his messianic belief in the correctness of his own generalization of that experience, which distinguished him from compatriots who became followers." Mao was obliged to prove his leadership capacities through political struggle with competing leadership factions.

<sup>25</sup> Edgar Snow, Red China Today: The Other Side of the River (New York: Pelican, 1970), p. 326.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 165.

He was emphatically part of a generation in that he did not in the 1930's command a decisive edge over his rivals and colleagues either by seniority or revolutionary experience. In another sense Mao's struggle shows how complex the composition of his political generation was, because though in a general sense he had "experience common to his generation," the wide range of conclusions drawn by individuals based on different personal observations and circumstances obliged Mao to assert his "messianic belief in the correctness of his own generalization of that experience" in a skillful exercise of raw political power.

As the CCP leadership took refuge in Yenan and prepared for further clashes with the blockading KMT forces, the Popular Front provided the conditions in Vietnam for legal and overt political activity by ICP leaders. Because this activity was confined to the major cities, its contribution to the ultimate victory of a peasant based revolution was modest. It did, however, have a significant consequence for the DRV in the post-Liberation period. Leaders like Pham Van Dong, Truong Chinh, and Vo Nguyen Giap played a major role in winning the confidence of the educated urban middle class and the intellectuals. Largely as a result of their influence a group of intellectuals associated with Hoang Minh Giam 27 began to support the ICP and subsequently became one of the two major non-Communist political parties in the Viet Minh Front under the name of the Socialist Party. During the Japanese occupation a second

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>A leading intellectual figure of the 1930's, the principal of the Thang Long School where Vo Nguyen Giap taught, and later DRV Minister of Culture.

group of Hanoi intellectuals formed the Democratic Party, and became a mainstay of the urban support for ICP programs. Both parties supplied able administrators for the DRV bureaucratic machinery. In Hue, intellectual support for the ICP was mobilized by such prominent figures as Phan Thanh and Huvnh Thuc Khang.

The December 9th, 1935 student movement in Peking also gained support for the CCP, but with the exceptions of Ch'en Po-ta and P'eng Chen, no important Party leader played a direct role in this movement. This movement began as a student protest against Japanese plans to set up a puppet government in North China. The CCP subsequently recruited many of the student activists in the movement. This movement was important in generating pressure on the KMT to turn its attentions from the CCP to the Japanese, and also attracted young recruits of considerable talents, such as Huang Hua, who later played an important role in the foreign policy sphere. In terms of the development of the CCP and the post-1949 PRC, however, the influence of the December 9th movement was modest.

Serious Japanese encroachments on China pushed the question of the united front to the fore. Chiang Kai-shek's detention in the 1936 Sian incident showed that even his nominal supporters and allies were impatient with his policy of attacking the CCP rather than rallying the

See the list of participants in Klein and Clark, <u>Biographic</u> <u>Dictionary</u>, Vol. II, p. 1068. Liu Shao-ch'i was the Secretary of the Party's North China Bureau and engaged in clandestine organization of the students, but played no direct role in the movement.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup>John Isreal, <u>Student Nationalism in China</u>, <u>1927-1937</u> (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966), pp. 111-156.

nation to oppose the Japanese. KMT attacks on the Communists abated somewhat, but little vigorous action was taken against the Japanese occupiers. The relatively successful resistance by the CCP against the Japanese and enthusiastic peasant response to it has led to the contention that patriotic peasant nationalism was the primary cause of Communist success, not their program of social revolution. The most familiar presentation of this view has been put forward by Chalmers Johnson who asserts that, "Prior to 1937, the peasants were a passive element in politics" and that the CCP "appeal to economic interests was a conspicuous failure." In this view, a modern nationalist consciousness among the peasantry did not exist until it was instilled in them by the depradations of the Japanese and "the hostile actions of easily identifiable foreign soldiers against Chinese soldiers and civilians in north and east China."

The "peasant nationalism" thesis has been rebutted by several important scholarly works, <sup>32</sup> but some aspects of it have been endorsed by no less an expert than Mao himself. Mao later told Edgar Snow the Japanese "had been of great help" and that their occupation had:

created conditions which made it possible for Communistled guerrillas to increase their troops and expand their

Chalmers A. Johnson, <u>Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power</u> (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966), pp. 111-156.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

Donald Gillin, Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province, 1911-1949 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967), and Mark Selden, The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). Ilpyong Kim's article on mass mobilization in the Kiangsi period has been cited and discussed earlier.

territory. Today when the Japanese came to see Mao and apologized, he thanked them for their help. He said that he hoped they would go as far as Sian and even Chungking. Had they done so the guerrillas strength would have grown even more rapidly. 33

Historical studies of North China during the Japanese occupation have demonstrated that the issues of social revolution were the major key, to the CCP success. Gillin concludes that in Shansi, the expropriation of gentry wealth "under the guise of financing the war effort" was "the chief reason for the enormous popularity of the Eighth Route Army in Shansi." Mark Selden's research on the period led him to the conclusion that the nationalist appeal of the united front "was crucial in winning the support or at least tolerance of the urban bourgeoisie and substantial segments of the landlord-commercial elite in the countryside. But such appeals were effective in securing active peasant support only when linked to a program focused on rural problems." 35

The Japanese occupation and the CCP resistance to it became the overwhelmingly dominant theme in the arts during the Cultural Revolution. Ironically, the united front period was resurrected as a symbol during one of the great mass movements of social mobilization in the modern period. Yet behind the anti-Japanese theme was a strong undercurrent of anti-KMT and anti-feudal sentiment. Mao's statement that he thanked

<sup>33</sup> Edgar Snow, The Long Revolution (New York: Vintage, 1971), pp. 198-99.

<sup>34</sup>Gillin, Warlord, pp. 283-84.

<sup>35</sup> Selden, The Yenan Way, p. 119.

the Japanese for their help and "hoped they would go as far as Sian and Chungking" so that guerrilla strength would expand even more rapidly was only partly facetious. The Japanese occupation was an effective stimulus intensifying peasant nationalism, but it also demonstrated the necessity of overthrowing the landlords and gentry who provided the social base of the Japanese occupation.

Vietnam's version of the united front was, as noted, initiated before the practice became general Comintern policy. Starting in South Vietnam with the collaboration of the ICP with Trotskyist and non-communist elements in urban political activities, it spread to other areas of Vietnam and reached its high point with the Indochinese Congress movement. This movement consisted of a series of local committees agitating for the convocation of an all-Indochina Congress to draw up a list of grievances about colonial abuses to be presented to the metropolitan government. The Congress was blocked by French obstruction, but the agitation during the campaign played a very important role in establishing ICP contacts among the urban bourgeoisie and was the first important example of the political utility of a united front. During this period, the Trotskyist movement had a small but vocal following in the cities, although generally speaking their political influence outside of Saigon was relatively weak. <sup>36</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup>As the Party's official history admits, the political gains made during the period of Popular Front activity were slight, because "we were subjective, did not lay bare the Trotskyistes' schemes, and tended to belittle the work of agitating among the grass root masses." Thirty Years of Struggle, pp. 57, 58.

# Demise of the Popular Front

International events intervened and forced a change in ICP policy. The Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939 removed the Popular Front restraints against anti-colonial activity, though the shock of this cynical alliance caused a "number of Party members and non-Party members" to become "confused and wavering." The collapse of the Popular Front in France led to a new wave of repression against the ICP. To preserve its strength, the Party withdrew its legal operations and retreated to the countryside to build a base for clandestine revolutionary activities. For many cadres, however, this action did not come in time, and a significant number of leading Party members were arrested and imprisoned throughout most of the subsequent Japanese occupation.

One result of their imprisonment was the almost complete dismemberment of the Southern branch of the ICP, where the Central Committee headquarters had been located. <sup>38</sup> After the French repression resumed in late 1939, the Northern branch of the Party fled to the highland areas near the Chinese border. It was thus no accident that the leader-

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., p. 64.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup>Three Party Secretary Generals (Nguyen Van Cu, Ha Huy Tap and Le Hong Phong) and the future Party First Secretary Le Duan were arrested in the South from 1938 to 1940. In 1940 alone a total of 800 Party members and cadres were arrested in South Vietnam. Hong Chuong, "Cuoc khoi nghia Nam Ky va nhung bai hoc cua no," (The Nam Ky Insurrection and Its Lessons), <u>Hoc Tap</u>, No. 11, 1965, p. 40.

ship that emerged during and after the Japanese occupation consisted largely of figures such as Truong Chinh, Vo Nguyen Giap, Pham Van Dong and Hoang Quoc Viet, who had operated in Hanoi during the Popular Front interlude. The regional fragmentation of the revolutionary movement was intensified by the systematic and effective French repression in the South after the collapse of the Nam Ky (South Vietnam) uprising. 40

From the Popular Front to the Nam Ky uprising, the form of the united front in Vietnam underwent sweeping changes. Legal political activity and support of the anti-fascist cause muted the direct anti-colonial content of the Vietnamese revolution, and led to a brief period of advocating social reforms. But although the anti-imperialist aspect of the revolution was no longer directed at the French, it still remained the dominant political theme. In July 1936 the Central

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup>It may be that one reason Le Duan was selected to replace Truong Chinh as Party Secretary General after Chinh's dismissal for Land Reform errors was that his revolutionary career had followed a different pattern than Dong and Giap who were closely associated with Ho during the critical years of 1941-45. Perhaps Ho wanted to avoid a difficult choice which would risk undermining the close personal relations between Chinh, Dong and Giap by choosing an "outsider" who had spent most of his revolutionary career in the distant South.

<sup>40</sup> The November 1940 Nam Ky uprising was ordered by the Southern Committee of the ICP without approval of the Central Committee (now headquartered in North Vietnam). It attempted to exploit the resentment of indigenous soldiers being drafted to fight a short-lived colonial war with Thailand over a boundary dispute, and to overthrow the French regime which had been recently defeated in Europe. The ICP also had organized in the countryside in many areas of the Delta and claimed a militia and self-defense force of 15,000 (5,000 with arms). Hong Chuong, "Cuoc khoi nghia Nam Ky" in Hoc Tap, No. 11, 1965, p. 40.

Committee responded to the 7th ECCI resolution and "temporarily decided not to put forth the slogans 'To defeat the French imperialists' and 'To requisition the landlords' land and distribute it to the peasants'." Thus the anti-feudal element of the revolution was held in abeyance in favor of struggling for "elementary democratic rights" and founding a broad "Anti-Imperialist People's Front."

After the Nazi-Soviet pact, the ICP Sixth Plenum (November 1939) abandoned its cooperation with the French, but asserted that while the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal tasks were the basic elements of the Vietnamese revolution, "at the moment the national danger was more serious." This Plenum, the last held in South Vietnam, apparently reinstated the previous platform of confiscating landlords' land and distributing it to peasants, but added the qualification that, "From the standpoint of national liberation, considering the national interest as supreme, all the problems of the revolution, even that of land, must be solved according to this aim." The Seventh Plenum a year later (October 1940) marked a further retreat from the anti-feudal program. It "affirmed that the Anti-Imperialist Front was the Anti-Japanese-French Fascist National United Front, and decided to temporarily with-

Thirty Years of Struggle, p. 50.

 $<sup>42\,\</sup>mathrm{Ibid.}$ , p. 65. "That is why, while advocating the Indochinese Anti-Imperialist National United Front, the bourgeois democratic revolution only confiscated the lands of the landlords who betrayed the national interest." In view of the tenuous position of the ICP at this point, this must be considered more a statement of policy than of accomplished fact.

draw the slogan of the Sixth Central Committee Session, 'To confiscate landlords' land and distribute it to the tillers'."<sup>43</sup> The following spring, Ho Chi Minh returned to Vietnam and convoked the historic Eighth Plenum, which "marked a strong shifting of forces against the fascist invaders," (e.g., changed the primary focus from the French to the Japanese), established the Viet Minh Front, and decreed that, "For the moment, the partial and class' interests must be subordinated to the national problem."<sup>44</sup> This policy remained in effect throughout the Japanese occupation.

CCP policy toward a united front during the Yenan period underwent considerable change. But the guiding principle was always to attempt first to secure the revolution through social mobilization. The first important CCP statement on the united front was the Ten Great Policies of August 1937. A major study of the history of the united front concludes that there was "no clear demarcation between internal reform and external resistance." This statement has "usually been seen,

<sup>43</sup> I<u>bid</u>., pp. 67, 68.

<sup>44 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 70. "As for the land question the Eighth Plenum assessed that, 'to further differentiate the ranks of the landlord class, it would still be necessary to temporarily put aside the slogan 'To confiscate landlords' land and distribute it to the tillers', and to put forth the following slogans: 'To confiscate imperalists' and traitors' land and distribute it to the poor tillers'; 'To reduce land rent and interest'; 'To divide the communal fields', and to proceed to the realization of the slogan 'Land to the tillers'." <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 71.

Lyman P. Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), p. 103.

not incorrectly but incompletely, as an anti-Japanese program. But only two of the ten policies (overthrow of Japanese-imperialist; anti-Japanese foreign policy), together with their supporting clauses, were directed wholly at the national enemy. All the others called, in varying degrees, for domestic changes."

As the Japanese occupation bogged down into a military stalemate, more Japanese attention was devoted to achieving greater political stability in occupied China. This required an aggressive program of combatting Communist influence and of expanding the numbers of Chinese collaborators. For this reason, the CCP was obliged to pursue a united front policy as a measure of self-preservation. As one study puts it, the CCP "wanted to maximize the opposition to Japan in order to minimize the opposition to itself."47 Efforts to expand CCP strength and influence required the continuation of social mobilization policies, and the protection of the Red Army. By 1940, the territorial control of Yen Hsi-shan, the warlord ruler of the province of Shansi, strategically located on the periphery of the Japanese occupied zone in North China, had been reduced to a fraction of his former domain by the superior political appeal of the CCP. A year later, the new Fourth Army incident further underlined the fragility of the united front, when KMT troops annihilated the headquarters elements of the main CCP force operating in contested territory near the Japanese zone.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup><u>Ibid</u>., p. 109.

KMT objection was that the CCP had taken advantage of the united front to spread its influence.  $^{48}$ 

This incident underlined the nature of the united front in China. The CCP was not only faced with a foreign occupation of part of its territory, but with a militarily stronger internal rival and a wide array of other forces with local or regional power bases. Thus the united front policy was not an expression of the dominance of the anti-imperialist element of the Chinese revolution, but a practical measure for self-preservation. In late 1939, Mao stated that the united front, armed struggle, and Party building were the three fundamental questions of the Chinese revolution. <sup>49</sup> "The united front is a united front for carrying on armed struggle," he wrote, "and the Party is the heroic warrior wielding the two weapons, the united front and the armed struggle, to storm and shatter the enemy's positions." <sup>50</sup> When Mao observed that the united front and armed struggle are "the two basic weapons for defeating the enemy," he was clearly referring to the KMT as well as the Japanese. <sup>51</sup>

Preoccupation with an internal enemy as well as an external occupier required that the CCP build itself up for a struggle on both

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Mao Tse-tung, <u>Selected Works</u>, Vol. II (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), p. 288.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup>Ibid., p. 295.

<sup>51&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

fronts. Thus, as one analysis points out, the Party rectification of the 1942-43 period in Yenan "can be seen as the inverse of the united front--the organizational and doctrinal tightening of the Party necessary to mold the many new members and to offset the diversion of the Party from direct revolutionary activity."<sup>52</sup> The rectification campaign "was born of the crisis precipitated by the Japanese offensive and the intensified Kuomintang blockade."53 It was an attempt to unify a party which had grown rapidly (from 40,000 to 800,000 from 1937 to 1939) and consisted of a wide variety of adherents with different backgrounds, motivations, and levels of political understanding. movement was meant to Sinify Marxist ideology and to reinforce Mao's leadership. It was also meant to forge unity between "two lines" of "political impulses and leadership styles" which, since 1937 had been "joined in uneasy coexistence" in the border region. 54 These different orientations were prototypes of a fundamental difference in outlook that periodically disrupted the Party up through its dramatic struggle in the Cultural Revolution. 55

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup>Van Slyke, <u>Enemies</u> and <u>Friends</u>, p. 116.

<sup>53</sup>Selden, The Yenan Way, p. 188.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

Selden defines the two approaches as (1) revolutionary, emphasizing struggle and broad political participation, and (2) bureaucratic, stressing stable administration and the reform politics of the Second United Front. Proponents of the first were the local cadres, whose "primary commitment was to a social revolution which would eliminate oppression and bring equality and hope to the poor in the desolate villages of the border region," while the second orientation was that of intellectuals and students coming to Yenan from the outside and local landlords and former officials of the area, as Selden notes, both members of the educated elite. <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 188-89.

The Popular Front period in Vietnam preceding the Eighth Plenum left a more complex legacy. Because the Popular Front minimized the opposition against France, and advocated a reformist program, the ICP often found itself at a political disadvantage. The self-professed Trotskyists gained a following in urban areas because their more radical program and criticism of the reformist collaboration of the ICP with the French and subsequent ICP endorsement of the Nazi-Soviet Pact won them the reputation of having a more patriotic program. The ICP policies were criticized not only by Trotskyists, but also by some members within the Party, who felt that they were not sufficiently nationalist in orientation. As Party historian Tran Huy Lieu recalled, "even the concept of the united front, concerning the character of the Indochinese Democratic Front, lay within the sphere of ideological struggle in the Party." <sup>56</sup> One Party member writing in <u>Dan Chung</u>, the leading newspaper of the ICP oriented group in Central Vietnam stated, "In these short three years, the Democratic Front has not yet spread widely among the people, and has not pushed forward the anti-imperialist spirit that has existed for over 70 years now."<sup>57</sup> The official Party answer to this criticism was that the Democratic Front was "a special form of the expanded Anti-Imperialist Front," but this answer was not

Tran Huy Lieu, "Mot vai net ve cuoc dau tranh tu tuong cua Dang tu nhung ngay thanh lap den Cach Mang Thang Tam 1945," (Some Aspects of the Ideological Struggle Within the Party From Its Formation to the August Revolution of 1945), Nghien Cuu Lich Su, No. 71, February 1965, p. 5.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

entirely satisfactory, and there was some tension between the "legal" and "clandestine" elements of the Party during this period. 58

The weakness of the Party and the vertiginous policy shifts of the 1930's left an inevitable residue of discord and disunity. Following the Eighth Plenum of May 1941, factional struggle took place in all three regions of Vietnam. Little information is available on the details or political significance of these struggles, other than a brief mention of sabotage by separate "A.B. (anti-Bolshevik) cliques" in North and Central Vietnam, and the existence of separate groups in South Vietnam. One of the legacies of the 1930's was that the Southern component of the Party became increasingly less important at the highest leadership echelons of the ICP's Central Committee. One of the weakening

<sup>58&</sup>quot;Some comrades in coming out of jail were not yet familiar with the new situation and the new policy of the Party, and made a distinction between the political mission and the revolutionary mission, regarding the cadres who operated openly as 'the politicians', not as revolutionaries. But the greatest surprise was the switch from the slogan of overthrowing the French imperialists, making Vietnam a completely independent country, and dividing land among the tillers, to slogans opposing the reactionary colonialists and demanding democratic freedoms." Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup>Thirty Years of Struggle, pp. 78-79.

The ICP's South Vietnam Region Committee (Xu Uy Nam Bo) was criticized for its "unprincipled concessions" and "loss of vigilance" toward the Trotskyists "at times" during the Popular Front period. Vu Tho, "Mot so van de lich su Dang thoi ky 1936-1939" (A Number of Questions on Party History During the Period 1936-1939), Hoc Tap, No. 85, April 1966, p. 5. A contradictory criticism was directed at the "narrow-mindedness" and "contractionism" which was said to have limited the expansion of Party influence among the masses in this period. This was "the legacy of the 1930-35 period when the Party was still mobilizing the masses for revolutionary struggle in conditions of complete clandestinity." Ibid., p. 7.

of the Southern movement, and the transfer of the Central Committee to the North led to a further strengthening of the Northern component of the Party, and by the end of the 1930's the Northern and Central elements dominated the ICP leadership. This regional fragmentation of the ICP was a problem for the remainder of the revolutionary period. With respect to its impact on the post-1954 DRV leadership, however, this shift toward greater homogeneity in the regional composition of the Party leadership may have contributed to strengthening unity among them. The independent tendencies of the Southern leaders re-emerged during the 1945 August Revolution, but were overcome by the reassertion of control from the Central Committee in the North, as mentioned in the following section. Moreover, inter-regional conflicts and rivalries were muted by the legacy of group solidarity derived from the 1930's prison experiences shared by much of the ICP leadership. 61

 $<sup>^{61}</sup>$ One of the extremely rare references to a jail experience of struggle and factionalism is made in the official Party history to a "struggle to overcome factionalist ideology originating from opposite points of view in Ban Me Thuot jail." The account adds, "It is beyond doubt that through these inner-Party struggles, our Party was further steeled and strengthened." Thirty Years of Struggle, p. 79. Another account ascribes these conflicts to "basic contradictions" concerning a number of national and international issues of the time (from 1943 to 1945), and personal antagonisms. However, "after being released from jail, the comrades all went out to operate in Central Vietnam and all executed Party orders for the good of the revolution, although ideologically and organizationally there was not yet real unity." Le Manh Trinh, "Bai hoe dau tranh de cung co va tang cuong su doan ket thong nhat noi bo Dang trong thoi ky 1939-1945" (Lesson on the Struggle to Consolidate and Strengthen Internal Party Unity During the Period 1939-1945), Hoc Tap, No. 8, 1963, p. 13. Biographical accounts of participants in the August Revolution make it clear that much of the leadership of the 1945 movement in Central Vietnam came from cadres who had been imprisoned in Ban Me Thuot and later rose to positions of prominence in the DRV.

In terms of the subsequent development of the Vietnamese revolutionary movement, the most significant feature of the 1930's was that Ho Chi Minh did not play a direct leadership role, during this period of Party setbacks and difficulties, and that the revolutionary successes came only after his return to Vietnam in 1941. This reversal in fortune was not exclusively due to Ho's leadership. The basic circumstance underlying the subsequent success of the ICP was a dramatic change in the internal and external political environment brought on by the Second World War. Nonetheless, Ho's contribution to the rebuilding and unification of the Party during the Japanese occupation, and his shrewd grasp of strategy and tactics, were indispensible in winning and consolidating the revolutionary victory in the August Revolution of 1945. Still, the Popular Front period was more than a hiatus in the development of the revolution. Tran Huy Lieu calls the 1936-39 period a "bountiful harvest" in terms of ideological development. The open circulation of Party books and newspapers, as well as legal political meetings facilitated the spread of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Because of this, he concludes, "even though at the end of 1939 the French colonialists were engaged in furious repression, and the movement had to switch over to a new phase, the seeds sown during these four years had taken root in every strata of revolutionary people, and continued to grow and blossom."62

Tran Huy Lieu, "Mot vai net ve cuoc dau tranh tu tuong," in Nghien Cuu Lich Su, No. 71, p. 5.

## SECTION III

#### FROM REVOLUTION TO LIBERATION

As many important ICP cadres remained in jail after the arrests of 1939-40, a leadership nucleus of Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap and Hoang Quoc Viet formed around Ho Chi Minh in the newly established base area of the Viet Bac near the Chinese border. Unlike other scattered nationalist groups operating from South China, the Viet Minh paid great attention to the recruitment of minority cadres, whose importance in preserving and expanding the Viet Minh during the Japanese occupation has been well documented. With the aid of these minority tribal groups, the revolutionary movement was, for the first time, able to consolidate a relatively safe base of operation, although it was not completely secure until the end of World War II was in sight.

General Chu Van Tan, a member of the Nung minority, raised an "Army for National Salvation" in 1941, well before General Giap's army came into existence. There had always been a close connection between the revolutionary movement in Vietnam's highlands and delta areas. This was symbolized by the fact that Tan's father had fought in the army of De Tham, who led the last organized military resistance against the

Chu Van Tan, Reminiscences on the Army for National Salvation, translated by Mai Elliott, Southeast Asia Program Data Paper, No. 97, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 1974); Vo Nguyen Giap, Tu nhan dan ma ra (Born from the People) (Hanoi: Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 1969), excerpted under the title "Stemming From the People" in A Heroic People, and John McAlister, "Mountain Minorities and the Viet Minh," in Peter Kunstadter ed., Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities and Nations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967), Vol. II.

French around the turn of the century. Tan himself joined the Party in the mid-1930's and was instrumental in establishing a liaison corridor between North Vietnam and the overseas ICP headquarters in China, which was the genesis of the Viet Bac base area. The close cooperation between the minorities and the ICP had two important results. First it helped to secure a base area and military position which put the Vietnamese far beyond their rivals in providing an effective resistance and intelligence network against the Japanese, a fact quickly recognized by the OSS teams in Southern China in the last phase of the war. This enabled the Viet Minh to get aid and recognition at a critical juncture in its development. And, second, it established a strong reservoir of support for the Viet Minh which was vital to its survival during the resistance against the French, and was of cardinal importance in political re-integration of the DRV after 1954.

Much attention has been focused on the Viet Minh guerrilla organization in the Viet Bac area. Considerably less attention has been given to the Viet Minh efforts at political organization in the rural delta areas of North Vietnam, which was an indispensible prerequisite to their victory in the 1945 August Revolution that firmly established the legitimacy of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Viet Minh as the embodiment of modern Vietnamese nationalism. In part, this neglect is due to a lack of comprehensive source material. From the scattered accounts of the period, however, the general outlines of Viet Minh political activities in the Red River Delta can be discerned.

## Vietnam's August Revolution

In both China and Vietnam, the Japanese occupation destroyed the prestige and control of the incumbent government. However, whereas changes were made in the government of the occupied areas in China, in Vietnam the French administration was allowed to remain in nominal administrative control, while the Japanese made the important decisions and exercised a form of indirect rule. The humiliation of France had a powerful effect on eroding the image of an invulnerable occupying force that its hitherto successful policies of colonial conquest and repression had built up. As Ho observed, "The truth is that from the fall of 1940, our country became a Japanese colony and was no longer a French colony."<sup>2</sup> The Japanese presence and the separation of the French administration from the metropole had several important consequences. In order to carry out the Japanese demands for requisitioning all available natural resources in Indochina to meet the war needs, the French dissolved the elective village councils and replaced them with appointive councils of degree holders, local mandarins, middle level officials, and village notables. The actions required of this new and more pliant administration led to increasing economic distress in the countryside and intensified peasant resentment of their local rulers.

Tran Huy Lieu, et. al., Xa hoi Viet-Nam trong thoi Phap Nhat (1939-1945) (Vietnamese Society During the French-Japanese Period, 1939-1945) (Hanoi: Van Su Dia, 1957), Vol. I, p. 69. (This book constitutes Vol. VIII of Tai lieu tham khao lich su cach mang can dai Viet-Nam).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup><u>Ibid.</u>, Vol. II, p. 26. (This is Vol. IX of <u>Tai lieu tham khao</u>).

Rice crops were pulled up and industrial crops planted in their place. The vital irrigation system was neglected, resulting in poor harvests and eventual disaster as the record floods of 1945 inundated the Red River Delta, compounding an already staggering catastrophy of famine and starvation, resulting from the extractive Japanese war supply policy. But even before the full extent of the impending tragedy was evident, increased taxations and corvee conscriptions had fueled peasant resentment. Concluding a careful documentation of the exploitative measures inflicted on the peasantry during the Japanese occupation, the pre-eminent DRV historian of this period notes that they "clearly explain why the Vietnamese people so enthusiastically participated in the August Revolution."4 Toward the end of 1944, the Japanese extractions led to a widespread wave of famine and starvation that lasted until the August Revolution the following year. The toll of this man made disaster was enormous. DRV estimates are that two million of the North Vietnamese population of ten million died of hunger. chaotic situation, the rural peasantry became, in the bland words of social science "available for mobilization."

Among the youth, a new movement developed, first sponsored by the French, then increasingly oriented toward the Viet Minh. Isolated from the metropole, the French attempted to pre-empt nationalist agitation from being organized and directed by either the Japanese or the Vietnamese themselves against the colonial authorities. Youth groups were organized throughout Vietnam and patriotic songs circulated among the students. By one estimate the expansion of schools during the Japanese

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup><u>Ibid.</u>, Vol. I, p. 154.

occupation, and the organization of youth groups "added approximately 500,000 young persons to the mobilized population." The youth groups were both rural and urban. In the countryside, rural schools contributed to the expansion of youth groups. At the same time, the Anti-Imperialist Youth League, organized by the Viet Minh, recruited rural members and developed rapidly in the latter part of the Japanese occupation. Clandestine Viet Minh adherents guided the activities of this league, and infiltrated the French-Japanese sponsored rural militia (Bao An Doan). 7

In the final phase of the Japanese occupation, the well developed Viet Minh youth movement in Hanoi spread to outlying provinces. Hanoi's prestigious Truong Buoi (College du Protectorat) was evacuated to Ninh Binh and then Thanh Hoa as the war moved toward its climactic stage in late 1944 and early 1945, and private middle schools were evacuated to the provinces surrounding Hanoi. The principal DRV account of the August Revolution in Hanoi states that because a "number of Youth Group members went along with the schools, the [Viet Minh] National Salvation Youth Group of Hanoi could expand its organization among the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>John T. McAlister, <u>Viet-Nam</u>: <u>The Origins of Revolution</u> (New York: Knopf, 1969), p. 172.

Over 4,800 rural schools were set up during the Japanese occupation. Ibid.

One lengthy interview was conducted with an observer (and subsequent participant in) the youth movement in Thai Binh province, who supplied a detailed account of its development. Interview No. 13, January 1972.

Another important network through which Viet Minh influence was expanded was the Association for the Propagation of the Romanized Script (Hoi Truyen Ba Quoc Ngu). This movement had been initiated during the Popular Front period as a means of increasing literacy among workers and peasants, and became an effective and respectable cover for Viet Minh work. Despite Japanese sponsorship of such groups as the Dai Viet, clandestine Viet Minh influence in the urban areas was considerable. In Hanoi, the Thanh Nghi group exercised a considerable impact in intellectual circles. Later, organized as the Democratic Party, it became an important part of the Lien Viet Front.

It was in the countryside that the real revolutionary situation
was developing, however. As starvation spread, the peasants became
increasingly desperate. The revolutionary potential of the famine lay

<sup>8</sup> Cuoc van dong Cach Mang Thang Tam o Ha-Noi (cuoi 1939-1946) (The Mobilization for the August Revolution in Hanoi - End 1939-1946) (Hanoi: Ban Nghien Cuu Lich Su Dang Thanh Uy Ha-Noi, 1970), p. 72.

The origins of the movement are briefly described by Hoang Quoc Viet, "Our People, A Very Heroic People," in <u>A Heroic People</u>, p. 186. In 1937, Viet suggested to Truong Chinh, then recuperating in a hospital, that a famous pro-French intellectual, Nguyen Van To, head the association. This association still could be found in some areas of South Vietnam after 1954, again serving as a legal front for revolutionary activities.

This group was led by Duong Duc Hien who was president of the Vietnamese Student Association in Hanoi, and later became a member of the National Assembly Presidium. The <u>Thanh Nghi</u> group published a newspaper which, among other things, graphically chronicled the famine and agrarian problems in North Vietnam. The chief author of these articles, Nghiem Xuan Yem, became the DRV Minister of Agriculture.

in the fact that it was clearly seen as a man made catastrophy. In order to set aside food reserves for a bitter and prolonged struggle against the invading Allied forces, and to serve as a recruiting incentive to bolster their own forces with Vietnamese conscripts if necessary, the Japanese stockpiled large quantities of rice in depots scattered throughout the countryside. Local officials were enlisted into the job of stocking and protecting these depots.

As the famine reached its peak, the March 9, 1945 Japanese coup against the enfeebled French administration took place. Fearing that the Gaullists would attempt to reassert French authority, the Japanese seized control of all public buildings and evicted the Vichy administration. An ostensibly "independent" Vietnamese government was formed, but did not have any real power. In the months that followed, the rice depots, symbols of peasant oppression, began to be seized by groups of peasants often led by the Viet Minh Anti-Imperialist Youth members of the Bao An Doan. 11 At this moment of extreme crisis, the only group that was able and willing to take effective action to solve the pressing life or death problem of peasant welfare was the Viet Minh. "nationalist" groups were immobilized by their choice of sponsors. Dai Viet Party hoped the Japanese would install them in power and could hardly take action against their benefactors' interest. The VNQDD and the Dong Minh Hoi were waiting in Southern China for assistance from the KMT in their attempt to seize power. Only the Viet Minh had the

Based on an eyewitness description of a peasant from Thai Binh province. Interview No. 13, January 1972.

political independence and the organizational resources to act on the peasants' behalf.

Most accounts of the August Revolution stress a few well documented episodes in the urban political maneuvering of mid-August 1945 following the Japanese surrender. Eyewitness and participant accounts, however, convincingly demonstrate the political power of the peasant movement of this period. In one such account, a peasant from Thai Binh province recalled:

In these conditions of death and famine, some people became emboldened to rise up and open the Japanese rice depots for the poor people. One I remember was Ngo Duy Dong, the present Province Party Secretary of Thai Binh, who led the movement in Duyen Hai and Tien Hai districts. At that time, I also went to seize the rice depots in Kien Xuong and Tien Hai districts. These depots were guarded by soldiers, and I saw that the people in the front ranks were shot dead. But as the front lines fell, the rear guard advanced, and in the end the soldiers fled and let the people take the rice from the depot. Nothing could have stopped this advance. It had an incredible power, and would not be stopped by guns or death. They stormed in to open the Japanese rice depot to get food to eat. 13

Several peasants interviewed by Gerard Chaliand over twenty years after the event, recalled the spirit of the times in vivid terms:

The basic Western language sources on the period are Paul Mus, Sociologie d'une Guerre (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1952), and Philippe Devillers, Histoire du Viet-Nam de 1940 a 1952 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1952). In his extended discussion of the cosmological reasons for the Viet Minh victory in the August Revolution, Mus completely ignores the impact of the famine. Similarly, Devillers scarcely discusses this crucial issue.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>Interview No. 13, January 1972.

On 9 March 1945 came the Japanese coup, toppling the colonial administration. Our people promptly attacked the French military post at Ban, on Road 5, which was held by a platoon of forty; we seized a quantity of arms and ammunition. The second attack was directed against a regional centre. The French were in such disarray they could do nothing to stop Side by side with the armed conflict, the masses were incited to lay hands on the stocks of rice held by the Japanese . . . . The communal rice stocks in the possession of the village elders were, in theory, intended for the poor. They were shared out, together with the supplies appropriated by the Japanese. In addition, all taxes were withheld. As a result of these steps, starvation was averted in the province. In other parts of the country, where these popular uprisings did not reach the same proportions, famine conditions prevailed. This seizure of rice for public use finally removed the peasants' uncertainties about the revolution. The atmosphere was such that people would storm any rice convoy on sight, often without the slightest planning or organization. We commandeered all the rice we could, and all the weapons. 14

Thus extensive rural agitation was in progress even before the Japanese surrender. From this came the revolutionary impetus which guaranteed the success of the subsequent urban Viet Minh coup in Hanoi and left a lasting political impression among all strata of Vietnamese, particularly those who had gone through the famine. The Viet Minh victory was not, as Paul Mus and others have suggested, the result of clever manipulation of peasant superstition, or crafty appropriation of the "Mandate of Heaven." The origins of the legitimacy which

<sup>14</sup> Gerard Chaliand, The Peasants of North Vietnam (Middlesex, Penguin Books, 1969), pp. 73-74.

The Vietnamese and Their Revolution (New York: Harper, 1970), pp. 29-43, pp. 68, 69.

sustained the Viet Minh through nine years of arduous resistance, and paralyzed French efforts to organize a countervailing indigenous political force, lay not in superior political guile but in the actual extraordinary achievements of the Viet Minh in solving the problem of famine, and in its subsequent performance as a government.

As the climactic events of mid-August 1945 approached, the ICP had about 5,000 Party members, including those in various French prisons. <sup>16</sup> Just after the August Revolution, it was estimated that the two Chinese sponsored "nationalist" groups had no more than 1,500 and 8,000 followers respectively, while the Viet Minh had about 70,000 adherents. <sup>17</sup> With these forces, the Viet Minh and the pro-Chinese groups vied for power. Because of its extensive rural support and wide distribution of forces, the Viet Minh had a clear advantage. And of course, the reason that the Viet Minh enjoyed this advantage was that they had formulated and carried out a political program appropriate to the situation.

The events normally associated with the August Revolution are a few well publicized episodes occurring in mid-August leading up to the

<sup>16</sup> McAlister cites this as evidence supporting the Mus view that the Viet Minh seizure of power was essentially a coup carried out by a tiny minority. Of the 5,000 Party members "more than 1,000 were in jail, and there were only over 3,000 party members to lead the revolution."

Tom tat lich su Dang va tam bai hoc kinh nghiem (Summary of Party History and Eight Lessons from the Experience) (South Vietnam: Tien Phong Publishing House, 1965), Vol. I, p. 90.

<sup>17 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u> Nevertheless, McAlister asserts that "none of the groups had a mass following." McAlister, <u>The Vietnamese and Their Revolution</u>, p. 234.

Viet Minh seizure of power in Hanoi. On August 13th, 1945 the day after the Japanese surrender, the historic Tan Trao conference took place. Ho Chi Minh had moved the Viet Minh headquarters from a neighboring province to Tan Trao in Tuyen Quang province, where a provisional government had been established. 18 After moving to Tan Trao in early May, Ho was sufficiently encouraged by the progress in consolidating Viet Minh controlled areas to proclaim most of the area north of Hanoi a "liberated zone," administered by a Provisional Command Committee (Uy Ban Chi Huy Lam Thoi). But it was not until the Tan Trao conference that the symbols of a national government (flag and anthem) were selected and a National Liberation Committee of Vietnam (Uy Ban Dan Toc Giai Phong Viet Nam) established with Ho as Chairman.  $^{19}$ The Tan Trao conference was a three day Party Plenum, which brought together representatives from all areas of Vietnam. 20 At the conference the decision was made to initiate a general uprising and seize power from the Japanese prior to the anticipated arrival of the Allies.

<sup>18</sup> The previous month, on April 16, 1945, the Viet Minh General Headquarters ordered the establishment of the Uy Ban Dan Toc Giai Phong Viet-Nam (National Liberation Committee of Vietnam), which was in effect the "Provisional Revolutionary Government" (Chinh Phu Cach Mang Lam Thoi). Ban Nghien Cuu Lich Su Dang, Cach Mang Thang Tam (1945) (The August Revolution, 1945) (Hanoi: Su That, 1971), p. 97. This committee, however, was not set up until the Tan Trao Conference.

<sup>19 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 119-120. The Standing Committee was comprised of Ho, Tran Huy Lieu, Pham Van Dong, Nguyen Luong Bang and Duong Duc Hien.

Many delegates from the Center and South were not able to reach Tan Trao in time to attend, however.

Forces were to be concentrated in the most important areas. <sup>21</sup> After the Party Plenum was concluded, a National Congress (Dai Hoi Quoc Dan) was convened in Tan Trao on August 16th, with 80 delegates attending. It was this conference that elected the National Liberation Committee, which was the forerunner of the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Although the Tan Trao decision was to proceed with a general uprising aimed at the most important targets, it did not reach Hanoi in time to influence events there. The North Vietnam Region Committee had independently reached the same conclusion, and on August 15th had ordered a partial uprising. 22 On August 17th, a civil servants' rally was transformed into a meeting of support for the Viet Minh, and on August 19th a massive demonstration was held, and the Viet Minh assumption of power proclaimed from the balcony of the Opera House. Truong Chinh was the first member of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee (the functional equivalent of the later Politburo) to arrive, on August 21st, and Ho followed on August 26th. The first Liberation Army unit entered Hanoi on August 28th. 23

The details of the Tan Trao resolution are given in  $\underline{\text{ibid.}}$ , pp. 116-122.

The Tan Trao decision did not reach Hanoi until the evening of August 17th. Cuoc van dong Cach Mang Thang Tam o Ha-Noi, p. 118.

Ban Nghien Cuu Lich Su Dang, <u>Lich su Quan Doi Nhan Dan Viet-Nam</u> (History of the Vietnam People's Army) (Hanoi: Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 1974), p. 173.

For various reasons, the Viet Minh victory in Hanoi has become the symbol of the August Revolution, in the eyes of the Viet Minh's nationalist opponents and French critics of the revolutionary movement. 24 One key event is often cited as the apotheosis of the Bolshevik organizational techniques which critics of the Viet Minh hold were the real cause of their victory. This was the dramatic takeover of the civil servants' meeting of August 17th, accomplished by pushing the scheduled speakers aside, unfurling an enormous Viet Minh banner behind the speaker's platform, and receiving a tumultuous accolade from Viet Minh supporters planted in the audience. 25 Although this incident was directly followed by the Viet Minh seizure of power, it does not provide an adequate explanation of their success. The detailed two volume province by province DRV study of the August Revolution shows clearly the extent of Viet Minh influence outside Hanoi. 26

A representative example of this view is the analysis of the Viet Minh's victory in the August Revolution by the VNQDD, which concludes, "Having seized power in the Capital of North Vietnam, and with the movement spreading to all the provinces, the local Viet Minh spontaneously rose up without meeting any resistance." Hoang Van Dao, Viet-Nam Quoc-Dan-Dang, lich-su dau-tranh can-dai 1927-1954 (The Vietnamese Kuomintang: History of Its Recent Struggle from 1927 to 1954) (Saigon: Khai Tri, 1970), p. 258.

 $<sup>^{25} \</sup>text{The incident}$  is described in <u>Cuoc van dong Cach Mang Thang Tam</u> o Ha-Noi, p. 122.

Tran Huy Lieu, ed., Cach Mang Thang Tam (The August Revolution) (Hanoi: Su Hoc, 1960), two volumes. An eyewitness account by an observer who had at first not believed the reports of Viet Minh rural strength after the March 9 coup, recalls travelling through Central Vietnam on August 18th and encountering "massive groups of demonstrators in orderly ranks stretching along the road for kilometers, with drums and flags and banners fluttering majestically." Nhan Dan, August 21, 1960.

Had the power base of the Viet Minh been confined to a few cities, they would have been easily ousted in the North by the Chinese occupation forces, as they were in the South by the French and British after only a few weeks in office. 27

The August Revolution of 1945 was a pivotal event in the Vietnamese revolutionary movement. It marked the first major step in reintegrating a society shattered by colonial rule. The French occupation had driven a wedge between the peasantry and the scholar-officials, by creating a new class of interpreters and indigenous officials to staff the colonial administration and ensure that its directives were carried out. An important element of the revolutionary leadership had come from families of scholar-officials who refused to cooperate with the French - the "poor but honest scholars" (nha nho thanh bach). Their forces were bolstered by political work among students, intellectuals and civil servants during the Popular Front and Japanese occupation

 $<sup>^{27}</sup>$ The reasons for the failure of the Viet Minh to hold Saigon are complex, but the principal and obvious reason was the hostility of General Gracey's occupation force, which effectively re-installed the French regime that the Japanese had disbanded on March 9, 1945. Although the Vanguard Youth numbered nearly 200,000 in the Saigon-Cholon area at the time of the August Revolution, and more than a million for all of Nam Bo (Cochinchina), there were only "several hundred" Party members in Saigon during the August Revolution. Nhan Dan, December 26, 1959. Moreover, the Southern branch of the Party was badly split between the Tien Phong (Vanguard) group advocating a policy of using the Japanese to gain independence after the March 9 coup, and the Giai Phong (Liberation) group which followed the general policy of opposing the Japanese. In the Party's estimate "this dissension and factionalism reduced the prestige of the Party, was an obstacle to the rapid development of the revolutionary movement in Nam Bo in the pre-insurrection phase, made the Nam Bo insurrection break out slower than in the North and Central Vietnam, and also reduced to some extent the fighting strength of the Party headquarters and the Nam Bo people in the first days of the Resistance." Le Manh Trinh, "Bai hoc dau tranh de cung co," in Hoc Tap, No. 8, p. 13.

periods. But it was not until the August Revolution that this group, united by social background and political conviction, was able to link up with the most powerful revolutionary force in Vietnam, the rural peasantry.

Vietnam's August Revolution was not an urban coup, but a coalescence of revolutionary leadership and reawakened peasants. solid rural base of the ICP that secured their tenuous victory in Vietnam's large cities. And, during the course of the rural agitation of 1944-45, a new generation of revolutionary leaders was produced. By the time of the Third Party Congress, most of the first echelon leaders were those who had emerged from the revolutionary agitation of the mid-1920's, and in particular from the student movement of that period. The second echelon leaders were mainly people who had entered the movement during the August Revolution. In the countryside, for example, members of the Anti-Imperialist Youth who led the peasantry to seize the rice stocks and alleviate the famine, and then led the movement on to a seizure of power in the rural areas, are the main source of the DRV's leading provincial officials. One of them, subsequently a member of the Hung Yen Province Committee, described the common experience that molded the emerging youths of the period into a political generation:

In August 1945, we took over every district in the land. The people in this area advanced on the main town in a twelve-mile procession and claimed it as their own. Every single town and village was in the hands of militants – it was a nationwide take-over of power. You couldn't move, there were so many people. Suddenly we found ourselves enjoying independence and freedom. The

mood of the country was unbelievable: people were burning with enthusiasm. I shall never forget those times. 28

As David Marr found on his early 1975 visit to North Vietnam, the majority of the second level leadership became politically active during the 1945 period. He describes meeting a Vice Minister, "one of the many responsible leaders in their late 40's to early 50's whom we have met everywhere on our trip . . . . Others of the same generation are provincial administrators, intimately aware of popular attitudes and aspirations because they have been a part of the province from birth. What these central specialists and provincial generalists share is the August 1945 Revolution and nine subsequent years of protracted political and military struggle against the French."29 As this observation on the shared experience of urban and rural leaders suggests, the August Revolution brought together intellectuals and peasants in a single political framework whose main content was nationalism, but whose indispensible political foundation was a common concern for the general welfare which was expressed in its simplest form in the programs to eliminate colonial occupation, famine and illiteracy.

Having gained power in the North, the problem was to consolidate it in the face of Chinese attempts to supplant the Viet Minh with their own proteges. For the first time since 1930, the ICP leadership faced

<sup>28</sup> Gerard Chaliand, The Peasants of North Vietnam, p. 74.

<sup>29</sup> David Marr, "North Vietnam, A Personal Journal," <u>Indochina</u> Chronicle, March 1975, p. 18.

a serious internal challenge, but the danger lay not in the VNQDD and Dong Minh Hoi, but in their Chinese allies. As the VNQDD retrospectively admitted, "the great majority of the people remained confident that the communist Viet Minh were the only real patriots." Skillful diplomacy by Ho Chi Minh neutralized the Chinese support for their clients and allowed the Viet Minh to hold onto the power they had won. 31

On August 27th, the Provisional Government "was reshuffled, and included non-Viet Minh and non-Party personalities." The Democratic Republic of Vietnam was proclaimed on September 2, 1945, becoming the first socialist state in Asia to gain power by peasant revolution.

Although the DRV leadership was expelled from Hanoi a year later during the French military reoccupation, the formal state structure remained intact until the Viet Minh once again re-entered Hanoi in 1954. Hanoi became the symbol of the DRV government, even though there were dramatic Viet Minh exploits in Saigon, where power was seized on August 25th, and in Hue where the Viet Minh took control on August 23rd and Bao Dai formally abdicated the royal throne on August 30th to become citizen Vinh Thuy, political advisor to the Provisional Government.

<sup>30</sup> Hoang Van Dao, <u>Viet-Nam Quoc-Dan-Dang</u>, p. 285.

<sup>31</sup> The details of both internal policy and diplomacy are provided by Vo Nguyen Giap in Nhung nam thang khong the nao quen (Hanoi: Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 1970), Vol. I, translated by Mai Elliott, Unforgetable Months and Years, Data Paper: No. 99, Southeast Asia Program (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1975).

<sup>32</sup> Thirty Years of Struggle, p. 95.

The fledging DRV was immediately required to solve the very problems that had brought it to power. The famine had been alleviated by the opening of the granaries, but a disastrous flood occurring at the height of the August Revolution overwhelmed the neglected dikes and flooded much of the Red River Delta. While engaged in a dangerous political contest with the Chinese occupation forces and their Vietnamese clients, the DRV had to take immediate steps to restore agricultural production. The first meeting of the government took place the day after the proclamation of independence. A participant account of this meeting by Vo Nguyen Giap is worth quoting at length:

There was no speech to open the meeting. Uncle took from his pocket a small piece of paper on which he had jotted down his ideas. Casting aside the usual formalities, he immediately dealt with the substance of the meeting.

"Old venerables and young brothers. After 80 years of oppression and exploitation, and because of the French policy of keeping our country and people in ignorance, neither you nor I, nor anyone among us, are familiar with administrative technique. But this does not worry us. We will just learn as we go along and go along as we learn. We will most certainly commit mistakes, but we will correct them; we have the courage to correct our shortcomings. With our deep love for our country and people, I'm sure we'll succeed. At present, what are the most urgent problems? In my opinion, there are six."

Continuing in this simple style, he raised before the Cabinet the most urgent problems. He said:

- "(1) It is necessary to launch a movement to increase production in order to cope with the famine. While we're waiting for the corn and yam harvest which is due in three or four months, we will start a collection of rice. Once every ten days, all the population would go without food for one meal, and the rice thus saved will be collected and distributed to the poor.
  - "(2) We will start a campaign against illiteracy.
- "(3) We will organize, the sooner the better, a general election with universal suffrage to allow the people to exercize their democratic and free rights.

- "(4) We will begin a movement to teach hard work, economy, integrity and honesty in order to eliminate the bad habits left behind by colonialism.
- "(5) We will eliminate immediately the three kinds of taxes: head taxes, market taxes and boat taxes. The smoking of opium must be strictly forbidden.

All the problems were dealt with by Uncle within thirty minutes. The staggering difficulties and complications which had been left behind by the colonialists after 80 years of domination, the life and death matters, and the urgent problems confronting the nation were raised by Uncle in a concise, precise and clear manner, along with the direction in which we should move and at times even the measures to solve them. The comrades who had spent time with Uncle saw that this was his usual working style. 33

The policies and leadership style set at this initial meeting provided the foundations for subsequent policies and work style of the DRV that continued through the Resistance and after Liberation. As General Giap concludes, "Some of the points Uncle raised at that first Cabinet meeting continue to this day to be the great line and policy of our Party and State."34

In terms of gaining experience in government and administration, the first year of the DRV's existence was the rough equivalent to the Yenan experience of the CCP. All the major policy themes which have been at the center of DRV political life since then were confronted in the early days of the DRV administration. Ho summarized these as eliminating the foreign enemy (giac xam), hunger (giac doi) and ill-iteracy (giac dot). "Southward March" (Nam Tien) military volunteers

 $<sup>^{33}</sup>$ Vo Nguyen Giap, <u>Unforgettable</u> <u>Months</u> <u>and</u> <u>Years</u>, p. 33.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

were sent to the South to assist the beleaguered Viet Minh in its struggle against the first French attempts at reconquest. A major agricultural production campaign was launched with the slogan "an inch of earth is an inch of gold." The government directed efforts to reclaim abandoned land, gave to peasants the right to land not being productively utilized by landlords, and sponsored the planting of quick yielding potatoes and legumes to carry the population through the dangerous pre-harvest months when the rice supplies from the previous harvest ran low. 35 These coordinated efforts staved off another famine, and gained further support for the Viet Minh. A massive antiilliteracy campaign was initiated, and the foundations for a general education program were laid. 36 These programs met with universal acclaim and forestalled the possibility of opposing political groups presenting an alternative platform. Just before the scheduled election of Vietnam's first National Assembly in early 1946, the aging Dong Minh Hoi leader, Nguyen Hai Than, was urged by his followers to present a distinctive program to oppose the Viet Minh. In heavily Chinese accented tones, the result of a lifetime of exile in China, he replied: "Ho Chi Minh has said it all."37

<sup>35</sup>A detailed account of this and other governmental actions of 1945-46 can be found in Nguyen Kien Giang, <u>Viet-Nam nam dau tien sau Cach Mang Thang Tam</u> (Vietnam in the First Year after the August Revolution) (Hanoi: Su That, 1961).

 $<sup>^{36}</sup>$ This is discussed in the concluding section dealing with education.

<sup>37&</sup>quot;Ho Chi Minh no noi ca roi." Interview in Saigon with an official of the Japanese sponsored pre-August Revolution government of Tran Trong Kim, and subsequent follower of the VNQDD. August 1971.

Recognizing their political weakness, the pro-Chinese groups accepted a Viet Minh offer of 70 reserved seats in the National Assembly (in addition to the 333 elected delegates). $^{38}$  The VNQDD repaid this concession by misappropriating funds intended to support diplomatic efforts to protect Vietnam's precarious independence and to purchase arms. 39 This and other actions made effective cooperation with the VNQDD difficult, and resulted in their isolation and subsequent defeat. The united front aspect of the DRV government was preserved by the inclusion of non-Viet Minh notables, including the last Imperial Viceroy to North Vietnam, Phan Ke Toai, distinguished intellectual figures such as Hoang Minh Giam, and the eminent figure of Huynh Thuc Khang. Khang who had been closely associated with Phan Chu Trinh and had contacts with Phan Boi Chau, was one of the early revolutionary figures in Central Vietnam, had been imprisoned by the French for anti-colonial activity a decade before Vietnam's modern revolutionary movement came into being, and had attempted to serve as a link between the "new and the old" generations of nationalists in the mid 1920's. 40 To link Vietnam's modern revolution with its anti-colonial

<sup>38</sup> Apercu sur les institutions de la Republique Democratique du Viet-Nam (Hanoi: Editions en langues etrangeres, 1972), pp. 46-47.

<sup>39</sup> The details of this episode are related by Tran Van Tuyen in Hoang Van Dao, Viet-Nam Quoc Dan Dang, pp. 314-315.

<sup>40</sup> Nguyen Q. Thang, <u>Huynh Thuc Khang</u>, <u>con nguoi va thu van</u> (Life and Literary Works of Huynh Thuc Khang) (Saigon: Phu Quoc Vu Khanh Dac Trach Van Hoa, 1972), p. 103.

precursors, Ho made a special effort to persuade Khang to participate in the new government. Khang came to Hanoi but expressed his misgivings about "inter-party conflict" between groups which he viewed as all pursuing the same nationalist objective. His meeting with Ho demonstrates how Ho was able to appeal to the older traditionalist patriotic generation, as well as the younger nationalists:

The first meeting between Uncle and Mr. Huynh was very moving. They both quickened their steps and then embraced each other, tears suddenly filling their eyes. They reminisced about the old Second Laureate [Ho's father] who had travelled North and South on many occasions, braving hardships and difficulties, in those long years of darkness and gloom. And right in the first moments, Mr. Huynh found a very close friend in the famous revolutionary whom he had wanted to meet for so long. After the meeting with Uncle, Mr. Huynh told a friend, "It is a great blessing for our people to have Mr. Ho." He placed his complete faith in Uncle. Though he was much older than Uncle, he always referred to him as "the old father of the nation" whenever he mentioned him. 41

Khang clearly saw Ho as a worthy successor in the scholar-official tradition, and a personality who could provide the linkage between the "old and the new" that he himself had failed to accomplish. For his part, Ho appointed Khang Minister of Interior, and acting President when Ho left for France in an attempt to secure Vietnam's independence. 42

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup>Vo Nguyen Giap, Unforgettable Months and Years, p. 86.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup>Ho's ability to work with traditional patriot-scholars is illustrated in his instructions to Khang prior to departing for France; "I beg you to remember," said Ho, "that 'from an unchanging position one can respond to ten thousand changes'." ("Xin cu nho rang, 'di bat bien ung van bien'."). Nguyen Luong Bang, "Nhung lan gap Bac," (The Times I Met Uncle), in <u>Bac Ho hoi ky</u>, p. 82. This was a polite way of telling Khang in the language of the Chinese classics that he was not expected to take an active role in government, but to serve as a patriotic symbol. (The elderly Khang died the following year).

# China's Third Revolutionary Civil War

The end of the Japanese occupation was followed by renewed civil conflict. The KMT, now equipped with American military supplies, proved an even more formidable opponent. The border region government was even driven out of its base area in Yenan, and the CCP was forced temporarily on the defensive. The theory of "peasant nationalism" cannot explain the dramatic expansion of the CCP in the years of the "third revolutionary civil war" period from 1945 to 1949. Mao later was reported to have recalled, "In 1945 Stalin refused to permit China's carrying out a revolution and said to us: 'Do not have a civil war! Collaborate with Chiang K'ai-shek. Otherwise the Republic of China will collapse'. However, we did not obey him and the revolution succeeded."43

Although the united front lasted until mid-1946, the prospects for a peaceful political settlement between the KMT and CCP were never great, given the nature of the issues that separated them. Po Yi-po, a prominent leader in North China, told Jack Belden in 1947 that "If there had been no <a href="Cheng Feng Movement">Cheng Feng Movement</a>, we might have been cheated by

<sup>43</sup>Cited in Harrison, The Long March to Power, p. 384. In 1958 Mao criticized Stalin's China policy. "The Chinese revolution won victory by acting contrary to Stalin's will. The fake foreign devil [in Lu Hsun's True Story of Ah Q] 'did not allow people to make revolution'. But our Seventh Congress advocated going all out to mobilize the masses to build up all available revolutionary forces in order to establish a new China. During the quarrel with Wang Ming from 1937 to August 1938, we put forward ten great policies, while Wang Ming produced sixty policies. If we had followed Wang Ming's, or in other words Stalin's, methods the Chinese revolution couldn't have succeeded. When our revolution succeeded, Stalin said it was a fake." Stuart Schram, Chairman Mao Talks to the People, pp. 102-103.

Marshall's truce maneuvering and surrendered our democracy to Chiang K'ai-shek."44 From his talks with Po and others, Belden concluded that, "It seems quite obvious that the Communists had decided before the end of the war with Japan that they could compete on an equal basis for power in China."45

One important corollary of the demise of even a formal attempt at united front action was the resumption of a large scale land reform program and intensification of the social revolution. While land reform had been implemented in the base areas, such action was obviously impossible in regions not controlled by the Red Army. At the close of the war, land in many Japanese occupied areas was seized, despite the fact that Party agrarian policy still called for only a program of reduction in rent and interest rates. This was particularly true in Manchuria. William Hinton discovered that in newly liberated areas in Shansi province, formerly occupied by the Japanese, the peasants had gone beyond the official CCP policy and initiated land seizures because of the intense class hatreds that had been exacerbated

Jack Belden, <u>China Shakes the World</u> (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), p. 66. Po added that during the <u>Cheng Feng</u> "it was not a question of seizing power. No such period was before us. It was a question of whether we were going to lead the country or whether we would be led by Chiang K'ai-shek. Finally the <u>Cheng Feng</u> taught us that the Chinese Communist party must have its own principles. It was not necessary that we travel the same road as the Soviet Union." <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 67.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Chao Kuo-chun, Agrarian Policy of the CCP, 1921-1959 (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 76-77.

by the wartime collaboration of the gentry. "This increasingly explosive force was channeled for a time into forms of attack against the gentry that did not formally violate the provisions of 'double reduction' yet nevertheless transferred land from the gentry to the peasants."

At the end of 1945 Mao wrote, "The directive on arousing mass struggle recently issued by the Jehol Provincial Party

Committee may be applied in the Northeast. Our Party must bring tangible material benefits to the people in the Northeast: only then will the masses support us and oppose the Kuomintang attacks. Otherwise the masses will be unable to see clearly which of the two parties, the Kuomintang or the Communist Party, is good and which is bad, may be taken in for a time by deceitful Kuomintang propaganda and may even turn against our Party, and thus an extremely unfavorable situation would be created for us in the Northeast."

After the Nationalist offensive of mid-1946 broke the tenuous military truce, the CCP implemented a more radical land reform.

William Hinton, <u>Fanshen</u> (New York: Vintage, 1968), p. 130. Hinton notes that cadres at the county level "saw the Anti-Traitor Movement as an initial skirmish in an all-out war against the landlords as a class and tried to guide it in that direction," while the active peasants "saw it only as a movement for revenge of wartime injuries." <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 125. His narrative demonstrates that the poor peasants retaliated against both the gentry and less well off villagers. Sharpening the class line, they ultimately narrowed the focus to the gentry, with the results cited above.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup>Mao Tse-tung, <u>Selected Works</u>, Vol. IV, pp. 82-83. The urgency of utilizing appeals based on class interests, is evidenced by Belden's statement that Chiang K'ai-shek "still had a reservoir of prestige, especially in the Japanese occupied areas." <u>China Shakes the World</u>, p. 67.

"Leftist" deviations in the land policy, later ascribed to Liu Shaoch'i became prevalent in 1947. These errors were corrected by a softening of the line in 1948, and a repudiation of "leftist deviations." Hinton wrote, "If the earlier emphasis had been on the first of Mao's principles ("satisfy the demands of the poor and hired peasants"), now the second of them ("there must be firm unity with the middle peasants and their interests must not be damaged") had been brought into focus."

"The land reform movement of the late 1940's," writes Harrison,
"was second in importance only to military strategy as a component
of Communist victory in the civil war because successful united front
policy, Party-building, and especially mass support hinged on it."<sup>50</sup>
In 1948 Mao observed that, "the peasants stood with our Party and our
army against the attacks of Chiang K'ai-shek's troops [wherever]
... the land problem was solved radically and thoroughly," and
reported that 1.6 million peasants who had obtained land had joined
the army.<sup>51</sup> Nieh Jung-chen summarized the importance of the social
revolution to the CCP war strategy in late 1947 when he said, "land
reform supports the war and the war is basically for land reform."<sup>52</sup>

Hinton, Fanshen, p. 412. A detailed explanation of the actual impact of the change in land policy is found in Ibid., pp. 400-416.

<sup>50</sup> Harrison, The Long March to Power, p. 406.

<sup>51</sup> Cited in Ibid.

<sup>52</sup>Cited in <u>Ibid</u>.

Land reform and the support of the peasants were not the only factors in the CCP victory. Heavy handed KMT repression and the economic disruption of the war had a strong impact in the urban areas, particularly among students and civil servants. As one account of the period describes the situation, "Student and teacher alike turned on the war as the chief cause of the country's economic plight and their Contrary to its attitude during the eight years of the anti-Japanese resistance, the intellectual community was unwilling to accept as readily as the personal sacrifices which the Civil War made necessary."<sup>53</sup> In 1947 student demonstrations to "resolve the crisis in education" took place in Nanking and Shanghai and a student movement to "oppose Civil War, oppose hunger" was initiated in Peiping and Tientsin. 54 These movements were followed in 1948 by a nationwide series of student strikes, designated the "Anti-Oppression Anti-Hunger Movement."55 Although only a small number of students favored the establishment of a communist government, they were sufficiently affected by the dislocations of the civil war to urge an immediate end to it, and an abandonment of the KMT policy of military victory. 56

Suzanne Pepper, "The Student Movement and the Chinese Civil War, 1945-49," in The China Quarterly, No. 48, October/December 1971, p. 712.

<sup>54&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

<sup>55&</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>., p. 720.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup>Ibid., pp. 732-35. Ambassador Leighton Stuart wrote in February 1948 that direct communist influence in the student movement was a marginal factor in the agitation. He wrote that, "In each instance of civil unrest, an organized group appeared convinced that the government had acted unreasonably and arbitrarily against [the] group's economic or political interests. Government made no adequate arrangements for the orderly settlement of points at issue, leaving [the] group no alternative except to abandon [its] demands or present them through mass action." Cited in Ibid., p. 730.

Final victory over the KMT was achieved through a combination of factors, including the peasant support gained by land reform policies, and the rapid erosion of the KMT base of support by its repression and economic impoverishment of the Chinese urban middle class. 57 CCP victory was essentially gained in North China, however. In most areas south of the Yangtse, the KMT defeat came in the final climax of the war, and was directly attributable to CCP political and military successes in other areas. In the end it was the People's Liberation Army crossing the Yangtse that liberated the southern provinces, and a host of accompanying Northern cadres that administered them.

The period of the "third revolutionary civil war" is indispensible in understanding the success of the CCP. If "peasant nationalism" had been a factor in their expansion during the Japanese occupation, this theory cannot explain the rapid expansion and military victories of the CCP after 1945. In both the 1937-45 and 1945-49 phases, the growth of the Party was impressive. Reduced from a membership of 300,000 in 1934 to 40,000 by the end of the Long March, Party membership rose to over a million in 1945 (1,211,128). By October 1949, Party membership had risen to nearly four and half million (4,488,080). This impressive post-war growth was due primarily to the appeal of the CCP social

This evolution is vividly chronicled in Derk Bodde, <u>Peking Diary</u> (New York: Fawcett, 1967).

<sup>58</sup> Franz Schurmann, <u>Ideology and Organization in Communist China</u> (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), p. 129.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

evolution to increasing numbers of Chinese, and to the improved military position of the Chinese Communists who, after 1945, possessed the power to protect the political gains they had made carrying out rural social revolution.

Another important aspect of the final five years of the preLiberation period is the uneven regional spread of CCP control. After
the KMT occupation of Yenan in March 1947, the Party Central Committee
was split into two groups, one led by Mao, one by Liu Shao-ch'i. To
a degree this was a continuation of the wartime distribution of responsibility between the base areas and underground guerrilla work. The
result was a lack of communication between the two groups that may
have contributed to variances in policy, and planted seeds of discord
that subsequently surfaced in the Cultural Revolution. Finally,
the vast disparities in CCP growth in North and South China created
difficulties for the PRC in its early years, since land reform and
other policies already accomplished in the North had to be carried out,
and few trained local cadres were available to provide the leadership
for this complex process of social transformation.

#### Revolutionary Victory

In the case of the JCP, the seizure of power and establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was not accompanied by a thoroughgoing period of social transformation. The external threats from

This is discussed in a following section on concepts of leadership. Harrison notes that there were no full fledged Central Committee meetings held between mid-1945 and early 1949, and only two important formal Party meetings during this period, The Long March to Power, p. 400.

foreign occupying forces during the first year of its existence, and the urgent necessity of increasing agricultural production diverted attention from the social revolution. Patriotic landlords and rich peasants played a key role in the Resistance Committees in the struggle against the French. A moderate rent reduction policy was the only important class oriented program for the first years of the Resistance, and it was not until 1953 that a land reform program was instituted.

A Party summary of the lessons learned during the Vietnamese revolution listed three basic mistakes of the Resistance period. The first was that, "From the August Revolution to 1949, the understanding of the role of the peasantry was insufficient, and the importance of the rural areas in the Resistance was not fully appreciated. Because of this there was some degree of disregarding the anti-feudal question (not zealously carrying out the rent reduction and carrying out the land reform a little late). Thus although the peasants were given attention (boi duong) it was still not sufficient, and it affected the revolutionary enthusiasm of the peasants. 62

A second error was that for a few months in 1950 "the concept of a protracted and self-sufficient war of Resistance was not thoroughly grasped, so that in the face of the stormy advance of the Chinese Liberation Army in liberating South China, we immaturely and rashly felt that we could take advantage of that situation to launch a general

This possibly refers to the failure to organize peasants in the Delta during this period, and excessive reliance on regular troops in sparsely populated mountain base areas.

 $<sup>62</sup>_{\underline{\text{Tom}}}$  tat 1ich su Dang, pp. 105-106.

A major campaign against French positions in the highland regions North of Hanoi was launched. While this campaign did force the French to withdraw from their exposed positions, it also resulted in a major shift of French strategy which gave priority to pacifying the populated regions of the Red River Delta, and made severe inroads on the Viet Minh position there in 1951-52. A slightly different assessment is presented in the updated official Party history, Forty Years of Party Activity. This document presents the border campaign of 1950 as a "resounding victory" and quotes Ho as saying "we not only looked at the present, but also looked at the future" and "resolved to answer the doubters and pessimists." Nevertheless, the official history also notes the tendency to assume that the fallout effect of China's victory would give a decisive impetus to Vietnam's revolution, <sup>64</sup> which gave rise to "incorrect attitudes among cadres and Party members about the length of the Resistance War and a lack of unanimity about the program of preparing to move strongly into a general offensive." These attitudes were a major object of discussion in the Party's Second Congress, convened in early 1951.

The Second Party Congress marked a turning point in the Vietnamese revolution. The Indochinese Communist Party, which had been formally dissolved in late 1945 to allay the fears of non-communists in the

<sup>63&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid., p. 106</sub>.

<sup>64&</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>. The history states that, "The victories of our Army and people were closely connected with the victories in the world revolutionary movement. The prestige of our Party and government was constantly increasing in the international arena." The error was evidently in overestimating the importance of external events and not correctly analyzing the internal situation.

newly formed government, was reconstituted as the Vietnam Workers

Party (Dang Lao Dong Viet-Nam). 65 This move was accompanied by

more emphasis on class background for Party recruitment, which had

been generally ignored in the first phase of the Resistance. As the

Party later concluded, the third major lesson of the Resistance period

was:

In building the Party there were also times when insufficient attention was paid to education that would clarify the class nature and vanguard character of the Party, thus to a certain extent confusion was created among a number of Party members on the class character and because of this the class and vanguard nature of the Party was not sufficiently developed. At times the development of the Party was heavy on quantity and light on quality, and did not pay sufficient attention to education (giao duc). 66

At the Second Congress, it was determined that the character of the revolution had changed from a "bourgeois democratic revolution" to a "people's national revolution." From this basic change in orientation flowed a series of related decisions. The broad Lien Viet Front and the Party-dominated Viet Minh Front were amalgamated in March 1951. In

Truong Chinh, citing one of Ho's instructions to Party members during the early Resistance period, notes that Ho uses the word "the group" (doan the) to indicate the Party, and "association members" (hoi vien) to indicate Party members. He explains, "You must remember Chairman Ho wrote 'Revising the Work Style' at a time when our Party was not yet operating openly, so he had to use this euphemism." Truong Chinh, Ho Chu Tich, lanh tu kinh yeu cua giai cap cong nhan va nhan dan Viet-Nam (Chairman Ho, Beloved Leader of the Vietnamese Working Class and People) (Hanoi: Su That, 1970), p. 54.

<sup>66</sup> Tom tat lich su Dang, pp. 106-107.

 $<sup>^{67}</sup>$ The implications of this are discussed in the next section.

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1952 the Central Committee initiated the "three consolidations" (of the Party, the military, and mass organizations) and, in 1953 the Land Reform program was instituted.

All these decisions were based on a Party view that patriotic appeals were not in themselves sufficient to defeat the French. A significant number of urban youths who had joined the Resistance in the first flush of nationalist enthusiasm at the prospect of an independent Vietnam began to tire of the prolonged struggle. In 1950-51 many left the Viet Bac base areas and returned to the French controlled zone. The Viet Minh leadership made the decision to concentrate on building a more solid class base of support, on the theory that those who stood to gain most from the revolution were the ones that would most willingly endure the sacrifices necessary to achieve victory.

For the first time since the early days of the ICP, the antifeudal aspect of the revolution became a key factor in the expansion and survival of the revolutionary movement. Party recruitment was suspended in 1950 and a "consolidation" of Party ranks, which had expanded from 5,000 in 1945 to 700,000 in 1950, was undertaken. 68

French political efforts to divide the Resistance forces arrayed against them had also an effect. Some important religious and sect groups entered into alliances with the French, the urban youths were increasingly reluctant to join the revolutionary forces, some because of the hardships entailed in joining and others because they saw their class interests threatened by the revolution. Minor political concessions to

 $<sup>^{\</sup>mbox{68}}$  The composition of the Party is discussed in detail in the following section.

indigenous "autonomy" raised the hopes of the Viet Minh's nationalist opponents that the French could be used to hold off the Viet Minh while they maneuvered to power and gained independence by non revolutionary means. By relying on the French however, the Viet Minh's opponents lost their remaining credibility as a nationalist political force.

While the Party (now the Dang Lao Dong Viet-Nam (LDP) or Vietnam Workers' Party) was placing more emhpasis on class line and the antifeudal mission, they simultaneously emerged as the uncontested champions of the Vietnamese nationalist movement. The intensification of the anti-feudal aspect of the revolution was accompanied by a corresponding elevation of the Viet Minh role in carrying out the anti-imperialist revolution. But unlike the last phase of the revolution in China, where intellectuals and the urban middle class increasingly turned away from the KMT and toward the CCP, in Vietnam the urban groups simply opted out of political life and became spectators in the struggle between the Viet Minh and the French, leaving de Lattre de Tassigny to cry out in despair that at least the youths on the Viet Minh side "fight well for a bad cause."

Though the anti-feudal aspect of the Vietnamese revolution was given more prominent attention after 1951, it remained subordinate to the goal of defeating the French and winning independence. The Land Reform and reduction of interest and rent were important in gaining

<sup>69</sup> Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 116.

additional support for Viet Minh military operations. <sup>70</sup> It also led to a large scale transfer of resources into the DRV war budget. In 1953, receipts for the first time exceeded expenditures by "tens of thousands of tons of paddy." <sup>71</sup> The intensification of indoctrination in the armed forces was not intended as a purge of its ranks but to lift morale and strengthen unity. <sup>72</sup> In many ways the post-1951 policies of the LDP had the same impact as the CCP Rectification Campaign in Yenan. It tightened discipline during a period of difficulties, and provided a clear ideological guideline to strengthen internal solidarity, at a critical phase of the revolution.

It is still not clear to what extent the institution of the Land
Reform program contributed to the success of the Vietnamese revolution.

Land reform and rent reduction gained support for the Viet Minh which, in turn, allowed them to expand their zone of control and mobilize more adherents. After being temporarily suppressed in the Red River Delta in 1950-51, the Viet Minh forces there grew to a strength of 80,000 by late 1953. Control of villages in four key delta provinces rose from 600 (out of 2,700 villages) in 1952 to nearly 1,500 in mid-1953. Jean Chesneaux, Contributions a 1'histoire de la nation vietnamienne (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1955), p. 305. This expansion was not, however, directly related to the land reform program which was only beginning to be implemented in late 1953.

<sup>71</sup> Lich su Quan Doi Nhan Dan, p. 517.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup>The DRV official history of the People's Army states that "Through study, the cadres and soldiers made great advances ideologically, developed a spirit of taking charge (lam chu), and eliminated all traces of the self-serving mentality. The cadres and soldiers who came from the exploiting classes determinedly 'transformed themselves to the core' (thay xuong doi cot) and resolutely cast aside the influence of the exploiting class ideology, and held firmly to the standpoint of the proletarian class to reform themselves into good cadres and soldiers." <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 520.

One indication that it did not play a decisive role is that when the land reform was accelerated after Liberation, large numbers of rural cadres were attacked on class grounds. The negative inference to be drawn from this fact is that the land reform did not fundamentally change the social and economic structure of rural Vietnam prior to 1954. Further evidence of the persistent influence of the traditional rural elite came during the cooperativization campaign, which demonstrated that even the post-Liberation land reform had not effected a complete transformation of rural society. And, finally, a study of the composition of the LDP in 1959 showed that the "vast majority" of members had been in the Party over ten years, that is, before more stringent class criteria were instituted and prior to the land reform.

Despite the new policy measures and military successes, victory was not won easily. While the French position had been irretrievably eroded, the prospects of an extended prolongation of the war led Ho and the LDP to decide in October 1953 to "open a diplomatic front." The Central Committee directed that "the flag of peace must be grasped by our hand and raised high," and that "we must absolutely not nurture the illusion that peace will come quickly and easily."

Dien Bien Phu furnished another hallowed battlefield in Vietnam's pantheon of defeats administered to foreign occupiers. But the Geneva

<sup>73</sup> This is discussed in a later section.

<sup>74</sup>Nhan Dan, November 28, 1959.

<sup>75</sup>Lich su Quan Doi Nhan Dan, p. 535.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup><u>Ibid.</u>, p. 536.

Agreements left Vietnam a divided country, thus ensuring the continued dominance of the anti-imperialist aspect of Vietnam's revolution. The extent to which the postponement of reunification influenced internal DRV policy after 1954 cannot be known with certainty. The continued existence of a foreign supported regime in the Southern half of Vietnam, however, not only evidenced a failure to complete the national democratic revolution, but increasingly represented a threat to the security of the socialist North.

While China's victory was more decisive, leaving only the irredenta of Taiwan, the uneven evolution of the CCP success left a legacy of post-Liberation problems. Only in the scattered base areas, mostly in North China, was there a strong local CCP presence that could quickly be transformed into a governing body. In many areas occupied by the Japanese, notably Manchuria, the clandestine resistance networks later posed problems of political integration, and led to charges of setting up "independent kingdoms." And in Southern China, where the CCP strength had been nearly eliminated in the 1930's, political and administrative cadres had to be brought in from the outside, and a local base of support built up in the course of the post-Liberation land reform. As the PRC came to power in 1949, the problems of political integration in China were as diverse as the elements of its revolution.

In the DRV, the revolutionary movement had been much more evenly developed, because of Vietnam's smaller size and the anti-colonial nature of the revolution. Moreover, the regroupment of Viet Minh adherents from the South after the Geneva settlement gave the DRV an additional source of trained and reliable cadres. The de-facto division

of Vietnam into "free zones" (vung tu do) controlled by the Viet Minh, and "temporarily occupied zones" (vung tam chiem) controlled to some degree by the French, also created problems of integration. But these zones were not large and could easily be staffed by Viet Minh supporters who had operated clandestinely in the area, or cadres from adjacent districts in the same province. 77 Most importantly, the revolutionary movement had come to power not as a victor in a bitter civil war, but as the widely acknowledged representative of Vietnam's long tradition of struggle to attain national independence. 78

The most fundamental contrast between these two Asian revolutions is that China's represented a conscious breaking with tradition, and was basically inner-directed, while the Vietnamese revolution grew out of a historical tradition of scholar-official opposition to foreign occupation, and was initiated and carried to victory by leaders who had been steeped in that tradition and viewed themselves as the guardians

As in the case of China, the absence of a strong resistance movement in some areas actually proved to be an advantage, since there were fewer cadres from landlord and rich peasant backgrounds whose interests were threatened by the subsequent land reform and Cooperativization programs. In China, however, most of those problems occurring in the base areas had been resolved prior to Liberation in various rectification movements.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup>While the issue of Vietnamese nationalism is complex, it can be said that though there were Vietnamese fighting against the Viet Minh and opposing them politically, most of these opponents recognized that their cause had been hopelessly compromised by their reliance on French support, and that the Viet Minh had become the true representatives of Vietnamese nationalism. For evidence of Vietnamese noncommunist views on this subject, see D. Gareth Porter, "Crisis of Legitimacy," in Sam Brown and Len Ackland, eds., Why Are We Still in Vietnam? (New York: Vintage, 1970).

of a "transmitted tradition" (truyen thong) of Vietnamese nationalism. Just as the Chinese experience of civil strife and social revolution was to condition the CCP's outlook as a government in power, so the anti-imperialist and traditionalist background of the Vietnamese leaders shaped the political course set by the DRV after regaining power in 1954.

# PART TWO

POST-LIBERATION INTEGRATION: CONCEPTS AND POLICIES

### SECTION I

### THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE POST-LIBERATION STATE

In China as well as in Vietnam, revolutionary victory and the establishment of a governing regime presented both leaderships with complex problems of political integration. After the turmoil of a prolonged revolutionary struggle, the disparate elements of each society had to be reintegrated into the new framework. This process had both a vertical and a horizontal dimension. The vertical linkages between the leaders and the led, center and locality, and between social classes would have to be strengthened or rearranged. Simultaneously the horizontal ties between the various regions of each country and between ethnic and religious minority groups and the majority community would have to be revitalized, and areas where the revolution had not been able to develop bonded with the revolutionary strongholds into a stable political and administrative system.

Differences in the nature of each revolution, and distinctive paths of political development in each country persisted even after Liberation, and resulted in somewhat different approaches to those problems of integration. The main distinction between the two cases was that only half of Vietnam's territory had come under the administrative control of the DRV, while the Chinese had succeeded in liberating all of their territory but the province of Taiwan. This

Tibet retained semi-autonomy until 1959, but its anomalous position did not substantially affect post-Liberation Chinese policies of political integration.

meant that the first (national democratic) stage of Vietnam's revolution remained uncompleted in the South, and the North was obliged to take this into account in embarking on the second stage of the "socialist revolution." Although Taiwan remained a central problem in China's foreign relations, it did not significantly influence internal political integration policies. In Vietnam, the unresolved problem of the South continued to affect internal politics even after the DRV had assumed full control of the North after the Geneva Agreements.

While China quickly moved from its "people's democratic" revolution to a post-Liberation program of pursuing the second revolutionary stage, of "socialist revolution," the Vietnamese set themselves a somewhat different task. As one DRV commentator later wrote, "The North began its socialist revolution while the South was still under the yoke of the imperialists and their agents. The new task that confronted the Vietnamese people was to accomplish the national democratic revolution in the entire country." In China the victory of the first revolutionary phase was considered to be complete. Looking beyond this triumph to the second stage of the revolution, Mao cautioned that, "To win countrywide victory is only the first step in a long march of ten thousand li." He predicted that, "After several decades, the victory

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Tran Phuong, "The Land Reform," <u>Vietnamese Studies</u> No. 7, 1965, p. 189.

Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Vol. IV, p. 374.

of the Chinese people's democratic revolution, viewed in retrospect, will seem like only a brief prologue to a long drama." The main theme of the drama was Mao's attempt to find a successful Chinese strategy for building socialism.

## Development of the Concept of the Two Stage Revolution

One of the basic points of doctrine on which all the early

Communist revolutionaries were agreed was the concept of the two stage

revolution. The bourgeois-democratic revolution to overthrow the

feudalists and imperialists would be followed by the socialist revolu
tion in which all forms of exploitation would be eliminated. As

noted in the preceding section, all revolutionary parties in Vietnam

subscribed to the idea of a two stage revolution (though the non
Communist VNQDD's [Viet-Nam Quoc Dan Dang, or Vietnamese Kuomintang]

concept of the second stage was somewhat different from that of the

Communist Youth League and Tan Viet parties).

Ho Chi Minh introduced a rudimentary version of the two stage revolution in his book, The Revolutionary Path in 1926. He explained that there was a "national revolution" and a "class revolution," and illustrated the concept by explaining that success in the Vietnamese revolution would aid the French revolution and the reverse. 5 Because

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Pham Thanh Vinh, "Ho Chu Tich voi tinh yeu nuoc thuong noi khong bo ben da phat cao ngon co quyen dan toc va quyen song cua con nguoi," (Chairman Ho, With Boundless Patriotic Spirit and Loving His Country, His People, Has Raised High the Flag of National Rights and the Right to Live of Human Beings), Nha nuoc va phap luat (The State and the Law) (Hanoi: Lao Dong, 1971), pp. 64-65.

the framework of the "revolution" was still international in scope, the distinction between two stages within a colonial country was not sharply drawn. The "class revolution" pertained primarily to the proletariat of the industrialized countries while the "nationalist revolution" applied more to the colonized countries. 6 As the doctrinal debates between contending revolutionary factions in Vietnam became sharper, the idea of the two stage revolution became the principal common ground of the disparate revolutionary groups. At the famous 1930 "unification congress" in Hong Kong which established the Vietnamese Communist Party (soon renamed the Indochinese Communist Party), Ho listened for an hour to the details of the factional rivalries. Finally Ho terminated the arguments, "We won't talk about these matters," he said, "I have come here with the mission of unifying all the communist forces. The program of the communists is like this: first make the bourgeois democratic revolution and then make the socialist revolution. Do you comrades accept this?"

The famous Lenin-Roy debates at the Second Congress of the Comintern concerned Lenin's contention that revolutions in underdeveloped colonial and semi-colonial countries could succeed only if the proletarian-led revolutions in the industrialized West succeeded first. Because of the backward peasant economies of these countries, said Lenin, the communist revolutions would need to strengthen the bourgeois nationalist party movements in order to succeed. The implication was that the two stages of revolution referred not only to the sequence in which revolutionary tasks would be carried out in each country but also to the differences between advanced and underdeveloped countries in the first stage of revolution. Industrialized countries were closer to the socialist revolution, while underdeveloped countries were in the initial stage of the national revolution. Cf. Helene Carrere d'Encausse and Stuart R. Schram, Marxism and Asia (London: Penguin, 1969), pp. 27-31.

<sup>7&</sup>quot;Mot vai net ve Chi Bo dau tien cua Dang va ve Dong Duong Cong San Dang," (Some Aspects of the First Chapter of the Party and About the Indochinese Communist Party), Nhan Dan, January 16, 1965.

The two stage revolution was, therefore, the central doctrinal tenet of the unified communist movement in Vietnam. This concept was developed in greater detail by Tran Phu, the Party's first Secretary General (and one of Ho's first pupils in Marxist-Leninist theory) in the Party Program of 1930. This document defined the basic revolutionary strategy as proceeding from the "bourgeois-democratic revolution" (tu san dan quyen cach mang) to the subsequent stage of making a "socialist revolution" (xa hoi chu nghia cach mang). The terminology was translated from similar Chinese terms by Ho in the course of editing the newspaper Thanh Nien in Hong Kong in the mid-1920's. The literal meaning was "bourgeois people's rights revolution" and "socialist doctrine revolution."

In the early revolutionary experience of the Chinese Communist Party, the concept of the two stage revolution was complicated by debates over the role of non-Communist nationalists in the revolution, and by transformations within the Comintern as Stalin consolidated his power. As Benjamin Schwartz observes, "while Trotsky tends to draw the 'backward areas' into what he regards as a unitary historic process, while he tends to exaggerate the extent to which the backward areas are already dominated by 'capitalist relations', Stalin, the 'empiric', is quite willing to perceive that the world process has not yet merged into a single drama." Stalin, therefore, in the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>Pham Thanh Vinh, in <u>Nha nuoc va phap luat</u>, p. 65.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>Benjamin I. Schwartz, <u>Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao</u> (New York: Harper, 1967), p. 88.

mid-1920's urged a continuation of CCP efforts to ally with bourgeois nationalist groups.

By 1940 Mao's analysis of the Chinese Revolution asserted that at the time of the founding of the CCP in 1921, the leadership of the Chinese Revolution had ceased to be a bourgeois democratic revolution of the old type and had become a "new democratic revolution," an integral part of the world socialist revolution. 10 The concept of "new democracy" was a product of Mao's thought in the 1930's and 1940's. In the 1920's Mao not only had used the conventional Marxist-Leninist formulation, but had not at first thoroughly grasped the implications of the two stage concept. In 1923 his nationalism led him to exclude only the "militarists" from participation in the national revolution against the foreigners. 11 By 1926 he had adopted an extreme "leftist" position of stating that "the attitude of the various classes in China toward the national revolution is virtually identical with the attitude of the various classes in Europe toward the social revolution," implying that the proletarian leadership of China's revolution was considerably more developed than it was in fact. 12 Mao shortly thereafter concluded that the KMT had lost the leadership of the revolution in the great political

Stuart R. Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 67. Schram comments, "the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat during the two stages of the revolution - 'bourgeois democratic' and socialist - is the least original aspect of Mao's thought. What is original is the skill with which, since 1939 at least, Mao has navigated between the two extremes of sacrificing proletariam (i.e., communist) hegemony and excommunicating the bourgeoisie altogether." Ibid., pp. 67-68.

<sup>11 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 202-203.

<sup>12&</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 214.

upheavals of 1926-27 when reactionary elements seized hold of the KMT and "changed the nature of the revolution." His conclusion was that "China is in urgent need of a bourgeois democratic revolution and this revolution can only be completed under the leadership of the proletariat." From this time on, the CCP would not subordinate its interests to those of bourgeois elements in a united front partnership.

Mao achieved a workable and original balance between "an excessively sectarian attitude and subordination to the bourgeoisie" in his important statement on New Democracy, which he defined as "a revolution of the united front of social classes." This formulation allowed Mao to achieve a middle ground between excessive reliance on other political forces, and exclusive reliance on CCP leadership during the difficult period of the late 1930's and early 1940's. It also fitted the united front into the framework of the two stage revolution. Mao cautioned that "some immature communists think that the present task - the democratic revolution - is our only task, and that we do not have to face that of the socialist revolution at the future stage, or they think that the present revolution or the agrarian revolution is in fact the socialist revolution. It must be emphatically pointed out that both views are

<sup>13&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 202.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

erroneous."17

After Ho's return to Vietnam in 1941, the Indochinese Communist
Party also confronted the related problems of re-defining the class
nature of their revolution and analyzing how far they had progressed
in the first stage of the revolution. The Viet Minh Front was established in 1941 as a Vietnamese version of the multi-class united front
alliance. The task of the Viet Minh Front was to overthrow the Japanese
and the French and "establish a government of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam in the spirit of New Democracy (Tan Dan Chu)."

This was the
conceptual foundation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam set up in
1945.

Ho's use of the term New Democracy probably owed something to his stay in China in 1938-40, when this idea was being developed by Mao. But the context in which it was employed was significantly different. Unlike the Chinese, the Vietnamese did not have to face strong political competition from "bourgeois" nationalist parties. As noted above, Vietnamese Party leaders and historians assert that the bourgeois nationalist movement was definitively eliminated from a position of revolutionary leadership after the abortive VNQDD Yen Bai revolt of 1930.

<sup>17 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 233. Mao continues, "Every communist must know that the Chinese Communist movement as a whole is a complete revolutionary movement embracing the two revolutionary stages, democratic and socialist, which are two revolutionary processes differing in character, and that the socialist stage can be reached only after the democratic stage is completed." <u>Ibid.</u>

Van Tao, Thanh The Vy, and Nguyen Cong Binh, <u>Lich su Cach Mang</u>
Thang Tam (History of the August Revolution) (Hanoi: Su Hoc, 1960), p. 92.

New Democracy in China had a different political meaning. Because the CCP still faced a formidable political rival, it needed to compete with the KMT for support from other political sectors. Van Slyke claims that:

The ancestor of the New Democracy was the democratic republic that the CCP had called for in 1936, and its lineage can be traced down through On Coalition Government [1945] and On the People's Democratic Dictatorship [1949]. It provided the theoretical framework that tied together the actual actions of the CCP in the areas under its control and the actions it was calling for in areas under KMT control. New Democracy was therefore, an important part of the domestic political program that had already been discussed... The timing of On the New Democracy, the substance of which was anticipated in earlier statements, was influenced by the constitutional movement in KMT China. The September 1939 session of the PCC [People's Consultative Conference] had passed a resolution sponsored by the CCP and others that requested constitutional rule. In November 1940, On the New Democracy therefore appears as the CCP entry in this contest, one that it would certainly not wish to leave to the KMT alone. It was both a bid for support (away from the KMT) and a statement of the kind of. multi-class coalition regime that the CCP desired to lead and to expand. 19

Thus, while the terminology was the same in Vietnam and China, the social and political context was quite different. China's New Democracy was a strategy in the struggle with its KMT rivals, as well as an expression of its united front policy, while Vietnam's New Democracy was little more than a terminological appendage to its attempt to rally all political forces under ICP leadership to join the struggle to oust the Japanese and French and establish an independent Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

<sup>19</sup>Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends, pp. 111-112.

New Democracy continued to characterize the Vietnamese view of state organization until the constitutional revision of 1959, though the term was infrequently used. In the interim, the basic characterization of the nature of Vietnam's revolutionary development underwent a significant terminological change. In 1945 the ICP had been formally dissolved in the interests of emphasizing the united front aspect of the government and allaying the misgivings of the non-communists in the governing coalition. This cosmetic act was possible precisely because of the dominant political position of the Viet Minh which made overt Party rule unnecessary. 20 After being driven out of Hanoi and becoming a Resistance government, the Viet Minh kept the Party in the background until 1951 when it was re-introduced to the public, and the class aspect of the revolution given greater prominence. The official Party history records that, "This was the first time that our Party observed that the bourgeois democratic revolution in a country such as our is called people's national democratic revolution [cach mang dan toc dan chu nhan dan]."21

<sup>20</sup> 

A DRV historian writes that, "In the face of the heavy pressure exerted by the Chiang Kai-shek group with regard to the continued existence of our Party, this was an excellent measure to help our Party avoid the brunt of their attack. At that time, either the Party continued to operate openly, in which case the Chiang Kai-shek group would use the excuse of 'opposing communism' to suppress the Vietnamese revolution and destroy our Party; or the Party had to sacrifice its name to preserve its forces and continue to lead the revolution. The Central Committee, headed by Chairman Ho, made a timely decision to follow the second course of action." Nguyen Kien Giang, Viet-Nam nam dau tien sau cach mang thang tam, p. 130.

<sup>21</sup>Bon muoi nam hoat dong cua Dang, p. 57.

The change of terminology from "bourgeois democratic" to "people's national democratic" revolution was meant to emphasize the anti-colonial liberation struggle, whose purpose was not to secure rights within the framework of the French-dominated state, but to completely eliminate French control on behalf of "the people." Since the bourgeoisie as a class did not play a significant role in this liberation struggle, the revolution would not be detained in an effort to secure their support, but would begin to prepare for the second or socialist stage of the revolution, even as they were struggling to complete the first. Truong Chinh's political report to the Second Party Congress noted that the people's national democratic revolution would not only resolve the antiimperialist and anti-feudalist problems of Vietnam's revolution, but would "simultaneously sow the seeds of socialism and create conditions for advancing toward socialism."  $^{22}$  The people's national-democratic revolution was seen as a link between the anti-colonial revolution and the establishment of a socialist state. In Truong Chinh's words, it would "fulfill the bourgeois-democratic mission and progressively be transformed into a socialist revolution."23

This change was made necessary, in part, by the intensification of the war and the new mobilization strategies required to counter French

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23&</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>. By this time Ho's early transcription of the "bourgeois rights revolution" (tu san dan quyen cach mang) had been changed to "people's democratic revolution" and the word order had been Vietnamized "cach mang dan toc dan chu nhan dan." (In Vietnamese the noun "revolution" precedes its qualifiers.)

pacification efforts. In order to counteract the flagging support of the urban middle class for the costly and prolonged resistance, the Communist Party leadership publicly re-emerged in the form of the Lao Dong (Workers') Party and the Viet Minh Front was transformed into the Lien Viet Front. These moves strengthened Party leadership of the revolution at the top and re-structured the Front organizations at the bottom. The purpose was to ask for greater sacrifices from those who stood to gain most from the revolution. As the editor of Nhan Dan later put it, the Party had changed from a clandestine illegal Party to one which had control of a state apparatus and an army, and was leading mass membership organizations.

The Second Party Congress determined that, "the direct revolutionary mission of the Party at that time was to carry the Resistance to victory. The organization and activities of a party operating clandestinely and those of a party leading a State have many points of great difference."<sup>24</sup> As a government in control of a state apparatus administering the resistance areas, the DRV was able to put policies into effect that would retain and strengthen peasant support, despite the escalating hardships of the resistance. General Vo Nguyen Giap recalled that the Party saw that it was necessary to carry out a land reform while the resistance struggle was still going on (although the Land Reform campaign did not reach its peak until 1955-1956). It recognized that "the national

<sup>24</sup>Hoang Tung, "Muc dich viec sua doi dieu le Dang," (The Object of Revising Party Regulations), Nhan Dan, March 31, 1960.

problem was basically the peasant problem" and only because of this was the victory of the revolution ensured. The Party, Giap observed, affirmed that the principal ideological thrust of the land policy was "to satisfy the needs of the working peasants, while at the same time paying attention to the anti-imperialist mission, and of the policy of the National United Front."

Nguyen Duy Trinh later remarked that, "In order to realize the anti-feudal mission, we had to pay attention to motivating the masses, most importantly ideologically motivating the peasants, and getting the peasants to struggle to reclaim political prestige and land so that they could really become the masters of the countryside. In this way the worker-peasant alliance was consolidated, so that it was able to become the foundation of the National United Front and the base of support for the national democratic government."<sup>27</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>Vo Nguyen Giap, Speech on the Resolution of the Party 10th Plenum, Nhan Dan, October 31, 1956.

<sup>26&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

<sup>27</sup> 

Nguyen Duy Trinh, "Phat huy truyen thong doan ket phan dau cua Dang" (Develop the Tradition of Unity and Struggle of the Party), Nhan Dan, March 4, 1957. As a result of French military efforts to isolate the Viet Minh zones, and a change in French strategy from assaults on Viet Minh base areas to pacification in the populated delta region, the Viet Minh were able to transform the guerrilla war character of life in the base areas to that of a regularized governmental administration. The fiscal base of resistance operations was significantly changed and the wide range of contributions and donations was eliminated and replaced by a formal tax system and a national bank was established. Cf. Nhan Dan, No. 20, September 1951, republished in Cuoc khang chien than thanh cua nhan dan Viet Nam (The Sacred Resistance of the Vietnamese People) (Hanoi: Su That, 1960), Vol. III, p. 92. The reversal of this strategy by General Navarre in the last phase of the war once again posed a military threat to the Viet Minh rear base areas, and probably limited the effectiveness of their governmental operations.

While China had accumulated considerable experience in governmental administration in its base areas, the Vietnamese activities in their zones of control were more limited because of the threat of French military incursions. It was not until the defeat of the French and the Coneva Agreements in 1954 that the Vietnamese had to systematically confront the issue of moving from resistance struggle to the problems of governing.

## The Nature of the State After Liberation

On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the founding of the DRV, and one year after the liberation of North Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh put the victory in the context of a century old anti-colonial struggle. While victory had been won, the "first step" was not along the road of a "long march of ten thousand <u>li</u>" in socialist transformation as Mao had said at the time of China's Liberation, but was a precondition for advancing to the "second step" of the reunification of Vietnam. As Ho put it, "peace and national reunification are our main demands for the time being." This view was elaborated in the 8th Plenum of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee (August 13-20, 1955) which added, the "primary and immediate mission of our entire Party and people" was to establish a "broad front with an appropriate character" of "all national, democratic, and peace forces" to strive for peaceful Vietnamese reunifica-

House, 1962), Vol.  $\overline{\text{IV}}$ , p. 115.

<sup>29 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 121.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p. 122.

tion.  $^{31}$  To accomplish this goal, it would be necessary to "go all out in consolidating the North, while at the same time winning over the people in the South."  $^{32}$ 

This dual mission meant that the line of demarcation between the first and second stage of the revolution had been blurred. As long as the two parts of Vietnam could not be unified, the national democratic revolution could not be considered completed even though the North had been liberated. In 1956, General Giap noted that while the national democratic revolution had been completed in the North, as long as imperialism and a feudal class continued to exist in the South, "from the perspective of the entire country, the national democratic revolution is still continuing..."

However, the problem of the South had not received adequate attention in the period immediately after Liberation. Confident that the two regions would be re-unified, and beset with political, economic and administrative problems in the North, the DRV leaders devoted their energies

Announcement of Resolution 8 of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee, Nhan Dan, August 22, 1955. This characterization of the united front reappeared at the time of the Tet Offensive of 1968 in South Vietnam in the form of the Vietnam Alliance of National, Democratic and Peace Forces, headed by Trinh Dinh Thao.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> The term most often used to describe the post-1954 period in North Vietnam was "after the restoration of peace," whereas in China the universally used "since Liberation" was the terminological reflection of the fact that China's revolutionary first stage was essentially complete.

Wo Nguyen Giap, "To Quoc ta nhat dinh thong nhat" (Our Father-land Will Certainly Be Unified), Nhan Dan, July 12, 1956.

almost exclusively to "consolidating the North." This involved completing the land reform in preparation for "advancing toward socialism," and resulted in an overzealous push to conclude this complex task. excesses of the land reform were ordered stopped at the 9th Plenum (April 19-24, 1956), a session primarily devoted to assessing the anti-Stalin theme of the 20th Congress of the CPSU. 35 It was subsequently revealed by General Giap that in April 1956 the Politburo had also "begun to discover errors and had decided to issue a directive on the initial steps to rectify errors committed in the land reform."36 In addition to being an attempt to resolve an important political problem in the North, the termination of the leftist errors of the Land Reform campaign was probably also intended to allay the fears of elements in the "national, democratic and peace forces" in the South who may have been frightened by reports of the land reform in the North. 37 A Nhan Dan editorial in May 1956 reminded its readers that consolidating the North should mean raising living standards there to "continuously" demonstrate its absolute superiority over the regime in the South."38

By July 1956, it had become apparent that the scheduled reunifi-

Resolution of 9th Lao Dong Party Plenum, Nhan Dan, April 27, 1956.

<sup>36&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan, October 31, 1956.</sub>

<sup>37&</sup>quot;In our mission of correcting errors concerning the land reform program and organizational readjustment, in the mission of expanding democracy and improving living conditions, and in the economic and financial mission, we must pay close attention to winning over the South." Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup>Nhan Dan, May 22, 1956.

cation elections envisaged in the Geneva Agreements would not take place. 39 This development forced the DRV leaders to devote more attention to the problem of re-unification and the effect this impasse would have on building socialism in the North. At the 10th Plenum of October 1956, General Giap acknowledged that the Plenum had not systematically discussed the problem of reunification, and the Party had not until then sufficiently grasped the fact that it would be a prolonged process. 40 No firm decisions on unification were made at the Plenum, and the matter was referred to the Politburo for further consideration. 41

The renewed concern with the unresolved situation in the South was followed by a new period of political consolidation in the North. The 10th Plenum determined that with the conclusion of the rent reduction and land reform campaigns, "we have basically completed the anti-feudal mission in the North." A program of rectifying the political errors committed during the land reform was announced. In this campaign, those people wrongly classified as landlords or rich peasants had their cases reviewed, and many cadres unjustly dismissed from their positions were recalled. Emphasis was put on internal unity and expanding Party democracy (which was in part a response to the stress on these themes

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Ho Chi Minh, "Letter to All Compatriots in the Entire Country," Nhan Dan, July 7, 1956.

<sup>40</sup>Nhan Dan, October 31, 1956.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup>Ibid

<sup>42&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>

in the Soviet Union after the 20th Party Congress). The state forms of a People's Democratic Dictatorship were to be re-emphasized, legal safeguards for "the people" strengthened, and "class background-ism," (excessive and oversimplified discrimination against those not coming from the worker-peasant "basic class elements") was discouraged. 43

The "leftist errors" of the land reform were attributed to a failure to "grasp the close connection between the two revolutionary tasks, the anti-feudal and the anti-imperialist." The former should be fulfilled in relation to the latter, said a subsequent DRV analysis. 44

The slogan "to consolidate the North while taking the South into great consideration" was not thoroughly grasped, and although "great attention was paid to satisfying the economic and political demands of the working peasants, the necessity to broaden the National United Front was overlooked." Thus the uncompleted national democratic revolution in the South directly affected the policies of the North and delayed its attempts to concentrate its energies fully on the second revolutionary stage of building socialism.

China's re-unification problem did not lead to similar results.

The single province of Taiwan was much less prominent in terms of

China's total territory than was the loss of the Southern region of

Vietnam to the DRV, and did not represent as great a security threat,

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup>Tran Phuong, "The Land Reform," <u>Vietnamese Studies</u>, No. 7, p. 190.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

with its small population and physical separation from the mainland. The CCP leadership felt that their victory, while not completely consolidated, was decisive enough to continue emphasizing a united front coalition of groups that accorded non-communists a formal role in the state structure. This took the form in 1949 of the Common Program and the Organic Law of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) which served as a provisional Constitution until 1954 when a formal Constitution was adopted. Although the CPPCC was no longer a formal part of the state structure, it became a mass organization, analogous to the Vietnamese Fatherland Front. The differences in terminology and history of the two fronts illustrate their somewhat different functions. The CPPCC was originally sponsored under KMT auspices, and became an important CCP political instrument in winning support away from the KMT. After Liberation its function was mainly to facilitate internal political integration among various classes in Chinese society. Vietnam's Fatherland Front, formed in 1955, was a successor to the Lien Viet, and retained its predominantly antiimperialist character in its new incarnation. Its primary function was to mobilize political support for the struggle in the South.

In 1952 the PRC established a constitutional drafting committee. The following year, the First Five Year Plan (1953-57) was instituted. The Constitution was completed in 1954. These developments marked the beginning of the transition to socialism. The reduced importance of the CPPCC in the transformed state structure, in effect, "signified the end of the revolution's bourgeois-democratic phase."

<sup>46</sup> Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends, p. 236.

Continuing the Revolution: New Democracy and the Socialist Revolution

If the bourgeois-democratic revolution was over in China, the next problem was to determine the proper role of the bourgeoisie during the period of the socialist revolution. Underlying the theoretical question, therefore, was the related question of the class basis of the state. Mao said in 1949 that New Democracy was, "A state system which is shared by the common people and which the bourgeoisie is not allowed to own privately -- add to this the leadership of the working class and we have the state system of the people's democratic dictatorship." Subsequently Mao arrived at a less sanguine view about the ease with which the PRC could move from a bourgeois or new democratic revolution to a socialist revolution. This more pessimistic assessment was based on a growing conviction that the ideological influence of the bourgeoisie would not gracefully fade away and that class contradictions would be a permanent part of China's social and political system.

Mao's February 1957 On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People was, in part, a response to the political opposition to Party policies from non-Party intellectuals in 1956 during the Hundred Flowers episode. It also awakened Mao to the problem of revisionism, which he saw at the root of the political ferment in Eastern Europe. In this analysis of China's political condition, Mao concluded that the "large scale and turbulent struggles of the masses characteristic of the previous revolutionary periods have in the main ended, but class struggle

<sup>47&</sup>lt;sub>Mao</sub> Tse-tung, <u>Selected Works</u>, Vol. IV, p. 420.

is by no means entirely over," even though the "superstructure of the state system and laws of the people's democratic dictatorship and the socialist ideology guided by Marxism-Leninism plays a positive role in facilitating the victory of socialist transformation and the establishment of a socialist organization of labor..." Although the state was socialist in nature, there were pervasive "survivals of bourgeois ideology" that threatened the political consolidation of state unless carefully and correctly dealt with.

This important document contained Mao's definition of China's post-Liberation problems of political integration. In his view successful political integration would require the resolution of contradictions (1) between the interests of the state, the collective and the individual, (2) between democracy and centralism, (3) between the leadership and the led, and (4) between bureaucrats and the masses. Even more important, political integration would require the commitment of the bourgeois and the intellectuals to China's newly established socialist system. The vacillating support of the national bourgeoisie for the revolution during the bourgeois-democratic stage, according to Mao,

<sup>48</sup> Mao Tse-tung, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among The People (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), pp. 16-17.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup>Mao's 1957 speech mentions that "the socialist system was basically established last year." <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 43.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup>Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., p. 43.

became ambivalance toward supporting a socialist system at the expense of their own class interests.  $^{52}$ 

Despite the fact that the bourgeois democratic revolution had been concluded in China, and the socialist revolution begun, the bourgeoisie continued to enjoy a distinct and legitimate role in China's political system. This role was, however, conditional on the willingness of the bourgeoisie to accommodate themselves to socialism. Mao's doubts about the extent to which the bourgeoisie had been transformed into committed socialists increased and finally culminated in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution's attempt to systematically eradicate their lingering ideological influence. 53 On the eve of that vast political upheaval Mao said, "to consolidate New Democracy and to go on consolidating it for ever is to engage in capitalism. New Democracy is a bourgeoisdemocratic revolution under the leadership of the proletariat. It touched only the landlords and the compradore bourgeoisie, it does not touch the national bourgeoisie at all." He added. "In our state at present approximately one third of the power is in the hands of the enemy or the enemy's sympathizers. We have been going on for fifteen years and we now control two thirds of the realm."55

<sup>52&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>., pp. 3-4.

<sup>53&</sup>quot;It is the desire as well as the policy of the Communist Party to exist side by side with the various [bourgeois] democratic parties for a long time to come. But whether these democratic parties remain in existence for long depends not merely on the desire of the Communist Party, but on how well they acquit themselves and on whether they enjoy the confidence of the people." <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 43.

<sup>54</sup> Stuart Schram, ed., Chairman Mao Talks to the People, p. 216.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup>Ibid., p. 217.

Mao's concern with the persistence of the threat posed by the apparently ineradicable influence of the bourgeoisie in China reached its height in the Cultural Revolution. There were, however, numerous earlier expressions of his preoccupation with this problem, particularly after the appearance of On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People in 1957. The persistence of bourgeois influence into the period of building socialism led Mao to conclude that the lines of demarcation between the two revolutionary stages were not absolute. In 1958 Mao said, "In the democratic revolution of the past, the revolution was constantly divided into two stages, the former serving as a preparation for the latter. We are partisans of the theory of the permanent revolution, and yet so many comrades give no thought to the time for carrying out the socialist revolution, or to how land reform should be carried out. They close their eyes to the sprouts of socialism, although the sprouts of socialism appeared long ago."56 In an important speech, also in early 1958, known as the Sixty Articles on Work Methods, Mao stressed the link between permanent revolution, class struggle and work style. "Our revolution is like fighting a war," he said, "after winning one battle, we must immediately put forward new tasks. In this way, we can maintain the revolutionary enthusiasm of the cadres and the masses..." $^{57}$ Mao warned of the dangers of forgetting politics "once attention is

Stuart R. Schram, "Mao Tse-tung and the Theory of Permanent Revolution," The China Quarterly, No. 46, April/June 1971, pp. 230-31.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup><u>Ibid.</u>, p. 227.

shifted to the technical side" and of the fact that "classes have not been wiped out, and there is still class struggle."<sup>58</sup> The increasing prominence of the idea of "permanent revolution" was thus related to a growing shift in emphasis away from the united front concept of the "people's democratic dictatorship," to "dictatorship of the proletariat" which was increasingly viewed as the only way to draw a sharp class line between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat and prevent revisionism.<sup>59</sup>

In China the principal post-Liberation problem of political integration was the transformation of the bourgeoisie and other non-worker-peasant elements into supporters of socialism. For Vietnam the basic problem was that the country was divided between a socialist North and a non-Socialist South. Both countries' problems of political integration were manifested in the blurred line of demarcation between the bourgeois-democratic and socialist stages of the revolution. But though the line was not clearly demarcated in either case, in China it was a temporal division while in Vietnam it was a geographical problem as well. In the PRC, there was an overlap between the two stages, but they applied to all of China with the exception of Taiwan. China's irredenta did not have an effect on her internal policies comparable to the influence that South Vietnam had on DRV domestic decisions. Vietnam's line of demarcation between the two revolutionary stages was also complicated

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup><u>Ibid</u>., p. 228.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup>This view was expressed in its clearest form after the Cultural Revolution in such articles as Chang Chun-chiao, "On Exercising All-Round Dictatorship Over the Bourgeoisie," <u>Peking Review</u>, No. 14, April 4, 1975, which shows how important a role the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat played in (and before) the Cultural Revolution.

by the fact that the socialist revolution in the North could not be given undivided attention as long as the South had not completed the first revolutionary stage.

# Democracy and Dictatorship: Role of the Bourgeoisie in the Socialist Revolution

As North Vietnam determined to "take socialist transformation as the central task" while, at the same time, "making initial steps in socialist construction," in preparation for the First Five-Year Plan of 1961-65, a simultaneous decision was made that "we can and must guide and restrict within the South the solving of contradiction between imperialism and the colonies in our country." The effect of this decision was to compartmentalize the divergent revolutionary stages by proceeding with socialist construction in the North, though the national democratic revolution in the South remained uncompleted. This decision probably influenced the DRV view of the importance of reconciling the united front class alignment and the sharper class distinctions implicit in the task of building socialism. And as envisioned in the early years of the DRV, the advance "from a people's democratic regime toward socialism is an inseparable process." The DRV views on the post-

Languages Publishing House, 1965), Vol. II, p. 41. Foreign

<sup>61 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 48.

<sup>62</sup> Nhan Dan, December 31, 1956.

Liberation role of the bourgeoisie reflected the continuing impact of the unresolved national democratic revolution in the South on the political system in the North.

No reliable figures exist on the size of Vietnam's bourgeoisie. In the 1930's, a French economist classified 9,000 persons out of a total population of ten and a half million as "indigenous rich." Of this small group representing less than .01 percent of the population, many of the "indigenous rich" were in reality overseas Chinese. 63 Unlike the Chinese bourgeoisie, who enjoyed an independent political and economic position until the CCP victory of 1949, the Vietnamese bourgeoisie remained restricted and dominated by the colonial presence. In the words of one DRV analysis of Vietnam's compradore bourgeoisie, "in China's situation, that of a semi-colony, the bourgeois compradore class was able to participate in and hold political power, and became 'mandari-nized' (quan lieu hoa). Vietnam's bourgeois class, under the conditions of being a colonial country during the French period of domination was

Paul Bernard's figures are cited in Le Thanh Khoi, <u>Histoire du Viet-Nam</u> (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1955), p. 420. Khoi asserts that Vietnamese bourgeoisie represented essentially landed wealth. The number of "large property owners," according to a comprehensive French survey, was 6,350. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 432. The total number of "indigenous rich" in Bernard's survey was 9,000. Presumably these are more or less the same group of people. During the First Indochina conflict the bourgeoisie probably expanded as a result of the war economy, but the basic dependency on the French colonial system remained unchanged. The figure used by one of the DRV's top economic theoreticians, Bui Cong Trung, to indicate the size of Vietnam's bourgeoisie was the pre-1942 calculation that the entire country had less than 3,000 families in commerce that paid taxes of more than 60 Indochinese piasters. Only 9 out of 147 commerical firms were wholly owned by Vietnamese. <u>Nhan Dan</u>, January 8, 1957.

not like that."<sup>64</sup> Since the interests of the French and native Vietnamese entrepreneurs were opposed, the colonial system, in the DRV view, restricted the growth of an economically and politically independent Vietnamese bourgeoisie to a greater extent than in China.<sup>65</sup>

DRV analyses of the class problem in the post-Liberation state stress three related points: (1) the numerical weakness of the bourgeoisie, (2) the resistance of the bourgeoisie to foreign domination, and their hostility to the pressures of the colonial regime on indigenous economic interests, and (3) the continuing importance of the Northern bourgeoisie in influencing their counterparts in the South to view the DRV favorably and support reunification. These themes were summarized by Le Duan in He noted that the resistance of the Chinese bourgeoisie to the CCP was "dogged," and "socialist transformation therefore, involved pretty bitter class struggle." In the Soviet Union "a sharp class struggle took place in the process of transformation owing to the relentless opposition of both the industrial and rural bourgeoisie."66 But in Vietnam, the situation was different. Socialist transformation involves not only class struggle to abolish exploiting classes, but also a "revolution" of shifting from small to large scale production. In Vietnam, the DRV leaders considered the problem of production scale

Nguyen Cong Binh, "Thu ban ve giai cap tu san mai ban Viet Nam" (Some Preliminary Comments on Vietnam's Bourgeois Compradore Class), Nghien Cuu Lich Su, No. 24, March 1961, p. 36.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

Le Duan, On the Socialist Revolution in Vietnam, Vol. III, p. 13.

more important than the class problem. 67

"Since the urban bourgeoisie and the rich peasants did not make up a sizeable and potent force as in other countries," said Le Duan, "it was not necessary at all to put up a bitter class struggle."68 Moreover, in transforming the bourgeoisie in the North, "we must reckon with our Southern compatriots' revolutionary struggle and act in such a way as will best rally the bourgeoisie within the National Front for Liberation against the American imperialists in South Vietnam. Hence, we have used moderate measures: repurchasing of property owned by the bourgeoisie, and uniting with it in view of common progress."69 Although the Vietnamese bourgeoisie was weak, however, "bourgeois ideology among the intellectuals is not so weak."70 Nevertheless, the DRV considered the main revolutionary task in the North to be the "technological revolution," and were confident that the potential conflict between bourgeoisie and working class interests could be resolved as a "contradiction among the people," because of the past and present external political factors that unified diverse classes in Vietnam. 71

<sup>67&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid., p. 14</sub>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup><u>Ibid</u>. His report adds that, "On the whole, the urban bourgeoisie was very small, while in the countryside the rich peasants accounted for less than 0.5 percent of the population, and held as the main means of production no more land than that of the working peasants." <u>Ibid</u>.

<sup>69&</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 20.

<sup>70&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup><u>Ibid.</u>, p. 172.

From the time of his speech On the Correct Handling of Contradictions in 1957. Mao became increasingly less confident the problem of China's bourgeoisie would remain a contradiction "among the people" and grew progressively more convinced that the persisting strength of bourgeois influence was a threat to the PRC's socialist revolution. In China, the first revolutionary stage was in large part a struggle against the KMT, who the CCP viewed as the "representative of the bourgeoisie." In the late 1950's, China's bourgeoisie numbered 1,300,000 (about 2 percent of total population) of which 700,000 were working in enterprises and simultaneously receiving dividends from the state. 72 Thus the importance of the bourgeoisie posed a political problem which forced the CCP to devote considerable attention to this class both before and after Liberation. During the struggle with the KMT Mao had placed great stress on alliances that would win over the "middle forces" and, on the eve of Liberation, pointed out that, "the national bourgeoisie at the present stage is of great importance," and that "we must unite with the national bourgeoisie in common struggle."<sup>73</sup> As Schram points out, despite the

<sup>72</sup>Tran Luc, May kinh nghiem Trung Quoc ma ta nen hoc (Some Experiences of China that We Should Study) (Hanoi: Su That, 1958), p. 72. He defines "bourgeoisie" as "industrialists and merchants." Mao said in 1956 that, "The Chinese national bourgeoisie and its intellectuals consist of a few million people." Stuart Schram, ed., Chairman Mao Talks to the People, p. 89. Comparing Vietnam's bourgeoisie with China's, Tran Luc says that, "In terms of numbers and wealth, Chinese industrialists and merchants are greater than our Vietnamese industrialists and merchants certainly don't have to bow to China's." May kinh nghiem, p. 89.

<sup>73</sup> Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Vol. IV, p. 385.

marginal role of the bourgeoisie in the political life of the new Chinese People's Republic, "the role assigned to the bourgeoisie was of some significance; it reflected the fact that Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues had been able to carry along with them a minority of the privileged classes in Chinese society."<sup>74</sup>

Nevertheless, the size and continuing influence of the bourgeoisie made bourgeois ideology a target of recurrent political campaigns throughout the 1950's. By 1962, Mao had concluded that while the bourgeoisie had been weakened, they would remain a permanent threat to China's political system.

The economic foundations of the landlord class and the bourgeoisie have been eliminated. The reactionary classes are now no longer as ferocious as in 1949 when the People's Republic was founded, nor as ferocious as in 1957 when the right-wing bourgeoisie madly attacked us. Therefore we speak of them as the remnants of the reactionary classes. But we may on no account under-estimate these remnants. We must continue to struggle against them. The reactionary classes which have been overthrown are still planning a come-back. In a socialist society, new bourgeois elements may still be produced. During the whole socialist stage there still exist classes and class struggle, and this class struggle is a protracted, complex and sometimes even violent affair. Our instruments of dictatorship should not be weakened; on the contrary they should be strengthened. 15

Mao became increasingly obsessed with the ideological threat of the emergence of a new bourgeoisie, and his relatively benign view of the bourgeoisie at the time of Liberation was gradually transformed until he pointed to the danger of a bourgeois restoration.

<sup>74</sup> Stuart R. Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, p. 78.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup>Ibid., p. 168.

During and after the Cultural Revolution the problem of bourgeois ideology became, in effect, the central political issue in China, and China's post-Liberation political and institutional development was reinterpreted in terms of the new Maoist vision. Mao is now said to have "profoundly analyzed the law of struggle between the two classes and between the two roads after the basic completion of the socialist transformation of the ownership of the means of production, put forward the great theory of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat and formulated the Party's basic line in the whole historical period of socialism" This theoretical development in the Marxist concept of the state gradually evolved over the two decades of political development in the PRC. But the "sprouts" (as Mao might put it) of this distinctive theory were present in Mao's earlier views on the unreliability of the bourgeoisie.

Mao had not always taken such a negative view of "reactionary elements." At the outset of the Great Leap, for example, Mao divided Chinese society basically into those who were enthusiastic about socialism and those who were not. The bourgeoisie did not represent a direct threat but were merely passive "anti-adventurists" whose major demerit was their "sad and dismal pessimism." In 1959 Mao divided Chinese society into "activist" (30%), "follower" (40%), and "passive"

The Ming, "Uphold the Weapon of Proletarian Dictatorship," Peking Review, No. 13, March 28, 1975, p. 14.

<sup>77</sup> Schram, Chairman Mao Talks to the People, p. 138.

(30%) categories that cut through class lines. 78 Mao drew a sharper class line in early 1962:

Those whom the people's democratic dictatorship should repress are: landlords, rich peasants, counter revolutionary elements, bad elements and anti-communist elements. The classes which the counter-revolutionary elements, bad elements and anti-communist rightists represent are the landlord class and the reactionary bourgeoisie. These classes and bad people comprise about four or five per cent of the population. These are the people we must compel to reform. They are the people whom the people's democratic dictatorship is directed against.

Subsequently, as noted above, Mao drew a sharp class line that included many more "bad elements." In 1964, he concluded that "at present approximately one third of the power is in the hands of the enemy's sympathizers."

While Mao placed increasing emphasis on the threat of the lingering influence of the bourgeoisie and the importance of proletarian dictator-

<sup>78&</sup>quot;Those cadres are leading several hundreds of millions people. At least thirty per cent of them are activists, thirty per cent are passive elements including landlords, rich peasants, reactionaries, undesirables, bureaucrats, middle peasants and some poor peasants [italics added], and forty per cent follow the stream. How many people is thirty per cent? 150 million people... Those who follow the stream are also prepared to do these things. There are just thirty per cent who won't. Now thirty per cent and forty per cent equals seventy per cent — so at one time there were 350 million fanatics." Ibid., p. 134.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup>Ibid., p. 169-70.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., p. 217. Le Duan is reported as saying that only 2 percent of the DRV population did not like socialism, 6.7 percent were vacillating, and "the rest support us." Nguyen Khanh Toan, Xung quanh mot so van de ve van hoc va giao duc (Some Matters Relating to Literature and Education) (Hanoi: Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi, 1972), p. 664. The date and source of this statement is not given by Toan in his 1965 speech, but it is mentioned in connection with the 1959 Party decision to embark on building socialism "from the posture of a victor." Ibid.

ship, the DRV leaders moved in the opposite direction. The uncertainty of achieving unification with the South had resulted in a considerable delay in producing a State Constitution. A committee to draft the Constitution was established in 1956, but the final draft of the Constitution was not produced until the end of 1959. In the interim, as noted above, the DRV had concluded that reunification would be a prolonged process and that the North must proceed with its own socialist development, while "taking the South into account." The three-year plan for "economic transformation and development" (1958-60) was an interim measure designed to prepare for the next step of socialist construction, agricultural cooperativization and the First Five-Year Plan for economic development (1961-65).

The decision to move ahead with socialist construction was taken at the Party's 14th Plenum in November 1958, which initiated the agricultural collectivization program and determined that the "central political mission" was to undertake "socialist transformation in order to create favorable conditions for building socialism in the North, making it a firm base for the struggle to achieve national unification." Subsequent quotations from the 14th Plenum, one of the most important political decisions in the post-1954 period, used the term "uninterrupted revolution" to describe the preparation for moving into the period of socialist construction. The Plenum determined that the national

<sup>81&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, December 8, 1958.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>82</sup>Nhan Dan, June 14, 1960.

democratic revolution had been basically completed in the North, and that the main political problem of the future was to ensure that the North took the socialist rather than the capitalist road. The DRV leaders (in contrast to Mao in 1958) had no doubts that this was a foregone conclusion because the "Party of the working class could not possibly choose the first [capitalist] road, but must follow the natural law of the uninterrupted revolution, and must necessarily take the second [socialist] road."83

But the period of uncertainty on the question of the South between 1955 and 1959 had left doubts in the minds of some cadres as to where the Vietnamese revolution stood. The theory of uninterrupted revolution was probably offered to answer this question and also to explain the necessity of moving ahead with collectivization. Uninterrupted revolution meant that there was no "wall" between national democratic and socialist revolutions, and that even though the national democratic revolution had not been completed in both zones of Vietnam, the socialist revolution should proceed in the North. 84

<sup>83</sup> Ibid. The Vietnamese term for uninterrupted revolution is literally the "non-stopping revolution" (cach mang khong ngung). The Chinese term "pu tuan-te ke-ming" means the "unbroken revolution," with the connotation that there is not a sharp line between revolutionary stages.

Hoang Tung, "Van dong hop tac nong nghiep len mot cuoc dau tranh cach mang to lon va kho khan" (The Agricultural Cooperativization Campaign Is a Great and Difficult Revolutionary Struggle), Nhan Dan, May 29, 1959. A "number of comrades" who had the tendency to believe in "revolutionary stage-ism" were criticized for not having a firm class stand. The context of the article suggests that the problem was a reluctance by some cadres to push forward with cooperativization on the grounds of the unresolved national-democratic revolution in the South, and possibly also because of a less than firm commitment to the socialist revolution.

The increased emphasis on the socialist revolution in late 1958 was reflected in the draft Constitution of the following year. In presenting this document, Ho observed that the 1946 DRV Constitution was no longer suitable because it had reflected a "new democratic regime" whose "mission had already been fulfilled." In the light of North Vietnam's "new situation and revolutionary mission, it is no longer appropriate." 86

Nonetheless, the situation in the South continued to have an impact on the state form of the DRV even after the decision to compartmentalize the two aspects and stages of Vietnam's revolution in North and South had been taken. The DRV state was declared to be "a people's democratic state based on the alliance between the workers and peasants and led by the working class."

This was considered to be the functional equivalent of the "dictatorship of the proletariat," but the term "people's democratic dictatorship" which had been employed in the early stages of the drafting of the Constitution was dropped in the final version. While China went from New Democracy to increasing stress on "the dictatorship of the proletariat," the DRV elected to use the milder formulation

<sup>85&</sup>lt;sub>Nha nuoc va phap luat</sub>, Vol. III, p. 33.

<sup>86&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

Nhan Dan, December 31, 1959. During a period of intense public discussion about the proposed draft of the Constitution, a letter in the pages of the Party newspaper stated that there were people who advocated not putting anything about the leadership of the working class in the Constitution in order to attract intellectuals and the "upper classes" in South Vietnam. In this view, the leading role of the working class would be "covertly understood" in the North. Nhan Dan, June 16, 1959. This approach, was, however, rejected.

"people's democratic state."88

Vietnam's "uninterrupted revolution" therefore had a different political meaning from China's "permanent revolution." The former was primarily an expression of the persisting dual nature of Vietnam's revolution and the overlap and inter-connection between the national democratic revolution in the South and the socialist revolution in the North. Under these circumstances political actions in the North had to take the possible impact of the South into consideration. This was an important reason for not emphasizing the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and the class struggle aspect of the revolution which was symbolized in China by the unremitting struggle against bourgeois influences. Equally important, the DRV did not consider the bourgeois class to have been a major problem during the course of the Vietnamese revolution because of their numerical insignificance, their oppression by colonialism, and their nationalist sentiment. The national democratic state outlined in the 1960 Constitution was, in essence, an expression of a continued emphasis on interclass alliance in a situation where the liberation struggle in the South was of vital and continuing importance to the socialist North.

At the start of the First Five-Year Plan (1961-65) the DRV leader-ship affirmed that North Vietnam had "completed the tasks of the initial period of the socialist revolution" and that the Vietnamese revolution was "moving into a new phase." Along with the completion of this

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>88</sup>Le Duan, On the Socialist Revolution in Vietnam, Vol. I, pp. 19-20.

<sup>89 &</sup>lt;u>Nhan Dan</u>, January 1, 1961.

first phase in the North, the struggle in the South was "holding firm and pushing forward." The basic characteristics of the new phase of the socialist revolution in the North were that "the socialist relations of production had been basically established, socialism had become the guiding force in the North, and exploiting classes had been eliminated." While Mao and other Chinese leaders came to doubt that socialism had been solidly established in the PRC and moved toward the Socialist Education campaign and the Cultural Revolution, the DRV leaders became increasingly concerned with the situation in the South, and the optimistic 1961 forecast was tempered by the growing seriousness of another foreign intervention.

<sup>90&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

#### SECTION II

## PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION

Transforming the social and economic structure of the state was the major post-Liberation task of political integration in Vietnam and China, but there were other problems as well. In the immediate post-Liberation period, areas in which revolutionary forces had been weak had to be incorporated into the new state structure, and fitted to the overall framework of state policy. Land reform had been completed in many areas in both Vietnam and China prior to Liberation. But with the victory of the revolution, land reform had to be undertaken in large areas where the Party had been weak. Leaders of an essentially rural movement had to learn how to administer the cities. Ethnic and religious minorities had to be incorporated into the new political system. And the revolutionary leaders had to devise a system of territorial administration to govern the state to which they had fallen heir.

Some areas of integration proved more difficult than others, and China and Vietnam each found themselves faced with distinctive problems. Vietnam's revolution had developed more evenly in its smaller territory, and the DRV had come to power in only half the country. At the time of Liberation, CCP forces in South China were weak. The very

In early 1949, Mao noted that, "Conditions in the South are different from those in the North, and the Party's tasks must also be different. The South is still under Kuomintang rule." Mao Tse-tung, "Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China," (March 5, 1949), Selected Works, Vol. IV, p. 361.

rapidity of the victorious CCP military sweep from North to South
China served to accentuate the problem. China's cities were also
larger, more numerous, and more complex than Vietnam's urban areas.
Both countries had large ethnic minorities dwelling in strategic border areas. Vietnam's problem with its Catholic religious minority
was serious because of the continuing issue of foreign intervention
in Vietnam and the background of Catholic opposition to the revolution.
The greatest problem of integration was the division of each state into
two zones of control. In this regard the DRV exclusion from half of
Vietnam's territory was a problem of considerably greater magnitude
than China's failure to liberate the island of Taiwan.

# $\frac{Patterns}{Periods} \ \underline{ of} \ \underline{Territorial} \ \underline{Control} \ \underline{in} \ \underline{the} \ \underline{Revolutionary} \ \underline{and} \ \underline{Post-Liberation}$

Because Vietnam's territory was relatively small in land area, and its opponent was a colonial administration attempting to govern the entire country, the revolutionary forces were distributed fairly evenly throughout its territory. In the development of China's revolution, the CCP had been forced to abandon the areas of its initial strength in South China and take refuge in the North, where KMT control was weak. CCP revolutionary strategy was also influenced by China's geography. The CCP was able to administer large and secure base areas because of their remoteness from the threat of KMT and Japanese attack. While such attacks were made, and occasionally succeeded (driving the CCP out of its Kiangsi base in the 1930's and out of their capital of Yenan

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>In 1961, it was noted that "almost all rural Party Chapters have been in existence for over ten years." Nhan Dan, February 7, 1961.

in 1947), the result was simply to displace the center of the revolutionary movement to another area.

Vietnam's revolutionary struggle after 1945 evolved into a pattern which was described as "inter-locking comb teeth" (the cai rang luoc) to suggest the closely interlocking pattern of territorial control between the Viet Minh and their opponents. The Viet Minh base area in the Viet Bac north of Hanoi was under constant threat of attack. With the exception of the brief command of General de Lattre de Tassigny (1950-51) during which major attempts were made to pacify the delta lowlands and to set up a defensive ring North of Hanoi, the French generally followed a strategy of pursuing the Viet Minh in their base areas. The Navarre plan (of 1953-54) also attempted to regroup forces in the delta, but was ultimately forced to resume the earlier strategy of pursuit, which led to the debacle of Dien Bien Phu.

In the area above the 17th parallel that became the truncated post-1954 Democratic Republic of Vietnam, there were two major liberated areas throughout the Resistance, the Viet Bac north of Hanoi and three provinces of upper Central Vietnam - Ha Tinh, Nghe An and Thanh Hoa, which had produced a disproportionate number of revolutionary leaders. Large expanses of the Red River Delta had been under partial Viet Minh control with the exception of the 1950-51 od when French military efforts temporarily suppressed the movement. Even in the open Red River Delta area, the Viet Minh rebounded from their setbacks of 1950-51 and toward the end of the war (May 1953) were in complete

control of 5,000 of the 7,000 villages of the delta. 3

Since the mid-1930's, CCP strength in South China had been limited to a few scattered base areas. Communist zones of control during the last part of 1948 were largely concentrated North of the Yangtse River and in Manchuria. Land reform and other policies of social transformation had been carried out in many areas of North China well before all of China was liberated. In order to prepare for a nationwide program of socialist transformation, particularly in the area of agricultural collectivization, land reform had to be rapidly completed in South China. The absence of a strong Party organization there caused considerable complications in this endeavor. Cadres and troops from Northern areas of China had to aid in administering the South and supplement the thin ranks of local CCP supporters. 5

In order to effectively deploy limited political and administrative cadres in the early post-Liberation period, the PRC established administrative bodies at levels just above the traditional governing echelons of China's system of territorial administration. The provinces,

Henri Navarre, Agonie de l'Indochine (Paris: Plon, 1956), p. 46. Navarre's accompanying map on p. 45 gives a vivid graphic illustration of the widespread Viet Minh control. The map of the Red River Delta is blackened with dots representing the villages controlled by the Viet Minh.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Cf. the map of zones of control in China during the last six months of 1948 in Lionel Chassin, <u>The Communist Conquest of China</u> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 193.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>The tensions between Northern and Southern cadres that emerged during the Land Reform period in Kwangtung are described by Ezra Vogel in <u>Canton Under Communism</u> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 91-106.

the traditional regional administrative centers of China, were subordinated to a system of six Great Administrative Regions (Ta hsing
cheng ch'u), which were joint military-civilian bodies until 1952
when the Military and Administrative Committees of the Great Regions
were transformed into civilian Administrative Committees. During the
early years of the PRC, the military played the main role in regional
administration, which reflected the fact that the administrative resources of the army were more numerous and flexible than those of the
Party. More importantly, it illustrated the fact that a high proportion of CCP leaders had held positions of military command during
China's revolutionary struggle, a point that will be further discussed
in the following section.

Because the revolution had not developed at the same pace in all parts of China, the immediate post-Liberation period demanded flexibility in dealing with the problems of different areas. The Great Administrative Regions were granted extensive powers to apply policies in an appropriate manner in the provinces under their jurisdiction. Some large provinces with diverse and complex political or administrative problems were split up into Special Districts which were ruled directly by the Great Regions. At the lower echelons, the sub-hsien level of the ch'u played the key role in leading the land reform and in exercising political leadership in the post-Liberation process of social transformation. Village level administrative units directly

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Roy Hofheinz, "Rural Administration in Communist China," in Roderick MacFarquhar ed., China Under Mao: Politics Takes Command (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966).

below this were divided and reduced in size so that the problems of each area could receive special attention from the cadres concentrated at the ch'u level. 7

The importance of the Great Regions, the sub-province Special Districts, and the <a href="mailto:ch'u">ch'u</a>, lying between the <a href="mailto:hsien">hsien</a> and the villages, were that they were able to concentrate limited political leadership resources at a level just above the traditional administrative echelons of province, <a href="mailto:hsien">hsien</a> and village, which could exert direct leadership on the subordinate levels while taking into account the special problems of each area. In addition, concentrating cadre resources in the interstices of the traditional system, midway between the basic centerprovince-<a href="mailto:hsien">hsien</a>-district echelons, prevented the dispersion of the limited number of cadres while the provincial, <a href="mailto:hsien">hsien</a> and village administrations were being strengthened.

To some extent the importance of these "interstitial levels" was a result of the requirements of the revolutionary period. A leading Chinese authority on the problems of territorial administration writes that during the anti-Japanese war period, the territorial administrative hierarchy had been divided into as many as seven or eight levels because, "This system of administrative areas of a larger number of levels suited the demands of wartime that different areas should have a large amount of flexibility and scope for action." This system was retained

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 102.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>Chang Li-man, "Special Features in the Changes of Administrative Areas in China," <u>Cheng Fa Yen Chiu</u>, No. 5, October 2, 1956, <u>ECCM</u>, No. 57, p. 1.

in the immediate post-Liberation period for the same reasons.

By 1952, many of the tasks of strengthening the main levels of government had been accomplished, and by 1954 the process was completed. At the same time the Great Regions came under civilian leadership in 1952, the province level was considerably strengthened and the Great Region divested of much of its autonomous powers. 9 by 1954 the Regions were dissolved, primarily to rationalize bureaucratic administration and to facilitate implementing the First Five-Year Plan. 10 It has conventionally been argued that the dissolution of the Regions was a response to the challenge of fragmentation into "independent"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>The implementing decree stated that "the organizations of provincial and municipal people's governments should be strengthened in order to increase the responsibility of leadership at provincial and municipal levels, "while at the Region the 'people's governments' were transformed into 'administrative committees' with supervisory rather than deliberative powers, and some bureaucratic organs at Region level formerly attached to the Region People's Government were attached directly to the Central Government, while others were transferred to the Region Administrative Committee." "CPG Decision on Change in the Structures and Tasks of the People's Government (Military and Administrative Councils) of Administrative Regions," NCNA, Peking, November 16, 1952, SCMP, No. 453, November 17, 1952.

<sup>10</sup> Chang Li-man, the basic source on administrative changes in the early 1950's, writes that "when the country had entered the stage of large scale planned economic construction, strong planning would be needed in all tasks, and there must therefore be the corresponding strengthening of centralized and unified leadership. And to further maintain this system of administrative areas with a large number of levels would obstruct the development of economic construction. For this reason, during the past few years we have abolished the level of administrative region, and abolished the level of administrative bureau under the province . . and abolished the level of tsun under the hsiang [administrative village]. The ch'u as its own level in the administrative structure, has been changed into a local organ of the higher level [e.g., the hsien] and in many areas, the ch'u unit has also been abolished altogether." Chang Li-man in Cheng Fa Yen Chiu, No. 5, October 2, 1956, ECCM, No. 57.

kingdoms" and the threat to political integration of a return to warlordism. Available evidence, however, indicates that this was, at most, a secondary explanation, and that the dissolution of the Regions was primarily for purposes of streamlining the administration. By 1954, therefore, the administrative areas of China basically "consist[ed] of three levels, namely the provincial, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1001/j.ncm.name">hsiang</a> levels as set down in the constitution of the People's Republic of China." Republic of China.

North Vietnam's land area was about the size of a single Chinese province and, therefore, its territorial administrative system was not as elaborate. But although the DRV administration was in appearance different from China, it was quite similar in terms of the actual area being administered. A basic characteristic of China's traditional political system was the inability of the central government to penetrate beneath the <a href="https://doi.org/10.13">https://doi.org/10.13</a> A Chinese county-sized unit or <a href="https://

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Frederick C. Teiwes, "The Evolution of Leadership Purges in Communist China," The China Quarterly, No. 41, January-March 1970, p. 123. With regard to the threat of "independent tendencies," the example usually cited is Kao Kang in the Northeast. But it was the combination of his regional power base with a strong position at the center that made him a powerful figure with some autonomy. As one account pointed out prior to his downfall, Kao Kang was "the only person in the CCP who plays an important role in the Central and local governments." "Kao Kang, An Ever Correct Leader," Hsin Wen Pao, Hong Kong, November 23, 1952, SCMP, No. 457.

<sup>12</sup> Chang Li-man, Cheng Fa Yen Chiu, No. 5.

<sup>13</sup>J. K. Fairbank, The United States and China (New York: Viking, 1962), p. 92. Another historian of traditional China asserts that no formal government existed below the hsien, and that the hsien magistrate "who was under the superivsion of officials at higher levels, was not empowered to make major decisions." T'ung Hsu-ch'u, Local Government in China Under the Ch'ing (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), p. 193.

averaged about 1,000 square miles in area, while its Vietnamese counterpart, the <u>huyen</u> was only about 250 square miles. <sup>14</sup> In Vietnam a familiar epigram claims that the "law of the Emperor stops at the village gate." Historical research, however, has shown that the Emperor's law did in fact penetrate the village gate, and that there was a closer bond between Vietnam's villagers and the state than in China. <sup>15</sup>

Vietnam's provinces serve approximately the same function as China's <u>hsien</u>. In the DRV, as in traditional Vietnam, the average province has ten <u>huyen</u>, comprised of 20-30 villages of approximately 5,000 population each. <sup>16</sup> This relatively small administrative scale allowed provincial cadres to exert direct leadership at the village level to an extent not possible in China above the <u>hsien</u> level. <sup>17</sup> Nonetheless,

<sup>14</sup>J.B.R. Whitney, China: Area, Administration and Nation Building (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1969), p. 80. The Vietnamese figure is derived by dividing North Vietnam's total land area (62,000 square miles) by the number of huyen (250). In the heavily populated lowland delta, the size of the huyen is even smaller.

<sup>15</sup> Alexander Woodside notes that in 19th century Vietnam there was a political vacuum between the district (huyen) government and the villages, but one which was "not as severe as it was in China because Vietnamese districts were smaller and less internally differentiated. It might be added that in distinguishing between what is natural and what is artificial, at least in its origins, in the administrative fabric which evolved in Vietnam over nearly ten centuries, the Vietnamese district magistrate or tri huyen, although he had some forerunners, did not emerge before the 15th century. But a well organized network of xa (village) officials antedated him by two hundred years; for the xa is historically a far more idiomatic Vietnamese local administrative form than the Chinese style district." Alexander B. Woodside, "Some Features of the Vietnamese Bureaucracy Under the Early Nguyen Dynasty," in Papers on China, Vol. 19 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>Nhan Dan, July 23, 1959.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>This aspect of territorial administration is further elaborated below.

in Vietnam as in China, the "interstitial" levels of leadership had been important during the Resistance, when "partly because of the conditions of a segmented battlefield and the fact that the leadership tasks were not yet complicated, and partly because the grasp of collective leadership and division of responsibility in the Party Committees was not yet really clear, many Party Committees assigned each Party Committee member leadership responsibility over a specialized branch [of activity] or a local area." The effect of this leadership approach was to create a de facto intermediate or "interstitial" administrative level between the Party Committees at province and huyen levels to ensure a "large amount of flexibility and scope for action," as in China.

Unlike China, Vietnam's wartime military command structure did not become the basis of the administrative system in the immediate post-Liberation period. During the Resistance, Vietnam's territory had been divided into North, Central and Southern commands, each headed by a leading civilian Party figure. 19 There were also Military Regions within each major political command. After the Geneva Agreements, the Southern and lower Central areas of Vietnam were removed from the jurisdiction of the DRV. The Military Regions above the 17th parallel

<sup>18</sup> Nguyen Khai, "Kien toan va cai tien cong tac cac cap uy, tinh, thanh" (Overhauling and Expanding the Missions of the Party Committee at Province and City Echelons), Hoc Tap, No. 5, 1963, p. 9. This critique was made in the context of a campaign to increase expertise and bureaucratic rationality within the Party.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>Le Duan and then Le Duc Tho in the South, and Nguyen Duy Trinh in the Center. In the North, where the Central Committee was located, Ho and other leaders exercised direct control.

became, in slightly altered form, the basis for a new regional level of administration. The Viet Bac Region was established in mid-1956 $^{20}$ on the basis of the famous mountain zone between the Chinese border and Hanoi, and a Thai Meo Region was set up in 1955 to encompass the minorities areas northwest of Hanoi. 21 In addition to these large regions covering diverse ethnic minority groups, there were the Inter-Region III consisting of lowland provinces south and west of Hanoi, the Left Bank Region (Ta Ngan) consisting of the delta provinces to the southeast of Hanoi, and the former Inter-Region IV, consisting of the provinces in upper Central Vietnam. The region (khu) had both administrative and political powers, and was clearly the nucleus of regional administration during the 1955-58 period. 22 The region echelon appear to have been the main center of political coordination for the Land Reform campaign, and after this campaign was terminated the influence of the region in the lowland delta areas diminished until their abolition in 1958. 23

<sup>20</sup> The Viet Bac base area was a <u>Lien-Khu</u> or an Inter-Region until the establishment of the Viet Bac Region on June 15, 1956.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>The Thai Meo Region, established on May 17, 1955 and, as will be discussed below, was renamed the Tay Bac (Northwest) Region on October 28, 1962.

 $<sup>^{22}</sup>$ There is a surprising lack of data on the role of the region during this period, but its functions may be surmised from press items, such as an article by the Deputy Director of Communications for Inter-Region III indicating the extent of a region administrative structure (Nhan Dan, January 1, 1958), and articles on the political leadership role of the Left Bank Region in drought prevention (Nhan Dan, January 6, 1958).

 $<sup>^{23}</sup>$ The National Assembly decision to abolish the region (khu) was announced on April 21, 1958. It was not carried out until some months later.

The region level was discarded because its role of providing administrative flexibility and political leadership during the consolidation period had been completed. Moreover, some of the political errors of the Land Reform period were ascribed to a failure of leading region cadres to provide sufficiently discriminating and responsive direction to the lower levels. 24 There were other reasons for the abolition of the region (announced on April 5, 1958) that were even more fundamental. As in China, this administrative reorganization marked the end of the political consolidation period and the beginning of a period of coordinated central planning related to the collectivization of agriculture and industrial development. This called for the uniform application of centrally determined policies and the more effective deployment of scarce cadre resources. As a Nhan Dan article explained:

In conjunction with the augmentation of cadres to the economic and cultural branches, the Party and Government are preparing for the abolition of the region in the delta, the readjustment of the borders of some provinces and districts, and the [re]-

One of the few insights into the political role of the region in this period is an article in the November 5, 1956 issue of Mhan Dan relating the impact of the 10th Plenum and the launching of the Rectification of Errors campaign on the Left Bank Region. The Region Party Secretary was heavily criticized and removed from office for his role in the Land Reform campaign and his allegedly isolated and autocratic leadership style, which allowed the first case of "hitting at our internal ranks" to take place. This incident of condoning an unjust punishment to a village Party Secretary created widespread apprehension among the Party cadres. This article also indicates that the Land Reform teams, which were independent of the local Party organizations, were controlled by the region. At the Region Congress to study Resolution 10, the Region Party Committee members with "principal responsibility" in the Land Reform underwent self-criticism, but the political problems were evidently of such intensity and complexity that they could not be solved at the Congress. Problems of this sort probably speeded the demise of the region echelon.

distribution of administrative authority among [administrative] levels. This policy stems from the requirement of strengthening Party leadership in local areas and developing the initiative of local areas in socialist construction. In carrying out this policy the province and huyen echelons will be given appropriate authority. 25

In the new allocation of administrative authority, the province would become the key leadership unit in the countryside, as the central government priority moved to socialist construction.<sup>26</sup>

By the end of the political consolidation phase of the immediate post-Liberation period, both China and Vietnam had transformed their territorial administrative hierarchies from a complex, many layered structure with diffused political and administrative powers, to a more streamlined system oriented toward the needs of planned economic development. In the case of China, however, the dissolution of the "interstitial" echelons between the main administrative pillars of the centerprovince, <a href="https://nsien.org/hsien.o

<sup>25&</sup>quot;Viec dieu chinh can bo phai phuc vu yeu cau cua nhiem vu chinh tri" (The Redeployment of Cadres Must Serve the Political Mission), Nhan Dan, August 5, 1958.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup>"The province will become an important unit in leading and directly carrying out the State Plan. The task of the province will be heavier in carrying out the line, policies and programs of the Center, and will have decision making authority concerning many local missions, and administrative responsibility regarding a number of industries and commercial enterprises." Ibid.

 $<sup>^{</sup>m 27}$  The changes at each level of administration will be discussed in the following section.

administrative echelons, and the region system was definitively abolished after the initial period of political consolidation.  $^{28}$ 

From Rural Revolution to Urban Administration: The Post-Liberation Consolidation in the Cities

Another important post-Liberation problem of integration was the takeover of the urban areas by revolutionary organizations that had emerged and matured in the countryside. The political problems posed by the urban areas were more serious in China than in Vietnam. China's cities were numerous, large, complex, and the center of the social milieu from which the KMT derived its strength. While the CCP had sympathizers among urban workers, professionals and intellectuals, its organizational strength in the urban areas at the time of Liberation was limited. North Vietnam had only three urban areas of importance (Hanoi, Hai Phong, and Nam Dinh). Their size and complexity was not great in comparison to China's cities, and much of the Viet Minh leadership either came from or was linked in some way to the urban petit-bourgeois and, therefore, no strangers to Vietnam's urban

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup>In some cases no distinction was made between the functional leadership role of the Region Party Committee and the Province Party Committee. Nhan Dan, March 5, 1958, notes, for example, that the Central Committee Secretariat ordered "both the comrade Secretary of the Region Committee and the Comrade Province Party Secretaries responsible for economic matters," to "extend direct leadership on agricultural production." Although the article criticized the Thai Binh Province Committee Secretary and his deputy for leadership deficiencies in this area, the fact that the Region Committee was also responsible for "direct leadership" suggests a duplication of roles. When the direct leadership of the region became less important, it was abolished rather than being transformed into a coordinating and inspection level as in China.

areas.29

In early 1949, with the complete victory of the revolution in sight, Mao wrote:

From 1927 to the present the centre of gravity of our work has been in the villages—gathering strength in the villages, using the villages in order to surround the cities and then taking the cities. The period for this method of work has now ended. The period of 'from the city to the village' and of the city leading the village has now begun. The centre of gravity of the Party's work has shifted from the village to the city. 30

Peking and Tientsin were among the first major cities taken over by the victorious CCP forces and, to an extent became a model for the administration of cities subsequently liberated in the South. Peking demonstrated that the transfer of power could be accomplished without bloodshed, and that the communist cadres could provide order and restore economic stability in the wake of the chaos of revolutionary war. Several weeks prior to the surrender of Peking, Tientsin was taken (January 15, 1949). As one study notes, "not only was it the first major metropolis where strategies had to be devised to cope with this problem [of dealing with the various socio-economic groups in the city], but also the solutions worked out in Tientsin frequently

Mhan Dan noted that there was a view within the Party that Party members "mainly came from peasant or petty bourgeois backgrounds, so how can it be called a Party of the Workers?" Nhan Dan, July 25, 1959. The following section will discuss the social composition of the Party.

Mao Tse-tung, "Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China," <u>Selected Works</u>, Vol. IV, p. 363.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Derk Bodde, Peking Diary, pp. 110-161.

served as models for other areas."<sup>32</sup> Confronted with the strength of well established groups, including secret societies which were in control of many basic sectors of urban life, and lacking cadres familiar with urban problems, the CCP had to move slowly and to concentrate on using and transforming existing social organizations.<sup>33</sup>

The situation in other major urban areas was similar. In Wuhan "interest groups, whether in the form of mass organization or 'democratic parties' were not completely eliminated. They continued to play some roles, though highly circumscribed," in local political life. 34 In Shanghai were over 95 percent of former KMT personnel stayed at their posts after the Communists entered the city, 35"the bourgeoisie was an extremely powerful interest group within the New Democracy, and certain Party leaders [e.g., Liu Shao-ch'i] had been prepared to compromise with it." In Canton the takeover was facilitated by the experience in other areas. 37 Nonetheless, there was a serious lack of

<sup>32</sup> Kenneth Lieberthal, "The Suppression of Secret Societies in Post-Liberation Tientsin," The China Quarterly, No. 54, April/June 1973, p. 242.

<sup>33&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

<sup>34</sup>Ying Mao-kao, "Urban Bureaucratic Elite in Communist China," in A. Doak Barnett ed., Chinese Communist Politics in Action, p. 232.

<sup>35&</sup>lt;sub>H</sub>. Arthur Steiner, "Communist Chinese Urban Policy," <u>American Political Science Review XLIV</u>, No. 1, (March 1950), p. 59.

<sup>36</sup> John Gardner, "The Wu-Fan Campaign in Shanghai," in <u>Chinese Communist Politics in Action</u>, p. 535.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup>Ezra Vogel, <u>Canton Under Communism</u>, p. 42.

CCP cadres, and those that were in command reflected the diversity of China's revolutionary movement, and posed an internal problem of political integration.  $^{38}$ 

Rapid growth in the urban population compounded the problem of diversity in the cities. During the first five years of the PRC's existence, the urban population increased slightly over 35 percent. 39 This growth is reflected in the fact that in 1949 there were 157 "cities" in the country and by 1957 the number of "large, medium, and small" cities had risen to 177, while the number of cities with a population of over 1,000,000 rose from five to thirteen in the same period. 40 In order to organize these large population agglomerations, the PRC experimented with "urban residents committees" in Tientsin and Shanghai and, in 1952, established residents committees in all major urban areas. "41 These committees were primarily adjuncts to the city administration, and increasingly took on control functions. 42 They were superseded by urban communes during the Great Leap, which tried to combine productive activities with local administration into an

<sup>38&</sup>quot;In Canton there were four major groups that had to be integrated into a single working organization: the Southbound Work Team from the north; the Kwangtung guerrilla forces; the underground party and youth league members from Canton and Hong Kong; and the former Kuomintang officials who remained on their job." Ibid., p. 51.

<sup>39</sup> Franz Schurmann, <u>Ideology and Organization in Communist China</u>, p. 381.

<sup>40 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 380-81.

<sup>41 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>., p. 375.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup>Ibid., p. 380.

integrated social unit. After the Great Leap, the urban communes were reorganized, and the earlier administrative aspects of the urban residents committees again predominated.  $^{43}$ 

Hanoi and Hai Phong were the two major urban areas and were autonomous cities in DRV territorial administration after 1954. Another large city was Nam Dinh, which had an important textile industry. Most other urban areas were primarily provincial seats of administration. Hanoi's population grew from 530,460 in 1955 to 1,095,924 in 1963. 44 The urban population in 1958 totalled 1,300,000 or nearly 9 percent of North Vietnam's population, rising to 3,210,000 non-agricultural producers in

 $<sup>^{43}</sup>$ One study of the urban communes concludes that "even Chengchow, the city that effected the most changes toward creating the communist society, sacrificed depth of commitment for numbers of participants. Thus the visionary 1958 social experiment was abortive, and the 1960 one of the same name did not cover similar organizational content." Janet Salaff, "The Urban Communes and Anti-City Experiment in Communist China," The China Quarterly, No. 29, January-March 1967, p. 109. A later study by the same author remarks that, "The residents' committees had been organized some fifteen years before the Cultural Revolution, and in some cities the only substantial changes in community administration that had occurred happened during the 1958 urban commune movement. During periods of political consolidation after the Great Leap Forward, the residents' committee leaders did not emphasize mass mobilization." Janet Weitzner Salaff, "Urban Residential Committees in the Wake of the Cultural Revolution," in John W. Lewis ed., The City in Communist China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), p. 294. The article further notes that, "The failure to integrate the unemployed was particularly striking." Ibid.

<sup>44</sup>Nhan Dan, October 10, 1964. Much of this increase is attributable to the expansion of administrative and educational facilities. The number of students rose from slightly over 50,000 in 1954 to nearly 300,000 in 1964. Ibid. In the government, administrative personnel in the central bureaucracy expanded 19 percent during the period 1957-63. Nhan Dan, January 10, 1964.

1962 or 18.6 percent of the total population. 45 During the critical initial period of consolidation, however, the population of Hanoi remained relatively static. 46

Many of the bureaucrats who had been working under the colonial administration were retained in office. Foreign technical advisers assisted in maintaining basic services and production activities. 47

Just prior to Liberation, the Viet Minh takeover of provincial towns had been preceded by a forced evacuation on local initiative that disrupted

<sup>45&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, July 10, 1963.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup>From 530,460 in 1955, Hanoi's population rose slightly to 570,000 in 1957. <u>Ibid</u>. By 1961, it had increased to 900,000 because of the incorporation of some of the city's outlying districts. In 1963, it was reported that, "In the past few years, 125,000 people have come into Hanoi from rural areas in all parts of the North, most of whom are families who have someone working as a cadre or state employee." <u>Ibid</u>.

<sup>4/</sup>Bernard Fall asserted that the DRV tried to encourage some French technicians to remain behind, such as mining engineers, the French director of the Hanoi streetcar company, and the Renault automobile shop. Two Vietnams, p. 191. He also claimed that until 1961, no engineers were produced by the DRV, and that until 1961 there were no engineers (e.g., technical supervisors) at the major textile plant in Nam Dinh, where the French had employed 47. The Hon Gay coal complex was under the supervision of only two technicians, instead of the 150 that the French had employed. Ibid., p. 139. Fall noted here, however, that while the French technicians stayed on at the Hon Gay mines for two years, they were never allowed to actually visit the mines, this raises the question of how much the Viet Minh needed these technicians to actually operate these major industrial installations. It seems more likely that they were kept on to minimize French economic sabotage. "Although some French technicians had remained behind, they were in many cases of little help (assuming that the Viet Minh needed help) since the departing Franco-Vietnamese administration had taken almost everything that was moveable: dock cranes, railroad repair equipment, and even the radium necessary for the use of the X-ray machines in the Hanoi hospital." Ibid., p.153. There were about 4,000 technicians from socialist countries who came to North Vietnam. Nhan Dan, April 18, 1961.

the economy of several towns. This error was quickly corrected, <sup>48</sup> both to restore normal urban activities in the areas directly affected and to forestall a possible adverse reaction in Hanoi and Hai Phong, which had not yet been taken over. <sup>49</sup> However, because of the large numbers of cadres with urban or intellectual background in the Party, the takeover of Hanoi in November 1954 presented little problem. <sup>50</sup> Many cadres thoroughly understood the urban milieu and had extensive social links there. <sup>51</sup> Worker representation in the Party,

<sup>48</sup> The authorities acknowledged that, "a number of cadres who have not yet carefully studied the new policy of the Party and the Government, and have not investigated the urban situation, mechanically applied the policy for the rural areas in the urban area. In Nam Dinh and Thai Binh, a number of cadres had the idea of evacuating the people from the city (before the armistice), dissassembled a number of machines and took them out of the city. This created many difficulties in the daily life of the people, and was completely contrary to the spirit of the policy toward newly liberated areas." Nhan Dan, August 10-12, 1954.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup>A foreign eyewitness account of the takeover in a book highly colored by the author's subsequent disillusionment with the DRV concluded that, "The new regime was installed with great ease, and did absolutely nothing to frighten the 'liberated' population, who received them with scepticism and little love, but without any hostility. The class that had previously been the rulers and owners . . . accepted in advance to make the sacrifice for their less fortunate compatriots and were prepared to collaborate with the Resistants who, in turn, flattered them." Gerard Tongas, J'ai vecu dans l'enfer communiste au Nord Viet-Nam et j'ai choisi la liberte (Paris: Nouvelles Editions Debresse, 1960), p. 120.

<sup>51</sup> As one vigorously anti-communist Vietnamese noted, "very large numbers of cadres" entered Hanoi "to approach the intellectuals in the city," and the writers in the Viet Minh "in some cases" were able "to persuade numbers of their former colleagues from going to the South." Nhu Phong, "Intellectuals, Writers and Artists," in P. J. Honey ed., North Vietnam Today (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 79-80.

however, remained small and was only 3.4 percent of total Party membership as late as 1959,  $^{52}$  and by 1962 the Lao Dong Party worker membership was still only 5 percent.  $^{53}$  The reason for this was not only the relatively small role of industry in the North Vietnamese economy, but also a deeply ingrained suspicion among Party cadres that workers had not been tested by the hardships of the Resistance and had actually been corrupted by living in enemy controlled areas during this critical period.  $^{54}$ 

After a brief period of implementing Party policy in the newly liberated "urban areas," the Vietnamese leadership concluded that in most cases they were nothing more than towns which had served as administrative centers, and posed little problem for the consolidation of Party control.<sup>55</sup> The small administrative scale and low level of

<sup>52</sup>Nhan Dan, September 16, 1959.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup>Nhan Dan, April 7, 1962.

have accepted the leadership of the Party but have not yet acknowledged the leadership of the working class . . . . Many comrades brought out the [workers'] negative side and on that basis were suspicious of them; they were passive during the Resistance, lived in the enemy zone, and unconsciously absorbed influences of the enemy, they complained about policies, came to work late and left early . . . spoke out in reckless way, and struggled in an unprincipled manner." Prior to 1954, the industrial output of Vietnam was not more than 10 percent of the GNP, and workers comprised 1 percent of the total population - 250,000 out of 25 million. Nhan Dan, June 6, 1959. Tran Van Giau, A Viet Minh leader in the South during the August Revolution of 1945, defended a policy toward intellectuals that would de-emphasize their non-proletarian background and recognize their patriotic contributions by pointedly asking, "Who fixed the cars of the French when they were in Hanoi? The workers, that's who!" Nhan Dan, November 17, 1956.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup>Self-criticism of Ha Nam Province Party Committee, <u>Nhan Dan</u>, June 28, 1955.

urbanization in the North, along with the relatively more even geographical development of its revolution, meant that the initial problems of consolidating state power were not as severe as in China. The problems that were encountered in the urban areas were due more to the depressed economic situation than political resistance to the new regime. 56 Nevertheless, cadre behavior had alienated part of the urban population. In mid-1956, the Hanoi authorities acknowledged that, "In carrying out the policies and programs of the Front, cadres have committed many errors, and so there are still people who are suspicious of and lack confidence in a number of our policies. In addition, a number of cadres still have a bureaucratic and commandist behavior which has given rise to resentments (thac mac) among the people."57 Some cadres were reportedly concerned that when elections for ward representatives were held the "right people" would not be voted in and saboteurs would raise awkward questions at the ward delegates conference, but these problems did not occur. 58 No three-anti or five-anti campaigns were carried out against the bourgeoisie, as in China, because Vietnam's urban bourgeoisie did not play as prominent a role in either the economy

<sup>56</sup> Inflation was a continuing problem during the first post-Liberation years. A report on the urban economy noted that one out of every ten persons in Hanoi was involved in trade, but few were producers.

Nhan Dan, August 2, 1956. Fluctuations in rice prices had not been solved even by 1958. Nhan Dan, January 9, 1958. The food problem in Hanoi improved with rice consumption (paddy) rising from 286.8 kilos per person in 1955 to 367.2 in 1959. Nhan Dan, July 10, 1963. Adverse economic conditions in the early 1960's caused a temporary setback but more efficient rationing and retailing reduced the scope of the problem. Nhan Dan, September 11, 1964.

<sup>57&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, July 8, 1956.

<sup>58&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

or administration of the cities, since those roles had been dominated by the overseas Chinese and the French respectively. The demise of the colonial regime left a vacuum to be filled, more than a problem of integrating classes which had been overthrown by social revolution as in China. Moreover, there was a strong reservoir of nationalistic sympathy for the revolutionaries among Vietnam's urban populace as well as a strong element from urban petty bourgeoisie origins within the Party itself who were able to move easily into the new urban centered administrative system and man its technical, educational and cultural nerve centers.

## Intellectuals and the Revolution

Precisely because of this close association, the DRV leadership felt particularly sensitive about the problems raised by intellectuals during Vietnam's "Hundred Flowers" episode, the Nhan Van affair of 1959. This episode of protest by a number of DRV intellectuals was ostensibly directed against Party influence in artistic matters, and it brought attention to the close social and intellectual links between Party members and former "bourgeois intellectuals." Such intellectually

<sup>59</sup>Nhan Van (Humanistic Literature) was the title of a literary magazine published by dissident intellectuals in 1956. The title was apparently a word play on the name of the Party newspaper Nhan Dan (The People), and became the designation for the group of dissident authors. The group published protests against what it regarded as excessive Party influence in the arts and criticized Party leadership in general, calling for a more open political system. As noted below, some members of this group attacked Party policy on reunification, while other members were accused of having links with French and South Vietnamese intellegence.

prominent figures as Tran Duc Thao, an agrege (thac si) in philosophy from the Sorbonne and former student of Jean Paul Sartre, attempted to use the traditional Vietnamese respect for intellectual attainment to put forward political views which conflicted with the Party line. 60 Thao was seen by some of his associates as a brilliant theoretician and as a "successor to Marx." 61 He later confessed that he had "de-manded the broadening of democracy while brushing over the problem of dictatorship, making it appear as if there were no longer any enemy around. 62 A professor in the Faculty of Pedagogy where Thao taught was reported to have said, "I still shudder when I think of the activities of the Tran Duc Thao gang. If they had been able to carry out their plans, not only the professors who were Party members but also all honest people loyal to the regime like me would have their heads hanging from the top of a tree. 63

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup>Duong Bach Mai, "Tri thuc Viet Nam doi voi Cach Mang" (Vietnamese Intellectuals and Revolution), Nhan Dan, August 30, 1957, writes that, "The Vietnamese people have a long tradition of giving respect to intellectuals." One reason that the intellectuals continued to enjoy considerable prestige is because they were an important link with South Vietnam. Most of the articles on intellectuals during the immediate post-Liberation period were done by prominent Southerners such as Tran Van Giau, Duong Bach Mai and Pham Huy Thong.

Mhan Dan, May 11, 1958. Professor Pham Huy Thong, Chairman of the Faculty of Pedagogy, rejected this pretension as "like the scholasticism of the Middle Ages in Europe." Nhan Dan, May 5, 1958. While Thao's brilliance was not denied, it was held that his intellectual arrogance had led him into political errors which included challenging Party authority in the ideological and artistic sphere, slandering other socialist countries (notably the Soviet Union), and linking up with bourgeois counter revolutionary elements in North Vietnam. Ibid.

<sup>62&</sup>lt;u>Nhan Dan</u>, May 22, 1958.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup>Nhan Dan, May 5, 1958.

Tran Dan, another prominent intellectual was branded as the "son of a landlord and bourgeois." He and his group were accused of having "seized control of the Writers' Association and a number of people in the Party group of the Writers' Association" and then directing their efforts toward the Arts and Literature Association and the central Arts Sub-section. Another article in Nhan Dan commented, "it is too bad that for a rather long period of time a number of weak persons - including even Party members - have been deceived by the slogan 'new, new' and 'the search for creativity'."

The DRV was concerned about people like Tran Duc Thao and Tran Dan because Vietnam's intellectuals provided a social bridge between the petit-bourgeois of the colonial period and the membership of the Party. DRV leaders feared that the intellectuals would be an opening wedge for its enemies to penetrate to the core of the political system. This fear was illustrated by imputed connection between the Nhan Van group and an alleged spy ring left behind by the French. The Nhan Van group had control of a private printing house, which was said to

<sup>64</sup> Nhan Dan, April 25, 1958. In addition, Thao was alleged to have plotted to take over the university to provide a base for spreading his views. Nhan Dan, May 4, 1958.

<sup>65</sup>Nhan Dan, April 1, 1958. At the time of the Nhan Van movement in 1956, "a number of people in artistic circles, including Party members and responsible cadres, were still not clear about the matter."

Nhan Dan, April 14, 1958.

<sup>66</sup> One of the Nhan Van leaders, Nguyen Huu Dang was said to have been responsible for this connection. "Dang had a very crafty trick. Although the spy gang of Thuy An was in the [Nhan Van] group, Dang did not let Thuy An and the others expose themselves by writing articles in the paper." Nhan Dan, May 12, 1958.

be sponsored by some of Hanoi's bourgeoisie. The combination of the connection with groups within North Vietnam hostile to socialism and with external enemies (the Diem regime, France and the United States) presented a serious political challenge. The Nhan Van group felt that the Party and government leaders would not be able to solve the "problems that came rushing in" at the end of 1956. The rectification of errors in the land reform campaign had not yet been completed which meant that "people were not yet as united as before, and in the cities the problems of hoarding and speculation led to a runaway inflation, affecting the lives of every strata of the working people. In some Catholic areas, the reactionaries wearing priests' clothing have stirred up chaos."69

But though the Party felt threatened by this dissident opposition in 1956, it did not move strongly against it until 1958. The reason given was that, despite warnings to cease oppositionist activity, the <a href="Mhan Van">Nhan Van</a> group had continued its activities in a more subtle manner. To Another reason for the delayed crackdown on the Nhan Van group was that the DRV was preparing to embark on a period of socialist construction which some intellectuals felt was premature, given the undeveloped economy of the North. Since some of the intellectual dissidents

<sup>67&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan, April 15, 1958.</sub>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup>Nhan Dan, May 12, 1958.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Nhan Dan, April 14, 1958.

had been connected with the group of individualistic leftists (generically labelled Trotskyists) who had bitterly denounced the Party for moving too cautiously during the Resistance and earlier stages of the revolution, this criticism was especially galling to Party leaders. 71

The 1958 criticisms of the Nhan Van group indicate that there was a close connection between the problem of dissident intellectuals and the problem of reunification. In addition to the charges of linkages with foreign intelligence, the behavior of many of the oppositionist intellectuals during the Resistance became a major focus of criticism. This suppression of dissidents came at the time that the DRV had provisionally decided to compartmentalize the revolution and pursue a policy of building socialism in the North while a policy for the South was worked out. It is probable that the propaganda campaign in South Vietnam based on the Nhan Van 1956 criticisms made the DRV authorities reluctant to move against this group for fear of further alienating Southern non-communist intellectuals. As long as peaceful reunification remained a possibility, stern measures against the dissenters were not taken. But the potentially damaging impact of this

 $<sup>^{71}</sup>$ This was particularly true of the case of Truong Tuu (Nhan Dan, April 16, 1958) and Tran Duc Thao (Nhan Dan, May 4, 1958), both with a record of close connection with Trotskyists, and of criticism of earlier Party policies.

<sup>72</sup> The article by The Lu, "Phan Khoi di Khang Chien nhu the nao?" (What Did Phan Khoi Do During the Resistance?) Nhan Dan, April 21, 1958, is one of many examples.

 $<sup>^{73}</sup>$ Criticism of the Nhan Van group included charges that some of their alleged statements were identical to those coming from U.S. and South Vietnamese psychological warfare agencies (bon tac dong tinh than).

criticism on the reunification struggle was duly noted at the time, and the dissenters advised to proceed with caution.  $^{74}$ 

This advice was ignored, and the intellectual opposition to Party leadership and policies continued. When the repression of this opposition came, it was directed against four distinct elements of the <a href="Mhan Van">Mhan Van</a> group. The first "dangercus" group was accused of being lackeys of the imperialists and being intelligence agents, as well as having past links with indigenous political groups opposing the Viet Minh during the Resistance, such as the VNQDD. To Another "dangerous" group was the intellectuals with past histories of Trotskyist connections and opposition to the Communist Party, who used Marxist-Leninist theory to propagate "revisionism." A third group was the "reactionary elements among the bourgeoisie" who supported the attacks

<sup>74</sup> Nguyen Chuong, a high ranking cadre in the Central Committee Propaganda and Training Section, wrote in 1956 that while he applauded the Nhan Van statements about the desirability of reunification, mere verbal endorsement of the principle was not enough. "I hope that the brothers in the Nhan Van paper will review the contents, methods, and attitudes of their criticism and see if they are really in accordance with Marxism-Leninism or not, and whether they are advantageous to the mission of unification and independence of our country, or whether the opposite results have been achieved." Nhan Dan, September 25, 1956.

<sup>75</sup>Nhu Phong, "Bo mat that cua nhom pha hoai 'Nhan Van Giai Pham'" (The Real Face of the "Nhan Van Giai Pham" Group of Wreckers), Nhan Dan, April 14, 1958. The most prominent of these was the aforementioned Thuy An (Luu Thi Yen), supposedly an acquaintance of Marty, the French Surete Chief, and General de Lattre de Tassigny, as well as VNQDD leaders. She was alleged to have been a psychological warfare agent in Hanoi during this period. The author is not to be confused with the Saigon writer Nhu Phong (also a Northerner) who has written on DRV policy toward intellectuals.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

on the Party on grounds of class interest. Finally, there was the group of artists who had been deeply permeated by the "ideology of the exploiting class" to the point that "even ten years of serving the Resistance could not reform them. These persons became so disaffected with their work and life style that in some cases, it led to opposition to the Party and the revolution."77

These four classifications of oppositionists were, in fact, more a listing of the degree of seriousness of each type of oppositionist activity than a systematic characterization of separate elements within the <a href="Mhan Van">Mhan Van</a> group. The most serious problem was that of the connections with foreign powers and opposition parties, because of the continuing problem of foreign intervention in Vietnam's reunification. The While many of the specific criticisms of the disaffected intellectuals were similar to those being made at about the same time in China, the context was different. As one analysis of the political goals implicit in the statements of the "Hundred Flowers" opposition in China concludes, "most of the quotations given from the Hundred Flowers period are attacks on bureaucracy, privilege and abuse of power. Very few

<sup>77&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

<sup>78</sup> The oppositionists were collectively characterized in "a type of alliance with many complex elements, who either have had a record of being lackeys for the enemy for a long time, or feel emnity toward the regime because of their class interests. These [elements] have colluded with each other with the support of the imperialists and a reactionary segment of the bourgeoisie, who have taken advantage of a period in which the world and national situation is encountering difficulties to attack our Party and state, and propagate dangerous ideas among the people under the guise of 'stimulating their morale' and stirring up the masses to the point of an overthrow [of the regime] along the lines of the Hungarian counter-revolutionary gang." Ibid.

are opposed to communism or Mao. The political criticisms were largely from the left . . . . A group of 'Rightists' in the provinces was later accused of having said 'society is in a mess' and 'another revolution is necessary'."<sup>79</sup>

In Vietnam, the criticisms were mainly aimed at preserving individual artistic freedom, and restricting the power of the Communist Party. There seem not to have been any young proletarian radicals in the Nhan Van group like Lin Hsi-ling in China who attacked what she saw as bourgeois elements in the new society and demanded "a search for true socialism and advocated using explosive measures to reform the present system." The majority of North Vietnam's oppositionist group came from established non-Party figures with an accumulated capital of intellectual prestige and urban social connections. Typical of these is Dao Duy Anh, an early leader of the Tan Viet Party, with a

<sup>79</sup> Martin Bernal, "Mao and the Writers," The New York Review of Books, October 23, 1969, p. 36.

There were, of course, young writers involved in the Whan Van affair, and some apparently from "poor" backgrounds. supported Saigon compilation of Nhan Van writings, which remains the only accessible collection of selections from the Nhan Van periodical, lists writers such as Phung Quan among the "youth faction" of the Nhan Van writers. Said to be from a "poor" background, Quan criticized "bureaucratic behavior" among Party cadres. Tram hoa dua no tren dat Bac (A Hundred Flowers Bloom on Northern Soil) (Saigon: Mat Tran Bao Ve Tu Do Van Hao [Front for the Protection of Cultural Freedom], 1959), pp. 117-121. Such criticisms were not, however, primarily aimed at demanding a more rigorously egalitarian socialist system, but were cited as examples of Party abuses of power and reasons why the Party should relax its monopoly on political power and allow more freedom to artists. The reliability of the Saigon collection of Nhan Van is hard to evaluate. Both DRV and Saigon sources agree on the texts of important passages in the writings reproduced in the South. Whether all items are authentic, and whether a representative sample of Nhan Van writings is presented cannot be determined. The analysis, commentary and biographical information is very uneven in quality and generally unreliable .

wide ranging social network of past associations among intellectual groups of many political colors. <sup>81</sup> Far from demanding a more thoroughgoing revolution, Anh complained that the Party set excessively high standards for non-Party members. <sup>82</sup> Anh acknowledged the impact of the news of China's "Hundred Flowers" slogan on his actions, but asserted that, "I can now see that in China the internal enemy has been basically overthrown, and even then the rightists were able to use that slogan for their destructive plots, while in our country the class enemy has not yet been completely overthrown, so that demanding the carrying out of that policy is too premature and dangerous. The plots of the Nhan Van Giai Pham group are concrete evidence of that." <sup>83</sup>

This formulation of the respective political problems of China and Vietnam needs further definition. While in China the class enemy was "basically overthrown" bourgeois influences' reappeared as a target for the Cultural Revolution. The fact that the "class enemy" had not been completely overthrown in Vietnam did not lead to further rectification campaigns in the North, precisely because while class struggle and social transformation were still necessary there, an even more

<sup>81</sup> Dao Duy Anh's self-criticism, Nhan Dan, May 20, 1958.

<sup>82</sup>However, Anh's own actions did not support his pleas for greater respect and authority for non-Party members. He acknowledged in his self-criticism that he had displayed an "incorrect attitude" toward the Minister of Education [Nguyen Van Huyen, a distinguished non-Party figure]. The probable implication is that Anh felt that it was safe to vent his frustrations on the Minister because Huyen was not a Party member. Nhan Dan, May 21, 1958.

<sup>83&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, May 20, 1958.

dangerous class enemy existed in the South. Although 1958 was the year of the DRV decision to proceed with building a socialist regime, the South continued to be taken into account in determining basic policies. The continuing importance of the re-unification problem to the DRV demanded internal unity, not internal struggle. As Dao Duy Anh said, the most injurious aspect of his opposition activities was that, at a time when errors in the Land Reform had created problems, "I let the enemy exploit my dissatisfaction and the disunity thus created in the University which I have some responsibility for, and to propagandize against our regime."

Despite the fact that both Saigon and DRV political analyses agree that the Nhan Van opposition was primarily directed at Party interference in the arts and at Party policies in the North, there is evidence that some of the dissident intellectuals were also criticizing the Party's policy on reunification. Neither Saigon nor the DRV chose to emphasize this aspect of the intellectual opposition since for different reasons, each regime had a vested interest in defending a policy of inaction on reunification. The context and timing of the

<sup>84&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan, May 21, 1958.</sub>

<sup>85</sup>The poem of Tran Dan on reunification was scathingly critical of Northerners who had gone South in 1954 (including the ones who were responsible for political and psychological warfare exploitation of the Nhan Van affair). Moreover, to admit that the poem and its author were suppressed for (among other things) criticizing the cautious DRV policy toward the South would undermine Saigon's contention that it was the DRV whose aggressive policy had sabotaged reunification. For its part, the DRV may have felt defensive about its policy of non-action, and was certainly not anxious to publicly air a sensitive and politically explosive topic, which would further exacerbate the delicate problem of the South.

DRV move against the intellectuals is one important piece of evidence. By 1958 the Recrification of Errors campaign was fundamentally completed, <sup>86</sup> and the DRV was preparing to embark on a transitional Three-Year Plan of socialist transformation. Frequent reference was made in carly 1958 to the "new stage" of the revolution. The new program of socialist transformation would require a united effort, hence the political flexibility of the consolidation period was no longer necessary. <sup>87</sup> In contrast to China's unambiguous post-Liberation decision to advance toward socialism, however, the DRV formulated a policy which would prepare for a subsequent economic development program (which was decided upon in 1960) while a policy responding to the increasingly tense and complex situation in the South could be devised.

The appropriate slogan for the South was to "firmly hold together the movement" (giu vung phong trao) while the North attended to its own "consolidation." Even though the military liaison delegation of the DRV Army's General Headquarters was forced by harrassment from the Diem government to withdraw from its fruitless mission in Saigon in May 1958, it was still maintained that the delegation's presence

 $<sup>^{86}</sup>$ The conclusion of this campaign was announced in Nhan Dan, June 26, 1958.

Merle Goldman asserts that the 1955 campaign against the writer Hu Feng was related to the need for discipline and heightened class consciousness in the early stages of the Agricultural Cooperativization Campaign and the First Five-Year Plan. She cites as evidence the Lu Ting-i statement that, "Our Five Year Plan cannot be brought into realization in a calm, placid way. It demands a class struggle, and [sic] acute complicated struggle." Merle Goldman, Literary Dissent in Communist China (New York: Atheneum, 1971), p. 144.

in Saigon was useful, and provided "conditions for meeting with the authorities in the South so that both sides had the possibility of being closer and understanding each other. This mission is very appropriate to the most sacred aspirations of compatriots throughout the country, and is sympathized with and supported by peace loving world opinion." At a conference of the Fatherland Front in March 1958, Le Duan spoke about the reunification question and "made the conference have greater confidence" in the policy of peaceful reunification in the South. 89

Nevertheless, the policy of peaceful reunification remained controversial, particularly among regrouped Southerners and some dissident intellectuals who had joined the revolution more for patriotic reasons than to pursue a socialist revolution. When it appeared that the anticipated early liberation of the South would not occur, some of these intellectuals were indignant. The most pointed criticism of DRV policy was the poem "Certain Victory" by Tran Dan. 90 This poem, written in late 1954 or in 1955, was explicitly political in content — one of the rare cases in which the Nhan Van group used art as a direct political

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>88</sup>Nhan Dan, May 18, 1958.

<sup>89</sup>Nhan Dan, March 19, 1958. Several days afterward, Truong Chinh (who later had important differences with Le Duan on the relative priorities of building socialism in the North and pursuing revolution in the South) "expressed his complete agreement with the ideas presented by comrade Le Duan at the conference on March 18, 1958." Nhan Dan, March 22, 1958.

 $<sup>^{90}</sup>$ The only available complete text of the poem is in the Saigon compilation  $\underline{\text{Tram hoa dua no}}$ , pp. 103-112. Published extracts from the DRV press tend to confirm the basic accuracy of the Saigon version.

weapon. <sup>91</sup> The poem was attacked for its bleak portrayal of life in Hanoi, but its main political subject, reunification, was passed over by the official critics. Dan wrote that reunification could not be accomplished by faint-heartedness, and that there was "no other road" than "using muscle." <sup>92</sup> In a vague reference to the DRV authorities (possibly Ho himself) Dan complains that the fact that the U.S. is a "paper tiger" has been forgotten. <sup>93</sup>

A close associate of Tran Dan, Le Dat, was criticized for encouraging the participation of Southern writers in Nhan Van on the "deceitful" ground that the "'struggle' of Nhan Van was a struggle of the artists of the South as well as the North, in the hopes of deflating the adverse reaction of the cadres, troops and soldiers from the South."94

<sup>91</sup>Citing a line in the poem, "I use my modest skills to write a political poem," the DRV critique agreed that it was just that. Nhan Dan, April 1, 1958.

 $<sup>^{92}</sup>$ The fact that Tran Dan was responsible for overseeing literary work in the Army gave a special pertinence to his scorn for the DRV reluctance to take more forceful action in the face of Diemist political obstructionism in the South.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>93</sup>Here the authenticity of the Saigon text is in doubt. The capitalization of the word "Nguoi" ("Person" or "the Man") made it a clear reference to Ho, the only "Person" in the DRV. Despite the claim by Hoang Van Chi that this was spelling in the original text and was criticized in the North, no reference to this is made in <a href="Mainton">Mhan Dan</a>'s critique of the poem.

<sup>94</sup> Nhan Dan, April 26, 1958. Some of the Southern writers may have been disgruntled because of early deficiencies in DRV efforts to provide a satisfactory outlet for their skills. In 1956 it was admitted that "with regard to the intellectuals from the South who are presently in the North, and former students who have returned from abroad, we have had cases of not correctly using them. Sometimes the reason given is simply that 'People from the South don't understand the situation in the North'." Nhan Dan, December 23, 1956.

In fact the "adverse reaction" (phan kich) of the Southerners had been directed toward the DRV itself. 95 The majority of the 90,000 Southerners who had regrouped to the North in 1954-55 while awaiting the scheduled elections of 1956 were soldiers. 96 Because of the need to tachieve rapid economic recovery, and the inutility of maintaining a large standing army when the primary immediate tasks were economic and political, most of the Southern troops were organized into production groups (tap doan san xuat) and sent into the remote mountainous areas on construction tasks. Since it was anticipated that they would return South in a short time little effort was made to integrate them into the DRV administrative system. This created considerable resentment among the Southerners, particularly after the 1956 deadline for the reunification elections passed without result. 97 The DRV response was to attempt to improve their material situation, but nothing was done about the basic question of taking a stronger stand on the issue of reunification. A 1958 congress of representatives of 6,000 of the Southern regrouped cadres was held to explain DRV reunification policy.

<sup>95</sup>A Nhan Dan editorial acknowledged that because of Vietnam's poverty and varied regional conditions, "a number of regional prejudices still exist; education about the significance of regroupment and the struggle to unify the country etc. . . . has not yet been done in a thoroughgoing manner; the carrying out of the policy toward the brothers and sisters from the South still has deficiencies." Nhan Dan, January 10, 1958.

<sup>96</sup> The Pentagon Papers (Senator Gravel Edition) (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), Vol. I, p. 258.

<sup>97</sup> Some of the complaints of the Southerners are detailed in, "Why Is It That the Southern Comrades in the Worksites, State Farms and Industries Are Upset (thac mac)?" Nhan Dan, November 11, 1956.

Premier Pham Van Dong tried to mollify the disgruntled Southerners.

"Saying that going out to do production is a continuation of the revolution in the new situation is not just a manner of speaking for the purpose of encouragement. That is the reality of the revolution."98

Although most of the <u>Nhan Van</u> criticism was not directly aimed at the DRV disinclination to pursue a more active policy toward the South, the disciplining of the intellectual dissidents was closely connected with the reunification issue. 99 As suggested above, the most likely explanation for the unwillingness of the authorities in the North to take stronger measures against the <u>Nhan Van</u> group for a period of almost two years is that they were concerned about the

<sup>98&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan, June 4, 1958.</sub>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>99</sup>The heaviest criticism of the Party was reserved for the senior intellectuals who had demanded a removal of Farty control from the sphere of the university and the arts. Very little criticism was directed toward the younger dissidents. Tran Dan and Le Dat, who were attacked not so much for their political views as for their modernistic literary doctrine, indicating either that the issue of reunification was too sensitive to discuss in open polemics or that the Party felt defensive about its policy toward the South. In August 1958, they were the only two Nhan Van figures mentioned in the context of an article on North-South cultural exchange, which pointed out that unlike the indiscriminate jailings of the French period, or in the contemporary South, Dan and Dat had merely been given a "leisurely indoctrination." And, in contrast to Tran Dan's militant call for reunification, the author, a well known DRV poet (Che Lan Vien, of Southern origin) merely sent some literary tears of sympathy to the South. Mhan Dan, August 21, 1958. The case of Thuy An, Nguyen Huu Dang and Phan Khoi was not resolved until 1960. They were convicted of having "formed a group" and becoming par of a spy net allegedly connected with the renowned French authority on Vietnam, Maurice Durand, urging people to demonstrate against the government, and attempting to form an opposition political party. In contrast to the apparently light punishment of Dan and Dat, Thuy An and Dang were both sentenced to fifteen years in jail. Mhan Dan, January 21, 1960.

known. But the 1958 criticism of the Nhan Van group also raised a broader issue, that of the middle class intellectuals who supported the revolution for patriotic reasons but were reluctant to go on to the next stage of building socialism. Several times the DRV criticisms of these intellectuals mentioned their opposition to the March 6, 1946 agreement which allowed the French to return to Vietnam. The contemporary parallel was the failure of these same intellectuals to support a policy of temporizing on the issue of reunification, and

 $<sup>100</sup>_{\mbox{\scriptsize in}}$  Among many people who have not ideologically kept pace with the transformations in the revolution, old, unresolved conflicts and petty resentments reappear. On top of this there are new conflicts and petty resentments that are even more potent. These are the unsteady steps that gradually lead further away from the organization and the collective, and end up in being pulled along and losing the way. This explains why some of our comrades and some artists who participated in the Resistance have recently contributed some compositions or commentaries to the Nhan Van Giai Pham group." Quang Dam, "Dap cho nat chu nghia xet lai trong van nghe," (Smash to Bits Revisionism in the Arts), Nhan Dan, March 23, 1958. The article complains that members of the Nhan Van group who participated in the Resistance were "putting forward the slogan of the Resistance to oppose us." Cf. also "Nang cao tu tuong cho kip voi su chuyen bien cua cach mang" (Raise the Ideological Level to Keep Pace with the Transformation of the Revolution), Nhan Dan, April 3, 1958.

<sup>101</sup> Tran Duc Thao, for example, "slandered our diplomatic policy which he felt was a surrender and betrayal! Speaking of the March 6, 1946 Preliminary Accord, Thao was in agreement with the Trotskyist opposition to our government and uttered crude and rude defamatory comments about our leaders." Mhan Dan, May 4, 1958. Phan Khoi, who was an advisor to the VNQDD in Quang Nam province, was reported to have commented after the March accords that the "Viet Minh have sold out the country." Nhan Dan, April 17, 1958. Nguyen Huu Dang had opposed the Viet Minh policy of fighting the Japanese, and wanted to use the Japanese to attack the French - another example where pure nationalist goals were advocated without consideration for the consequences of the tactical means to implement them. Nhan Dan, April 15, 1958.

subordinating this national goal to the Party program of building socialism in the North. The 1958 move against the Nhan Van group was probably intended as a signal to the urban intellectuals that "bourgeois individualism" would not be allowed to obstruct the implementation of Party decisions.

Signs of a resurgence of the urban social ills of the colonial period, along with economic difficulties such as inflation and scarcity of goods, probably contributed to the decision to move ahead with building socialism despite the unresolved reunification problem, and to take stronger measures against "bourgeois remnants". At the beginning of 1958, "some people asked 'why is it that prior to now the old social ills had greatly diminished, but just recently have begun to reemerge'?" The answer given was that the economic and political dislocations of the Land Reform had an adverse impact in both rural and urban areas. 103 As one article concluded, when peace came to the North, the "Free [Resistance] Zones" and the "temporarily occupied zones were integrated and, on top of this came the unsettled period after the errors of the Land Reform, so that the social ills were not completely eradicated and had a chance to remerge." 104

The recommended solution to this problem was improvement of the difficult economic situation which was seen as a key factor in the

<sup>102&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan</sub> Dan, January 30, 1958.

<sup>103&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

reappearance of "social ills," as well as more thoroughgoing education of the masses and implantation of socialist ideology. To do this, the DRV had to definitively embark on the period of socialist construction. Postponing economic and political development in the North in the hope of achieving reunification would only exacerbate the "unsettled" conditions in the urban areas. And if, in the course of this move to a "new stage" some intellectuals dropped by the wayside, that was a price that had to be paid to solve the very problems that prompted many of their complaints.

## Integrating Minority Groups

Another problem in national integration was the incorporation of areas inhabited by ethnic and religious minorities. In North Vietnam, the problem of integrating ethnic minorities was made easier by the fact that the revolutionary movement had been headquartered in the Viet Bac minority area. Thus, many DRV leaders were fluent in one or more minority dialects, and a group of revolutionary leaders had been recruited from the ethnic minority groups during the earlier phase of the revolution. However, the French policy of "divide and rule" had been partially successful in sustaining and exacerbating antgagonisms between the ethnic minorities and the Vietnamese majority. It was the Catholic minority in North Vietnam, however, that posed the most serious integration problem for the DRV.

China's revolution also enlisted the support of minority groups.

In contrast to Vietnam, the Christian religious minorities posed a

less serious problem of political integration than the ethnic minorities.

The reasons for this dissimilarity are several. First, Vietnam's Catholic religious minority was overwhelmingly comprised of peasants, concentrated in highly organized communities in the rural areas. China, the Western influenced Christians were split between the rural peasantry and the urban middle class, and between Protestants and The total number of Christians in China was less than 1 percent of the population (3 million Catholics and 1 million Protestants). 105 China's main problem with the Christian minority seems to have been the bitter struggle to get the Catholic clergy to break with the Vatican and establish a National Church. 106 The less hierarchical Protestant churches, while also deprived of foreign financial and organizational aid and accused of being an entering wedge for imperialism, apparently proved more adaptable. 107 Both Catholic and Protestant churches, however, had their activities in the countryside severely circumscribed by the land reform, during which churches were closed. 108 The financial means to support a rural clergy were further limited by the commune movement. 109 Although detailed information is not available, it appears that the main strongholds of the Christian

<sup>105&</sup>lt;sub>Francis Price Jones, The Church in Communist China</sub> (New York: The Friendship Press, 1962), p. 8.

This is discussed in detail in Richard C. Bush, Jr., Religion in Communist China (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1970), Chapters IV and  $\overline{V}$ .

<sup>107 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>., Chapter VI.

<sup>108&</sup>quot;All rural churches were closed down during the Land Reform in the early 50's and many were never allowed to reopen." Ibid., p. 162.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid., p. 230.

churches were in urban areas, and it was there that most of the recorded Church-State struggle seems to have occurred. The Archbishop of Shenyang noted in 1960 that the Church had "a number of black sheep" who sabotaged socialist activities, but the only one specifically named was the former Bishop of Shanghai, arrested for allegedly sabotaging land reform, harboring KMT agents, and turning the Church into a "bandits' lair." In contrast to the North Vietnamese situation, the problem of Christian religious groups was largely focused on the urban Catholic leadership. The arrest of the Bishop of Shanghai in 1955 was a decisive event in the struggle of the CCP to induce the Chinese Catholics to sever relations with the Vatican, and followed the 1954 Papal encyclical to Chinese Catholics rejecting the concept of an autonomous Chinese Church. The Bishop's arrest "marked the end of any effective resistance by the Church and the beginning of a new era in its life in China."

Prior to 1954 the DRV had a Catholic community of nearly one and a half million - or about 10 percent of the total North Vietnamese population of 13 million. While the Chinese Christians became objects of suspicion because of their connections with the imperialist powers, the Vietnamese Catholic Church was viewed as an institution of the French colonial regime, and many Catholic communities (notably those of Bui Chu and Phat Diem in the Red River Delta) actively opposed the

<sup>110</sup>Cited in Donald E. MacInnis ed., <u>Religious Policy and Practice</u> in <u>Communist China</u> (New York: MacMillan, 1972), pp. 250-251.

<sup>111 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>., pp. 123-124.

Viet Minh during the revolution. 112 North Vietnam's Catholic minority proved to be a difficult group to assimilate into the post-Liberation state. Approximately 600,000 of the more than 800,000 refugees that fled the North after the 1954 Geneva Agreements were signed were Catholics, or about half of the total Catholic population of North Vietnam. 113 Many left because of fear that their earlier opposition to the Viet Minh would bring reprisals against them. Others left because the Church organized the exodus, parish by parish. They were spurred on by a rumor campaign to convince DRV Catholics that the Blessed Virgin had left for the South, and they they would be incinerated in an atomic holocaust if they stayed behind. 114

Seven hundred priests also left the North, leaving behind 340 priests to minister to the needs of a Catholic community which, by 1971, had grown to nearly 2,000,000. 115 Only two of the twelve bishops in the North remained after 1955. 116 This allowed the subsequent appointment of eleven new bishops who were apparently acceptable to both

<sup>112</sup>A strong indictment of the role of the North Vietnamese Catholic hierarchy in the Resistance is contained in The Hung, "Giao Hoi Viet-Nam va Cach Mang Giai Phong Dan Toc" (The Vietnamese [Catholic] Church and the National Liberation Revolution), Hoc Tap, No. 1, 1962, pp. 69-77.

<sup>113</sup>Bernard Fall, The Two Vietnams, p. 154.

Nhan Dan, July 9, 1961, gives an interesting account of the exodus from a Catholic village just North of the 17th parallel. The article also describes the movement of non-Catholic villagers from Quang Tri, South of the DMZ, to the village, and the process of integrating them with the remaining Catholics in the area.

<sup>115</sup> Pham Van Kham, press conference in Paris, May 1971, reprinted in Doi Dien (Saigon), No. 26, August 1971, pp. 58-60.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid., p. 60.

the DRV and the Vatican. 117 The depletion of the Church leadership weakened the Catholic organization in North Vietnam and evidently removed the most vigorous opponents of the regime. For this reason, the DRV did not feel compelled to force a rupture between the Church leadership and the Vatican, as in China, despite the many problems posed by local Catholic communities in rural areas.

As late as 1956, some Catholics were still attempting to leave the North. One such attempt led to the Quynh Luu "revolt" of 1956. No reliable and detailed account of the incident is available. 118 It is, however, clear that continued dissatisfaction with the DRV prompted some of the Catholic communities in Quynh Luu district of Nghe An province to demand relocation to the South. 119 This movement came during the period of political ferment in the DRV. The errors of the Land Reform had

<sup>117&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

Land Reform and violations of the Party's policy toward religious groups was the precipitating factor. The Diemist claim that the Catholic opposition was mobilized by a "secret organization that had been in place for a long time" was cited by the DRV as evidence of its counter-revolutionary nature. With regard to the instigators, the "contradiction" was "antagonistic" and "only force could resolve the situation." The article stressed that the legitimate demands of the Catholics would be heeded, however, and Party errors rectified. Nhan Dan, November 21, 1956. This article deals explicitly with the Quynh Luu incident, despite Bernard Fall's claim that "Hanoi news media continued to deny Western reports of the uprising, in general and in detail, until well into January 1957 . . . " Viet-Nam Witness, p. 102.

The hostility of the Catholics in Quynh Luu toward the revolutionaries was, apparently, of long standing. There had evidently been a clash with the Viet Minh in the area in 1952, and further incidents related to the refugee movement in 1954. Nhan Dan, November 21, 1956.

been admitted, the Party Secretary General removed, the <u>Mhan Van</u> intellectual dissidents in full flower, and there was disarray in the socialist bloc caused by the Hungarian revolt. Despite the political tensions of the time, the Quynh Luu incident was ended by restrained, though forceful, army actions. 120

Catholic opposition to DRV policies continued, however. The religious hierarchy still exercised powers in Catholic areas that penetrated deeply into the temporal sphere. Parishioners who had participated in the Land Reform were "rebuked" and forbidden the sacraments on the grounds that such political struggle was "contrary

 $<sup>^{120}\</sup>mathrm{A}$  regrouped Southern cadre, who later returned to the South and defected, and who was stationed in the neighboring province of Thanh Hoa, recalled being told of the Quynh Luu incident by friends who had been in the area on leave at the time. "According to what they said, a number of Catholics in Quynh Luu demanded to move to the South. However, the 305th Division was ordered by the government to prevent them from leaving. The people became enraged and seriously wounded a soldier and a company commander from the 305th Division. They picked up clubs to attack the soldiers. The soldiers from the 305th Division had received orders to go there and stop them from leaving but had only weapons with no ammunition. However, because they were not tightly controlled, a person had managed to bring along a clip for his automatic rifle. When he saw his company commander being beaten up he flew into a rage, loaded his weapon and shot and killed eight persons. He was disarmed immediately afterwards." The former soldier said that he did not know the final outcome of the affair, but recalled being assigned to control a similar demonstration in Thai Binh province the following year, with orders not to carry weapons and to retreat if attacked. The Rand Corporation, Studies of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, Interview DT-101 (II), p. 21. A poem apparently written by a resident of Quynh Luu satirizing the Diem government's attempt to exploit this incident for psychological warfare purposes, portrayed the incident as caused by "a few hooligans" capitalizing on the legitimate presentation of grievances at the <u>nuven</u> seat to "dupe" the villagers and "fish in troubled waters." The following day "the cadres came in, and everything was set straight." Mhan Dan, December 14, 1956.

to the religion." Party members and cadres in some Catholic areas were isolated and unable to function effectively.

The 'backbone' brothers and sisters and the masses have not yet been ideologically motivated in a thoroughgoing way, and not yet carefully brought along. Moreover, in a number of places, the government and the Party Chapters lack the assistance of the masses, and have not become a really firm foundation for the struggle of the masses. Many people have become worried and shaken. In the face of the reactionaries cloaked in religious garb and the gang of vagabonds and thugs, a number of the brothers and sisters have ceased their activities, and have had to ask for pardon and return property to the landlords and the church. 122

There were even cases of covert rent collection by former landlords in Catholic areas. <sup>123</sup> In one parish, a government school was emptied of students two days after the teacher was advised not to waste his talents on the government school, and to come and teach the scripture in the church. Going to the government school, the parishioners were told, had the dual disadvantage of costing money and "injecting the mind of a Communist in the students." <sup>124</sup>

These challenges to the civil authorities were compounded by the problem of economic scarcity in the North. Both the government and the church hierarchy were competing for scarce resources. In order

<sup>121</sup> Nhan Dan, April 17, 1957.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid.

<sup>123&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan, March 29, 1958.</sub>

<sup>124</sup> Ibid.

to maintain their status and authority among the parishioners, Catholic priests and prominent laymen were engaged in frequent fund drives for church activities. In many cases this resulted in a direct conflict with the state for the slender surplus resources of the peasants, which church authorities attempted to resolve in their favor by urging their parishioners not to pay the agricultural tax. 125

The persisting strength of the church's social organization in Catholic areas created difficulties during the cooperativization campaign. The policy toward the church lands was spelled out in Resolution 16 (April 1959):

Religious lands will still be left to the parishes and churches to use as before. In the case that the majority of peasants in a village have entered a cooperative, and there is no one left to work the fields for the church or pagoda, if the religious masses request it, the cooperatives can agree to set aside the income from some fields, (including) fields of the religious group to be used in matters of worship. The percentage of income to be set aside for worship will be discussed among and determined by the religious masses. If the religious masses do not want to bring lands belonging to the church or pagoda into the cooperatives, the cooperatives can set aside for the religious believers a fixed number of work days to till those fields. 126

<sup>125&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

Nhan Dan, August 3, 1960. The Resolution further noted that the land of those who had gone to the South had been given either to close relatives or to other villagers. In the event the new owner joined the cooperative, the land would still belong to the owner who went South, and be given back to them on their return to the North. This provision was presumably eclipsed by the total collectivization of land in the higher level cooperatives in 1961-62. And, by that time, the prospect of the refugees returning North must have seemed considerably more remote than in 1959.

Despite these concessions, some Catholic opposition to cooperativization persisted. In mid-1960, well over a year after the inauguration of cooperativization, "the agricultural cooperativization campaign in areas with compatriots who follow the Catholic religion is both a struggle among the peasants and a struggle between us and the enemy." 127 In Phat Diem, center of the largest Catholic community in North Vietnam, some priests openly opposed cooperativization, and told their parishioners, "What profitith it a man if he gains the world but loses his soul?" 128 One young girl from this area, who gradually accepted cooperativization, blushingly recalled that she had been taught to believe that "Communists had tails and ivory tusks the size of huge bananas." 129

Local cadres were, however, cautioned not to make distinctions between Catholic and non-Catholic villagers. Although in some areas where there was a large Catholic population there were "manifestations of collaboration between the reactionaries and unreformed landlords, as well as a number of rich peasant elements" to sabotage cooperativization, cadres were instructed not to let this influence their attitudes toward Catholics in general. A major problem in cooperativization was the fact that the refugee movement had depleted local resources, including buffalo, tools and capital, and many newly established

<sup>127&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, August 27, 1960.

 $<sup>\</sup>frac{128}{\text{Nhan}}$  Dan, September 27, 1960.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid.

<sup>130</sup> Nhan Dan, August 27, 1960.

cooperatives in Catholic areas comprised mainly of poor and lower middle peasants were encountering considerable difficulties. 131 These difficulties were reflected in disparities in the ratio of the rural population joining cooperatives in Catholic areas. In some areas, such as Ninh Binh province, nearly 82 percent of the total population had joined, while in Catholic areas of the province only 48 percent had done so, and some districts with a large Catholic population had as few as 35 percent of rural families entering the cooperativies. 132

The problem of integrating the tightly organized Catholic communities in local areas into the programs and institutions of the state was approached by organizing support from within the communities.

After discovering that it was among the women that anti-government rumors circulated, the Party revitalized its recruitment of women. 133

In some places terminology from the Land Reform relating to political integration reappeared, and cadres were advised to "sink deep roots and tendrils" (bat re sau chuoi) among the poor and lower middle peasants in Catholic areas, thus bypassing the clergy and local elite. 134

<sup>131 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>.

<sup>132</sup> Nhan Dan, September 20, 1960.

Nhan Dan, March 4, 1960. In Tien Hai district, Thai Binh province, because the District Committee did not pay attention to the women's movement work, there was not a correct ratio of women in various organizations. Male cadres thought that inactivity meant inability of women to lead, but they did not want to participate in 'social affairs' themselves. After the problem was uncovered, recruitment of women in Party and popular organizations was considerably increased. Ibid.

<sup>134</sup> Nhan Dan, September 20, 1960.

The ultimate solution was to concentrate on the new generation of youths in Catholic areas. A model of this process, a hamlet in Hai Duong province, started out with only two Party members at the outset of cooperativization in 1959. Finding cooperativization impeded by obstructionist "bad elements" the hamlet decided to strengthen Party leadership. This could only be done, apparently, by concentrating on the youths, since they "were less infected with the bad customs and habits of the old society," and were "at the age of enthusiasm and wanting to progress, so that they could recognize the right course of action and easily grasp the revolutionary line." Party strength in the hamlet was expanded from two to seventeen during the cooperativization campaign. Thus cooperativization was used as a movement of social as well as economic transformation, and was an important instrument in bringing about the political integration of minority groups. 136

In the case of ethnic minorities, the problems of Vietnam and China were somewhat similar. Both countries had vast strategic territories which were sparsely populated by ethnic minorities. During

<sup>135</sup>Vu Oanh (Deputy Chief of the Central Committee's Organization Section), "Mot Chi Bo 'Bon Tot' o vung co dong bao theo dao Thien Chua" (A 'Four Good' Party Chapter in an Area with Many Catholic Compatriots), Nhan Dan, December 13, 1963. This is a good illustration of why Catholic elders were reluctant to entrust education of their young to the state, since in this case it did indeed "inject the mind of a Communist" into the youths.

 $<sup>^{136}</sup>$ This integrative aspect of cooperativization is more fully discussed in a following section.

the immediate post-Liberation period in China, 60 percent of the country was inhabited by ethnic minorities comprising 6 percent of the population. 137 The 1960 census in North Vietnam revealed that ethnic minorities comprised 14.8 percent of the total population, living in an area equivalent to two-thirds of the total DRV territorv. 138 China and Vietnam each have had long histories of attempts to suppress or assimilate these minorities, which left a legacy of hostility toward the dominant ethnic group in each case. The foundation for a more positive approach to the integration of minority nationalities was not so much the result of Marxist doctrine, which tended to view the nationalities question as basically a problem of cultural and economic backwardness, but of revolutionary strategy. The importance of China's minorities became apparent in the shortlived move to establish a base area in Kwangsi in the late 1920's. Subsequently in the course of the Long March, and then in Yenan the attitudes of the minority people became of vital importance to the survival of the CCP.

A leading Chinese writer on the nationalities question, Chang
Chih-i contrasts the Chinese experience with minorities in the revolution with that of the Soviet Union on the grounds that the Russian

<sup>137</sup>George Mosely, The Party and the National Question in China (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966), p. 29, p. 32. The text of this book is a translation of the most extensive PRC work on the problem of ethnic minorities by Chang Chih-i. In citation, the author will be identified as Mosely when the reference is to his analytic comments, and Chang Chih-i when referring to the main text, and referred to by its original title, "A Discussion of the National Question in the Chinese Revolution and of Actual Nationalities Policy (Draft)," as published in 1956.

<sup>138</sup> Viet Chung, "National Minorities and Nationality Policy in the DRV," in <u>Vietnamese</u> Studies, No. 15, 1958, p. 4, p. 15.

ethnic group was less than half the total Soviet population, and that some of the other ethnic groups were even superior to the Russians in terms of economic and cultural development. In China, the Han comprise more than 90 percent of the population, and were economically and culturally more advanced than the minorities. "Under these dissimilar circumstances, the national problem within China, as it developed in the course of the Chinese revolution was not, naturally, characterized by mutual trust to the same extent that it was in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, China's national democratic revolution emerged first in Han areas and especially in the South and along the coast, and the ties with the national minority peoples were consequently few." Chang asserts that the main contradiction of the pre-Liberation period was "between imperialism and the great mass of the Chinese people" which has "caused some people to assume falsely that an internal national question was not present." Despite Chang's assertion that the "anti-imperialist contradiction" was the major one, it might also be argued that the importance of the social revolution among the Han population relegated minorities problems to a secondary position. 140

<sup>139</sup> Chang Chih-i, "A Discussion of the National Question in the Chinese Revolution," pp. 55, 56.

<sup>140</sup> Chang states that "the leading revolutionary task of the time" was to "carry forward the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal struggle," but then drops the anti-feudal aspect in claiming that the main contradiction was between imperialism and the great mass of the Chinese people. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 56.

Although by 1949 the CCP had trained a number of Han cadres for work with ethnic minorities, and some important minorities leaders had emerged, the solution to the problem of integrating the nationalities into the framework of PRC institutions and policies lay, as Mao said, in training a large number of minorities cadres. 141 At the time of Liberation, CCP policy was to allow traditional leaders who had a following among their people to remain in power. "In general," says one account, "the policy followed was to avoid a frontal attack on the ruling class as such while diminishing the sources of their preeminence--principally landholding, money lending and religious functions."142 This approach, of course, required different methods and policies than were at that time being employed in Han areas. By means of using flexible criteria with regard to class background and adherence to non-progressive local customs, Party membership was expanded in minorities areas until by 1957 the CCP had 400,000 Communist Party members, 400,000 cadres at or above the hsiang (village) level and 600,000 members of the Communist Youth League working in these areas.  $^{143}$ 

Partly because of this expanded local support, but mainly because of the ideological fervor of the anti-rightist campaign Great Leap

<sup>141</sup> June Dreyer, "China's Minority Nationalities: Traditional and Party Elites," <u>Pacific Affairs</u>, Winter 1970-71, Vol. XLIII, No. 4, p. 514.

<sup>142&</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>., p. 518.

<sup>143&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

period, minorities policy abruptly changed in late 1957 and in 1958 to one of accelerated assimilation. 144 The failure of this policy became quickly apparent and by late 1958, it was concluded that "at present there are still very few communist hard-core elements who are capable of political leadership among the minority nationalities." 145 Moreover, the uneven progress of political integration of different minorities areas made application of a uniform policy unworkable. Although CCP influence was relatively strong among the Hui and Mongol minorities, it was for some time tenuous in Sinkiang among the Uighurs and scarcely existed in Tibet. 146 Thus a return to the earlier flexible policy was necessary. The tenure of the elites in minorities areas remained stable throughout the 1949-65 period, though lack of reliable information after the Great Leap makes it difficult to assess the progress of the CCP in integrating its minorities areas into the

<sup>144&</sup>quot;The position of the traditional elite actually became more precarious during the Great Leap Forward than during the anti-rightist campaign [in which leaders in minorities areas had been accused of localism]. In the drive to increase production, simplify administration and eliminate bureaucracy, the congeries of compromises which had been worked out in minorities areas seemed to represent so many more examples of obstacles to success. The idea that minority areas had social characteristics which the Party should adapt to came under severe attack." Ibid., p. 521.

<sup>145 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 521-522.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid., pp. 518-19.

larger framework of the state. 147

Minority cadres had played a key role in Vietnam's revolution. 148

Moreover, according to General Chu Van Tan, the most prominent leader of minority origin, their advance toward socialism would be facilitated by the fact that Vietnam's different ethnic groups "have lived within a unified country for a long time with close economic, political, cultural and social ties with each other." 149 These ties were not always of a harmonious nature, however. During the colonial period French policy exacerbated the divisions between ethnic groups in order to "divide and rule." A DRV account relates that the French "sowed division especially between the Thai and the Kinh [ethnic Vietnamese], the toughest elements, then between the Thai and the Meo, Xa and other ethnic groups. They tried to instill into the Thai the fear of being assimilated by the Kinh and to persuade them that Kinh 'expansionism' could

<sup>1470</sup>ne of the few studies done on the minorities problem in China concludes that since the prospects for advancement among minorities political elites is generally limited to their own area, "their integration into the PRC had taken place in only a limited sense." <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 524. But certainly the insulation of the minorities communities from policies inappropriate to their circumstances and the increase in numbers of local political cadres is a better indication of the ultimate success of a minorities policy than the opportunity of some indigenous higher level cadres to secure positions in non-minorities areas.

<sup>148</sup>The backgrounds of two principal leaders from minority groups are described in Chu Van Tan, <u>Reminiscences on the Army for National Salvation</u>, and Le Quang Ba, "Reminiscences of Underground Revolutionary Work," <u>Vietnamese Studies</u>, No. 15, 1968.

<sup>149</sup> Nhan Dan, March 21, 1959.

be resisted only with the protection of the French."<sup>150</sup> This policy left a legacy of uneven Party control in minorities areas. In some places like the Viet Bac mountain areas north of Hanoi where the Viet Minh had been headquartered, Party strength was extensive. Other regions such as the Tay Bac area northwest of Hanoi had large areas that had been controlled by tribal groups allied with the French.

As in China, Autonomous Regions were created in order to deal flexibly with the problems of each area. The two major regions 151 were the Viet Bac (formed in 1956) and the Tay Bac (originally Thai Meo) Region founded in 1955. The Tay Bac Region, covering nearly 1/5 of the DRV land area was, as noted above, an area of relatively weak Viet Minh control, and in the early years of the DRV had practically no local Party organization. 152 Because of this "the leadership and

<sup>150</sup> Nguyen Duc Hop, "The Thai," in <u>Vietnamese</u> <u>Studies</u>, No. 15, 1968, p. 147.

<sup>151</sup>In addition to the Viet Bac and Tay Bac Regions, a Lao-Ha-Yen Region comprising the provinces of Lao Cai, Ha Giang and Yen Bai, was set up in 1957 and abolished in 1959. This was the only area to have an Administrative Cadres Staff Section (Ban Can Su Hanh Chinh) as a leading organ, since this is generally a transitional form of administration in areas where Party control has been particularly weak. Its role is outlined in Nhan Dan, March 27, 1957. Subsequently it was revealed that in 1957 "the political situation had only just been stabilized," evidently because of undisclosed problems between the government and mountain tribesmen, possibly the Meo, in the remote mountain areas of Lao Cai on the Chinese border. Nhan Dan, December 1, 1962. Nhan Dan, March 23, 1959 announced the abolition of the region and its absorption into the Tay Bac and Viet Bac Regions.

<sup>152&</sup>lt;u>Nhan Dan</u>, September 14, 1962.

influence of the Party among the various ethnic groups was restricted." <sup>153</sup> In order to build up Party strength, the post-Liberation halt in Party recruitment was not applied in the Tay Bac Region. <sup>154</sup>

Political integration in ethnic minority areas could best be achieved by expanding the number of minority group cadres, who were the intermediaries between the Party and state, and their local areas. This was most effectively done by recruiting youths during the various campaigns to encourage fixed settlement and collectivize agriculture among the minorities. In 1957 the Party decided to intensify transformation in the mountain areas, but progress was slow because of the continuing lack of trained local cadres. The Viet Bac Autonomous Region, whose ethnic groups had generally supported the revolution, had a stronger base of trained local personnel than other areas. Nevertheless even the Viet Bac Region had initially suffered from a lack of ethnic cadres, who comprised as little as 10 percent of the total number of cadres in the region in 1955. Most of the Viet Bac ethnic cadres were in areas that had been former base zones, and most of them had apparently

<sup>153&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

<sup>154&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

<sup>155&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, April 25, 1959.

<sup>156</sup>As noted below, Chu Van Tan stated that by 1963 there had been a sixfold increase of ethnic cadres in the Viet Bac, raising the figure to 60 percent of the total number of cadres there.

been recruited during the Resistance. <sup>157</sup> In the Tay Bac Region, only 49 percent of the cadres had been recruited locally by 1960. <sup>158</sup>

During a visit to the Thai-Meo Region in January 1959, General Giap had rejected the idea that the highlands must progress more slowly toward socialism than the lowland delta areas, and offered the opinion that "aithough there are some differences" between minorities and delta regions, "politically they are basically similar." But although it was announced at the 16th Plenum of the LDP Central Committee in April 1959 that "feudalism and the land question have basically been resolved in the minorities areas," problems in integrating ethnic minorities persisted. The 16th Plenum was later reported to have qualified the view that feudalism was no longer a major problem by stressing that consolidation of labor exchange teams and cooperatives must be accompanied by eliminating the "last remnants" of the feudal landholding structure. 161

<sup>157&</sup>quot;In many old Party base areas the ratio of Party members is high and, in some places, comprises 3 percent of the total population, but it is worthy of note that the quality of Party members is not yet high. The number of young Party members is very small. In the huyen Party organization in Thoat Lang (Lang Son) only 4 percent of Party members are under 30 years of age." Nhan Dan, June 9, 1962.

<sup>158&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan</sub> Dan, July 18, 1960.

<sup>159&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan, January 13, 1959.</sub>

<sup>160&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, May 19, 1959.

<sup>161</sup> Nhan Dan, November 4, 1959.

During the initial phases of agricultural cooperativization, it became clear that the general policy could not be applied without modification in the minorities areas, and cadres were instructed to combine "completing the democratic revolution" with the collectivization campaign. 162 The reason for this modification was that despite a continuous recruiting drive, by 1960 the Party local organization in mountain areas was still considered weak. 163 Moreover, cooperativization in these weak areas was obstructed by some members of the traditional elite, some of whom had been reclassified as "laboring peasants" during the Rectification of Errors campaign. 164 Secretary of the Viet Bac Region stressed that the traditional customs of various ethnic groups would have to be taken into account during cooperativization. He told an interviewer that, "We are striving to instill an attitude of concrete and specific leadership among the cadres, and to have them overcome the 'disease' of generalization and superficiality." 165 Chu Van Tan acknowledged several months later

<sup>162&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, December 5, 1959.

<sup>163&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, September 24, 1960.

<sup>164&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, July 21, 1960.

<sup>165</sup>Nhan Dan, June 8, 1960. Two contrasting examples of the specific problems caused by local custom were given. The Nung Phan Sinh in Lang Son had the habit of arriving at the periodic market the day before, carousing and singing all night, and not returning until the following afternoon. Customs such as this were not favorably regarded, and one cooperative was able to save 8,000 man days by putting a stop to it. In Tuyen Quang province, however, a Cao Lan cadre was told by villagers from the same ethnic group that custom required them to maintain breeding pigs for ancestor worship. They sought (and presumably received) assurances that they would not have to part with these animals if they entered the cooperative. Ibid.

that, "We must recognize that advancing the mountain areas toward socialism is now encountering difficulties," and that "the ideology of the cadres and people has not been transformed in accordance with the new situation." Truong Chinh noted that the Central Committee had formulated separate policies on the class line for lowland areas and the mountain regions, where the watchword would be "resolute but gentle, simple but firm and penetrating." 167

During the period from the first year of cooperativization in 1959 to late 1961 when the first (lower level) phase of cooperativization had been essentially completed in the lowland areas, the number of highland families in cooperatives rose from 14 to 75 percent of the

<sup>166</sup>Nhan Dan, March 21, 1959.

<sup>167</sup>Nham Dan, December 5, 1959. The Politburo formulated two different class policies within the ethnic minorities areas. "In areas with greater economic development and a clear division into classes, the following class policy will be applied; rely completely on the poor and lower middle peasants, unite closely with the middle peasants, win over the upper strata who have ties with the masses, restrict and gradually eliminate the rich peasant economy, ideologically reform the rich peasants, eliminate the power of the feudalists, prevent the landlords from raising their heads, open the way for the landlords to reform themselves through labor and become new persons, repress the reactionaries who are currently engaged in sabotage, resolutely get the people of the mountain areas to go along the road of cooperativization and to advance toward socialism." Ibid.

In the case of areas less well developed economically, where class distinctions were not clear, "Rely completely on the laboring peasants, particularly the poor and miserable laboring peasants, win over the upper strata with ties to the masses, eliminate the remaining vestiges of feudalism, repress the reactionaries who are currently engaged in sabotage, and get the mountain people to go along the path of cooperativization and advance to socialism." <a href="Ibid">Ibid</a>. The guideline for the more advanced mountain areas is identical to that used in the lowlands, with the exception of the mention of the "upper strata with close ties to the masses" and the "reactionaries," terminology which suggests a considerably lower level of political integration than in the Vietnamese lowland areas.

total. 168 As a result of this campaign, the indigenous cadre strength in ethnic minorities areas was greatly expanded. 169 By 1963, ethnic cadres in the Viet Bac Region were six times the number in 1955, and the number of Party members had risen from 20,000 in 1955 to more than 40,000 in 1963, with a Party presence in "almost all hamlets and villages in the Region. 170 At the end of 1961 Party organization in the rural areas of the Tay Bac Region was widespread and almost all villages had a Party Chapter, largely due to a major recruiting push in the 1956-59 period, with the greatest expansion coming in 1959. 171

<sup>168&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan</sub> <u>Dan</u>, November 4, 1961.

 $<sup>^{169}</sup>$ During the cooperativization campaign, 7,500 new Party members were recruited in the 2,000 villages in the ethnic minority mountainous areas. Nhan Dan, December 8, 1961.

<sup>170</sup> Chu Van Tan, "Viec thuc hien chinh sach khu vuc tu tri dan toc o Khu Viet Bac" (The Carrying Out of Policy in the Viet Bac Autonomous Ethnic Region), Hoc Tap, No. 7, 1963, p. 37. An earlier statistic of the Central Minorities Commission indicated that ethnic cadres comprised 72 percent of all cadres in the Viet Bac Region as of 1959.

Nhan Dan, February 2, 1962. Whether this figure was compiled on the basis of different criteria than the 1963 figure of 60 percent given by Chu Van Tan cannot be determined on the basis of available evidence.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>171</sup>Nhan Dan, September 14, 1962. In some cases, however, integration went more slowly. An example is a remote Meo village along the Lao border in Thanh Hoa province of upper Central Vietnam. After a 1957 attempt of one of the local leaders to style himself a "king" (xung vua) the DRV stepped up their efforts to "create a bridge linking the locality with the security forces." Evidently this was a prolonged process and was apparently accomplished by manipulating clan rivalries as shown by the fact that most of the newly selected leaders came from two of the five major clans in the area. Nhan Dan, March 18, 1975. The Lao border area in Central Vietnam posed continuing problems because of its remoteness and vulnerability to incursions from U.S. supported Meo in Laos. In one mountain village whose inhabitants "lived almost totally cut off from the lowlands" the first Vietnamese border patrols were greeted by the phrase "hello government" (chao chinh phu) since the group of soldiers was the only visible embodiment of the state in this area. Nhan Dan, July 24, 1963.

The gains in numbers of ethnic cadres at higher levels were evidently not as rapid. Perhaps the most basic impact of cooperativization on the integration of "nomadic" groups such as the Meo, was their organization into settled agricultural communities. By the early 1970's, 70 percent of the groups which had practiced shifting cultivation in 1945 had been settled, mostly at lower altitudes. 173

The problem of integration in the mountain areas involved not only the relationship between the Vietnamese and the minority groups, but among the different minority groups interspersed throughout the highland regions. Unlike China's generally consolidated ethnic minority groups, the DRV minorities were often intermingled within a single village. This was especially true of the Viet Bac Region

<sup>172</sup> In Lao Cai province, which appears to have had more complex and deep rooted problems than many other minorities provinces, it was revealed that "the majority of leading cadres from <a href="https://www.nummer

<sup>173</sup>George McT. Kahin, "Minorities in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam," Asian Survey, July 1972, p. 583.

<sup>174</sup> For example, "there is practically no village in Lang Son where Tay and Nung do not live side by side. These two national minorities, sprung from the same stock, speaking the same dialect and having the same habits and customs, constitute nevertheless two strongly divided ethnic groups. Feuds and rivalries, now smouldering, now open, used to set them apart and were shrewdly exploited by the colonial administration." Vu Canh, "In the Country with Seven Streams," Vietnamese Studies, No. 15, 1968, p. 191.

and some regions along the Lao border in Central Vietnam. This demographic pattern gave rise to some problems during the cooperativization campaign, in which one ethnic group was reluctant to join another in the same cooperative. The recommended solution was to prove the superiority of the cooperatives in raising living standards and to use economics as an incentive for integration. 175

Education was one important integrative mechanism for ethnic groups, and the DRV had expended considerable effort to develop a script for the ethnic groups that did not have a written language.

This allowed each ethnic group to preserve its own culture, while providing a bridge of communication with the majority culture. As one account noted, "Previously, before they had studied the national language and did not know Vietnamese, the Meo found studies very difficult. Now they study using their own language, the Meo find it much easier to overcome illiteracy, and when they come to study the common language [Vietnamese] they learn quickly." The problem of using minority languages to facilitate contacts with the majority population was that trained teachers from the minority groups were lacking, and

<sup>175</sup>An example was the initial refusal of Thai and Muong minorities in Thanh Hoa province to join together in a cooperative. Their reluctance was eventually overcome by the demonstrated benefits of this form of agricultural organization. Nhan Dan, February 10, 1962.

<sup>176</sup> Nhan Dan, November 10, 1962. Another article notes that, "Like the Tay-Nung alphabet, the Meo alphabet has served as a 'bridge' to facilitate the assimilation of the common national language and script, since all these three transcription systems are based on Latin characters." Thanh Ha, "The Languages of National Minorities and the Creation and Improvement of Their Scripts," Vietnamese Studies, No. 15, 1968, p. 130.

ethnic Vietnamese teachers had to be sent to the mountain regions. The situation gradually improved and by 1966 there were nearly 5,000 ethnic minority primary school teachers, and nearly 1,000 at secondary level and above, while 12 percent of the total population was enrolled in various schools. The schools in local areas with an admixture of different ethnic groups appear to use Vietnamese, the "common language" (tieng pho thong), as a medium of instruction from the first grade on. The school had higher educational levels, the Vietnamese language becomes even more important, since it is not only a common medium of expression among different minorities, but also the means for going on to a higher educational level. At the senior middle school in That Khe (Cao Bang), according to a DRV reporter, "It is absolutely impossible for me, at least at first sight, to distinguish among teachers and pupils of different ethnic groups. They all speak Vietnamese without accent [and] are dressed city style . . . . "179

<sup>177</sup> Nhat Hung, "Education in the Service of National Minorities," Vietnamese Studies, No. 15, pp. 118-19.

<sup>178</sup>A Nung from a remote village in Cao Bang near the Chinese border noted that his hamlet of 14 households contained five different ethnic groups (Tay, Nung, Man, Xan Diu and Lo-lo). In the local primary school only Vietnamese was used and it was forbidden to speak local dialects in conversation. (Interview No. 44). It may be that the use of Vietnamese is not only confined to schools with mixed ethnic groups. An interview with a Tay from neighboring Bac Can province revealed that although the pupils in the local primary school were all Tay, Vietnamese was used throughout after a brief initial period of bilingual instruction during the learning of the alphabet. (Interview No. 43).

 $<sup>179 \</sup>text{Vu Canh}$ , "In the Country of Seven Streams," <u>Vietnamese</u> <u>Studies</u>, No. 15, p. 212.

Uneven development of various ethnic groups within the Autonomous Regions created pressures for further subdivisions within the region that would reflect the different levels of political integration. Because the Party had different political policies for areas which were determined to have become economically advanced enough to have a relatively distinct class structure, and areas which did not, a proposal to divide the mountain regions into two zones was advanced.  $^{180}$  While this proposal was rejected, the diversity within the vast Tay Bac and Viet Bac Autonomous Regions led to further dissatisfaction with the region structure when, on 1963, the Party implemented a national decision to increase the powers of the province. Some Viet Bac cadres felt that because the primary role in economic management had been assigned to the provinces, the region had become superfluous and should be abolished. 181 The effect of the increased role of the province was to restrict the autonomy previously granted to local areas within the region. In late 1962 the Thai Meo Region was renamed the Tay Bac Region, and its 18 chau (a traditional designation for sub-province minority areas) were regrouped as huyen falling under three newly

<sup>180</sup> Nhan Dan, March 26, 1960. This would presumably also have allowed a separate administrative area along the strategic Lao border in Central Vietnam, where no separate ethnic region existed, and where 50,000 of North Vietnam's two million ethnic minority inhabitants lived scattered along a nearly 3,000 kilometer border. This widely dispersed living pattern created problems which resulted in "enemies sowing confusion and working on superstitions, particularly among the Lao border, to destroy unity." Nhan Dan, March 21, 1959.

 $<sup>^{181}</sup>$ Chu Van Tan, "Viec thuc hien chinh sach," in  $\underline{\text{Hoc}}$   $\underline{\text{Tap}}$ , No. 7, p. 41.

created provinces. <sup>182</sup> But although the creation of provinces within the Tay Bac Region was part of the national economic development program, and designed primarily to centralize economic management, it gave a stronger identity to the sub-region local administrative units, thus complementing the purpose of changing the region's name from an ethnic to a geographical designation in order to de-emphasize the role of its two largest minority groups. <sup>183</sup>

These organizational changes reflected a de-emphasis on the "special characteristics" of the mountain areas, and concessions to ethnic minority groups. Despite the Party's efforts to make distinctions in applying its class policy based on the level of economic development of each area, dissatisfaction still existed in local areas. Some minorities cadres contended that the special characteristic of ethnic minorities was that middle peasants were more numerous than poor peasants, and that each locality should have its own class policy. 185

<sup>182&</sup>lt;u>Nhan Dan</u>, October 28, 1962.

<sup>183</sup> Vietnamese Studies, No. 15, p. 17.

<sup>184</sup>Chu Van Tan, "Nam vung duong loi giai cap cua Dang o nong thon mien nui" (Firmly Grasp the Party's Class Line in the Mountainous Rural Areas), Hoc Tap, No. 2, 1962. Although the Party had tried to apply policy flexibly "even now, manifestations of disagreement with the class line of the Party are by no means finished." p. 3.

<sup>185 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>. Noting that generally speaking 65 to 75 percent of the members of Cooperative Administrative Committees were poor or lower middle peasants, General Tan acknowledged that while the class characteristics of the mountain areas are not like those of the lowlands, "Generally speaking, in areas where class distinctions have taken shape there is still a clear dividing line to be drawn between middle and poor and lower middle peasants that should not be 'subjectively and artificially' erased." Ibid., pp. 31-32.

Apparently the DRV had concluded that the past compromises with traditional leaders were excessive and needed to be reviewed. A specific case of this was the province of Lang Son, which was criticized for "rightist errors." Lang Son's neglect of its task of building up the Party at the local levels, and incompetent economic management by the province had led to withdrawals from cooperatives ranging from 15 to 35 percent of the total membership. 187

In the Viet Bac area, where Party organization was relatively strong, heavy pressure had been directed at the province Party organizations to halt the setbacks in agricultural cooperativization that occurred during the economically depressed years of the early 1960's. The Cao Bang Province Party Committee was publicly rebuked for its "rightist ideology" which resulted from the fact that "most cadres and Party members in Cao Bang province come from the intermediate strata and are still strongly affected by the old ideology of small producers" which is characterized by undisciplined individualism. 188 This, in

<sup>186</sup>Although caution and discrimination in dealing with the local elite was recommended, at the same time it was necessary to "avoid a simplistic ethnic group viewpoint that leads away from the class line, and results in losing political vigilance and falling into the snare of narrow ethnic group-ism." Ibid., p. 33.

 $<sup>^{187}</sup>$ Be Chan Hung, "Vi tu tuong chi dao huu khuynh nen phong trao cua tinh Lang Son trong hai nam qua bi sut kem" (Because of the Rightist Ideology in Leadership, the Movement in Lang Son Province Has Deteriorated in the Past Two Years), Hoc Tap, No. 11, 1963, p. 49.

<sup>188</sup>Vu Ngoc Linh, "Dang Bo Cao Bang kien quyet dau tranh khac phuc tu tuong huu khuynh" (The Cao Bang Party Headquarters Resolutely Struggles to Overcome Rightist Ideology), Hoc Tap, No. 9, 1964, p. 44.

turn, had resulted in the infiltration of "bad elements" into the Party and, "at a time when the movement was encountering serious difficulties the Province Committee had a serious lapse of internal unity." Neighboring Lang Son province also had some places where the Party organization was "taken over by a number of bad elements." Criticism was directed at Party leaders at province and huyen level who "for a rather long period of time" had lost their revolutionary fervor and thought only of individual and family interests, leading to a situation in which they were "running after the backward masses, going contrary to policy, and creating difficulties for the movement." 191

Overpopulation in the lowland delta areas and population transfers to the highlands injected a new element in the problem of integrating the minority areas. A DRV study notes that, "The recent influx of Kinh [ethnic Vietnamese] coming from the delta to reinforce the local economic potential, has created a new factor in relations between nationalities in the Northwest. The reactionaries have tried to fan up hatred between the Thai and the Kinh but to no avail . . . "192"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>189</sup>Ibid., p. 45.

<sup>190</sup> Be Chan Hung, "Dang Bo Lang Son kien quyet khac phuc tu tuong huu khuynh, quyet tam dua phong trao len" (The Lang Son Party Head-quarters Resolutely Struggles to Overcome Rightist Ideology and Push the Movement Forward), Hoc Tap, No.11, 1964, p. 57.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>191</sup>Ibid., pp. 55-56.

<sup>192</sup> Nguyen Duc Hop, "The Thai," <u>Vietnamese Studies</u>, No. 15, p. 156. In 1963, 170,000 ethnic Vietnamese moved to the mountain areas. <u>Nhan Dan</u>, June 11, 1964.

This movement of ethnic Vietnamese into the Tay Bac Region may have also been related to the security problem posed by U.S. supported ethnic groups from neighboring Laos. Le Quang Ba, the head of the Nationalities Commission remarked on a major increase in infiltration of commando groups into the DRV mountain areas during 1963. 193 Ba linked the expansion of the Party to the task of providing security in the mountain areas, which now assumed a new and urgent priority. 194 The increased threat of infiltration and subversion in minorities areas gave new prominence to the local militia, which was termed "the strongest mass organization of the Party in the rural mountain areas, which the Party Chapters have used as a foundation for expanding the Party and Labor Youth Groups."

The intensification of the war in the South, and the increased threat of U.S. intervention in the North underlined once again the

<sup>193&</sup>quot;The year 1963 was a year in which the enemy stepped up his activities of sabotaging the North. They sent many teams of spies and commandoes into the mountain areas in order to reactivate a number of unreformed old landlords and set up a base for sabotage activities." Ibid. In Yen Bai province, ethnic Vietnamese cadres were criticized for being "narrow minded" about recruiting ethnic cadres and impeding the development of a local militia. Nhan Dan, January 9, 1963. In the case of Lao Cai province, noted above, suspicions of the reliability of minorities had restricted the expansion of the militia in some areas, and this problem was singled out for attention in mid-1962. Nhan Dan, June 13, 1962. The upgrading of the militia training task evidently came as early as 1961. Ibid. The recruiting of militia became increasingly important as the outside threat escalated in 1962-64.

<sup>194</sup> Nhan Dan, June 11, 1964. In 1963, 7,000 new Party members were recruited from ethnic minority groups, equalling the total recruitments during the cooperativization period of 1959-61.

<sup>195&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, June 13, 1962.

strategic importance of the ethnic minority regions. On the eve of the U.S. intervention in the Vietnam war, the growing assimilationist trend in minorities policy was halted, and the Party Secretariat concluded that, "Experience of the last few years has shown that it is absolutely necessary to have a specialized organization in order to help the sections and Party groups and committees of various levels investigate deeply [how to] provide good leadership among the ethnic minorities."196 The 1960 slogan of "mountain areas catching up with the lowlands" was now supplemented with a new emphasis on the role of these regions in making the DRV a "firm foundation for the struggle to reunify the country." Several years later, after the air war on the North had started, the "rightist period" was defined as the years 1961-63. 198 Although the resolution of the political problem of "rightist ideology" was attributed to a "streamlining" of the Party committees at all levels and "elimination of the bad elements who slipped into government agencies," it appeared that, in fact, a more rigorous "left" policy had been recommended and rejected. 199

<sup>196&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, June 11, 1964.

<sup>197&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

<sup>198&</sup>quot;Several Critical Lessons Concerning the Good Change in the Revolutionary Movement in Lang Son," <u>Hoc Tap</u>, No. 11, 1966, p. 39, translated in <u>JPRS</u> No. 39,585, January 18, 1967.

<sup>199 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 43. Cadres who had argued that the serious problems in cooperativization during 1961-63 were caused by class enemies, were told to relax class criteria for militia recruiting, and "avoid careless criticism of the inner ranks or attacks against the enemy which cause unnecessary confusion and tension in the rural areas." <u>Ibid.</u>

brief "leftist" trend of 1963-64 which de-emphasized the special characteristics of the othnic minority groups was halted and reversed by the war, which once again elevated the "anti-imperialist task" to a top priority. The minority situation was complicated by the national security requirements and the corollary need to establish a strong political presence in the mountain regions. Unlike the Catholic areas, which were surrounded by regions with a strong Party presence, the mountain areas - especially along the Lao border - were vulnerable to penetration. While a possible solution was to intensify the assimilationist pressures, the opposite course of action was evidently chosen. 200

Vietnam's problems of integrating religious and ethnic minorities were quite similar to China's, but there were important differences

The policy dilemna caused by the security problem in the minorities areas was expressed in the following terms: "If you are too narrow minded about the various aspects of the minorities' life style and the influence of their customs and old habits, it will severely restrict the expansion of [militia] forces. On the other hand, if you are not strict and judicious regarding serious political problems, the purity of the militia's ranks cannot be guaranteed." Nhan Dan, January 9, 1963. A 1965 article on a successful Party chapter in a mountainous area formerly plagued by oppositionist activities suggests that, while organizing an effective border patrol, a relatively soft line policy was employed. The sabotage activities of the "bad elements" were uncovered, including attempts to subvert the local Party members. "During the most difficult moments, the Party chapter showed firmness, and knew how to resolve the cases in a flexible and resolute manner." Bui The Chuyen, "Chi Bo xa Thong Nhat, mot Chi Bo '4 tot' o vung cao mien nui" (The "4-Good" Party Chapter of Thong Nhat Village in the High Mountain Region), Hoc Tap, No. 3, 1965, p. 71. An example of a more flexible policy with regard to the traditional elite was the case of a former tribal shaman, who became a key cadre in the agricultural cooperative and used his prestige to win over the reluctant wealthier villagers, presumably members of the former elite. Mhan Dan, April 26, 1964.

as well. China's religious groups were more geographically and occupationally dispersed, while the DRV's primary problem was with highly concentrated groups of rural Catholics. With regard to minority groups, however, China had the problem of integrating large territories populated by a single dominant ethnic group such as in Tibet and Sinkiang (as well as the Hui group of the Northwest, whose Moslem religion posed another complicating factor) where Party presence was weak. Minorities cadres in the DRV were unevenly distributed.  $^{201}$  Local Party organization was strong in the Viet Bac and weak in the Tay Bac. Partly because of the ethnic diversity within Vietnam's two major ethnic minority zones, Vietnamese language, education and institutions provided a common denominator for integration of diverse ethnic groups within the regions. These factors seem to have encouraged a policy that was marginally more assimilationist than in the Chinese case, though this approach was apparently being de-emphasized as the Second Indochina War escalated.

Integrating distinct social, religious, and ethnic minorities into the post-Liberation political systems of Vietnam and China was a continuous task that could not be quickly accomplished. While the similarities are more numerous than the differences in each country, China's growing preoccupation with the progress of social transformation focused primary attention on the intellectuals and the bourgeoisie as the main

 $<sup>^{201}</sup>$ It is probably not coincidental that the most extensive contiguous ethnic group, the Tnai of the Northwest, is the one that has posed the greatest problem of integration for the Vietnamese, both before and after Liberation.

target of political integration, while the North Vietnamese became increasingly concerned with their Catholic and ethnic minorities because of their possible connections with co-religionists or tribal groups allied with the enemies of the DRV. In the long term, it was recognized that the basic instruments of political integration were the expansion of state institutions and Party organization among the minority groups, a process that was well underway by 1965, the end of the period under consideration.

## SECTION III

## POLITICAL INTEGRATION: PARTY AND STATE INSTITUTIONS

During the "retreat" from the Great Leap Forward in China, when the relationship between the central Party and government leadership and local level institutions was being reassessed, the Party newspaper posed the question, "How far does the 'pole' have to go in order to reach the bottom?" This metaphor suggests a sense of great distance between the center and the locality in China. An important aspect of political integration is the closing of this gap by political and administrative means. In the previous section, the "horizontal" aspects of integrating regional, political, religious and ethnic minority groups with the majority population were discussed. This section will focus on the "vertical" integration of center and locality.

Vertical integration may be attempted in a number of ways. An elaborate framework of state institutions may be built in an effort to encompass as wide an area of administrative jurisdiction as possible. This approach is limited in usefulness by the great demands a large and non-productive bureaucracy makes on the national economy, and the

JMJP, July 22, 1960, SCMP, No. 2313, p. 11. This phrase also has another, more colloquial, political meaning. "Chinese Communists have a colloquial expression to describe proper organizational technique when one leader is replaced by another. The flagpole is thrust to the bottom (yi ganzi cha dao di). In practice it means that when one great leader is replaced, his closest associates are also replaced; to establish an effective organization the new leader assembles a group of associates with whom he can work very closely." Ezra Vogel, Canton Under Communism, p. 121.

inflexibility and inefficiency which are inevitable in overextended bureaucracies. Another approach is to organize a mass political party which will penetrate the society down to the lowest levels. The disadvantage of this is that large Party organizations tend to require large bureaucracies which also tend toward inflexibility and immobilization. A third solution is to concentrate the administrative resources of the state at the center of the political system, organize local communities on a more or less self-regulatory basis, and use the political party to link the two. This is the integrative strategy adopted by both Vietnam and China.

There are, however, important differences between the two. Both the DRV and the PRC attempted to build state institutions patterned on the model of the Soviet Union in the period following Liberation. This model might be termed the Administrative State, a designation which implies hierarchy, formalism, a tendency towards bureaucratic solutions to policy problems, and a reluctance to encourage unstructured mass participation in government. It stresses the uniform application of general rules throughout the bureaucracy, while attempting to maintain a clear line of demarcation between the Party and governmental functions. Some PRC leaders advocated retaining this model, but

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>One author notes that, "It is remarkable that the Soviet textbook definition of socialism is almost exactly the same as the Weberian and post-Weberian definition of bureaucracy: both are defined as the imposition of rationality on the affairs of men through complex organization and scientific management. The Soviet system not only subscribes to the same goals as modern bureaucracy, but is structured in real life very much in accordance with the Weberian model and its indices of rationality." Alfred G. Meyer, "Theories of Convergence," in Chalmers Johnson ed., Change in Communist Systems (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), p. 326.

Mao and others became convinced that rather than facilitating political integration it would result in a divorce of the leadership from the masses. The Maoist system that was eventually devised de-emphasized hierarchy and formal rules, and the role of non-Party inspectorate organizations. Until the virtual dissolution of the Party organization in the Cultural Revolution, the Party increasingly intervened in government operations. The importance of cadres and mass organizations outside the normal chain of command also increased, particularly during the Socialist Education campaign of 1962-1964. During this period, China moved toward a government of "men, not laws."

In the DRV, an attempt was made to balance the formalism of the Soviet Administrative State, with a system of extensive political participation at the lower levels, particularly in the post-1959 agricultural cooperatives. Nevertheless, the North Vietnamese political system remained attached to the basic concepts of the Administrative State; hierarchy, specified rules, and clear separation of Party and State. Although the DRV tendency toward unnecessarily elaborate institutional

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Benjamin Schwartz has noted that in the tradition of Mencius "it is not institutions which mould the sage-rulers and the men of virtue; it is the sage-rulers and chun-tze (superior men) who irradiate their ethical power through the institutions. When one examines the idiom of the Cultural Revolution one somehow feels that the untroubled image of Mao as the fountainhead of all morality, standing above all laws and institutions; may owe more to certain Chinese cultural perspectives than to any Western source of inspiration." Benjamin Schwartz, "The Reign of Virtue: Some Broad Perspectives on Leader and Party in the Cultural Revolution," China Quarterly, No. 35, July-September 1968, p. 16. While this assessment was made during the Cultural Revolution, it had definite antecedents in the Great Leap and Socialist Education campaign periods.

structures was occasionally criticized, North Vietnam's leaders endorsed the related concepts of a clear administrative division of labor, and scrupulous attachment to "socialist legality."

This orientation toward the Administrative State can be explained by both cultural and ecological factors. By background and inclination, the DRV leadership was disposed to respect the accumulation of relevant experiences in other countries, for reasons that will be discussed in subsequent sections. External models were employed selectively, though sometimes formalistically, when they seemed useful to the DRV. The ecological factor is the small size of North Vietnam. Whereas an elaborate bureaucracy might become ossified in China's large territory, the distance between the top and bottom of North Vietnam's administrative hierarchy was not great, and a complex bureaucratic structure could still maintain effective internal communication and be effectively monitored from the outside by the Party organization. As a result, the Administrative State which was found dysfunctional to political integration in the PRC, proved satisfactory to the DRV's needs in the eyes of the North Vietnamese leadership.

The different approaches to the institutional aspects of political integration in Vietnam and China parallel differences in the area of leadership and policy making, discussed in the following sections. These differences are also the result of contrasting relationships with the Soviet Union, which provided the initial model of the Administrative State. And, as the concluding sections of this analysis point out, the concept of the Administrative State is implicit in North Vietnam's training of "revolutionary successors" to shape the future DRV state,

just as Mao's rejection of this model stemmed from his vision of China's future.

## Central Government and Administration

After Liberation in China and Vietnam the structures of government expanded rapidly to meet the administrative requirements of the state.

In the PRC cadres serving "in the organs of the central government" rose from 720,000 in 1949 to 3 million in 1952; 5.27 million in 1955, and 7.92 million in 1958. The number of cadres working in the "organs of the central government of the DRV" had reached 30,000 by 1959, possibly double the number of 1955. In 1960, the introduction of the LDP Party Constitution noted that "at present the ranks of full-time [thoat 1y] Party and state cadres (not counting those in the Armed Forces) has risen to over 110,000, of which over half are Party members." In the DRV and in China state expenditures for administration after the initial years of consolidation ranged between 8 and 10 percent of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Harrison, The Long March to Power, p. 460.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>The total number of state workers and employees (cong nhan, vien chuc cua Nha Nuoc) increased 208.3 percent during the period 1955 to 1959. Nam nam xay dung kinh te va van hoa Xa Hoi Chu Nghia (Five Years of Development of Socialist Economics and Culture) (Hanoi: Cuc Thong Ke Trung Uong, 1960).

<sup>6</sup>Nhan Dan, September 8, 1960. There is no precise definition of full-time cadres. The term "thoat ly" (Chinese t'o li) was used in the Resistance to signify local cadres who had left their family surroundings to become full-time revolutionaries. In this context it probably means any cadre who is paid by the state, that is, all those above basic level (co so) village and factory organizations.

## total budget. 7

To organize, deploy and control this bureaucracy, the DRV adopted the same form of state organization as the PRC. The National Assembly's Standing Committee and its Chairman oversee the operations of the Premier and the State Council. Partly because of its smaller administrative scale and less complex bureaucracy, the DRV did not initially have a well developed system of oversight committees in its National Assembly, nor did it at first have a nominally independent procuratorial branch to investigate the performance of the state bureaucracy in carrying out policy as in China and the Soviet Union. 9

Another important factor underlying the initial differences between the post-Liberation National Assemblies of China and Vietnam was their contrasting origins. Since the CCP had not laid claim to governing all

<sup>7</sup>Nam nam xay dung, p. 77. The percentage of the DRV budget spent on administration was 14.5 (1955), 10.1 (1956), 9.3 (1957), 9.2 (1958), 7.8 (1959), 8.1 (1960, projected). <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 72. In the mid-1950's, China's expenditure on government administration was about 8 percent of the total state budget. Jan S. Prybyla, <u>The Political Economy of Communist China</u> (Scranton: International Textbook Company, 1970), p. 203.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>There are terminological differences between the PRC and DRV institutions. The DRV equivalent of the Chinese State Council (Kuo wu-Yuan) is the <u>Hoi Dong Chinh Phu</u> or Government Council (not the Sino-Vietnamese equivalent of the PRC institution, or Quoc Vu Vien). While the Chinese National People's Congress (Jen-min Ch'uan-kuo Tai-piao Tahui) is in the DRV simply the National Assembly (Quoc Hoi), a term derived from the French "Assemblee Nationale."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>These two points of difference in the DRV and PRC are noted in a comparative review of the DRV state system in relation to those of other socialist countries during the early dcliberations on North Vietnam's constitutional revision. Cf. Tran Huy Lieu, "Hien Phap Nuoc Viet Nam Dan Chu Cong Hoa" (The DRV Constitution), Nhan Dan, December 29 and 30, 1956.

of China prior to 1949, its first national representative body was the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), an essentially appointive and advisory body. The 1954 Constitution brought the National People's Congress into existence. This body was elected indirectly by lower level congresses and was "twice or thrice removed from direct popular election." The DRV National Assembly came into existence through the national elections of 1946, which returned 333 delegates to the Assembly. As a consequence of the outbreak of the First Indochina War and the Viet Minh retreat to clandestinity, the constitutional authority of the Assembly was held in abeyance. It did not meet after 1946 until 1953, when it ratified the Land Reform program. The powers of the Assembly's Standing Committee (Ban Thuong Truc Quoc Hoi) were modified, and that organ reduced to an advisory body. The prolonged resistance war took its toll on the National

<sup>10</sup> James R. Townsend, <u>Political Participation in Communist China</u>, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), p. 105.

<sup>11&</sup>quot;In the wartime situation, without the proper requisites for the Assembly to carry on normal activities, and the Constitution not yet put into effect, the Standing Committee of the National Assembly did not assume the mission and responsibilities outlined in the Constitution . . . . The National Salvation Resistance demanded a high degree of concentration of authority to be able to cope with urgent requirements in a timely fashion. Thus the National Assembly decided to devolve the weighty responsibility to the government led by Chairman Ho Chi Minh, to direct all aspects of the resistance struggle. The National Assembly Standing Committee had the mission of contributing ideas to the government and criticizing it." For this purpose, the Standing Committee, "selected a person to participate in the meetings of the Government Council and the economic, financial, internal administrative, and cultural sub-sections of the government to contribute constructive ideas." Nhan Dan, December 31, 1956.

Assembly, which by 1956 had been reduced from the original 333 deputies to  $244.^{12}$ 

After an initial period of political and administrative consolidation, the National Assembly was reorganized and strengthened. This was done both as a response to the 1956 10th Plenum decision to broaden the boundaries of political participation, in the spirit of the CPSU 20th Party Congress attack on the Stalinist usurpation of power, and as part of the DRV Rectification of Errors campaign. The National Assembly met daily for nearly the entire month of January 1957, and underlined its new prominence by expanding its committee structure and carefully examining all aspects of the government programs. At the conclusion of this unusual legislative session, a Standing Committee was elected, headed by Ton Duc Thang and invested with the powers originally envisaged for it in the 1946 Constitution. Unring the Resistance period the government had been identified with Ho Chi Minh, the State Chairman, and Pham Van Dong, the Premier. The Standing Committee had not yet been given the importance it was to subsequently

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>Nhan Dan, January 8-25, 1957.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>Nhan Dan, January 26, 1957.

<sup>15</sup>The National Assembly recorded a vote of confidence in the "Government led by Ho Chi Minh," Nhan Dan, January 23, 1957. In the text of the Nhan Dan report, however, a distinction is made between the Party, the government, and Chairman Ho as if to indicate that Ho stands apart as a separate element of the DRV leadership structure.

achieve.

The 1954 PRC Constitution also defined the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress as the "highest organ of state authority." Nevertheless, Liu Shao-ch'i, the first incumbent of this position, evidently concentrated his efforts on his responsibility as Party First Secretary. <sup>16</sup> Government operations were run by Premier Chou En-lai, under general directions from the Politburo, first through the Government Administrative Council and then through the State Council, established in 1954. Franz Schurmann notes that,

The State Council became so large that it was difficult to hold plenary meetings of all agency heads. In size, the State Council came to resemble the Central Committee of the Party. As a practical result, it was the Standing Committee of the Council (consisting of the premier, the vice-premiers, and the chief secretary) which met most frequently. Thus both the Council and the Party came to be directed by a small—and largely identical—leadership core. 17

The small leadership core, however, had to manage and control an expanding bureaucracy which had grown from thirty ministries in 1954 to forty-one in 1956.

In 1957 and 1958, PRC leaders decided to reverse the expansion of the central bureaucracy by implementing a program of decentralization,

<sup>16&</sup>quot;During the course of the First NPC (1954-59) the Standing Committee was regularly convened, but the available evidence suggests that NPC Secretary-General P'eng Chen, rather than Liu, handled most of the work." Donald W. Klein and Anne B. Clark, <u>Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism</u>, Vol. I, p. 623.

<sup>17</sup>Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization, pp. 180-81.

<sup>18&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

"structural simplification" and sending cadres to the lower levels in the countryside (hsia fang). 19 This program reduced the number of ministries and sections of the State Council. The decentralization which devolved power to the province level was accelerated during the initial phase of the Great Leap Forward. When the PRC retrenched from this overzealous program in 1959, a degree of recentralization was recommended in a major speech by K'o Ch'ing-shih, the Mayor of Shanghai, entitled "All the Country is a Single Chessboard." In this article, it was stressed that excessive decentralization would lead to an ineffective use of resources. 20 Recognizing this, it was necessary to "proceed from the fact that China has a population of 600 million" and "correctly deal with the relations between the general situation and the partial situation, the relations between each key point and the whole area and the relations between centralized leadership and level-by-level management." 21

As part of the move to reconcentrate authority at the center, the role of the Party in government operations was strengthened. At the same time the semi-independent position of the Procuracy was terminated. Prior to 1959 the Procuracy had been responsible for monitoring

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 182.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>K'o Ch'ing-shih, "On 'The Whole Nation is One Coordinated Chess Game'," Hung Ch'i (Red Flag), No. 4, February 16, 1959, ECMM, April 20, 1959, p. 39.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 38.

<sup>22</sup> The use of the term "Procuracy" for the PRC's Chien-ch'a Yuan and DRV's Vien Kiem Sat follows the established precedent in Soviet administrative terminology. Cf. Glenn H. Morgan, Soviet Administrative Legality (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), pp. vii-viii.

the performance of the bureaucracy and, therefore, was engaged in a sensitive area of the political system which brought its activities into conflict with the Party. During the Great Leap period, the Procuracy was criticized and its role sharply circumscribed. Although the Procuracy in itself had not held a central position in the institutional structure of the PRC, its semi-independent role symbolized a commitment to the concept of the Administrative State with a vertical hierarchy of state institutions whose operations were guided by explicit rules and formal criteria for evaluating bureaucratic performance.

The PRC rejection of the concept of the Administrative State, in this case patterned on the model of Soviet institutions, was implicit in its critique of the Procuracy. "The bourgeois rightists hidden within the procuratorial organs planted the banner of studying the experience of the Soviet Union and falsely made 'vertical leadership' and 'general supervision' to oppose Party leadership over procuratorial They say that 'the procuratorial organs are judicial organs, are only responsible to the law, should not be responsible to the Party, and that the procuracy cannot be the yes-man of the Party Committee'; their insolence is such that they want to supervise and put themselves above the Party Committee." Those responsible for devising rules and systems for procuratorial work were criticized for not paying sufficient attention to Chinese realities and Party policies. They were said to "revere their [Soviet] textbooks as 'classics', swallow [the contents] without chewing and apply them in their original form." Handbooks prepared by the procuratorial branch resulted in a system

where "higher levels mechanically transmit, and lower levels mechanically apply . . . . The result is that our hands and feet are bound to such an extent that the activism of the masses in the struggle against the enemy is injured." The criticism added that, "We think that this kind of 'only believe books' demeanor has become so serious that even the words of the Party are not heeded." The result is an advocacy of "supreme supervision" or "supervision of supervision" over state organs and cadres. The seriousness of this charge is evident in the conclusion; "In summary, in order to open up the road to the restoration of capitalism, and . . . to attempt to make a crack in the political-legal front, they unlawfully attempt to transform the dictatorial function of the procuratorial organs and direct the point of the struggle against the state organs and the people."<sup>23</sup>

As the model of the Administrative State was being challenged in China, North Vietnam was expanding and strengthening its state institutions and, in some cases, patterning them along Soviet lines. In 1960, as the DRV was preparing to embark on its First Five-Year Plan, and in conjunction with its new Constitution, the DRV set up a People's Procuracy system, whose mission was to check on the execution of Party and government policies and directives in the state bureaucracy, as well as monitoring the administration of justice and matters pertaining

<sup>23&</sup>lt;sub>T</sub>'an Cheng-wen, "Absorb Experience and Teaching, Impel a Great Leap Forward in Procuratorial Work," <u>Cheng-fa Yen-chiu</u>; 3: 34-37 (1958), cited in Jerome Cohen, <u>The Criminal Process in the People's Republic of China</u>, 1949-1963 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 382-383.

to criminal procedure. 24 The Procuracy was established to ensure the "unified and scrupulous adherence to the law," and to "prevent and overcome any influence of localism and dispersionism." 25 The Procuracy was one of the institutions that was meant to overcome the lingering influence of the guerrilla work style of the Resistance. Nhan Dan observed in mid-1960 that, "Many comrades haven't yet understood the aspect of democratic dictatorship" and spoke disapprovingly of "some cadres" who asserted that "only the imperialists need laws; we don't need them." 26

At the time the new Constitution was formally adopted in 1960, the creation of new state institutions such as the Procuracy was accompanied by the strengthening of existing organs. The powers of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly were increased, and its structure expanded. Truong Chinh - the third ranking figure in the DRV leadership hierarchy - was appointed to head this body, replacing Ton Duc Thang who was not a Politburo member. Thus the head of the Standing Committee outranked the Premier (Pham Van Dong) in both constitutional authority and Party position. The Standing Committee was organizationally reinforced by the addition of four committees (uy ban) of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>Unlike the Chinese and Russian Procuracies, the Vietnamese Procuracy was set up within the Army as well. The tenure of the Chief Procurator in China was four years, concurrent with the term of the National People's Congress which appoints him, while the term of the Soviet Chief Procurator is seven years. In the DRV the term was five years. Since the DRV National Assembly term is four years, this provision may reflect a desire to stress the separation of this institution from the National Assembly.

<sup>25 &</sup>lt;u>Mnan Dan</u>, July 10, 1960.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup>Nhan Dan, June 27, 1960.

National Assembly to supersede the previous sub-sections (tieu ban). Evidently these had not had a continuing operational role, but were primarily devices for allocating areas of special responsibility among the Assembly delegates at each Assembly session. With the existence of a permanent staff, the Standing Committee could take a more active role in supervising government planning and operations. 28

Preparations for North Vietnam's First Five-Year Plan (1961-65) necessitated further enlargement of the State Council. This body had been substantially reinforced in 1958 in order to carry out the Three-Year Plan of socialist transformation (1958-60) by the appointment

The committees were, the Planning and Budget Committee, the Draft Legislation Committee, the Nationalities Committee, and the Unification Committee. Nhan Dan, April 14, 1964. A list of the earlier sub-sections and the delegates assigned to them is in Nhan Dan, 1 January 1957.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup>Thus it was felt that, "Compared with the First National Assembly [1946-59], the establishment of the committees is a notable step forward. They are the instruments necessary for the National Assembly to carry out its mission as 'the highest authority of the state', with the assigned responsibility of supervising (kiem sat) the organs of the state as the 'sole legislative organ of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam'." Nhan Dan, April 14, 1964. Schurmann's distinction between "supervision" and "control" should be noted here. The term used is "supervision" (Vietnamese, kiem sat; Chinese, chien-ch'a) which means "to check on performance after it is accomplished" rather than "to watch over performance in progress (chien tu)." Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China, p. 332. The Procuracy in both countries is literally the "Supreme People's Supervisory Institute" (Vien Kiem Sat Nhan Dan Toi Cao). The use of this term with regard to the National Assembly Standing Committee's powers indicates that there is no direct involvement in government operations, even after the establishment of the expanded staff structure.

of two new Vice-Premiers, Pham Hung and Truong Chinh. <sup>29</sup> At the same time, there was a reorganization of some ministries. Four new Ministers and fourteen new Deputy Ministers were appointed, a Supreme Court, Prosecutor's Office and Scientific Commission were established, and the Minorities Staff Section upgraded to a Commission. <sup>30</sup> A newly appointed Politburo member, Nguyen Duy Trinh became minister at the Office of the Prime Minister. <sup>31</sup> The State Council was expanded again in 1960 and Trinh along with another junior Politburo member, Le Thanh Nghi, were elected Vice-Premiers. Thus the enlarged State Council consisted of the Premier, five Vice-Premiers, six Staff Offices directly under the Premier, and twenty six Ministries or equivalent government departments. <sup>32</sup> The size and organization of the State Council remained basically unchanged throughout the period under consideration. <sup>33</sup>

 $<sup>\</sup>frac{29}{\mathrm{Nhan}}$  Dan, April 30, 1958. This was the first step in the political rehabilitation of Truong Chinh, prior to his 1960 appointment as Chairman of the National Assembly Standing Committee.

<sup>30&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

Mhan Dan, July 16, 1960. Schurmann notes that in China, "By 1959 the structure of the State Council looked simpler than in 1954. There were six as compared to nine offices, and fourteen as compared to twenty 'directly attached agencies'. Though the number of ministries was about the same (thirty one compared to thirty), it was far fewer than the forty-one in 1956. On the other hand, the rise in number of committees (eight as compared to five) indicates the importance attached to the function of coordinating committees." Ideology and Organization in Communist China, p. 183. In contrast to the DRV's five Vice-Premiers, the PRC had sixteen in 1959. Klein and Clark, Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, Vol. II, p. 1102.

The next major National Assembly selections of government leaders came in mid-1964. The changes in composition of personnel of the State Council were minor. Nhan Dan, July 4, 1964. Fairly extensive personnel changes were made in late 1965, as the war became the overriding priority of government. Cf. Nhan Dan, October 12, 1965.

The increasing complexity of the central government bureaucracy gave rise to problems of personnel and organization. In the first few years after Liberation, the DRV personnel system was largely improvised. Many civil servants who had been retained from the former regime continued to receive their original salaries, while revolutionary cadres were paid partly in salary and partly through a system of allowances and food allotments. Salary reform was taken up at the December 1957 13th Plenum of the LDP Central Committee. A new uniform system was devised to merge the retained personnel with the new cadres and to eliminate the oversimplified, egalitarian aspects of the existing system, and offer differential rewards to jobs demanding different levels of competence. This 21 grade salary system was put into effect in mid-1958.

Planned economic development necessitated an increase in cadres to staff the economic management bureaucracy. In 1960, the projected development of cadres over the course of the First Five-Year Plan was a sixfold increase in high level cadres from 3,900 (1960) to 25,000 (1965), and a fivefold increase in middle level cadres from 22,300 (1960) to 115,000 (1965). Bespite this programmed expansion of the central

<sup>34</sup>Nhan Dan, March 23, 1958.

<sup>35</sup>Nhan Dan, July 3, 1958. In the PRC, the 1956 readjustment of grades and salaries resulted in a 24 grade system in which the highest grade received a salary about nine times as great as the lowest grade. A. Doak Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy and Political Power in Communist China, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 41-42.

<sup>36</sup> Nhan Dan, June 18, 1960.

bureaucracy, the 1958 salary reform was criticized as unnecessarily complicated, since it set up too many echelons in the salary scale which were not sufficiently differentiated. The Moreover, the differences between wage levels were considered to be excessive in many cases. The remedy was a reduction in rank distinctions and a more flexible policy on wages in which the discrepancy between high and low wages would "depend on the type of activity." A major objective of this salary adjustment was to align remuneration more closely with the actual position filled and work performed, and less on the formal rank held within the bureaucracy.

Despite previous efforts to rationalize and streamline the institutions of the central government, bureaucratic proliferation persisted. By 1962 "decentralization in both organization and style of work" was considered essential because:

In the prevailing situation, the organizational machinery within all state organs is usually subdivided into small units or many unnecessary intermediate echelons. Many central organs have as many

<sup>37&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, May 12, 1960.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup><u>Ibid</u>. Among workers in state enterprises, the 1958 system of 38 grade levels was reduced to 7, while the salary levels remained fixed at 14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup>In 1958 the Party press called attention to the need for reducing the size of the bureaucracy, as indicated in an article in <u>Nhan Dan</u>, January 15, 1958, urging the "revising and reduction of the table of organization, and transfer of people to production." Since 1954 administrative personnel had increased 56 percent while specialized personnel had increased 14 percent. At the end of 1957, personnel involved in paperwork and internal management comprised a high 22.6 percent of all administrative personnel. <u>Ibid</u>.

as twenty divisions or bureaus and one hundred sections. Some divisions or bureaus have only seven or eight persons and are divided into two or three sections which have only one or two persons. 40

In part this bureaucratic parthenogenis was due to a widespread feeling in each organization that it had to have a "proper" structure.

The Deputy Minister of Interior complained that:

Formalism and dogmatism are the factors that caused this situation of organizational unwieldiness and dispersion. As a matter of fact, there are bureaucratic agencies (co quan) which create this or that organization (to chuc) not on the basis of the political mission, but on the basis of a way of thinking which wants one's own agency to have all the appropriate trappings (le bo) and sub-branches (chan ret, lit. centipede legs) like other agencies. Because of this the table of organization becomes swollen and the organizational structure is distended. This wastes many cadres but doesn't bring about any real results. It's fine to go all out in studying the experience of the fraternal countries, that is a very necessary thing. But you must know how to employ that experience in Vietnamese circumstances. There are many agencies which have not done this. They have used the framework, the forms of organization of fraternal countries in a procrustean manner (rap khuon), and have created a muddled situation in the organization of the state administrative machinery.

This tendency to replicate institutions of other socialist countries with a larger administrative scale and more complex economic structure, resulted in an increase in superfluous personnel. The number of personnel in the official table of organization in 1962 had risen nearly

<sup>40&</sup>lt;u>Nhan</u> <u>Dan</u>, October 12, 1962.

 $<sup>^{41}</sup>$ Le Tat Dac, "May y kien ve cai tien to chuc va le loi lam viec trong bo may Nha Nuoc hien nay" (Some Ideas on Improving the Current Organization and Work Style in the State Machinery),  $\underline{\text{Hoc}}$   $\underline{\text{Tap}}$ , No. 9, 1962.

a third from 1959, and most of the increase was due not to additions of trained researchers and technicians (whose numbers comprised only 14 percent of the total), but from purely administrative cadres and state employees who represented 51 percent of the total state bureaucracy. 42-

Although the tendency to formalism in institutional borrowing and adoption was criticized, the DRV leaders still remained attached to the Administrative State model, primarily derived from the Soviet Union and East European countries. During the early 1960's, the advisors most closely connected with the DRV's institutional development came from the Soviet Union, which sent delegations to help establish the Procuracy and the State Scientific Commission. In addition, Soviet textbooks were in wide use in the DRV and the operations of the Party training school were assisted by Soviet advisors. 43

By mid-1962, a program of simplifying the state administrative structure was formulated and a major bureaucratic reorganization took place the following year. This involved some decentralization of economic management and a reduction in the complexity of the central bureaucracy. The bureaucracy was encouraged to strengthen its internal monitoring activities. 44 The combined effect of these measures was

<sup>42&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

<sup>43&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, February 14, 1960.

<sup>44</sup>Cf. Nguyen Cao, "Tang cuong cong tac thanh tra," (Strengthen the Inspectorate Mission), Nhan Dan, January 16, 1963. This article stresses that the main responsibility for inspecting the operations of lower level units lies with "the leaders themselves," but notes that since the task is so large, each organization must have specialized inspectorate body to assist in this work.

to supplement the activities of the Procuracy in supervising bureaucratic compliance with policies determined by central Party and state organs.

To facilitate supervision of the bureaucracy, the number of third level offices (phong) subordinate to the sub-ministerial departments (vu) was drastically reduced. 45 The purpose of this streamlining was to "reduce an unnecessary link in the administrative chain" of ministries and other government bodies, speed internal bureaucratic communications and simplify external control. 46 In addition, this released cadres to other sections of the government involved in directly supervising or carrying out productive activities. There are no comprehensive figures on the cumulative total of cadres who were transferred from central organs and "sent down" to basic production units or to local positions of leadership like the "many thousands" of cadres in CPR central ministries who were affected by the Chinese program of "transferring cadres downward after 1957." During the 1962 DRV

<sup>45</sup> Eight hundred phong were eliminated or consolidated in 1962, leaving somewhat more than 1,000 phong heads. Nhan Dan, January 18, 1963. This indicates that the number of phong was reduced by nearly half.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup>Le Tat Dac, "Day manh hon nua cong tac cai tien to chuc va le loi lam viec trong cac co quan Nha Nuoc" (Push Forward Even More the Task of Improving the Organization and Work Style in Government Agencies), Hoc Tap, No. 3, 1963.

<sup>47</sup> Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy and Political Power in Communist China, p. 60. Barnett's research leads him to conclude that "the rate of lateral and, downward, mobility was apparently high" in the central bureaucracy. Ibid., p. 58. One survey of the hsia fang movement notes that it began in late 1956 as "a movement for administrative retrenchment" and, after the Rectification Campaign of 1957, became a movement not merely to "transfer to the lower levels" but to "transfer to the bottom most level to engage in physical labor." Rensselaer W. Lee III, "The Hsia-fang System: Marxism and Modernization," The China Quarterly, No. 28, October-December 1966, pp. 43-45.

reorganization, however, 3,000 cadres were transferred from administrative and professionally related work to "short handed areas" or sent to "reinforce" basic level production units.

In China, the initial rate of growth in the bureaucracy had been high. The increase in cadres specifically involved in government administration and mass movements, was, however, sharply curtailed after a rise of 84 percent in the 1949-52 period, declining to a growth rate of only 4 percent in 1953-55, and 8 percent in 1956-57. While the total number of cadres grew by 20 percent in 1958-59, the number of cadres in government administration fell 15 percent due to a transfer of nearly 32 percent of the workers and employees in government administration to industry in 1958. The total number of cadres decreased by an estimated 3 percent in 1960-61 because of depressed economic conditions, and the number of administrative personnel dropped an estimated 25 percent. This decline in administrative personnel apparently lasted until at least 1964, indicating a continuing (and evidently

<sup>48</sup>Le Tat Dac, "Day manh hon nua," <u>Hoc Tap</u>, No. 3, 1963, p. 23.

<sup>49</sup> John Philip Emerson, Administrative and Technical Manpower in the People's Republic of China, International Population Reports Series P-95, No. 72, U.S. Department of Commerce, April 1973, pp. 38-39.

<sup>50 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>., p. 39. "The net growth of 288,000 in the number of administrative personnel in 1958 and 1959 made up only 18 percent of the 1,564,000-man increase in the number of cadres. Of the remaining 1,276,000, two branches of the economy, state farms and education, accounted for an estimated 1,037,000 or 81 percent." <u>Ibid</u>., p. 40.

<sup>51</sup><u>Ibid</u>. During the same 1960-61 period technical personnel increased 15 percent.

successful)effort by the PRC leaders to hold the growth of the central state administrative bureaucracy in check. 52

North Vietnam's efforts to reduce the number of non-productive employees in the central bureaucracy resulted in a slight decline of the percentage of state employed personnel on the table of organization (bien che) from 28 percent (1960) to 24 percent (1963) of total salaried employees. Nevertheless, the table of organization had expanded 19 percent at the central level since 1957, and only 10 percent at the local levels, and as of early 1964 the table of organization of the central administrative organs comprised 1/4 of the entire state bureaucracy, leading the Deputy Minister of the Interior to complain, "it is clear that the table of organization of the state administrative organs at the central level are still much too overloaded." 54

<sup>52</sup> Estimates of total workers and state employees were 33.2 million in 1961 and about 32.9 million in 1964, "with a corresponding decline in administrative personnel." From 1964-71 the number of administrative cadres again rose, but at a moderate rate, increasing 40 percent during that period. Ibid., pp. 40-41.

<sup>53</sup>Le Tat Dac, "Khac phuc tinh trang lang phi suc lao dong trong cac co quan" (Overcome the Problem of Wasting Labor Power in Staff Agencies), Nhan Dan, January 10, 1964.

<sup>54 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>. The 1/4 figure for the central bureaucracy is taken from the Deputy Minister's remarks. There is not, apparently, a comparable official estimate for the post-1960 period in China, and attempting to reconstruct such a figure from the available data presented by Emerson encounters the problem of what categories belong to the "central" as opposed to the "entire" state bureaucracy.

In part, the top heavy DRV administrative system reflected the cultural predilection of the Vietnamese for the Administrative State model. While it was certainly influenced by advice from fraternal countries, like the Soviet Union, and, to a lesser extent, China, whose bureaucracies served an area and population many times that of the DRV and a complex industrial infrastructure, there was also a cultural heritage that made the bureaucratic approach to political development a natural one. China had the same tradition, but because some of her leaders saw it as an obstacle to political and economic development the state model based on the Soviet experience was later rejected and a distinctively Maoist formula of anti-bureaucratic measures put into effect during the Great Leap and afterward. As noted above, the PRC leadership concluded that excessive reverence for Soviet textbooks and mechanical assimilation of Soviet experience was detrimental to China's own developmental requirements, and warned that "this kind of

 $<sup>^{55}\</sup>mathrm{As}$  a small country with a large, advanced, and often overweening neighbor. Vietnam had experienced a long history of foreign influences on its state institutions, and had learned the art of selective adaptation of external political models for its own protection, even though some of these borrowings might have been anachronisms or merely superfluous. Woodside's study of Vietnamese institutional borrowing in the 19th century concludes that, "Despite the fact that Nguyen Viet Nam was not very much more than the size of a Ch'ing province, the Hue Six Boards as a whole had almost 100 directors, vice directors, and secretaries serving on their panels in the mid-1840's as compared to an equivalent figure of more than 400 in Peking." The reason, he suggests, was "a formalistic approach to institutional borrowing . . . . Because institutional borrowing was a constituent feature of administration in Vietnam, in the minds of Vietnamese officials disciplined conformance to the Chinese model often became an immediate value in itself, thanks perhaps to this inherent professional exaltation of written rules. The patterns of Chinese institutions received as much stress as their original purposes." Alexander Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese Model (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 69-70.

'only believe books' demeanor had become so serious that even the words of the Party are not heeded." During the same period, the DRV leadership insisted on the importance of "believing books." Nhan Dan editorialized that, "Books are the source of life--books are a Party school," and complained that "within the Party there are still more than a few evidences of a tendency to look down on books." The North Vietnamese passion for technical expertise, and learning in general, will be discussed in the final section on the role of education in socialization. It should be noted here, however, that susceptibility to "believing books" is probably also related to the legacy of the "poor but honest" scholar forebears of the LDP leaders, and the fact that the relatively simple romanized Vietnamese script made education easier and more attainable than in China, where education required a major investment of time and money, and hence had a class connotation which constantly threatened to restore the old cleavages in Chinese society.

The prevailing DRV view of the state stressed the concept of adherence to formal rules and socialist legality. The goal of re-inforcing

<sup>56</sup> Nhan Dan, December 13, 1959. Woodside notes that in the 19th century, the "scholarly nature" of Vietnamese envoys influenced the cultural inventory of Chinese institutions which they transmitted back to Vietnam. It was one more factor which ensured that the civil bureaucracy would approach its corresponding Chinese model more closely than would the Vietnamese military hierarchy. Civil institutions in Vietnam were more thoroughly "Sino-Vietnamese" than military ones partly because Vietnamese military officers rarely visited China." Vietnam and the Chinese Model, p. 118. The contemporary parallel would be that there was more contact with foreign advisors on state organization than Party organization in which the Vietnamese had a rich backlog of experience (as did the 19th century military mandarins) and did not feel it necessary to seek out foreign advice.

the government machinery was to ensure that "all agencies of the state and personnel in state agencies must work in accordance with the law."<sup>57</sup> Disregard for the legal system and violations of it "could lead to serious damage to the Party and State."<sup>58</sup>

A central issue involved in the question of how extensive a role a well-defined system of legal rules should have in guiding government activities was the relationship between the Party and the state. The PRC attacks on the Procuracy during the Great Leap, outlined above, charged that the concept of socialist legality was being used to insulate the bureaucracy from Party control. In the period following the Great Leap, divergent views on the question of socialist legality coexisted. During the Cultural Revolution, further attacks were mounted on the formal legal system. The conflict that preceded the renewed attack was then stylized as a simple struggle between the bureaucratism of Liu Shao-ch'i and the ideological voluntarism of Mao. This characterization

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup>Truong Tan Phat, "Nguyen tac phap che Xa Hoi Chu Nghia cua nha nuoc ta" (Principles of Socialist Legality of Our State), <u>Nhan Dan</u>, March 26, 1964.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup>Ibid. An extensive collection of DRV views on socialist legality can be found in "25 nam xay dung nen phap che Viet Nam" (Twenty Five Years of Building Up Vietnam's Legal System), Pham Thanh Vinh, Nha nuoc va phap luat, Vol. IV. Ho Chi Minh's comments on the subject are found in the preceding volume, "Ho Chu Tich trong su nghiep xay dung nha nuoc va nen phap ly dan chu xa hoi chu nghia Viet Nam" (Chairman Ho and the Mission of Building Up the State and Democratic Socialist Legality in Vietnam), Nha nuoc va phap luat, Vol. III.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup>Victor H. Li, "The Chinese Legal System," in John M. H. Lindbeck ed., China: Management of a Revolutionary Society, pp. 247-254.

has serious flaws as an accurate reconstruction of the political conflict in the PRC, but does illustrate important aspects of the role of socialist legality in the Administrative State. The essence of the Maoist attack on "Liuism", as summarized by one analytic study of Liu, was that his "attempt to combine revolution with order and equality with efficiency within a lasting institutional framework tended ultimately to subvert the values to be institutionalized. Thus, there is a close connection between political institutionalization and political socialization, a topic which is the focus of the concluding section of this study.

Divergent interpretations of "socialist legality" and the nature of state institutions became a major issue in the Sino-Soviet polemic, and the DRV leaders must have been well aware of its political implications.

Izvestia, for example, charged that:

Violation of socialist legality became a practice of state activity in China. Distorting Marxist-Leninist teaching on the role of the Party in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Chinese leaders assigned to Party organs not the role of organizers and teachers of the masses but

<sup>60</sup> In fact some Cultural Revolution accounts insist that socialist legality was an important instrument in protecting the rebels from retribution by the Party bureaucracy. "When K'uai Ta-fu, an outspoken Tsinghua University rebel, tried to appeal his conviction as a 'counter-revolutionary' to the CC, Liu refused to see him, and when K'ang Sheng complained that his refusal was 'at least not in correspondence with state law and is in contravention to the Constitution,' Liu told K'ang he 'failed to understand the situation'." Lowell Dittmer, Liu Shao-ch'i and the Chinese Cultural Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), p. 85.

<sup>61&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>., p. 215.

the role of a 'commanding force' determining and regulating all activities of local organs of power. 62

The DRV did not endorse these criticisms and, indeed, moved closer to the Chinese position on international questions during the period of 1963-1964. Yet, at the same time, the DRV continued to pattern its own institutions on the Soviet model. 64

The reasons for this DRV orientation toward the Administrative State are complex. One is the influence of culture and history, noted above. Another is the difference in size and administrative scale. A state bureaucracy of nearly 8 million as in China poses problems of a different order of magnitude than the 30,000 DRV cadres in the central government. In Chinese circumstances, the uniform application of formal rules may indeed allow the bureaucracy to escape Party control, whereas in Vietnam the opportunities for independent action in small administrative confines are much more limited. The implications of size on

<sup>62</sup> lzvestia, May 17, 1964, cited in Jerome Alan Cohen, "The Criminal Process in China," in Donald W. Treadgold ed., Soviet and Chinese Communism; Similarities and Differences (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967), p. 107.

<sup>63</sup>See Part Three, Section II.

<sup>64</sup>A 1963 report by Hoang Quoc Viet, Procurator General of the DRV, noted that, "We do not yet have criminal, criminal-procedural, civil and civil-procedural codes, and only separate normative acts are in effect . . . In order to overcome these difficulties, improve the procuracy, and strengthen legality, we decided to study more deeply the experience of the Prosecutor's (sic) Office of the USSR. For this purpose a group of leading workers of the prosecutor's office of North Vietnam went to the Soviet Union . . . We decided, taking into account our practical situation, to apply the experience of the Soviet Procuracy in our activities." Sotsialisticheskaya Zakonnost (Socialist Legality), No. 5, Moscow, May 1963, pp. 72-74. (JPRS No. 20,048, 8 July 1963).

bureaucratic control, and the related questions of local administration, decentralization, and Party-State relations must, therefore, be examined.

## Regional Administration: Decentralization and Central Control

After the initial period of political consolidation, both China and Vietnam dismantled or de-emphasized the "interstitial" levels of government. China dissolved its "Great Administrative Regions" in 1954, and eliminated the <a href="chiu">chiu</a> level intervening between the <a href="hsien">hsien</a> and the villages in many areas. North Vietnam abolished the Region level of government in all lowland areas in 1958. With the de-emphasis of these intermediary echelons of political and administrative control came a corresponding increase in the powers of the province and county (hsien/huyen) levels, resulting in two related policy changes. The first was the decision to make the province the primary coordinator of regional economic development, as central planning replaced the early phase of extensive local autonomy in reconstruction. The second was a decision to strengthen Party control at the province level to ensure that the centralization of economic planning did not create bureaucratic "independent kingdoms" in the local areas.

China's great size had historically posed three difficult problems of administration and control over its regions for the central authorities; (1) complexity of the regions to be administered, (2) lack of proximity to a political center (administrative distance) and (3) the design of administrative areas themselves and the degree to which they

conformed to functional areas (such as geographic or economic regions) in extra-political systems. Some issues concerning regional complexity have been mentioned in the preceding discussion. The problem of administrative distance can be seen by contrasting China's provincial sized units, averaging from 80,000 to 100,000 square miles, with the 62,000 square miles of territory of the entire administrative area of the DRV. The traditional Chinese hsien averaged about 1,000 square miles, while the DRV huyen was only about 250 square miles in area. 67

The relatively small administrative distance between center and village in North Vietnam facilitated political integration. In the DRV, over 2,500 of its nearly 6,000 villages were able to receive documents and directives from the central level in one day. One day regular mail service existed between Hanoi and 3,000 villages. Two million

<sup>65</sup> Joseph B. R. Whitney, <u>China</u>: <u>Area</u>, <u>Administration</u> <u>and</u> <u>Nation</u> Building, p. 16.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., p. 80.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>67</sup><u>Ibid</u>. The Vietnamese figure is derived by dividing North Vietnam's total land area by the number of <u>huyen</u> (250). In the heavily populated lowland delta, the size is even smaller.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup>Nhan Dan, August 8, 1960.

<sup>69</sup> Nhan Dan, August 11, 1961. China's postal service was perhaps better developed than the DRV's, since by 1956 postal service had been extended to 87 percent of the hsiang or administrative villages. China News Analysis, No. 514, May 1, 1964, p. 3. It should be noted, however, that the Chinese hsiang was equivalent to a Vietnamese inter-village group (lien xa) and therefore one level above the echelon described in the Vietnamese statistic. Moreover, the fact of service does not guarantee the speed of communications, which was clearly much greater in the DRV case. By early 1956, 83 percent of the PRC sub-hsien districts (ch'u) and 19 percent of the hsiang had telephones. By 1958 "telephone conferences could be held between the centres of a number of provinces and their counties." Ibid., p. 6.

of North Vietnam's population of 15 million regularly listened to the radio. 70 In China, with 75,000 communes by the early 1960's, each subdivided into village size production brigades, it could take two days for written communications to pass from the brigade to the <a href="hsien">hsien</a> level. 71 In areas distant from the capital, such as Fukien, even from <a href="hsien">hsien</a> headquarters mail may take four or five days before it reaches the central government. 72 It was not until 1964 that nearly all counties and towns in China were connected in a radio net, and it was not until 1968 that a major campaign was initiated to further extend this net to the communes and production brigades. 73

One means of expanding central control in the regional areas without immobilizing the initiative of local areas in applying central policies is to decentralize the operations of the state bureaucracy, and grant the local Party authorities some degree of control over them. As Franz Schurmann has noted, different kinds of decentralization have significantly different effects. As Decentralization which puts power

<sup>70</sup>Nhan Dan, November 3, 1962.

<sup>71</sup>A. Doak Barnett, <u>Cadres</u>, <u>Bureaucracy</u>, p. 149.

 $<sup>^{72}</sup>$ Ezra Vogel, <u>Hsien</u> (<u>County</u>) <u>Organization</u>, unpublished manuscript, p. 4.

<sup>73</sup>Alan P. L. Liu, Communications and National Integration in Communist China, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 119. Liu asserts that, "Language diversity and the absence of a common culture in China hindered radio broadcasting from exerting its potentiality for integration." Ibid., p. 127. Although his assertion that China does not have a common culture throughout its various regions seems overstated, the problem of regional diversity is clear.

<sup>74</sup>Franz Schurmann, <u>Ideology and Organization in Communist China</u>, pp. 196-198.

into the hands of lower level administrative units (decentralization II) actually increases central control, while transferring greater authority to the actual production level (decentralization I) weakens it, and allows more deviation from centrally determined policies. 75

In 1957, China initiated a policy of decentralization II, and "a rapid process of province level centralization set in. "76 Although an attempt was made at that time to divide China into large economic regions, it "was the provinces, and not the larger economic cooperative regions or the smaller communes which began to develop autarkic entities" with the result that, "particularly in 1958, many provinces began to act like underdeveloped nations, desiring to create integrated complexes of industry, agriculture, commerce, and education within their borders."77

This erosion of central authority was checked in 1959 when as noted earlier, the slogan "the entire nation is a single chessboard" was put forth. In 1961, the Regional Bureaus of the CCP were reconstituted in a further effort to strengthen central control. Although the pre-1954 Region level of government administration was not revived, the Party's Regional Bureaus apparently went beyond a supervisory and inspectorate role, and were actively engaged in problems of government

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>76&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid.</sub>, p. 209.

<sup>77&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid.</sub>, p. 210.

administration within their regions. 78

Like China, the DRV accompanied its First Five-Year Plan with a strengthening of the province level, and further reinforced the authority of this level several years later. North Vietnam did not, however, revive the Regional Party Bureaus which had been dissolved in 1958.

The abolition of the DRV Region structure in the lowlands stemmed "from the requirement of strengthening Party leadership in local areas and developing the initiative of local areas in socialist construction, and the province and <a href="https://www.huyen.com/huyen

After the Central Administration, the provincial administration (or municipalities and areas under their administration) is the most important level to map out plans, direct production and the work of various branches in the province according to the Party's resolutions and the overall plans of the state. It is necessary to strengthen the provincial level, reinforce the leadership of the Party Committee and step up the activities of the administrative committee of the province in order to enable the cadres at provincial level to give guidance down to village level. 80

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup>Cf. China News Analysis, No. 373, May 26, 1961. Barnett asserts that "in addition to having some of the standard Party departments, at least some of the new regional Party bureaus possessed staff offices comparable to bodies existing under the State Council, as well as certain commissions and bureaus, dealing particularly with economic matters such as finance and planning, comparable to ministry-level bodies in the central government." Cadres, Bureaucracy and Political Power in Communist China, p. 112.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup>Nhan Dan, April 21, 1958.

<sup>80&</sup>quot;Resolution of the Fifth Plenum of the Party Central Committee (July 1961) on the Development of Agriculture in the First Five-Year Plan (1961-65)," extracts in Vietnamese Studies, No. 2, 1964, p. 163.

The distinctive feature of the Vietnamese province was that its leadership could extend all the way down to the village level. 81

 $<sup>^{81}\</sup>mathrm{The}$  details and processes of administrative operations will be discussed in a following section.

<sup>82&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, June 11, 1959.

<sup>83</sup>One Vietnamese study of Chinese institutions equates the <u>hsiang</u> with a Vietnamese inter-village (lien xa), which was not an administrative unit, but a form of organization widespread during the Resistance, in which several villages were grouped together under the general supervision of a <u>huyen</u> level leader. Tran Luc, <u>May kinh nghiem Trung Quoc mata nen hoc</u>, p. 34.

PRC on the proper role for the sub-<u>hsien ch'u</u> which was abolished in 1957 but revived in some areas after the Great Leap.

In the DRV, an attempt was made to upgrade the importance of the <a href="https://huyen\_level-during-the-early-1960">https://huyen\_level-during-the-early-1960</a>'s, by instituting an elected People's Council, empowered in theory to oversee the activities of the Administrative Committee. 

\*\*Successive attempts were made to reinforce the role of the <a href="https://huyen-in-the-early-and-mid-1960">https://huyen-in-the-early-and-mid-1960</a>'s, but their very frequency reflected the difficulties in finding a role for an administrative unit that had an average population of around 50,000. 

\*\*Source North Vietnam had an average of 10 <a href="https://huyen-and-300-villages-per-province">huyen-and-300-villages-per-province</a>, while an average province in China had between 60 and 100 county level units with an average population of around 300,000 each. 

\*\*At the outset of Vietnam's First Five-Year Plan, it was acknowledged that "the role and position of the <a href="https://huyen-have-not-been-clearly-defined-and-the-mission-and-powers-of-the-huyen-have-not-been-correctly-specified">huyen-have-not-been-correctly-specified</a>, and that the <a href="https://huyen-huyen-huyen-element-"was not-strongly-developed</a>, while in China the <a href="https://huyen-huyen-element-huyen-huy

 $<sup>^{84}</sup>$ This figure is derived by dividing the rural population of the DRV in 1960 (14,398,201) by the number of districts (250).

<sup>85</sup> Elected People's Councils had previously existed at province and village levels. Apart from the limited powers of the People's Council in relation to the <a href="https://huyen\_Administrative">huyen\_Administrative</a> Committee, the <a href="https://huyen's autonomous functions were limited to such things as "managing hospitals, general education schools, and public welfare organizations at the district level" "Cap huyen rat quan trong" (The District Level Is Very Important), <a href="https://www.Nhan.org/">Nhan.org/</a> Dan, November 13, 1962.

<sup>86</sup>A. Doak Barnett, <u>Cadres</u>, <u>Bureaucracy</u>, p. 119.

<sup>87</sup>Nhan Dan, November 13, 1962.

as the "basic administrative link connecting all the higher and lower links of the state apparatus."  $^{88}$ 

As China basically eliminated the <a href="ch'u">ch'u</a> and the village administration and replaced them with communes linked directly with the <a href="hsien">hsien</a>, the leadership and administrative role of the roughly 2,000 <a href="hsien">hsien</a> expanded. When the focus of rural leadership shifted from the commune to their constituent production brigades, <a href="hsien">hsien</a> and commune cadres were sent down to the brigade level in an attempt to maintain the link between the lowest level of the central administration and the basic level production units. However, the large number of basic level units in the <a href="hsien">hsien</a> evidently limited the effect of this attempt to exert "concrete leadership from above." By the early 1960's, the number of <a href="hsien">hsien</a> stood at about 2,000, responsible for about 75,000 communes,

<sup>88</sup>Chang Li-man, "Special Features in the Changes of Administrative Areas in China," Cheng Fa Yen Chiu, No. 5, October 2, 1956, p. 12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup>A JMJP, June 20, 1960, examination of one <u>hsien</u> reported that the failure of <u>hsien</u> and commune authorities to "take cognizance of the great significance in strengthening the forefront of production" at the brigade level accounted for the "lack of concrete leadership" at the brigade and for the fact that the work teams and commune cadres "sent down to the lower levels by the CCP <u>hsien</u> unit have gone only to the administrative divisions, very seldom penetrating into the production brigades to give concrete leadership." <u>SCMP</u>, No. 2289, July 5, 1960, p. 13. The magnitude of the problem is apparent in newspaper reports of <u>hsien</u> cadres attempting to exercise direct control at the production level in the early 1960's. To cite a single example, 33 of 37 members of a <u>hsien</u> committee in Honan went to the lower levels to supervise production in 24 communes, with 165 brigades and a total of 2,500 villages, probably equal to a production team. JMJP, June 25, 1960, SCMP, No. 2294, July 12, 1960.

with perhaps as many as 200,000 production brigades. <sup>90</sup> Thus a <u>hsien</u> in China might have to oversee the activities of as many as 100 basic level agricultural production units. <sup>91</sup> While a DRV <u>huyen</u> might also have as many as 100 basic level agricultural production units in the 20-30 villages under its control, the number of <u>huyen</u> averaged only about 10 per province, making the total number of basic level units in the province much smaller than in China. <sup>92</sup> Moreover, unlike China, the DRV had retained the village administrative committees in North Vietnam's nearly 6,000 villages (about 4,000 in the lowlands and 2,000 in the mountain areas). <sup>93</sup>

It is largely their respective scales of territorial administration that has resulted in China's <u>hsien</u> being the "most important administrative unit in rural China now, as in the past." While in

<sup>90</sup> Theodore Shabad, China's Changing Map (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 31. The production brigade is generally said to be equivalent in size to the hsiang or administrative village of which there were 200,000 in the mid-1950's. At the 1959 Lushan Plenum, however, Mao put the total number of production brigades at 700,000. Stuart Schram ed., Chairman Mao Talks to the People, p. 145.

<sup>91</sup>In China there were as many as 180 <u>hsien</u> in populous provinces like Szechwan. And, in the PRC, the <u>hsien</u> also had to cope with problems of a relatively extensive local industry. Cf. Choh-Ming Li, "Statistics and Planning at the Hsien Level in Communist China," <u>Current Scene</u>, March 27, 1962.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>92</sup>By 1964, the DRV had a total of about 30,000 agricultural co-operatives. Nhan Dan, September 9, 1964.

 $<sup>93\</sup>underline{\text{Nhan}}$  Dan, August 1, 1960 gives the figure for lowland villages as 3,927, and  $\underline{\text{Nhan}}$  Dan, July 21, 1960 gives a total of 2,025 villages in mountain areas. In 1961 the DRV had 13,628  $\underline{\text{thon}}$  (hamlets).  $\underline{\text{Nhan}}$  Dan, 4 December, 1961.

<sup>94</sup>Barnett, <u>Cadres</u>, <u>Bureaucracy</u>, p. 117.

North Vietnam the <u>huyen</u> was viewed as merely a way station between the province and the villages. <sup>95</sup> Unlike the province and the village level cooperatives, the Vietnamese <u>huyen</u> was not a "complete planning unit." <sup>96</sup> Despite the continuing efforts to strengthen the <u>huyen</u> level, by the end of the period under consideration, the organization of the <u>huyen</u> in "a number of localities" was "still not consolidated and stabilized." <sup>97</sup> The <u>huyen</u> level "usually lacked competent technical cadres and cadres to monitor a number of specialized branches to help the <u>huyen</u> Party Committee exercise leadership in agriculture." <sup>98</sup>

<sup>95</sup>A DRV author also notes that the <u>huyen</u> is "not a complete administrative unit." Vu Van Hoan, "Les organes locaux du pouvoir d'Etat," <u>Apercu sur les institutions de la Republique Democratique du Viet Nam</u>, p. 82.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>96</sup>A 1964 article on the role of the <u>huyen</u> in leading the agricultural cooperatives points out that "the province and the cooperatives are the two kinds of important planning units. The cooperative is the basic level agricultural planning unit . . . . Each province is a complete economic planning unit." <u>Nhan Dan</u>, December 10, 1964.

<sup>97</sup>Nhan Dan, July 24, 1965. During a campaign to strengthen leadership at the huyen level in the first years of the U.S. air war against North Vietnam, the DRV acknowledged that, "Before now, during the effort to strengthen the Party leadership system at all levels, when the necessity of strengthening the province level and the basic levels was mentioned, a number of comrades incorrectly took this to mean that the huyen level only plays a secondary role in the chain of Party leadership." Vu Oanh, "Quan triet tinh than nghi quyet cua Trung Uong trong viec kien toan su lanh dao va chi dao thuc hien cua cac huyen uy truoc tinh hinh moi," (Fully Understand the Spirit of the Central Committee Resolution on the Improvement in Leadership and Supervision of [Policy] Implementation of the Huyen Committees in the New Situation), Hoc Tap, No. 10, 1966.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>98</sup>Nhan <u>Dan</u>, July 24, 1965.

## Party-State Relations

Most of the efforts to strengthen the huyen level were, in fact, efforts to strengthen Party leadership at that level. <sup>99</sup> The governmental administration remained concentrated at the province level, and although much was written about strengthening the huyen, the major efforts of the DRV were directed toward the province level. And, it was at this level that the Party-State relationship was a major issue. At the central level the Party leaders could exercise close control over the state bureaucracy, but at the province level there was an inherent tension between local Party control and regional branches of the central bureaucracy responding to directives from above.

The Administrative State model, with its emphasis on specified rules of bureaucratic performance, favors the retention of power by the state administration. A "politics in command" philosophy of leader—ship favors the Party committees at all levels. In 1957 both China and the Soviet Union moved from a ministerial system of vertical rule to a system of increased dual rule, that put the state administration under greater control of the regional Party apparatus. 100 In both the Chinese and Soviet cases, the problem of regional control of the bureaucracy was compounded by the vast territorial expanse of each administrative system. Both the Soviet Union and China subsequently modified the large grant of authority to the provincial levels, and

 $<sup>^{99}</sup>$ A  $_{\rm Nhan}$   $_{\rm Dan}$  editorial of December 10, 1964, for example, notes that the best way to strengthen  $_{\rm huyen}$  leadership in carrying out the State Plan is to strengthen the entire Huyen Party Committee.

<sup>100</sup>Franz Schurmann, <u>Ideology and Organization in Communist China</u>, p. 195.

recentralized their systems of economic management. 101 After proclaiming the "entire country a single chessboard" in 1959, the PRC recentralized political control over economic management in the form of the Regional Party Bureaus, and just prior to the Cultural Revolution, the "instruments of planning, direction and control, which had been much impaired during the Great Leap Forward, appeared to be rehabilitated and improved on the decentralized pattern envisaged in 1957, with a more clearly defined managerial position subject to Party control and limited mass participation. 102 These last two factors became central objects of controversy, and were focal issues in the Cultural Revolution.

The key differences between North Vietnam and China in economic management in the early 1960's were the increasing DRV stress on exercising central control of the economy through the Procuracy and various governmental inspection bodies, as discussed above, and the fact that the DRV's use of the Party organizations to handle problems of regional economic coordination was not as extensive and (possibly for this reason) did not lead to dissatisfaction with the Party bureaucracy as it did in China just before and during the Cultural Revolution. One reason for this contrast is the relatively small size of the DRV

<sup>102</sup> Peter Schran, "Economic Management," in John M. Lindbeck ed., China: Management of a Revolutionary Society, pp. 218-19.

Party apparatus between the central and basic levels. Unlike the CCP, the LDP has neither a regional supra-provincial level of organization or a sub-provincial Special District between province and <a href="https://www.nip.com/huyen">huyen</a>. In addition, the LDP Provincial Committees do not have a Secretariat and elaborate staff structure as in China. There was an attempt among Party members working in high levels of the DRV state bureaucracy to use their Party position to impose their leadership on the subordinate levels of the bureaucracy without going through the Party Committee at the lower level. This led to "dispersionism" and confusion between Party and state lines of authority. The solution lay in forbidding the extension of the authority of a Party group beyond the state organ in which it is located, thus preventing the formation of a vertical chain of Party command within the state bureaucracy parallel to the Party Committees at each territorial echelon.

The revised Party Regulations presented to the Third Party Congress in 1960 adopted measures to prevent the formation of an over-elaborate regional Party bureaucracy. In discussing the province and

<sup>1030</sup>ne study notes that the number of provincial secretaries increased by at least 50 percent in the 1956-66 period, with most of the expansion coming before 1961. "Since then the number of provincial secretaries [for 21 provinces] has generally been stable between 210 and 220." Frederick C. Teiwes, <u>Provincial Party Personnel in Mainland China 1956-66</u> (New York: East Asian Institute, Columbia University, 1967), p. 5. The DRV's 24 provinces each have only a secretary and deputy secretary.

<sup>104&</sup>quot;In the Party's organizational system at present there is still a state of dispersionism. A number of Party organizations have, in circumstances which do not require it, been established in a vertical system within the specialized branches that is not placed under the leadership of the local Party committee." Nhan Dan, September 8, 1960.

district level, the regulations specified that:

. . . it is necessary to get a unified understanding that the Party committee members operating in specialized branches [of the state bureaucracy] not take charge of that branch in their capacity as a Party committee member. These comrades must all act in their capacity within the specialized branch and resolve matters just as non-Party committee responsible cadres in other branches . . . . It is necessary to increase the consultations between the Party Committee Secretary and the Deputy Secretary, and between the Deputy Secretary and the comrades responsible for specialized branches in order to resolve daily matters in timely fashion, and it is not necessary to set up a Secretariat as at the Central level. 105

Throughout the 1960's the provincial Party organization was strengthened, but no formal Secretariat structure emerged, and the Party committee members continued to play leading roles in specialized branches of the state bureaucracy primarily as members of the Party group within that branch. 106

From the outset of the DRV First Five-Year Plan, vertical rule of the ministries and government bureaucracy predominated, despite the progressive reinforcement of the province echelon. An example of the limited powers of the provincial Party authorities to decisively control economic activities within their area is the following directive

<sup>105</sup> Revised Draft Party Regulations, <u>Nhan Dan</u>, September 8, 1960. Chapter II, Article 2.

<sup>106</sup> Teiwes writes that at the province level in China, "Overlap of Party and government posts in 1956-66 has been modest but constant . . . There appears to be markedly less overlap below the secretariat level." Provincial Party Personnel, p. 45. In a report on leadership of the cooperativization movement, Pham Hung noted that although the numbers of Province Committee members had increased to a "rather large" level, the Province Committee as a whole and its subsections had not been effectively involved in agricultural leadership. Nhan Dan, April 9, 1960.

on central-province relations in the key economic sector of transportation:

In general, in the case of plans or directives on professional matters pertaining to the Ministries or General Commissions (Tong Cuc) and sent down by them, the local [province] Transportation Service must carry them out, and the local Party Committee and Administrative Committee must lead the Transportation Service in implementing them well. If there is any matter on which the local Party Committee and Administrative Committee disagrees with the Ministry or Central Commission, it should report it and request that the Party Central Committee and the Central Government review the matter, but it is impermissible to take it upon themselves to not carry out [the directive] or revise it. 107

Possibly the reason that vertical rule was adhered to in Vietnam and rejected (or substantially modified) in China was because the small administrative scale of the DRV permitted both close control of center over province, and Party over government at all levels.

In the intimate setting of a province capital, the administrative distance between Party cadres and the ministry branch bureaucrats was not sufficient to permit the buffer of invisibility and lack of information that often cushioned local Chinese government bureaucrats from Province Committee interference. In a vast and highly differentiated administrative system, bureaucratic autonomy can be found by seeking out the interstices of intersecting lines of command. In Vietnam, where Party control easily encompassed and permeated the bureaucracy, those safe havens were not to be found.

Vertical rule appeared suitable to Vietnamese conditions in part because Vietnam's small industrial sector did not require the large

<sup>107&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, June 4, 1960.

managerial bureaucracy of its Chinese counterpart, <sup>108</sup> and the non-industrial sectors, such as transportation, were on a sufficiently small scale to pose the problem of excessive Party interference, rather than the absence of Party control. In late 1962 the DRV felt it necessary to increase the powers and authority of the local Administrative Committees and People's Councils "in order to develop a spirit of positive and creative initiative of the localities in every task." <sup>109</sup> The local Party Committees were criticized for "restricting the usefulness of the local authorities, violating the precept of popular control, and occasionally violating state law. <sup>110</sup> Another attempt was made to strengthen the state administrative presence at the troublesome huyen level, though this does not seem to have remedied the basic weakness of the huyen administrative machinery any more than previous similar attempts. <sup>111</sup>

<sup>108&</sup>quot;Compared with the socialist countries, no other country started out on economic reconstruction with a level of industrialization as low as ours. These figures clearly show this: Vietnam 1954 - 1.5%: China, 1949 - 17%: Korea, 1953, 42.4% [of GNP]." Nhan Dan, June 2, 1960.

<sup>109</sup> Nhan Dan, November 11, 1962.

<sup>110&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

<sup>111</sup> The general neglect of the proper formalities of local administration led the Ministry of the Interior to organize a special indoctrination session for <a href="https://www.nummers.com/huyen">huyen</a> chairman and deputy chairman (who are, of course, members of the <a href="https://www.nummers.com/huyen">huyen</a> Party Committee) to re-emphasize the importance of the governmental administrative machinery. A typical problem, which this session was designed to overcome, was that "some comrades in the Standing Committee of the <a href="https://www.nummers.com/huyen">huyen</a> Party Committee who are in charge of the governmental administration never convene meetings of the <a href="https://huyen Administrative">[huyen Administrative</a>] Committee. These comrades say, 'the <a href="huyen Party Committee">huyen Party Committee</a> itself prattles on for days without any results, so how can the <a href="huyen Administrative">[huyen Administrative</a>] Committee get anywhere?' <a href="hlyen Dan">Nhan Dan</a>, June 27, 1960.

Nevertheless, DRV emphasis on the vertical line of command in the state bureaucracy led to "dispersionist" tendencies, and required a re-emphasis of Party control within the state bureaucracy. It was noted that the Party leaders in the Party Committees of industrial enterprises tended to discuss purely professional matters in their meetings, to the neglect of political issues. 112 The recommended guideline on distinguishing between the error of "enveloping leadership" (bao bien) and the opposite error of "superficial leadership" (lanh dao chung chung) was to make a clear distinction between the "role of the party committee, which is leadership and inspection (kiem tra) and the role of the manager which is to direct the carrying out [of policy]." 113

The joint requirement of leading agricultural cooperativization and regional industrialization led to a strengthening of the province leadership role in 1961 at the Fifth Plenum, when the province was called the "most important level" in regional economic management and again in 1963 when it was noted that the role of the province has "a special importance" in economic management and administration. 114 Specific

 $<sup>^{112}</sup>$ Nguyen Tho, "Cai tien che do sinh hoat cua Dang Uy xi nghiep" (Reform the Operations and Activities of the Party Committees in Enterprises)  $\underline{\text{Hoc}}$   $\underline{\text{Tap}}$ , No. 6, 1963, p. 43.

<sup>113&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid.</sub>, p. 44.

<sup>114</sup> Nhan Dan, March 4, 1963. At a cooperativization conference held in 1960, Le Duan said that the Province Party Committees "must devote seven or eight tenths of their times [sic] to lead cooperativization and production." He added, "I find that many members of the Party provincial committees have not sufficiently mastered technique, but have only given a superficial leadership. In my opinion, apart from the provincial standing committees which are responsible for general leadership (and not all standing committee members are required in political leadership), other members must have a thorough professional knowledge." On the Socialist Revolution in Viet Nam, Vol. II, p. 50.

powers and responsibilities of the province were spelled out in detail. They included: (1) building up the basic level production infrastructure, (2) supplying production materials, (3) determining technical standards and methods of technical improvements, (4) establishing a plan for the distribution of labor among the specialized branches of the state administration in the province, (5) allocating food supplies and investment capital, (6) determining the percentage of profits to be distributed among members of lower level cooperatives, (7) establishing a plan for the training and utilization of cadres, and (8) concentrating its resources on the most difficult and central problems at specific times in specific places, and selecting key points and models to encourage production. 115 Although this impressive and extensive list of provincial powers does not specify the exact relationship between the provincial Party authorities and the central government in these matters, it is clear that a major expansion of province authority took place during the First Five-Year Plan.

Not all of this expanded power went to the Province Party Committees, however. At the same time the economic management of the province was being strengthened, the State Council increased the powers of the central ministries and the Province Administrative Committees. The State Council statement said that, "At the present time in our economic as well as our political activities, it is necessary to guard against dispersionism and a lack of centralization. Therefore, the distribution of administrative responsibilities among echelons should not create

<sup>115&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, March 4, 1963.

additional dispersion, but must lead to even greater strengthening of centralization." This allocation of managerial responsibility at various echelons of DRV territorial administration was intended not as a true decentralization of powers to basic level producing units (decentralization I) or even as a devolving of increased authority to an intermediate lower level unit such as the province (decentralization II), but as a means of decongesting an overcentralized administrative system. The State Council added that, "Now all of us are in accord on the point that the powers and responsibilities of the manager must be underlined, and that person required to use his powers to fulfill his responsibilities."

In 1964, the Politburo decided to transfer the functions of the Central Committee Labor and Salaries Department (Ban Lao Dong Tien Luong) to the Ministry of Labor, in an attempt to unify salary policies. Apparently this Central Committee body was transferred intact to the Ministry of Labor and became the Party Group of that ministry, in an attempt to strengthen the bureaucratic machinery of the State, and not duplicate it with an elaborate bureaucratic structure within the Central

<sup>116&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, April 30, 1963.

<sup>117</sup>In French bureaucratic theory and practice the distinction is made between decentralization, which involves a real transfer of authority to lower levels, and deconcentration which is a bureaucratic streamlining of responsibilities which actually increases central control.

<sup>118&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan</sub> Dan, April 30, 1963.

Committee. 119

The DRV had carlier moved away from the single manager system a few years after it had been abandoned in China. 120 But the DRV subsequently restored the single manager system, although the Chinese did not do so. The PRC had employed the Soviet "single-manager system" in the early years of the regime, but discarded it in 1956 on the grounds that it encouraged "dispersionism" and "localism" and undermined collective leadership. 121 The Party Committee system then took over much of the responsibility for economic management, until 1961, when many of the powers taken away from the ministries were restored, and the managers given increased operational flexibility. 122 The new Chinese approach was different from both the First Five-Year Plan reliance on the single

<sup>119</sup> Nhan Dan, January 30, 1964. The Ministry of the Interior retained the authority to make policy with regard to the state table of organization in professional and administrative spheres. Ibid. Based on the same Politburo decision the State Council redefined the lines of authority on the issue of workers' salaries between the Ministries of Interior, Labor, Security, Health, and the General Trade Union in order to "clearly define the boundaries between the labor salaries mission and the personnel organization mission and the relations with specialized branches involved with labor salaries."

<sup>120</sup> For example, in the Haiphong cement plant, one of the major DRV industries, the plant manager had also served as the plant Party Secretary, but these responsibilities were separated in 1958, which made Party leadership in that plant "rather more clear," Nhan Dan, June 27, 1958. Cf. also "Tang cuong su lanh dao cua cap uy Dang doi voi cuoc van dong cai tien quan ly xi nghiep" (Strengthen the Leadership of the Party Committee in the Campaign to Improve Industrial Management), Nhan Dan editorial, November 17, 1958. The strengthening of Party leadership in industrial management was intended to ensure that the top priority given the newly initiated agricultural cooperativization program did not lead to a neglect of industrial management. Ibid.

<sup>121</sup> Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization, pp. 269-70.

<sup>122 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 297.

manager system and the subsequent Party Committee system. Worker participation in management remained minimal. 123 Shortly after the 1961 change, the Socialist Education campaign was launched (1962-64) and "political work organs" established, which "seemed to indicate that the Party committees themselves were considered to be insufficiently red and excessively expert oriented. 124 The attack on the Party bureaucracy in the Cultural Revolution appeared to confirm this conclusion.

In the 1949-65 period China moved from the Administrative State model emphasizing external inspection and vertical rule and ministerial authority (1953-55), to decentralization and dual rule emphasizing Party control (1956-60), to a period of experimentation and adjustment (1961-64), and finally an attack on both the managers and the Party bureaucracy in the Cultural Revolution. North Vietnam throughout this period continued to strengthen the organs of the Administrative State

<sup>123&</sup>lt;sub>Peter Schran, "Economic Management," in Lindbeck ed., China: Management of a Revolutionary Society, p. 218.</sub>

<sup>124</sup> Ibid. Another analysis concludes, "Since 1949, various experiments in the centralization and decentralization of decision-making had been tried, with none of them ever being either applied or reversed indiscriminately . . . In 1965, therefore, the situation was confused. Conflicting tendencies appeared: some toward centralization; some toward a decentralization to the level of regional committees; and some toward a decentralization to the level of production units. The prevailing features were: strong centralization of key industries, decision-making power given to or taken by provincial Party committees in a significant but limited sector of economic life (mainly light industry) and a wide degree of management autonomy left to the communes and to the Party committees of industrial production units." Marianne Bastid, "Levels of Economic Decision-Making," in Stuart R. Schram, ed., Authority, Participation and Cultural Change in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 161, 165.

such as the Procuracy, emphasized adherence to regulations, and reaffirmed the primacy of vertical rule and ministerial authority.

Despite repeated attempts to trim the size of the central bureaucracy it continued to expand. As subsequent sections will attempt to elaborate, the contrasting leadership philosophy of China and Vietnam and the important differences in their attitudes toward forming new generations of leaders are related to the DRV preference for a regularized system of administration in which expertise plays a dominant role, and China's "politics in command" approach. Equally important are the differences in the origins and composition of the respective Parties which emerged from each revolution to guide their country's post-Liberation economic and political development.

## The Party and Political Integration: Composition and Leadership

The Communist Parties of China and Vietnam both began as small groups of revolutionary intellectuals, and expanded during a prolonged period of struggle. The composition of each Party was influenced by the society which produced these revolutionaries, the nature of their struggle, and the forces that opposed them. China's diverse society produced a Communist Party comprised of many different elements. The prominence of internal social conflict in China's revolution drew in significant numbers of workers and poor peasants to supplement and, to a degree, replace the original leadership. Various factions within the leadership were shunted aside, as Mao progressively consolidated his power. Vietnam's revolution was directed primarily toward the goal of eliminating French control, and they had little significant

political competition in carrying out this mission. The absence of a strong bourgeois nationalist alternative to Vietnam's Communist Party was a major factor in attracting large numbers of members coming from petty bourgeois origins. Although the composition of the leadership changed significantly from the early revolutionary period of the 1920's and 1930's to the August Revolution of 1945, the movement was guided from the beginning by the dominant authority of Ho Chi Minh.

At the time of its founding in 1930, the Indochinese Communist Party consisted of 211 members. The persecution of the 1930's reduced both the leadership and the rank and file, but just prior to the Japanese occupation, ICP strength was estimated by the colonial regime at around 30,000. 125 The renewed French repression following the Bac Son and Nam Ky uprisings again reduced the Party's numbers. By the time of the August Revolution of 1945, the ICP had about 5,000 members, but by the following year its strength had risen to around 20,000. 126 From this base the Party expanded with astonishing rapidity, and by 1950 had risen to 750,000. 127 As noted in an earlier section, most of this expansion came prior to the sharpening of the class focus in Vietnam's revolution and before the Land Reform campaign. A July 1953

<sup>125</sup>This estimate, made by the French Governor General Catroux, is cited in Thong Nhat, April 8, 1960. This high figure may refer to all ICP supporters rather than just Party members.

 $<sup>^{126}</sup>$ The 1946 figure was mentioned by Ho in a speech to cadres in Ha Bac province. Whan Dan, October 19, 1963.

<sup>127</sup>Ba muoi <u>lam nam dau tranh cua Dang</u>, Vol. II, p. 96.

report from Vietnam in the Cominform bulletin noted that, "This too rapid growth, which was not accompanied by corresponding systematic work with the new members led to a lowering of the political consciousness of the members. Hence the Central Committee decided to stop enrolling new members with a view to acquainting Party members with the rudiments of Marxism-Leninism." The halt in Party recruiting lasted for the remainder of the Resistance.

The CCP grew from its original 27 members in 1921 to 300,000 in 1934. The CCP grew from its original 27 members in 1921 to 300,000 in 1934. The Long March reduced the number to 40,000 in 1937. By 1940, CCP strength had rebounded to 800,000, where it remained through 1944. In 1945, Party membership was 1.2 million, and had grown to 4.5 million in late 1949. After Liberation, the CCP grew steadily, with upturns in the intake of new members during the cooperativization campaign and the Great Leap. By mid-1961, the CCP had grown to 17 million members.

<sup>128</sup>Din, "We Are Sure of Final Victory (Letter From Vietnam),"

For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy (Bucarest, Rumania),
21 August 1953. Bernard Fall in Le Viet-Minh, la Republique Democratique du Vietnam 1945-60 (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1960),
p. 151, cites additional figures on Party membership evidently given in the French language version of this article which do not appear in the English version cited here. In 1946, the Party had 20,000 members; in 1947, 50,000; in 1948, 168,000 (102,000 in the North; 43,000 in the Center; and 23,000 in the South). Fall also quotes the Vietnam News Agency of April 19, 1957 as giving a 1948 figure of 180,000. Ibid.
"Din" is reported to have given a Party membership figure of 500,000 for 1950, although the figure in the English language version cited above is 700,000 for that year. The only other figure given by "Din" in the English version is the erroneous statistic of 3,000 Party members for 1945.

The following figures on the CCP are all taken from Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China, p. 129.

The major expansion of the CCP came during periods of social mobilization, and the new members emerged from the ranks of those who were most active in these compaigns. 130 This had several consequences for the composition of the Party. It resulted in a continuing influx of youth into the CCP and created a broad age spread among Party members, and encouraged the enrollment of members from the "basic classes." Moreover, the post-Liberation Land Reform campaign in areas that had not had a strong CCP presence prior to 1949 helped to build up Party strength among those who showed political zeal in social mobilization, even though there was a general freeze in Party recruitment after Liberation. In Kwangtung province, for example, Party membership rose from 40,000 in 1949 to 200,000 in 1954. 131 Schurmann observes that by mid-1955 Party recruitment had intensified, and total CCP membership rose by 3 million during the campaign. 132 By 1956, peasants comprised nearly 75 percent of Party membership, workers about 15 percent, and intellectuals around 12 percent. 133 Of the 7.4 million peasants, 5.4 million were poor peasants and roughly 2 million were middle peasants (and said to be former poor peasants). 134

<sup>130&</sup>quot;In 1961 it was stated that 80 percent of all Party members had been recruited since 1949, 70 percent since 1953, and 40 percent since the Eighth Party Congress." Schurmann, <u>Ideology and Organization in</u> Communist China, p. 133.

<sup>131</sup> Vogel, Canton Under Communism, p. 371.

<sup>132</sup>Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China, p. 131.

<sup>133&</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>., p. 132.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>134</sup>Ibid., p. 133.

In Vietnam, the greatest period of Party expansion preceded the Land Reform, which was not systematically implemented until 1953, by which time a freeze had been placed on Party membership. As noted earlier, by 1959 "the vast majority of Party members and cadres are people who have joined the Party for ten years or more and are over 30-years old" while "Party members under 25 are very few." Thus the majority of Party members at that time had joined before the Land Reform. Even in 1962 after the initial stage of agricultural cooperativization had been completed, nearly 70 percent of the LDP's 500,000 members had joined the Party before or during the Resistance, and the number of Party members under 26 years of age was less than 10 percent. 136

The number of Party members at the village level in North Vietnam was about 40 percent of the total. 137 North Vietnam had a very small percentage of workers in its Party, reflecting its low level of industrialization and the fact that it was primarily a rural based movement with a leadership coming from a background that the DRV characterizes as "petty bourgeois." In 1959 only 3.4 percent of the LDP membership came from the working class. 138 Only 3,000 workers were admitted to

<sup>135</sup> Nhan Dan, November 28, 1959.

<sup>136</sup>Vu Oanh, "Ra suc lam tot cong tac phat trien Dang" (Go All Out to Do the Job of Expanding the Party Well), Hoc Tap, No. 11, 1962, p. 33.

<sup>137&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan, September 25, 1961.</sub>

<sup>138</sup>Nhan Dan, October 16, 1959.

the Party in the period 1954-59<sup>139</sup> and by 1962 workers comprised only 5 percent of the total LDP membership. 140

Since the LDP did not have a strong proletarian component in its ranks, it generally opposed "class background-ism" (thanh phan chu, nghia) which placed excessive emphasis on social origins rather than actual accomplishments as the basis for political recruitment or advancement. Nevertheless, the class composition of the Party was a continuing matter of concern for its leaders. A 1963 Hoc Tap article ascribed the persistence of "individualism" and "rightist ideology" in the Party to the fact that "the majority of our cadres joined the revolution in the capacity of small producers who followed the proletarian class to find a path of liberation for themselves and the nation." 142

<sup>139</sup> Nhan Dan, February 17, 1960.

<sup>140</sup> Nhan Dan, April 7, 1962. Workers in the CCP in 1956 were about 1.5 million out of a total industrial working population of about 20 million (16 million enrolled in trade unions), thus representing about .05 percent of the total industrial proletariat (which comprised about 3 percent of Chinese society) and 14 percent of the membership of the CCP. The Vietnamese proletariat comprises 1 percent (250,000 of the total population of the DRV). The Chinese figures are taken from Jan S. Prybyla, The Political Economy of Communist China, p. 196, and from Eighth National Congress of the CCP, Vol. I, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1956), p. 95. The Vietnamese figure is from Nhan Dan, June 6,1959.

<sup>141</sup> In 1959, a <u>Nhan Dan</u> article wrote that the "class background of Party members, although related to the quality of the Party, is not the determining factor. It is the political line and the ideological leadership which is determining." <u>Nhan Dan</u>, July 25, 1959. The 1960 revised Party regulations noted that in some places the error of "class background-ism" had been committed and urged that while class background should be considered, "do not be narrow-minded or close the door of the Party" to prospective candidates "who have the prerequisites to enter the Party." <u>Nhan Dan</u>, September 8, 1960.

<sup>142</sup> Hoang Minh Thi, "May y kien ve dau tranh chong tu tuong tieu tu san trong can bo ta" (Some Ideas on the Struggle to Oppose Petty Bourgeois Ideology Among Our Cadres), <u>Hoc Tap</u>, No. 10, 1963.

The definition of "petty bourgeois" does not stress the urban character of this class, but rather the fact that it does not come from the "basic levels" of workers or poor peasants. In addition, the links between different classes were complex because of the underdeveloped colonial situation of Vietnam. Although the working class in Vietnam was described as "absolutely revolutionary," it "had many relationships with the peasants and the urban petty-bourgeois." Thus, "Our Party came into being in a country where the petty bourgeois (including even peasants) were the most numerous force, and therefore the class origin of the greatest part of Party members is petty bourgeois." 144

During the Resistance, the predominance of cadres from petty-bourgeois origins among the Party leadership had been a cause for concern. After the 1950 freeze on Party recruiting, a rectification campaign was initiated to counteract the presumed pernicious influence of the non-proletarian hue of the Party. In indoctrination classes held for cadres in 1952-53, "of 1,365 students occupying leading positions, only 139 are workers and 351 working peasants." Consequently, concluded the Cominform's Vietnamese correspondent, "the Party must

 $<sup>^{143}</sup>$ Le Manh Trinh, "Bai hoc dau tranh de cung co va tang cuong su doan ket thong nhat noi bo Dang trong thoi ky 1939-1945,"  $\underline{\text{Hoc}}$   $\underline{\text{Tap}}$ , No. 8, 1963, p. 11.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid. Hoang Tung, the editor of Nhan Dan, observed that "some comrades think that the 'landlord mentality' or 'bourgeois mentality' still exists in the Party. This is completely without foundation . . . The number of comrades in our Party that came from the exploiting classes is not even 1 percent." Nhan Dan, April 14, 1960.

<sup>145</sup> Din, "We Are Sure of Final Fictory" (Letter from Vietnam), For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy, 21 August 1953.

improve the social composition of its cadres." At the Third Party Congress in 1960, it was reported that of the approximately 55,000

Party members who held fulltime positions in the state and Party bureaucracy, 59.4 percent came from worker or peasant background, while 39 percent came from "intellectual or other petty bourgeois" backgrounds. 147

The number of full-time cadres of petty bourgeois backgrounds exceeded those from the "basic classes" (workers and poor peasants) who represented only 32.7 percent of the total. A breakdown of available figures on the social composition of the LDP can be made, and compared with that of the CCP's total membership in 1956:

|                | LDP (50,00 full time state and | LDP total membership  | CCP total membership |                   |
|----------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-------------------|
| ,              | Party cadres)<br>(1960)        | (1960)                | (195                 | 6) <sup>149</sup> |
| Categories     | Percentage                     | Percentage            | Categories           | Percentage        |
| Intellectuals  |                                |                       |                      |                   |
| & other petty  |                                |                       |                      |                   |
| bourgeois:     | 39%                            |                       | Intellectuals:       | 11.7%             |
| Worker:        | İ                              | 3.4%                  | Worker:              | 14%               |
| Poor peasant:  | 28.3%                          | 150                   | Poor peasant:        | 50%               |
| Other peasant: | 27.7%                          | 45-50% <sup>150</sup> | Other peasant:       | 19%               |
| Other:         | 1.6%                           |                       | Other:               | 5.3%              |

<sup>146&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

<sup>147&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, September 8, 1960.

<sup>148&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

 $<sup>^{149}\</sup>mathrm{The}$  CCP figures are calculated on the basis of data from Schurmann,  $\underline{\mathrm{Ideology}}$  and  $\underline{\mathrm{Organization}}$ , pp. 132-33.

<sup>150</sup>Le Duan stated in 1961 that middle peasants "made up 45 to 50 percent of our Party membership . . ." On the Socialist Revolution in Viet Nam, Vol. III, p. 73. Nhan Dan, September 8, 1950 reported that "workers and poor peasants" comprised 54.5 percent of the 1960 Party membership. Since workers comprised only 3.4 percent of the Party membership, and middle peasants 45-50 percent, this figure appears to be too high.

Comprehensive figures for the intellectuals, petty bourgeois and middle or rich peasants in the LDP are not given. At the Third Party Congress in 1960, however, Truong Chinh confirmed that "the great majority of our cadres and Party members come from the petty-bourgeoisie (including peasants and urban petty bourgeois)." 151

After the initial period of rapid Party expansion in 1945-50 had been brought to a close by the halt in recruitment, an effort was made to increase the percentage of worker-peasant cadres by "purging the exploiting elements and paying attention to expanding the Party among the poor peasants." Nevertheless, in correcting the "rightist errors" in Party admission policy, the "leftist" error of "class background-ism" was committed, and "there was a narrow minded tendency which completely closed the door to the Party over an excessively long period of time." 153

Although there were exceptions to this "closed door" policy, they were apparently very few. The Party organizations in the old Resistance bases were already quite strong, and had undergone the post 1951 rectification campaign. Immediately after Liberation there was a fear in the old base areas that opportunists would infiltrate the Party and

<sup>151</sup> Truong Chinh, "The Party's Ideological Work," Third National Congress of the Viet Nam Workers' Party: Documents (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, n.d.), Vol. III, p. 18.

<sup>152</sup>Nhan Dan, September 8, 1960.

<sup>153</sup> Ibid. Another account states that the 1950 decision was to stop the regular admission of Party members, but to continue to take in people whose outstanding achievements "crop up" (dot xuat) in the course of the resistance. Nhan Dan, April 13, 1957.

thus Party recruitment should be very tightly controlled and only a few members admitted. <sup>154</sup> In newly liberated areas as a general policy there was to be no admission to the Party except in special cases in which candidates from the "laboring class" had scored particularly outstanding achievements in "struggle and production" and had been thoroughly tested. <sup>155</sup> During the first few months of the post-Liberation consolidation, the central authorities had to intervene to stop the excessive dissolution of existing Party organizations in newly liberated areas by the work teams that had come to assist in "consolidation." Nonetheless, the Land Reform Campaign did result in significant changes within the Party in rural areas and created a serious conflict within Party ranks. <sup>156</sup>

The "closed door" policy was not officially changed until the end of 1956. During the Land Reform, however, the rural Party machinery was in effect replaced by the Land Reform teams in many areas. 157

<sup>154</sup>Le Van Luong, "Cung co Dang, cung co doan ket" (Consolidate the Party, Consolidate Unity), Nhan Dan, January 6, 1955.

<sup>155&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

<sup>156&</sup>quot;Some work teams and cadres didn't take the trouble to correctly implement the Central Committee's policy on the readjustment of Party Chapters in newly liberated areas. Whenever they came across a complex situation in a Party Chapter, these comrades hastily purged and dissolved without patiently and thoroughly investigating the situation." Nhan Dan, July 22, 1955.

<sup>157</sup> The requirement for the intervention of the Land Reform teams from the outside was based on the view that social restraints would hinder a thoroughgoing Land Reform. In Bac Ninh province, over half the Party members were said to have been oppressed by landlords, but "said that they had sympathized with and been deferential toward the landlords and didn't dare to 'relate their miseries'." Nhan Dan, July 5, 1956. The Land Reform teams drastically changed the village leadership. Of 76 Party Chapter Committees in Bac Ninh, only 26 had old Party members participating in the Land Reform. Ibid.

These teams recruited a large influx of young activists from poor peasant backgrounds into the Party during the Land Reform period, and many rural Party members with long records of service were expelled or shunted aside. Because this policy led to an extremely tense political situation in the countryside, it was later reversed by having the older Party members reinstated, and evidently dismissing many of the new members who had been irregularly recruited by the Land Reform teams coming in from the outside. No comprehensive figures on the changes in Party composition during the Land Reform are

 $<sup>^{158}</sup>$ This phenomenon occurred both in areas that had come under French control during the Resistance and areas controlled by the Viet Minh throughout. In Vo Giang huyen (Bac Ninh), controlled by the French since 1949, "almost all Party Chapters" were said to have had outstanding records of achievement during the Resistance, which were "slandered" or "erased" in many villages, and Resistance cadres and Party members arrested or tried under false charges. Nhan Dan, January 14, 1957. The Chairman of the huyen Administrative Committee, who came from a landlord background, told the story of his downfall and subsequent rehabilitation in Nhan Dan, November 11, 1956. The arrest and imprisonment of the Bac Giang Province Committee member for Current Affairs is described in Nhan Dan, March 9, 1957. Strong Resistance base areas also had problems. The situation in Nghe An is cited below. The Ha Tinh Province Party Secretary stated that, "Ha Tinh has just gone through an unprecedented period of difficulties" resulting from "the slandering of the history of the Party organization, and the erasing of the revolutionary and Resistance achievements of the people," with the consequence that "a rather large number of cadres, Party members, and good people [Party sympathizers] were tried or were groundlessly placed under suspicion." Whan Dan, October 25, 1956. Apparently the old Nghe Tinh Soviet area was particularly affected by the Land Reform turmoil. Nhan Dan, January 7, 1957, reported that, "Many villages (particularly in Inter-Region IV, the place where the Soviet movement took place) old cadres who were incorrectly tried have now been freed, which has had a great impact on unity and pushing forward the rectification of errors."

<sup>159</sup>A <u>Nhan</u> <u>Dan</u>, November 2, 1956, editorial acknowledged that, "At present in the villages there are conflicts between old and new comrades" and that in many places "the rural situation is still tense."

available. Subsequent figures for 1959 and 1962, cited above, indicate that the Land Reform did not result in a large permanent influx of youth into the Party.

The frequent references to sharp conflicts between new and old, and between poor and middle peasant Party members in 1956-57 leave no doubt that the Land Reform left a divisive legacy in the rural Party organizations. During the Rectification of Errors campaign, it was acknowledged that in many places "the solidarity of the Party Chapters has dropped off" and that "many old Party members are prejudiced toward and look down on the new Party members" who, in turn, "gave the impression of not having confidence in the old Party members." In Bac Ninh, "a number of Party members and cadres do not yet have confidence in the poor peasants are wrong and didn't want to take people out of the landlord category so that they can hold on to the things they got during the struggle."

<sup>160</sup> In Nghe An province, a total including all but one <u>huyen</u>, 1,163 of 1,539 or 63 percent of village Party Chapter Committee members newly assigned during the Land Reform were forced out by the old members during the early stages of the Rectification of Errors campaign, and 900 of these or 76 percent of those expelled were new Party members. <u>Nhan Dan</u>, March 27, 1957. Nghe An was evidently among the provinces which committed the most serious errors during Land Reform, creating "many resentments among Party members." <u>Nhan Dan</u>, November 13, 1956. Nghe An was reported to have 60,000 Party members in 1961, however, and this number of Party Chapter Committee members scattered throughout the 400 villages in the province was not a major portion of the total.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>161</sup>Nhan Dan, May 11, 1957.

<sup>162</sup> In Tien Du <u>huyen</u> (Bac Ninh province), "Some comrades still point out some half-truths (hien tuong cuc bo) such as that there are very few poor peasants among the leading Resistance cadres and that the back-bone peasant elements committed errors in the Land Reform and, since the rectification of errors, rarely bother to attend meetings, attack each other, go to landlords' houses, etc. . ." Nhan Dan, February 7, 1957.

Although the poor peasants had been zealous during the Land Reform, their deficiencies soon became apparent. In an intensive survey of six villages in Vinh Phuc done prior to the rectification decision, it was found that many new peasant members had not fully grasped their political responsibilities. <sup>163</sup> The level of political understanding of some new Party members was so low that "the majority of [new] Party members did not understand that the Vietnam Lao Dong Party was the successor to the Indochinese Communist Party, and this gave rise to many incorrect ideas." Some felt that they had joined the Party only for the duration of the Land Reform and, having received land, would then retire from political life. The Land Reform exacerbated class relations in the countryside and left a rift between poor and middle peasants that later re-emerged during the cooperativization campaign. <sup>165</sup>

This was the background of the Party's decision to resume regular recruiting at the 10th Plenum in October 1956 when the LDP Central Committee acknowledged the gravity of the Land Reform errors, and ascribed them to an "incomplete grasp of the Central Committee's

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>163</sup>Nhan Dan, May 26, 1956.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid.

<sup>165</sup> In Vo Giang huyen (Bac Ninh) "while leading the Rectification of Errors campaign, many cadres appear to have forgotten the Party line for the countryside. Because of this, at present many villages have not adequately carried out the slogan 'poor and middle peasants united in one family', and have not mobilized the laboring peasants, particularly poor peasants to zealously participate in the rectification of errors." Nhan Dan, January 14, 1957.

policies." The Land Reform teams were criticized for having established a "separate hierarchy (he thong) from top to bottom" and allowing immature cadres to lead cadres with much experience. How while most of the turmoil in the Party had been at the village level, some "readjustment" had also taken place at the huyen and province level in a few areas, and although it was quickly halted it nevertheless "caused much damage to our Party." Subsequent to the 10th Plenum, the Politburo decided to resume regular recruiting into the Party in order to "broaden its ranks" at a slow but steady pace, and with attention being given to workers, poor peasants and new middle peasants (chiefly former poor peasants) and revolutionary intellectuals. However, the Party cautioned that "quality should be given more attention than quantity," suggesting that the expansion would be gradual and controlled.

<sup>166</sup> Nhan Dan, October 30, 1956. In addition to blaming the lower levels, Truong Chinh and Le Viet Luong, the individuals directly responsible for overseeing the Land Reform were demoted. "The Central Committee Plenum is very pained, and recognizes that the Central Committee has responsibility for these shortcomings and mistakes. But the direct [responsibility] is due to the fact that the leadership in carrying out the policies committed serious errors. The Central Committee members directly in charge of the Land Reform and organizational readjustment have reviewed their errors before the Central Committee . . . and were appropriately disciplined." Ibid.

<sup>167 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>.

<sup>168&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

<sup>169&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, April 13, 1957.

<sup>170&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, April 24, 1957.

The effort to restore unity in Party ranks as well as within Vietnamese society was connected with the conclusion by DRV leaders that the divisiveness of the Land Reform period had adversely affected the reunification mission. The Party's theoretical journal Hoc Tap followed the 10th Plenum with an article that said, in part:

We must always remember that our country is divided into two regions, and therefore in consolidating the North we must pay attention to winning over the South. But consolidating the North is the crucial mission in bringing about the country's reunification, therefore do not, on the grounds of winning over the South, lower the requirement for consolidating the North. At the same time, our policy is to carry out the reunification of the country by peaceful means, but we must always remember that the enemy is going all out to increase his military strength and turn the South into a military base to prepare for a new war. 171

Just as the policy toward intellectuals and the upper strata of the countryside had been affected by the reunification issue and the desire not to alienate potential sympathizers in the South, increasing the Party's solidarity likewise became an urgent priority in view of this perceived threat.

Another result of the 10th Plenum was a renewed effort to ensure broader democracy within Party ranks. Many of the political errors of the Land Reform program had been ascribed to "mandarinal" behavior on the part of individual leading cadres of the Party. Moreover, the LDP felt obliged to take into account the efforts of the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU to oppose the cult of the individual. Although it is unclear what specific effect this stress on collective leadership had at

<sup>171</sup> Nhan Dan, December 30, 1956.

the top levels of the Party, the lower levels of the Party were once again given the authority to take control of their own affairs, and play a leading role in reconstituting the Party Chapters that had been disrupted by the Land Reform teams. This was also, as noted earlier, a period in which the province was supplanting the region as the leading echelon in the countryside, making it easier to ensure that low level Party problems received sufficient attention and were flexibly resolved, although conflicts and resentments among low level Party members still posed a problem. The lower levels are supplementation.

The Rectification of Errors campaign in 1957-58 brought back many, but not all, Resistance cadres purged during the Land Reform, and an undisclosed number of young members recruited during that period were dismissed. The cooperativization period starting in late 1958 led to a major new attempt to expand the Party and change its composition,

<sup>172</sup>A Nhan Dan, November 16, 1958, editorial stated that the reelection of Party Chapter Committees was one of the factors in creating a "new transformation in the countryside." A series of articles on Party leadership stressed the importance of Party democracy. One article observed that while "the Party Secretary is naturally the soul of the Party Committee, it can only develop its potential if that Party Secretary unites with and develops the initiative and experience of the comrades in the same leading organ." Nhan Dan, November 13, 1957.

<sup>173</sup>Another of the frequent articles in the 1957-58 period stressing Party unity acknowledged that despite an improvement in the strengthening of post Land Reform Party solidarity, "nevertheless, all of us can see that in the recent past a number of cadres and Party members have manifested a lack of solidarity and unity in thought and deed, and this has given rise to additional difficulties in carrying out the programs and policies of the Party and government." Nhan Dan, April 25, 1958. "The key for distinguishing between absolute loyalty to the Party and the cult of the individual was the principle of criticism and self-criticism and struggle within the ranks of the Party, and expanding internal democracy under centralized leadership." Ibid.

which was termed the "1-6" campaign in honor of the founding date of The recruiting base for this new drive was primarily in the rural areas, and among the 730,000 members of the Labor Youth Group. 1/5 Initially, this effort to expand the Party encountered In some areas the huyen gave the villages a blank check in recruiting and "some Party Chapters took in even people who were still exploiting, or without a clear background, to say nothing of the fact that some places even invited former puppet officials who had committed crimes against the people to participate in the training classes for potential recruits." In other places, the "closed door" policy still persisted, particularly with regard to workers, youths, and In addition, some peasants were evidently unhappy about the new emphasis on increasing the prominence of urban workers in the Party, and asked why the new Draft Party Regulations specified that the LDP was the "party of the Vietnamese working class," and not "the party of the Vietnamese working class and laboring people" as in the old Party regulations. 178

<sup>174</sup> The campaign was announced in Nhan Dan, October 29, 1959. Historical research shortly thereafter discovered that the date was February 3, 1930.

 $<sup>175</sup>_{\mathrm{Nhan}}$  Dan, September 17, 1960.

<sup>176&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, January 22, 1960.

<sup>177&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

 $<sup>178\</sup>underline{\text{Nhan}}$   $\underline{\text{Dan}}$ , April 15, 1960. "Should we take this to mean that there is only the hammer, and no longer the sickle?" asked some peasants. The answer was that "by joining the Party we have become workers." Ibid.

By mid-1960, the 1-6 campaign had enrolled 62,000 new Party members, but only 40 percent came from the Labor Youth Group. The scattered available evidence suggests that a large part of the increase came from former Resistance cadres in the villages, since the older cadres who had themselves been through the trials of the Resistance tended to look on the village youth as unprepared and untested for leadership positions. Statistics from subsequent years, cited above, suggest that the influx of youth was modest and did not effectively solve the problem of rejuvenating the Party membership, since the number of members under 26 years of age comprised only 10 percent of the total membership in 1962. 181 By 1966 total Party membership had risen to

<sup>179</sup> Nhan Dan, June 27, 1960.

<sup>180</sup> Nhan Dan, October 16, 1959. Nhan Dan on September 9, 1959 noted that some cadres felt that only service in the Resistance was an adequate test of a Party member, some felt that the Party needed to be consolidated and not expanded, and some felt that they should only accept "well behaved" types and reject those who "struggled and criticized the leadership." These attitudes reflected "narrow minded isolationism" which was "rather widespread." A speech by Politburo member Nguyen Duy Trinh to cadres in the Resistance bastion of Nghe An accused "some Party members and cadres of resting on their laurels and losing touch with the masses." Nhan Dan, March 25, 1959. Nhan Dan, October 16, 1959 criticized the "narrow minded, prejudiced attitudes of the majority of Party members with the miscellaneous shortcomings of the life style [sinh hoat = sheng huo] of the workers, youths and women, to the point that they have become divorced from the masses."

<sup>181</sup>Vu Oanh, "Ra suc lam tot," <u>Hoc Tap</u>, No. 11, 1962, p. 33. The percentage of members under 26 was 8.95% of the rural membership and as little as 2.95% in strong Resistance base areas like Ha Tinh. The article notes, "It is because of their failure to realize the necessity of recruiting youths in developing the Party organization that many comrades still preserve their narrow-minded views. They have objected to the admission of youths into the Party. Clinging to their outmoded views, a number of comrades make an unrealistic comparison of self-praise: one year of Resistance equals ten years of peace." <u>Ibid</u>.

766,000 from 500,000 in 1960. 182 Its age composition was somewhat altered during this expansion. In 1961 the number of recruits under 30 had comprised 71 percent of the total new membership for that year, while in 1965 the figure had risen to 81 percent. 183 The number of women who were recruited in 1960 was 9.4 percent of the total new membership in 1961, a figure which rose to 20.8 percent in 1965. 184 Eighty percent of the 300,000 increase in Party membership from 1960 to 1965 were youths under 30 years of age (60 percent of them were former Labor Youths). 185 Approximately half of the 1965

<sup>182</sup> Nhan Dan, February 4, 1966. The Labor Youth Group rose from 730,000 in 1960 to 1,200,000 in 1965. Nhan Dan, April 19, 1966.

<sup>183</sup>Nhan Dan, February 4, 1966.

<sup>184</sup> Ibid. Party statistics on the number of women in Party committees at regional and local levels in 1961-62 were: Village Party Committees 5 percent, huyen and Town Party Committees 6 percent, Province, Region and City Party Committees 5.4 percent. Nhan Dan, November 6, 1962.

<sup>185</sup> Nhan Dan, January 16, 1966. No comprehensive figures are available for the increase of women in the Party. The reluctance of older male cadres to select women for leadership positions is detailed in a Nhan Dan March 6, 1966 article on increasing the number of women in Party positions in Thanh Hoa province. The percentage of youths in the Thanh Hoa Party organization was 7.2 percent in 1962 and 11.8 in 1966; the percentage of women rose from 8.8 to 10.8 percent in the same period. Nhan Dan, January 27, 1966. The major expansion of female Party members did not apparently take place until the post-1965 period.

Party membership was comprised of peasants. 186 Although there are no comprehensive statistics on provincial level Party membership, some scattered figures can be cited:

| Province | Party | Membership (a) |
|----------|-------|----------------|
| FIGATIGE | Fally | Hempersurb     |

| •               |        |        |      |                 | Party members as |
|-----------------|--------|--------|------|-----------------|------------------|
| •               |        |        |      |                 | a percentage of  |
| •               |        | Labor  |      | •               | 1960 province    |
| Province        | Party  | Youth  | Year | Population      | population       |
| Bac Giang       | 12,300 | 16,700 | 1961 | 523,352         | 2.3%             |
| Bac Ninh        | 11,700 | 27,300 | 1963 | 520,787         | 2.2%             |
| Ha Giang        | 2,000  | 3,800  | 1961 | 199,229         | 1.0%             |
| Hanoi           | 50,000 | 47,500 | 1961 | 643,576         | 7.8%             |
| Ha Tinh         | 35,000 |        | 1961 | 689,349         | 5.1%             |
| Hai Duong       | 21,127 | 27,869 | 1962 | 894,208         | 2.4%             |
| Hong Quang      | 6,000  |        | 1961 | 171,428         | 3.5%             |
| Kien An         | 6,000  | 10,000 | 1960 | 442,875         | 1.3%             |
| Nam Dinh        | 25,000 | 36,000 | 1963 | 1,027,358       | 2.4%             |
| Nghe An(b)(est) | 40,000 | 60,000 | 1961 | 1,221,842       | 3.3%(est)        |
| Phu Tho         | 22,300 | 30,000 | 1962 | 505,672         | 4.4%             |
| Thai Binh(b)    | 24,410 |        | 1974 | 1,600,000('73 e | st) 1.5%         |
| Thai Nguyen     | 11,850 | 15,000 | 1964 | 290,255         | 4.1%             |
| Thanh Hoa       | 46,000 | 74,000 | 1961 | 1,598,261       | 2.9%             |
| Tuyen Quang     | 5,000  |        | 1961 | 154,206         | 3.2%             |
| Vinh Phuc       | 14,000 | 22,700 | 1963 | 593,183         | 2.4%             |
| Yen Bay         | 3,000  |        | 1960 | 146,924         | 2.0%             |
| Ha Dong(c)(est) | 25,200 | 37,800 | 1966 | 882,537         | 2.9%(est)        |
| Son Tay(c)(est) | 10,800 | 16,200 | 1966 | 380,563         | 2.8%(est)        |
|                 |        |        |      |                 |                  |

 $<sup>\</sup>frac{186}{Nhan}$  Dan, April 19, 1966. 364,500 of the 766,000 total were peasants (47.5 percent).

<sup>(</sup>a) Provinces for which no figures are available are: Hung Yen, Ha Nam, Ninh Binh, Hai Phong, Quang Binh, Cao Bang, Lang Son, Hoa Binh, Hai Ninh, Lao Cai and Bac Can.

<sup>(</sup>b) Assuming a ratio of 2 Party members for every 3 Labor Youths, Party membership in Nghe An in 1961 would have been 40,000. Thai Binh province had a combined total of 77,000 Party members and Labor Youths in 1962. Using the same calculation, Party membership in Thai Binh in 1962 would have been slightly over 30,000.

<sup>(</sup>c) The estimate for Party and Labor Youth membership in Ha Dong and Son Tay is calculated from the 1967 statistic of 90,000 for combined Party and Labor Youth membership, based on the supposition that there are 3 Labor Youths for every 2 Party members, and that the total membership in Ha Tay province which is comprised of the former provinces of Ha Dong and Son Tay, is distributed proportional to the 1960 population of each province. These figures, therefore, are only estimates of the general size of the Party in these provinces.

These figures on province Party membership do not, however, include some of the heavily populated delta provinces of North Vietnam and are also not available for many of the mountain provinces. The total Party membership in the DRV in 1960 was about 3.3 percent of North Vietnam's population, while the equivalent figure in China may have been only slightly above 1 percent in the early 1950's and did not exceed 2.5 percent through the remainder of the 1950's and early 1960's. 187 While it has been argued that a higher party-population ratio indicates a greater degree of industrialization, 188 the slightly larger party-population ratio in Vietnam is probably due to its smaller population, the greater regional uniformity of Party expansion, and the fact that the Lao Dong Party expanded with great rapidity during the early years of the First Indochina War.

As the Party grew in numbers, its leadership structure was altered to meet changing circumstances. When Ho returned to Vietnam in 1941, he convened the 8th Plenum of the First Central Committee, which elected Truong Chinh General Secretary of the Central Committee and "added a

<sup>187</sup> Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization, pp. 136-38. Schurmann gives an estimate of 3.6 for the 1961 party-population ratio in the DRV. Complete figures on provincial Party membership in China (1956) are given on p. 136. The incomplete North Vietnamese data on this subject makes comparison difficult. However, of the DRV provinces for which figures are available, the provincial party-population ratio is slightly higher in Vietnam than in China. Moveover, the use of 1960 province population figures along with province Party membership figures that are several years more recent results in a higher Party-population ratio. As noted in a following section, in the early cooperativization period many provinces were said to have a Party-population ratio of between 1 and 2 percent.

<sup>188&</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>., p. 138.

number of comrades to the Central Committee." During the period preceding the Second Party Congress of 1951, the Standing Committee (Ban Thuong Vu) of the Central Committee was, in effect, the Politburo. The Second Party Congress (February 11-19, 1951) was attended by 158 official and alternate delegates. 190 At this meeting, Ho's unique position in the leadership was institutionally recognized by his election as Party Chairman, while Truong Chinh was re-elected General Secretary. This was the "first time since coming into existence that the Party Congress had met with full complement of representatives of the Party organizations in and outside of the country that had been democratically elected from the bottom up." 191 Twenty-nine Central Committee members were elected by the Congress. 192

Reference to a formal Politburo in Party literature does not antedate the Second Congress, and the Politburo was probably officially incorporated into the Party's leadership structure at that time, although its exact composition is not available. In 1959 there were 31 members of the Central Committee. 193 This small leadership group was

<sup>189</sup> Bon muoi nam hoat dong cua Dang, p. 31.

<sup>190&</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>., p. 56.

<sup>191</sup> Ibid., p. 59. Previously, "because of the necessity for clandestine operation under the imperialists' yoke, the Party Central Committee was usually only elected in a countrywide plenum, or designated."

Ba muoi lam nam dau tranh cua Dang, Vol. II, p. 110.

 $<sup>^{192}</sup>$ Bernard Fall, <u>Le Viet-Minh</u>, p. 153. According to Fall, there were 19 full members and 10 alternates.

 $<sup>193 \</sup>underline{\text{Nhan}}$   $\underline{\text{Dan}}$ , January 7, 1960. This included some, such as Tran Huu Duc, Xuan Thuy and Nguyen Thi Thap who had been coopted into the Central Committee after 1951.

a legacy of the clandestine period of Party organization, when secrecy and flexibility were the most important requirements for the survival of the revolutionary movement. These habits persisted at lower levels of the Party as well. One of the major provinces of the DRV did not hold a province Party Congress from the time of the LDP Second Congress in 1951 until 1959. When the Province Committee was expanded in 1959 (to 33 members) by an election intended to "represent the growth of the Party," there was grumbling among members of the old Province Committee that it would be too "loose-knit" (loang) an organization—clearly a holdover of the guerrilla view that organization whould be "light and streamlined" (gon nhe), a constant injunction during the Resistance. 194

The transformation of the LDP's mission from anti-colonial struggle to economic construction required changes in organization and in the leadership qualities required of its members. Ho pointed out that "in the old days we needed Party members who could fight the enemy and engage in guerrilla warfare; now we need Party members who can build socialism and construct factories and be farmers." This new mission also required an augmentation of the leadership group. Le Duc Tho, head of the Central Committee's Organization Bureau, noted that the Central Committee was too small to meet the "new tasks" of the First Five-Year Plan. 196 At the Third Party Congress, a new Central Committee

<sup>194</sup>Nhan Dan, January 15, 1960.

<sup>195&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, June 8, 1960.

<sup>196&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, April 5, 1960.

of 71 members (43 full members and 28 alternates) was elected.  $^{197}$ 

Several important contrasts between the structure and composition of the LDP and CCP Central Committees deserve mention. The large difference in the size of each Central Committee (71 in Vietnam and 170 in China) is also true of their respective Politburos. <sup>198</sup> China's Politburo elected by the Central Committee at the Eighth Party Congress in 1956 consisted of 26 members. This body proved too large to be an effective day to day decision making group and, at the Eighth Party Congress a smaller leading nucleus of six members formed the Standing Committee of the Politburo. The LDP's Third Congress elected a Politburo of eleven full and two alternate members, who collectively were involved in every major sphere of political, economic and institutional life in the DRV, but formed a small enough group to meet and deliberate on a regular basis. In the CCP, 24 of the 28 first secretaries at the provincial level or the equivalent in 1956 were regular or alternate members of the CCP Central Committee whereas only two members

<sup>197&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan</sub> Dan, September 8, 1960.

<sup>198</sup>At least one member was subsequently added to the 1960 LDP Central Committee. The obituary of Truong Chi Cuong noted that he had been coopted (bo sung) into the Central Committee as an alternate delegate in 1961. Nhan Dan, March 25, 1975. Cuong had special responsibilities for the South and may have been assigned there sometime after 1960. The 1960 Party statute provided that the Central Committee could "select a number of Central Committee members to set up a Central Office (Trung Uong Cuc) in particularly crucial Party headquarters. The Central Office will be placed under the direct leadership of the Central Committee." The term "Central Office" is the same designation that is used for "COSVN" (Central Office for South Vietnam). The Eighth Central Committee of the CCP consisted of 97 full members and 73 alternates.

of the LDP Central Committee were province committee secretaries. 199
While the CCP reconstituted the Regional Bureaus of its Central Committee in 1961, the DRV evidently did not feel that the political and administrative problems of most provinces were sufficient to require the full time attention of province secretaries with Central Committee rank.

The CCP Central Committee evidently declined in importance as a forum for major policy decisions in the early 1960's. From 1960 to 1966 only two Central Committee Plenums were held, and it is possible that they were supplanted by organizational innovations such as the Central Work Conference. Political conflict among the leadership group led to increasing experimentation with new forms of leadership that would bypass the Party bureaucracy. 200 And, in the Cultural

 $<sup>^{199}</sup>$  They were Ngo Thuyen (Thanh Hoa) and Vo Thuc Dong (Nghe An).

 $<sup>^{200}</sup>$ Parris Chang speculates that the device of the Central Work Conference was actually "an expanded working session of the Politburo or its Standing Committee and was the real focus of power and decision for the regime." Chang believes that, "Through the Central Work Conference, in which provincial officials were represented, the Party's 'organization men' may also have attempted to undercut Mao's political influence or at least to reduce his 'de-stabilizing' effect by making it more difficult for him to bypass the established framework, over which they had greater control, or go directly to the provincial leaders to mobilize support for his policies, as he had done frequently in the 1950's." Parris Chang, "Research Notes on the Changing Loci of Decision in the Chinese Communist Party," The China Quarterly, No. 44, October-December 1970, pp. 178, 179. While the Central Work Conference may have been a method of circumventing Mao's ad hoc use of forums with provincial leaders, it was in itself a sufficiently loose organizational format to serve Mao's ends as well as those of the putative "organization men," and illustrates Chang's contention that "in the 1960's political power in China was diffused to a considerable degree; consequently, the arena of political conflict expanded, and Party officials below the Politburo were, to a greater extent than in the 1950's, drawn into participation, through the Central Work Conference, in the decision-making process and the resolution of conflicts." Ibid., p. 180.

Revolution the Party's entire leadership structure came under attack.

The DRV leadership elected at the Third Party Congress of 1960 remained stable throughout the First Five-Year Plan period and the war years that followed. Because of the increasing gravity of the situation in South Vietnam, however, the DRV did not hold another Party Congress four years from the date of the Third Congress as specified in the Party regulations. These regulations also allow for the possibility of postponing or advancing the date of the Party Congress "under special circumstances." The escalation of the Vietnam conflict resulted in an indefinite postponement of the Fourth Party Congress. Consequently the Central Committee elected at the Third Party Congress remained essentially unchanged during the period under consideration. Central Committee plenums met regularly semi-annually as prescribed, in contrast to the infrequency of CCP Central Committee meetings during the same period.

The LDP leadership in the Central Committee consisted of only two members born before the turn of the century (Ho and Ton Duc Thang).

Of the 27 Central Committee figures whose ages are known, 16 were born between 1905 and 1912, while 11 were born between 1913 and 1922. Some scattered data is available on the class background of 18 members, though the interpretation of much of it is necessarily speculative. Of these, 5 came from a proletarian or poor peasant background, 4 from a "middle peasant" background, 8 from a scholar-official background, and

 $<sup>^{201}\</sup>text{Ho}$  Chi Minh, in his capacity as State Chairman, convened a Special Political Conference in 1964 to assess the overall situation in Vietnam.

1 from a merchant family. 202 Within the 13-man 1960 Politburo, probably at least 5 members came from "poor but honest" scholar backgrounds. 203 Of those whose regional origins are known, 16 came from the North, 14 from the Center, and 4 came from the South. Eight of the 13 Politburo members came from Central Vietnam.

of the CCP 1956 Central Committee core leadership (those members who had also been on the 1945 Central Committee) on which figures are available, the age spread was about the same as in the LDP but the median year of birth of these CCP members was 1902, while for the 1960 LDP leaders it was 1911. While Mao was born less than ten years prior to the median year, Ho was born twenty years before the median birth date of the LDP Central Committee members, thus placing a greater generational gap between the Party Chairman and his colleagues. Some evidence on class origins is available on about 65 members of the CCP core group, indicating that 14 came from proletarian or poor peasant backgrounds, 10 came from rich peasant, landlord or gentry backgrounds, and 10 came from scholar-official backgrounds. Thirty-nine of this

 $<sup>^{202}</sup>$ For further details on the composition of the LDP membership, see Appendix.

<sup>203</sup>They are Ho, Truong Chinh, Le Duc Tho, Vo Nguyen Giap and Nguyen Duy Trinh. In addition, Pham Van Dong's father held the post of Cabinet Secretary in the Imperial Court.

<sup>204</sup>The biographical data on this "core group" of the 1956 CCP Central Committee is taken from Klein and Clark, <u>Biographic Dictionary</u> of Chinese Communism, Vols. I and II.

<sup>205</sup> Seven of the 65 were said to have come from "impoverished scholar-official" backgrounds.

group are from provinces in Central China (21 of these are from Hunan), 16 are from Northern provinces, and only 8 from the South. 206

A comparison of the primary occupation area of members of the CCP Eighth Central Committee and the LDP Third Central Committee shows that the distribution between Party, government, and army work is similar.

|                 | 1960 LDP Cent. Com. | 1956 CCP Cent. Com. 207 |
|-----------------|---------------------|-------------------------|
| Party           | 29.5                | 29.4                    |
| Government      | 49.2                | 32.4                    |
| Military/Police | 21.1                | 22.9                    |
| Other           | ·                   | 15.3                    |

The only significant difference is that the CCP Central Committee evidently has more members primarily assigned to work in "mass organizations" as well as scientists, academics and intellectuals. There is

This reflects a major shift in leadership from South to North during the CCP's revolution. While leaders from Central China predominated in both periods, of 45 CCP leaders with biographies in Klein and Clark's compilation who died prior to the 1956 Eighth Party Congress, 30 came from Central China, 10 from South China, and only 5 from the Northern provinces.

<sup>207</sup> The CCP data is from Derek J. Walker, "The Evolution of the Chinese Communist Political Elite, 1931-56," in Robert A. Scalapino ed., Elites in the People's Republic of China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), p. 62.

<sup>208&</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>. In the case of the DRV, the few Central Committee figures involved in mass organization work are included in the government or Party categories, since they also had important government or Party positions. Mrs. Nguyen Thi Thap, the head of the Vietnam Confederation of Women, was, for example, a member of the National Assembly Standing Committee. Ton Duc Thang, head of the Fatherland Front, was Vice-Chairman of the DRV. Nguyen Lam, who specialized in youth work, was a Secretary of the Hanoi Party Committee, as well as of the Labor Youth Group.

an extensive overlap at the top levels of both the LDP and CCP leader-ship between state and Party functions, in the key political and economic sectors. The important distinction between the two cases is that in China both the Party and state bureaucracies came under attack in the period leading up to the Cultural Revolution, indicating that Party control of state administration was not (for Mao) a guarantee of correct policies and satisfactory implementation.

During the first years of the PRC, the Party played a major role in increasing political integration both by its leadership and by the process of relatively steady growth which expanded its ranks and increased the representation of sectors of society such as youth and minority groups that had previously been under-represented in the political system. While the CCP gained strength and expanded its influence during the Land Reform period, the Land Reform in North Vietnam caused a serious crisis in the Party. Many Party members who did not come from the "basic classes" were attacked as the revolution transformed its focus from anti-colonial struggle to social revolution. A period of several years was required to rectify the disarray in Party ranks before a major recruiting drive could be resumed.

Even with the expansion of the LDP during the cooperativization period, the Party made limited progress in rejuvenating its rank and file and its leadership. While the Socialist Education Campaign and Cultural Revolution in China brought widespread change in the composition of the CCP at all levels, the increasing threat of war made it desirable for the LDP to retain a leadership trained and tested in resistance against forcign intervention. And although the composition

of the CCP leadership did not significantly change during the 1949-65 period, deep fissures were developing in the Party which had their roots in the nature of China's revolution, and in the ideas on political leadership held by Mao Tse-tung. The potential for internal dissension certainly existed within the LDP, as the crisis of the Land Reform period shows. But the necessity of always taking into account the unresolved situation in the South, and the views of Ho and other top Party leaders on the mission of the Vietnamese revolution encouraged cautious and pragmatic leadership with an emphasis on internal political unity in the face of the escalating external threat. This strengthened the unity of the top leadership, but retarded the transformation of the Party's internal composition, and delayed the problem of generational succession.

# PART THREE LEADERSHIP AND POLICY MAKING

# SECTION I

# REVOLUTIONARY LEADERSHIP

Both Ho Chi Minh and Mao Tse-tung occupied a unique position in their respective political systems and, in the eyes of both their supporters and detractors, personified the revolutions they led. As Marxists, both would certainly deny that their individual contributions were essential to the success of the revolutionary movements that they organized. As Mao put it, "society pushed men like us onto the political stage. Who would have thought of promoting Marxism? We had never heard of it."

Nevertheless, the personal leadership styles of Ho and Mao did more than simply reflect the historical and social forces and cultural traditions which shaped the contemporary revolutions of Vietnam and China.

The two leaders left an enduring imprint of their ideas and personalities on the political movements they led, and it seems likely that other leaders with different approaches might have oriented the respective revolutions in different directions. This, indeed, was the main point of the Cultural Revolution, with its attacks on revisionism and the "other road" of political development, allegedly favored by some of Mao's potential successors. In the case of Vietnam, the persisting problem of eliminating foreign intervention in its revolution left a much narrower

<sup>1&</sup>quot;Talk on Problems of Philosophy" (18 August 1964) in Miscellany of Mao Tse-tung Thought (1948-68), Part II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 389. This compilation will be subsequently cited as Miscellany.

range of possible directions to take. The principal leadership task was not to organize a new social order, but to mobilize Vietnamese society to accomplish its anti-imperialist mission. Even after 1954, this task continued to influence and limit the course of socialist construction.

Ho's leadership was ideally suited for reconciling the internal and external tasks of the revolution, and there has been little evidence of serious discord within the top leadership of the Communist Party since the 1945 August Revolution. Yet there were critical choices to be faced at each major juncture of the revolution, such as the decision to temporize with the French in March 1946 in the hopes of averting the costly war that followed, the decision in 1951 to place greater stress on the land question and the issue of social revolution in order to strengthen the forces of the Resistance, the 1954 decision to accept the terms of the Geneva Accord, the decision to initiate the Rectification of Errors campaign in 1957, cooperativization in 1958 and, finally, the most difficult decision of all - determining DRV policy toward the South. Each of these decisions was controversial within the Party, and in each case the personal prestige of Ho helped to rally support for the decision taken. In many cases neither the Chinese nor the Vietnamese leader had a wide range of alternative options, given the goals of their revolutionary movements. Yet when the situation permitted some degree of latitude, Mao frequently advocated accelerating the social revolution, while Ho urged discipline in whatever was necessary to preserve the fragile gains toward national independence already achieved.

It is difficult to imagine Mao and Ho exchanging places. Their per-

sonal experiences, reflected in their leadership styles, were deeply embedded in their quite different cultural contexts and shaped by the distinctive requirements of each revolution. Ho was the link between the patriotic scholar officials and Vietnam's modern revolutionaries, while Mao's early rebellious instincts were directed against his exploiting father and the crushing burden of the Confucian tradition. Ho's leading position in the Vietnamese revolutionary movement was established at an early stage, while Mao had to struggle with his contemporaries for the power to control the direction of the Chinese revolution. Ho stressed solidarity and unity against foreign aggression, as did Mao. However Mao made the element of class struggle a prominent and enduring feature of the post-Liberation state, and throughout his career was preoccupied with producing definitive ideological statements which codified his views on revolution and leadership, while Ho's writings had the character of moral exhortations. To some extent, these differences in leadership styles are due to the stages of development in the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions, a point which will be discussed in the concluding sections. They are also products of and responses to the political culture of each society, and the different revolutionary tasks which confronted the Chinese and Vietnamese leadership.

#### Concepts and Traditions of Leadership

Traditional views of leadership in China and Vietnam were shaped both by cultural-historical factors and ecological criteria such as the size and complexity of the polity. Although historical legacies are

never unambiguous, some basic themes nevertheless stand out. The Chinese model of the leader is apt to be based on the unifier-ruler; the successful integrator of China's vast domain, the consolidator more than the conqueror. In the case of the archtypal Vietnamese leader, this unity is a given, typically a byproduct of a resistance to foreign encroachment that rallies the nation to the leader's banner.

These stereotypes are implicit in Alexander Woodside's analysis of traditional Vietnamese concepts of leadership.

It is not too much to say that the Vietnamese traditional monarchy's position was affected by two streams of thought, each concerned with social integration and each with its own symbolic forms. One stream of thought was socio-political in nature. It was derived wholly and directly from China. It stressed that the integration of Vietnamese society could only come from the vertical accommodation of social differences ... The second stream of thought that affected the monarchy and patterns of authority in Vietnam was mythopoetic and religious in nature. It was stronger than any equivalent tradition in China. 2

Woodside concludes from a study of historical sources that there were three distinct qualities of leadership in the "authentic" Vietnamese view.

The ideal Vietnamese ruler, by their reckoning, should be able to resist the political domination of the Chinese court. He should be able to introduce and domesticate Chinese culture. He should be part rebel, part guardian of agricultural fertility, and part cultural innovator. 3

By these criteria, Ho Chi Minh fits closely into the traditional pattern of the Vietnamese leader.

Mao Tse-tung, in contrast, presents a more ambiguous case of conformity with traditional ideals. As the previous section attempts to illustrate, Mao finally rejected the traditional role of "integrating society

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Alexander Woodside, <u>Vietnam</u> and the <u>Chinese</u> <u>Model</u>, pp. 11-12.

<sup>3&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

through the vertical accommodation of social differences" and elected to personally direct a process of rapid social change by intensifying social conflict. Richard Solomon points out, "a major point of departure from traditional Chinese political values has been Mao's effort to institutionalize 'the unity of opposites'." He has sought to substitute controlled political conflict between the Party's operative cadres and those they lead, as well as between different social and economic groups, for the traditional ideal of "the great unity (ta-t'ung) in which social conflict was denied legitimate expression."

The contrast is not, of course, absolute. Vietnam's revolution, led by Ho, has seen periods of bitter and divisive internal struggle, notably during the Land Reform campaign. And Mao has been a symbol of unity, particularly in the anti-Japanese war, and has been concerned with the creation of collective harmony (among "the people" at least). None-theless, the basic content of the Vietnamese revolution was the antiforeign struggle (a unifying theme) while the Chinese revolution, was on balance, a social revolution (with divisive consequences).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Richard H. Solomon, <u>Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political</u>
<u>Culture</u>, p. 516. It should be recalled, however, that on the eve of
<u>Liberation</u>, Mao invoked this image, and said that "for the working class,
the laboring people and the Communist Party" the future problem would
be "working hard to create the conditions in which classes, state power
and political parties will die out very naturally, and mankind will enter
the realm of Great Harmony." Selected Works, Vol. IV, p. 412.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>As Solomon notes, "The one Maoist political value which fully merges with tradition is an uncompromising stress on the collective good above the interests of the individual." Mao's Revolution, p. 516.

Ho linked unity with success, and consistently opposed radical measures that would impede the main task of gaining independence. After Liberation, DRV internal policies turned from cooperation to conflict. But, unlike Mao, Ho turned to reconciliation after each advance in revolutionary consolidation (land reform, struggle against rightist intellectuals, and cooperativization). By the time of the Socialist Education campaign (1962) it was evident that Mao felt conflict should be a permanent feature of China's socialist revolution, in order to forestall a capitalist restoration, and counter the threat of "sugar-coated bullets." Mao's move from

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>As noted earlier, the ICP came under attack from radical intellectuals during the 1930's and 1940's who were opposed to the policies of the united front. In March 1946, Ho's Preliminary Accord with the French was also attacked. In Truong Chinh's biographical sketch of Ho, he says that "Chairman Ho never ceased to repeat over and over again that unity was strength. In a country with a tiny working class like Vietnam, if the revolution is to be led to success the party of the workers must establish a broad national united front, and achieve 'great unity', unite everyone that is possible for us to unite with, win over anyone we can, the less enemies the better, with the goal of 'more friends and less enemies', and isolate the imperialist gang and their lackeys to the highest degree to overthrow them." Truong Chinh, Ho Chu Tich, lanh tu kinh yeu cua giai cap cong nhan va nhan dan Viet Nam, p. 47. Truong Chinh adds that, "Chairman Ho has always strived to achieve unity and solidarity in the Party, so that the Party would not have dissension, and not have factions. From the time the Party was established, whether he was in the country or abroad, he always strived to keep the Party organizationally and ideologically unified, and acting with one accord. He felt that only if there was unity in the Party could the people be united to oppose the imperialists and their lackeys." (Italics in original). Ibid., p. 56. Pham Van Dong wrote that "Chairman Ho is the symbol of unity, Chairman Ho himself is that unity." Pham Van Dong, Ho Chu Tich, lanh tu cua chung ta (Chairman Ho, Our Leader) (Hanoi: Su That, 1963), p. 10.

unity to conflict as an integrative strategy was a gradual process. 7
But, to some extent, it was the natural result of a revolution whose primary target was internal rather than external.

One important reason Ho re-emphasized the theme of unity after the land reform was that he and other Party leaders were becoming increasingly concerned about the unresolved problem of South Vietnam, and the possibility that an excess of struggle in the North might alienate potential supporters in the South. But the underlying reasons for Ho's stress on social solidarity are also connected with his view of the goals of the Vietnamese revolution. Ho's speech at the founding of the Indochinese Communist Party in 1930 contains the following assessment of the motivations that would expand the revolutionary forces in Vietnam;

... the French imperialists' barbarous oppression and ruthless exploitation have awakened our compatriots who have realized that revolution is the only road to life, without it they will die out piecemeal. This is the reason why the Vietnamese revolutionary movement has grown even stronger with each passing day. 8

The specter of "mat nuoc" -- the loss of country and racial extermination
-- is raised by Ho, and he pointed to French depradations as the most

As Frederick Tiewes points out, "Only when Mao met with major opposition at the highest levels of the Party over the Great Leap at Lushan did he speak of class struggle as a prolonged life or death process, one that would continue for twenty to fifty years. At the same time he remarked that in the past he had not spoken about class struggle due to reactionary ideology left over from old times, a statement not literally true, but one indicating that he had not previously emphasized the problem." Frederick C. Tiewes, "Chinese Politics 1949-1965: A Changing Mao," Current Scene, No. 1, January 1974, pp. 8-9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>Ho Chi Minh, <u>Selected Works</u>, Vol. II, p. 147.

powerful stimulus to revolution. At precisely that time, Mao was pointing out that the great opportunity for China's revolution lay in the "unusual phenomenon" that "in China alone there is prolonged and tangled warfare within the ruling classes. "10 This situation suggested to Mao that "a single spark can start a prairie fire" from the combustible revolutionary forces being built up by "deeping the agrarian revolution."11

In a revealing autobiographical recollection of his youth just prior to the Cultural Revolution, Mao recalled that during his years as a middle school teacher "I did not quite understand what sort of a thing imperialism was, still less did I understand how we could make revolution against it." However Mao soon came to recognize the force of peasant grievances. In the course of conducting rural surveys during his tenure at the Peasant Movement Training Institute in 1925, Mao recalled seeking out a poor peasant in his native village. "I talked to him," Mao said, "and came to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>The innate confidence of Sun Yat-sen and others in China's survival and his consequent decision to him at internal targets has been mentioned in an earlier context. During a period of great international tensions in 1959, and at a time when his leadership was under attack, Mao merely said, "Why should we let the others talk? The reason is that China will not sink down, the sky will not fall." Stuart Schram, Chairman Mao Talks to the People, p. 132.

<sup>10</sup> Mao Tse-tung, <u>Selected Works</u>, Vol. I, p. 118.

Ibid. As pointed out earlier, Vietnam's Nghe Tinh peasant revolts were principally aimed at the abuses of the colonial administration and the infringement of communal land rights. Demands for sweeping land reform were not initially the leading factor in the expansion of anti-colonial revolutionary activity in Vietnam.

<sup>12</sup> Stuart Schram, ed., <u>Chairman Mao Talks to the People</u>, p. 214.

understand why the class struggle in the countryside was so acute."13
Out of his investigation of peasant conditions came one of the great classics of modern social analysis, "Report on Investigations of the Peasant Movement in Hunan," which formed the basis for Mao's subsequent ideas on the Chinese revolution.

Ho's writings in the 1920's, most notably his pamphlet "French Colonialism on Trial," reflect his preoccupation with the brutalities of the colonial regime and his anger against colonial domination. 14 In calling for the Vietnamese people to struggle, Ho said, "First we will save the country, then we will save ourselves." 15 This commitment to "the Fatherland above all," a phrase often repeated in the Resistance, influenced Ho's views on post-Liberation goals. He defined "socialist ideology" as "putting the common good of the entire country above all else, above our

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 219.

<sup>14</sup> Ho's own anti-colonial passion voiced the common feeling of many of his compatriots, and the impact of his denunciations of the French colonial system cut across class lines. Vo Nguyen Giap recalls that in his student circle at Hue in the mid 1920's, reading a smuggled copy of French Colonialism on Trial was "the first time we had seen a book denouncing the colonialists, and were filled with hatred and became very excited."

Bac Ho hoi ky, p. 177. Tran Lam, a merchant seaman, found that upon reading Le Paria and French Colonialism on Trial "I became all stirred up inside and had to find the author, no matter what." Ibid., p. 116. As mentioned earlier, Ho's training course in Canton stressed the element of patriotic resentment against colonialism. Ibid., p. 60, pp. 93-96.

<sup>15</sup> Ha Huy Giap, Mot vai suy nghi ve dao ly lam nguoi cua Ho Chu Tich (Some Thoughts on Chairman Ho's Ethics of Human Behavior) (Hanoi: Thanh Nien, 1969), p. 30. This book is the most revealing available portrait of Ho as a leader in terms of traditional Vietnamese political culture.

own individual interests." Ho attributed Vietnam's miseries above all to colonial domination, and it was therefore logical that personal gratification should be subordinated to the national cause, and social revolution directed to serve the anti-colonial revolution. There was, of course, a close linkage between the social and national revolution in both China and Vietnam. The difference is one of shading and emphasis. But this difference is important and indispensible to understanding both the political views developed by Mao and Ho, and the responses to the respective revolutionary programs of these leaders by their followers and countrymen. 17

Mao's writings contain both abstract philosophical statements and concrete, detailed analysis of revolutionary strategy, while Ho's writings are largely exhortatory and explanatory. His definition of the goals of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 37.

The different emphasis placed by Ho and Mao on the external and internal targets of the revolution is evident in their accounts of the path that led them to Marxism-Leninism. In 1960 Ho said, "At first, patriotism, not yet communism, led me to have confidence in Lenin, in the Third International. Step by step, along the struggle, by studying Marxism-Leninism parallel with participation in practical activities, I gradually came upon the fact that only socialism and communism can liberate the oppressed nations and the working people from slavery." Selected Works, Vol. IV, pp. 448-50. Mao's view was that, "The oppressors oppress the oppressed, while the oppressed need to fight back and seek a way out before they start looking for philosophy. It was only when people took this as their starting point that there was Marxism-Leninism, and that they discovered philosophy. We have all been through this. Others wanted to kill me; Chiang Kai-shek wanted to kill me. Thus we came to engage in philosophizing." Mao Tse-tung, "Talk on Questions of Philosophy," (August 18, 1964), in Stuart Schram, ed., Chairman Mao Talks to the People, p. 213. In this recent recollection, Mao's emphasis is not as much on the original patriotic motivations that led him to engage in revolutionary activities, but on the internecine class struggle that intensified as the revolution developed.

socialist revolution are simple and basic, "warm clothes to wear, enough food to eat, a decent house to live in, and an education for everyone." At the time of the Great Leap Forward, when the future society in China was being discussed in visionary terms, Ho's appraisal of that movement was "the entire people surge forward, the Red Flag is planted all over, agriculture is being communized — that is the age of the Great Peace." 19

China's Great Leap illustrates several important aspects of Mao's conception of the Chinese revolution that differ somewhat from Ho's views. One is the necessity to break free from foreign conventions. Mao came to view communism not as a final state of "Great Peace" but as something which will continue to undergo transformations. The mission of the leader is to accelerate social and economic transformations, and speed the progress of the Chinese revolution. Mao recapitulated these views in 1964;

We cannot follow the old paths of technical development of every other country in the world, and crawl step by step

<sup>18</sup> Nhan Dan, March 9, 1960. This definition was formulated by Ho in January 1946 in a newspaper interview in which he said, "I have only one desire, one supreme desire, and that is to do what is necessary for our country to be completely independent, our people completely free, and all compatriots to have clothes to wear and food to eat, and everyone given the opportunity to study." Truong Chinh, Ho Chu Tich lanh tu kinh yeu, p. 60.

<sup>19&</sup>quot;Toan dan cung tien vot, co do cam khap noi, nong nghiep cong san hoa, do la thoi thai binh." Nhan Dan, January 1, 1959. Ho and the Vietnamese press favored the use of the phrase "tien vot" (surging advance) rather than "nhay vot" (leaping advance) which was the closest Vietnamese translation of the "Great Leap," possibly because the first phrase reflects the Vietnamese view of incremental progress discussed in the following section while the "leap" suggests "skipping stages" (dot chay giai doan) and U-shaped development curves which the Vietnamese reject.

behind the others. We must smash conventions, do our utmost to adopt advanced techniques, and within not too long a period of history, build our country up into a modern socialist state. When we talk of a Great Leap Forward, we mean just this.  $^{20}$ 

Mao did not offer a specific characterization of China's communist future, probably because he viewed communist society as something that "must still be transformed." Although "it will also have a beginning and an end, it will certainly be divided into stages, or they will give it another name, it cannot remain constant." While Ho's vision was fixed on the related goals of total Vietnamese independence and popular welfare, Mao concentrated more on the process and strategy of revolutionary struggle, and became increasingly convinced that revolutionary means were as important as revolutionary ends.

At the time of the Great Leap Forward Mao recalled, with some rancor, past criticisms of China by the Soviet Union. 23 He concluded that "our

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>Stuart Schram, ed., <u>Chairman Mao Talks to the People</u>, p. 230. This is a section of a 1964 report by Chou En-lai, but Schram attributes the ideas to Mao, and notes that in a Central Work Conference just before the report was delivered, Mao declared, "You people didn't even dare to include in the Premier's report the words 'catch up with'; I have added for you the words 'catch up with and surpass'. I have [also] added a passage, 'Sun Yat-sen said already in 1905 that [China could] surpass [the West]'." <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 336.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 110.

<sup>22&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

<sup>23&</sup>quot;In the past when we were opposing dogmatism, their journal the Bolshevik indulged in self adulation saying that they were one hundred percent correct. Their method was to attack one point or a few points and not mention the rest. Their journal True Words attacked five big mistakes of the Central Soviet Area, without mentioning one single good point." Ibid., p. 101.

editorials are at a higher level than those of <u>Pravda</u>" and that, "When it comes to the superstructure, in military science, in problems of strategy we have our own fully developed system. Stalin had no developed system. We do not have to learn from the Soviet Union."<sup>24</sup> Mao even went so far as to say that "the situation of the Great Leap Forward inspired not only us in China, but also our Soviet comrades."<sup>25</sup> China's record of great cultural achievement may have made it difficult for Mao to accept Soviet tutelage. Vietnam's historical experience had resulted in developing a tradition of cultural borrowing that acknowledged the grandeur of the original model, but was selective in adapting external ideas and institutions to Vietnamese realities.

## Personal Qualities and Achievements

One of Ho Chi Minh's most frequently noted personal qualities was modesty. The fact that Vietnam was a small country, and that Ho's leadership within the revolutionary movement was unchallenged allowed him to function in a low key manner, while Mao had to struggle both to impose his own leadership on the CCP and to restore China to a position of international prominence — tasks that did not encourage the emergence of a self-effacing leader. In his speech to the first class at the Nguyen Ai Quoc Party Training School in late 1957 Ho told the students that, "The

<sup>24&</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>., p. 129.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid

level of ideological understanding of our Party is rather low; nobody can boast about being good at it. Therefore modesty and frankness are to be emphasized... $^{26}$  Ho noted that the CCP "which is the model of the Communist Party in a semicolonial and semifeudal country, has long paid attention to theory," and advised that the LDP do so also. Nevertheless, while studying the "rich experiences of fraternal countries" they should not be mechanically applied "because our country has its own peculiarities," although "undue emphasis on the role of national peculiarities and negation of the great, basic experiences of fraternal countries will lead to grave revisionist mistakes." Vietnam's major accomplishment, in Ho's estimation, was not that its revolution had blazed a theoretical path for others to follow, but that it had become the first colonial country to militarily defeat a colonialist power. The revolutionary accomplishment in Vietnam was independence. Internationally, Vietnam's achievement was the direct contribution of this independence to speeding the "collapse of the imperialists' colonial system."28

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup>Bernard B. Fall, ed., <u>Ho Chi Minh on Revolution</u> (New York: Signet, 1968), p. 287.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>Ibid., 290.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup>Ban Nghien Cuu Lich Su Dang, <u>Chu Tich Ho Chi Minh</u> (Chairman Ho Chi Minh) (Hanoi: Su That, 1970), pp. 85-86. "This is the first time in history that a small, weak colony has defeated a powerful colonialist country, and contributed to speeding the collapse of the imperialists' colonial system." While Vietnam only claimed pride of place as the first Asian country to overthrow colonialism, the CCP said that "the way taken by the Chinese people in defeating imperialism and its lackeys and in founding the People's Republic of China is the way that should be taken by the peoples of many colonial and semi-colonial countries in their fight for national independence and people's democracy." (Liu Shao-ch'i speech at the meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions in 1949), in d'Encausse and Schram, Marxism and Asia, p. 271.

In order to "domesticate" the aspects of Marxism-Leninism derived from external sources to the realities of Vietnam, Ho often presented these concepts within the framework of his own definition. Ho introduced the agricultural cooperative regulations by saying that they were "like the old village charter (huong uoe)."<sup>29</sup> He criticized the Vietnamese newspapers for using "too many foreign words, and often using them incorrectly."<sup>30</sup> The context of his talk made it clear that he was particularly concerned about excessive use of literary Chinese loan words, rather than phonetic transcriptions of terminology from European languages (such as "So-viet"). <sup>31</sup> Supplementing his role as the "domesticator" of foreign influences, Ho played a didactic role as well, instructing his compatriots on the qualities needed to build socialism; industriousness, thrift, integrity, and uprightness (can, kiem, liem, chinh). These traditional virtues were redefined by Ho in a way that underlined the connection between

Nhan Dan, January 22, 1960. Frederick Wakeman points to the hsiang-yueh (Vietnamese "huong uoc") or village covenant, as one of the institutional precedents for Mao's stress on mass mobilization and public indoctrination. History and Will, Philosophical Perspectives of Mao Tsetung's Thought (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p. 12. He notes, however, that eventually "other means were developed for arousing political consciousness in the masses..." Ibid. There is no evidence that Mao himself ever used this analogy or mentioned the term hsiang-yueh in a contemporary context.

<sup>30&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, September 9, 1962.

<sup>&</sup>quot;There are words which we do not have, and are difficult to translate correctly. For example, doc lap (independence), tu do (freedom), giai cap (class), cong san (communist), etc. But for words which we have, why not use them, and why borrow foreign words?" Some examples given are "hoa xa" (train) instead of "xe lua," "phi co" instead of "may bay," and "quoc gia" (nation) instead of "nha nuoc."

old values and new requirements.<sup>32</sup> Ho also applied traditional Confucian virtues to a modern context and urged his countrymen to be "loyal to the country, filial to the people" (trung voi nuoc, hieu voi dan).<sup>33</sup>

Ho's pronouncements are more homilitic than philosophical. They reveal a creative use of tradition, and a leader that can act within the categories of familiar concepts while giving them a new meaning. Mao, as will be discussed in a following section, was frequently at odds with China's traditional social and philosophical precepts and, indeed, strongly attacked the attempts to revive the old Confucian concepts of "loyalty" and "humanity" during the Socialist Education campaign (1962-64). While Ho emphasized that unity is strength, Mao stressed class struggle and opposed the concept of "two divides into one," which expresses in philosophical terms the progressive integration of Chinese society. The

<sup>32&</sup>quot;'Industriousness' means increasing productivity on whatever task is performed. 'Thrift' means not wasting time or property of yourself or the people. 'Integrity' means not being corrupt and always respecting and preserving state property and people's property. 'Uprightness' is performing whatever task must be done, however small, and staying away from wrongdoing however trifling." Truong Chinh, Ho Chu Tich, lanh tu kinh yeu, pp. 64-65.

The Huy Giap, Dao ly lam nguoi cua Ho Chu Tich, p. 41. "Loyal to the country, filial to the people', we have studied this statement for some time now, and now and in the future we will continue to study it, and will never complete the study of it. Because as long as Vietnam still exists, and the Vietnamese people still exist, we will continue to study 'loyal to the country, filial to the people'." Ibid., p. 41. In 1947 Ho wrote, "Rectifying the Style of Work" (Sua doi loi lam viec) as a study document for cadres and Party members. It listed 12 points on building the Party and 5 points on "revolutionary virtue" -- humanity (nhan), right conduct (nghia), wisdom (tri), bravery (dung), uprightness (liem). Chu Tich Ho Chi Minh, p. 76. Truong Chinh comments that Ho "developed the Eastern tradition of virtue, that is tri, nhan and dung on a completely new foundation," that is, placing them in a revolutionary context. Ho Chi Minh, lanh tu kinh yeu, p. 59.

opposing concept formulated by Mao was that "one divides into two," which emphasizes that class struggle continues to exist in socialist society and, indeed, can grow more acute. In the early 1960's Mao criticized the Soviet view that socialism "unites as one," is "firm as a rock," and that unanimity is the "motivating force of social development." This, says Mao, denies the universality of contradictions, which are the "motivating forces of human development." 34

Both Mao and Ho were regarded by their colleagues as having contributed to the development of Marxism-Leninism, but whereas Mao's originality was asserted in both his theoretical writings and their practical application to the Chinese revolution, Ho's contributions were mainly in the area of revolutionary practice. Both Mao and Ho were constantly concerned

<sup>34</sup> Miscellany, Vol. II, pp. 265-66. Ho's conviction that "unity is strength" seems closer to the Soviet position.

 $<sup>^{35}</sup>$ Schram notes, however, that the elevation of Mao to a comparable status with Marx and Lenin as a theoretician did not take place until the Cultural Revolution. The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, pp. 116-17. Pham Van Dong, in a eulogy co Ho. writes, "The revolutionary path and strategy of Chairman Ho and the Party are a further development (phat trien) of Marxism-Leninism, and a worthy contribution to the storehouse of international revolutionary experience with regard to a series of very important problems concerning the people's democratic revolution advancing to socialism without going through the stage of capitalism, people's war and defeating imperialist aggression, national liberation war and protection of the Fatherland, building a new-style Party, the worker-peasant alliance and the national united front, the ideological task, the international line leading to the formation of a front of the peoples of the world opposing U.S. aggression in Vietnam... Chairman Ho's writings, from the beginning of his revolutionary struggle to the recent past, underline that development and contribution and reflect and clarify the process of revolutionary struggle, and the successive and increasingly great victories of our Party and people." (Emphasis added). Pham Van Dong, Chu Tich Ho Chi Minh, tinh hoa va khi phach cua dan toc, luong tam cua thoi dai (Chairman Ho Chi Minh, Spirit and Essence of the National Conscience of the Age) (Hanoi: Su That, 1970), pp. 22-23. The underscored terms suggest that Ho's writings were essentially a clarification and documentation of his real contributions in the field of revolutionary practice.

with communicating their insights to their followers, but approached this problem in different ways. Mao codified a body of theory, to be absorbed by his followers according to their capacities, while Ho's approach was to simplify the language, and present classic Marxist-Leninist concepts in familiar terms — an approach which precluded any claim to theoretical sophistication or doctrinal innovation.

## Leaders and Masses; Image and Communication

Direct contact between Mao and the Chinese people was complicated by the size of the polity and the language problem. His thick Hunanese accent made his <u>kuo yu</u> (national language) speeches difficult to understand. This may have contributed to Mao's inclination to express his leadership through his writings, and through symbolic appearances on T'ien An Men, which could be visually relayed to a wide audience. Mao's principal Western biographer observes that, "Though he was not obliged like Stalin to avoid crowds for the sake of security, he preferred to make known his views either through written statements or through speeches before closed groups of the Party or State apparatus, and leave the mass meetings to others. A certain element of mystery and withdrawal was apparently thought desirable to enhance his prestige." In the 1950's

Mao had early encountered problems with his accent when entering the national political and intellectual scene in Peking in 1918. He later wrote that most of the contemporary leading intellectual figures had "no time to listen to an assistant librarian speaking southern dialect." Stuart Schram, Mao Tse-tung (Baltimore: Penguin, 1967), p. 48.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 338.

Mao made frequent tours of the country but, in contrast to Ho, the recorded meetings of Mao with individual Chinese are relatively few. As the Cultural Revolution approached, Mao's image became more stylized, and his movements before the public seem to have become progressively slower and more ponderous to emphasize his grandeur as China's leader. Mao was perhaps influenced by the traditional image of the larger than life Chinese emperor who, in order to provide an integrative symbol for the vast reaches of China's political domain, was magnified to suprahuman proportions in order that his image could reach the farthest corner of the empire. 38

Buddhas are made of several times life-size in order to frighten people. When heroes and warriors appear on the stage they are made to look quite unlike ordinary people. Stalin was that kind of person. The Chinese people had got so used to being slaves that they seemed to want to go on. When Chinese artists painted pictures of me together with Stalin, they always made me a little bit shorter, thus blindly knuckling under to the moral pressure exerted by the Soviet Union at that time. 39

There was, of course, a recognition that in the modern context of a socia-

When Edgar Snow on his last visit to Peking expressed his concern about the exaggerated glorification of Mao, Madame Kung P'eng (the wife of Ch'iao Kuan-hua) replied; "I know that many foreigners feel that way... Let me tell you a story. During the early years of the revolution there was a strange thing. When the peasants came to the October anniversary and went past the reviewing stand, many did the k'ou-t'ou before Chairman Mao. We had to keep guards posted there to prevent them from prostrating themselves. It takes time to make people understand that Chairman Mao is not an emperor or a god but a man who wants the peasants to stand up like men. Does that help you see to what excesses some people would go - and how very mild a kind of respect for the Chairman is being permitted?" Edgar Snow, The Long Revolution, p. 69.

<sup>39</sup> Mao Tse-tung, "Talks at Chengtu: On the Problem of Stalin," in Stuart Schram, ed., Chairman Mao Talks to the People, p. 99.

list system image making must be kept within proper bounds. Mao observed that there are "two kinds of cult of the individual" and that, "One is correct, such as that of Marx, Engels, Lenin and the correct side of Stalin." While Ho constantly impressed the virtue of modesty on his followers, Mao linked "excessive modesty" to revisionism and slavish imitation of foreign models. 41

Ho communicated with his compatriots through his omnipresence and personal example. DRV newspaper reports document the frequency of his informal meetings with groups of workers, peasants, intellectuals and others. 42 The numerous participant accounts of these meetings reflect a common perception of Ho's charismatic qualities, such as the brightness

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup>Mao noted that Stalin "had an overlord flavor," which he attributed to his seminary training, and consequent personal and intellectual rigidity. Miscellany, Vol. I, p. 87.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup>Ibid., p. 96.

The best compilation of impressions derived from meeting Ho by Vietnamese from all walks of life is Chung ta co Bac Ho (Uncle Ho Is With Us), Vols. I and II (Hanoi: Lao Dong, 1970). These two volumes contain 63 articles by Vietnamese relating their emotions, observations and perceptions from meetings with Ho. While this is of course an official compilation, reflecting the views of those most prepared to respond to Ho's charismatic presence, similar views were expressed by a variety of North Vietnamese interviewed in the South in 1971-72. In addition, what is being examined here is not the praise of Ho, but the terms in which it is expressed, and what they reveal about the Vietnamese view of leadership. It is striking that despite the collective adulation of Chairman Mao, there does not seem to be any similarly extensive collection of personal impressions of meeting Mao.

and intensity of his eyes, <sup>43</sup> the simplicity of his clothes, the combination of playful wit and stern authority, and invariably his immediate rapport or "closeness" (gan gui) with those around him. <sup>44</sup> In contrast to the increasing gravity and immobility of Mao's demeanor, <sup>45</sup> Ho's rapid and purposeful movements and physical agility were a frequently remarked feature of his bearing and one that was evidently particularly striking to Vietnamese accustomed to the cultivated measured pace of traditional Confucianized leaders. <sup>46</sup>

ABoth Vietnamese and foreigners were struck by Ho's piercing eyes. Descriptions of the light emanating from them are frequent in Vietnamese accounts of meeting Ho. OSS agent Charles Fenn described Ho's face (in their 1945 meeting) as "vigorous and his eyes bright and gleaming." Charles Fenn, Ho Chi Minh, A Biographical Introduction (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), p. 76. Sainteny describes Ho, also in 1945, in the following terms; "His most striking features were his eyes -- lively, alert and burning with extraordinary fervor; all of his energy seemed to be concentrated in those eyes." Jean Sainteny, Ho Chi Minh and His Vietnam (Chicago: Cowles Book Company, 1972), pp. 51-52. Several pictures in Sainteny's book photographically record the gleaming of Ho's eyes. A young girl from Hanoi relates that when she was small, she and her school friends used to comment on the "two pupils in each of Uncle's eyes" every time they looked at his picture. Chung ta co Bac Ho, Vol. II, p. 112.

<sup>44</sup>Nguyen Luong Bang records his impressions upon meeting Ho for the first time in Canton during the mid-1920's, "...Comrade Vuong [Ho] was very quick and alert, quick but still self-contained (tu ton), alert but yet calm (on ton). In behavior and speech he was gentle (diu dang) and intimate, which caused me to feel close to him right away." Bac Ho hoi ky, p. 59.

As well as that of Ngo Dinh Diem in the South, whose waddling gait and portly figure projected the image of the <u>quan tu</u>, the Confucian "superior man."

<sup>46</sup> Giap notes that at Ho's first major public appearance on Independence Day in 1945, "The Old Man moved at a brisk pace. This surprised quite a few people then because they did not see in the President the slow and elegant gait of 'noblemen'." Vo Nguyen Giap, <u>Unforgettable Months and Years</u>, p. 27.

Although Ho "spoke with a faint accent of someone from the country-side of Nghe An province," 47 his speeches were easily understood by all Vietnamese. Moreover his first public appearance on Independence Day in 1945 demonstrated a style and presence that forged a close bond between Ho and his audience. It is described by General Giap as follows:

It was not the eloquent voice people were used to hearing on solemn ceremonies. But people immediately sensed in it profound sentiments and a determined spirit. It was full of life, and each word, each sentence pierced everyone's heart. Halfway through reading the Declaration of Independence, Uncle stopped and suddenly asked:

"Can you hear what I'm saying?"
One million people answered in unison, their voices resounding like thunder: "Y....es!" From that moment,
Uncle and the sea of people became one.48

Communicating with his compatriots was a constant preoccupation of Ho, and he frequently used the rhetorical device of question and response to enlist the participation of his audience. Needless to say, to the Vietnamese it was a startling new approach for a leader of state to be concerned whether or not he was being understood by the public.

One story often repeated by Ho was of an indoctrination session in the Viet Bac Region during the Japanese occupation, in which one male and one female cadre delivered impassioned speeches. Ho, sitting off to the side, asked the person sitting next to him if he understood. The answer was no. The reason, said Ho, is that "these comrades talked too much, and used high flown words. The level of understanding of our people at that time was still low, and when words like 'subjective', 'objective',

<sup>47&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>

<sup>48&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

'active' and 'passive', etc., were used, they didn't understand."<sup>49</sup>
Another story frequently cited by Ho to underline this point was his encounter with students returning from an indoctrination class during the Resistance. The dialogue went as follows. "What did you study?" "Karl Marx." "Was it interesting?" "Very interesting!" "Did you understand?" The stammered response was, "Uncle, there were many things that were too hard to understand." Ho concludes, "This is not a realistic way to study."<sup>50</sup>

For the Vietnamese, the low key, avuncular and intimate image of No corresponded to the traditional model of the leader. Woodside concludes that in traditional Vietnam there was a "dual theory of sovereignty" in which the indigeneous image of the ruler co-existed with the Chinese model. The Vietnamese word for sovereign (vua) "had no equivalent

<sup>49</sup> Nhan Dan, March 14, 1967.

 $<sup>^{50}</sup>$ Ibid. An amusing and revealing story of Ho's gentle and patient pedagogic method is told by General Giap. Ho's driver in 1945 after the DRV government had been established in Hanoi rarely read newspapers. "Whenever he was free, Uncle called him upstairs, told him to sit in an adjacent room and gave him newspapers and books to read. Once in a while Uncle went in to check. Once when he came in, he saw the comrade driver slouched in the chair, fast asleep, and the newspaper spread on the table in front of him. Uncle quietly left. A while later, he told the driver: 'When you start reading for the first time, you usually find things difficult to understand and it's easy for you to fall asleep. If you keep on reading for a while, you'll understand and become interested. And once you're interested you won't feel sleepy'." This tale of gentle persuasion is reminiscent of the story of a 19th century Vietnamese emperor, leaving his chambers on a sleepless night to walk the palace grounds. Coming across a sleeping sentry, the emperor lightly shook him awake, and invited him into the palace for tea to restore his vigilance for the remainder of his watch. Alexander Woodside, "Vietnam Under the Nguyen," lecture at Cornell University, March 20, 1970.

<sup>51</sup> Woodside, <u>Vietnam</u> and the <u>Chinese Model</u>, p. 10.

in Chinese culture. Roughly it suggested a protector figure (like the Vietnamese kitchen god or <u>vua bep</u>) who was not or should not have been as aloof from his subjects as a Chinese-style emperor. Thus, the image of intimacy and simplicity projected by Ho is closely attuned to this legacy of traditional Vietnamese political culture.

Uncle's life is a life of simplicity, modesty, without affectation, and with an optimistic outlook. Uncle is simple in the way he dresses and lives, and in every aspect of his daily life; simple and unaffected but very rich in sentiment, 53 with a high intelligence. From the time he was a cook's assistant on an ocean vessel, a snow shoveller in a school, throughout the days of the Resistance living in a cave, sleeping in the jungle, to the times he became the Chairman of a country, at all times Uncle lived close to the people and the troops, ate two simple meals a day, wore clothes that were just sufficient to keep him warm, worked tirelessly, and after completing his work on army and state affairs, he would take his gardening tools out to the garden to water the vegetables. 54

<sup>52&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

<sup>53</sup>Although the scope of this research does not permit an adequate discussion of the importance of "sentiment" (tinh cam) in Vietnamese culture, it should be noted that it has a slightly different meaning than kan ch'ing in the Chinese context. Whereas the Vietnamese word is very close to the English meaning of "sentiment" and is a deeply rooted Vietnamese psycho-cultural response to intense emotional experiences, the Chinese kan ch'ing is frequently used to suggest a social mechanism of bridging the gap between strangers in an impersonal society, and defusing the potential dangers of interactions in a social void by personalizing relationships. Another aspect of kan ch'ing is that, "subordinates could appeal to the 'emotions' (kan ch'ing) of those on whom they depended for moderation in treatment. This notion of kan chiing reflects the degree to which the relationship between superior and subordinate was personalized and diffuse in content, not mediated by legal norms or considerations of some specified technical function, as tends to be the case in industrial societies." Richard Solomon, Mao's Revolution, p. 121. Creating kan chiing is a particularly prominent aspect of business relations among overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. (I am indebted to Cliff Barton for his insights on this last point.)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup>Ha Huy Giap, <u>Dao ly lam nguoi cua Ho Chu Tich</u>, p. 19.

Ho is pictured as representing "the entire people in one person," $^{55}$  and not simply the proletarian elements within the nation.

The broad masses of the Vietnamese, young, old, men and women, all love and respect Chairman Ho. The intellectuals, the national bourgeoisie, all grades of notables and teachers have great confidence in Him (tin tuong noi Nguoi). He is the close friend and comrade of the venerable Huynh [Huynh Thuc Khang], the Uncle Ho of the nieces and nephews who are teachers. The compatriots in the South, the section of the nation that is the richest in sentiment, call Chairman Ho the "Old Father" (Cha Gia), which is a phrase that reveals respect from the bottom of their hearts. The highland brothers in Southern Central Vietnam feel very close to Chairman Ho, and it seems like Chairman Ho is always at their side, helping out day and night. 56

Ho is thus a "reconciliation figure," in the sense that in his person he integrates the various segments of Vietnamese society, and binds them together by his presence. At the stage of the revolution which Ho guided, this integrative function was the key to unity and success, and continued to be relevant after 1954 because of the unresolved situation in the South. 57 Another aspect of Ho's leadership image that reinforces his integrative role is his bachelor state. He is pictured as having only one family, the nation as a whole, and the absence of ties to relatives puts him in a position to practice one of his most frequent admonitions,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup>Thong Nhat, May 19, 1960.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup>Ha Huy Giap, Dao ly lam nguoi cua Ho Chu Tich, p. 33.

Far from appealing for a class struggle to win victory in the South, Ho at least once went so far as to employ the traditional Confucian categories, urging "scholars, peasants, artisans and merchants" to unite in overthrowing the U.S.-Diem rule. Nhan Dan, August 29, 1963.

"impartial assignment of tasks" (chi cong vo tu). 58

In contrast to the image of Mao as an innovator in Marxist-Leninist theory, and an omniscient observer of the world scene, holding forth with foreign visitors in a spacious study jammed with books, Ho lived in a small wooden house, built on stilts in the style of the minority groups in the Viet Bac, on the grounds of the former Residence Superieure.

Within this small house, which is also his office, 59 "there is only one small cabinet containing documents, and a small bookcase with four shelves containing all kinds of books on basic theory in five languages: in addition to Vietnamese, there is Russian, Chinese, English and

 $<sup>^{58}</sup>$ The intrusion of Mao's marital life as well as personal emotions into state affairs provides a contrast with Ho's ascetic and impartial image. An important example of this trait was Ho's selection of Le Duan to replace Truong Chinh as Party Secretary General. The designation of Le Duan as his successor was not explicitly made until Le Duan's appointment as Party First Secretary in 1960, but was already apparent as early as 1957 when Ho selected him to go to the Moscow gathering of Communist Parties. Le Duan who had spent his entire pre-1954 revolutionary career in Central and South Vietnam was chosen rather than Pham Van Dong, who had the longest and closest personal association with Ho, or Vo Nguyen Giap, or any of the leaders that had been in close proximity to Ho prior to 1954. Le Duan, although senior to both Dong and Giap in length of service in the Central Committee, had evidently not worked directly with Ho prior to 1954. His appointment underlined the new emphasis on the South, but nevertheless illustrates the point that Ho set an example in picking the most appropriate candidate, regardless of past personal ties.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup>The architect of Ho's two room house (one for office work and one for living quarters) recalls that prior to that time Ho had selected a small building formerly housing the resident electrician of the French High Commissioner's Office for his office and living quarters, rather than the many large and elegant rooms in the main building. Chung ta co Bac Ho, Vol. II, pp. 78-79. Ho's modest quarters are pictured on the back cover of Vietnam Pictorial, No. 166, 1972.

French."<sup>60</sup> According to one account, Ho keeps very few books because although he "reads very much and very widely, whenever he discovers something that is of use for the mission of one branch or another, Uncle underlines it, and sends it to the comrade in charge of that branch for reference and application."<sup>61</sup>

Both leaders avidly followed foreign developments. In 1959, at the very time that Mao was eliminating Chinese dependence on Soviet tute-lage, he remarked that, "Very often there are times when I don't like myself. I have not mastered all the various domains of Marxist learning. And, for example, I don't know foreign languages well either." More than a decade later, in the wake of the Lin Piao affair, Mao told provincial leaders that they should study the works of Marx and Lenin to supplement the heavy Cultural Revolution diet of Mao's works. "I myself become a student every day. I read two volumes of Reference Material daily, and that's why I know a little about foreign affairs." For the Vietnamese, as in the case of the Eastern Europeans, cosmopolitanism was

<sup>60</sup> Hoang Tuan Nha, "Mot ngay cua Bac Ho" (A Day in Uncle Ho's Life), Nhan Dan, May 19, 1957. Edgar Snow compared the "comforts of Mao's living quarters and study to "those enjoyed in a good ranch bungalow by a successful Long Island insurance salesman." Red China Today, p. 174. Snow also remarks on Mao's knowledge of Western classics, read in Chinese translations. Ibid., p. 177.

Chung ta co Bac Ho, Vol. II, p. 80.

<sup>62</sup> Schram, Chairman Mao Talks to the People, p. 154.

Ibid., p. 298. This refers to the publication <u>Ts'an-k'ao hsiao-hsi</u>, "A daily bulletin circulated to a fairly wide audience of cadres, containing translations from foreign news services." <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 352.

necessary for survival. The best policy was to know as much as possible about the potentially threatening world outside, while letting the powerful foreign states know as little as possible about the internal problems of Vietnam. Ho's linguistic abilities and his capacity for dealing with foreigners on their own terms were widely admired traits among his countrymen.

Painfully aware of Vietnam's small size and modest international stature, Ho combined a strong nationalism with his great cosmopolitanism which reflected itself both in curiosity about other cultures and other ways, and in his unconcern with developing a body of independent theoretical writings. The development of Mao's thought from a "practical"

 $<sup>^{64}\</sup>mathrm{Ho's}$  language skills are noted in several of the impressions in the Chung ta co Bac Ho collection. In 1956 he visited a worksite with Chinese advisors and French laborers (defectors who had remained after 1954). After correcting the interpreter's mistakes in both Chinese and French, Ho won the "enthusiastic admiration" of both the foreigners and the Vietnamese by his high fluency in these languages. Chung ta co Bac Ho, Vol. II, p. 125. A young girl who interpreted for Ho's meeting with a "friendly country" delegation (probably Chinese) recalled her conviction that since Ho was a "leader, and a great thinker (nha tu tuong lon)" his speaking style would certainly be "erudite and completely different from the ordinary way of speaking." She discovered to her consternation that Ho used ordinary phrases she could not translate. Ho translated himself, and impressed his audience with clever word plays. Ibid., pp. 112-114. Another instance concerned the visit of the East German Minister of Education, who was introduced as the Minister of Culture. Ho corrected the mistake, "Everyone was tickled to death and roared with laughter, not suspecting that Ho was so good in German." Ibid., p. 208. Ho was fluent in French, Chinese, Russian, English (see his letter to the OSS in Fenn, Ho Chi Minh, p. 80), and Thai, and knew some Italian and German.

<sup>65</sup>The different levels of cosmopolitanism of the two leaders can be gauged by contrasting Ho's early decision to go to France and other countries "to see how they do things" and then to "return and help our compatriots," with Mao's statement that "he never considered going to France himself, since he did not know enough about his own country." Schram, Mao Tse-tung, p. 51. Their respective decisions certainly do not imply a superiority in patriotic zeal on Mao's part, but merely reaffirm that the basic Chinese problem was primarily internal, while the source of Vietnam's woes was largely external.

application" of Marxism-Leninism to an actual development of MarxistLeninist theory are clearly related to the Sino-Soviet dispute and Mao's refusal to acknowledge Soviet ideological hegemony over the MarxistLeninist tradition. 66 Mao's thought also serves an internal integrative function in China. As one foreign observer concludes, the stylized communications of China are in the form of Mao Tse-tung thought, because they "have to be given in a dramatized form if it is to reach 800,000,000 people. Given the size (and the divisions of this far flung nation), myth is a necessary tool for government." 67

The PRC's canonization of Mao Tse-tung Thought is the product of large and complex integrative problems, which require a simple, uniform body of doctrine to guide lower level leaders in solving the countless variations of the fundamental problems identified by Mao. <sup>68</sup> But stylization and magnification of the image can produce only a distant and remote colossus, and it was probably inevitable that during and after the Great Leap Mao became a cult figure, "like the sun giving light wherever it

<sup>66</sup> Stuart Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, pp. 117-125.

Ross Terrill, 800,000,000, The Real China (New York: Delta, 1972), p. 64.

As the apotheosis of Mao's thought progressed, it became increasingly disembodied from its original context and given an abstract and universal force of its own. Thus during and after the Cultural Revolution, citations were rarely given for selected quotes from Mao, as though they had a potency entirely independent of the circumstances in which they were originally formulated. In the case of Ho, exhortative remarks urging unity, perseverance and the like were treated similarly, but when the remarks had a specific relevance to a situational context, the source was usually cited. Ho's writings were also widely disseminated in the DRV. By the early 1960's, 37 of Ho's works had been printed in 700,000 copies, totaling over 95 million pages. Nhan Dan, May 15, 1962.

shines."<sup>69</sup> Ho's light was an inner force of personality that was projected in a closely focused image, such as that of the charismatic gleam in the eyes. Like Mao, Ho wanted to "have a little air of mystery about him," as he told Bernard Fall<sup>70</sup> in an interview. But while Mao's "mystery" was cultivated by rationing personal contacts with his people, while at the same time disseminating full details of his life and thought, Ho's "mystery" lay in the contrast between his public accessibility and the almost complete absence of a private or personal dimension to his life. This paradox presented an image of the totally impartial leader, which characterized not only his public persona but his relations with his colleagues as well.

### Leaders and Comrades

The contrasting images of Ho and Mao among their countrymen at large are relevant to the question of the relationships with their closest colleagues. A cult of personality, for example, would be likely to extend from the public image to the political contacts of the leader with his subordinates. The intimate, low key, reconciliation figure would logically be more accessible to the ideas and criticisms of his subordinates. In the case of Ho and Mao, however, the leader-follower relationships are not that simple. Mao's own writings reveal that he was frequently, and

<sup>69</sup> Edward E. Rice, Mao's Way (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), p. 164.

<sup>70</sup> Bernard B. Fall, Ho Chi Minh On Revolution, p. 321.

often sharply, challenged by his subordinates. While much of this may be ex-post facto rancor surfacing in materials published during the Cultural Revolution, there is little doubt that Mao had a spirited, often antagonistic, political dialogue with his subordinates. No comparable body of documentation exists to clarify the relationships between Ho and his colleagues. What little information is available suggests that although Ho took a close and direct hand in policy deliberations, he did not have a personal ideology to impose on the DRV leadership, but rather tried to draw out the best ideas and analyses from his subordinates, as the Vietnamese proverb says, "using people like a carpenter uses wood."71

Mao's often troubled relations with his subordinates were due to a combination of factors. His ascension to the position of leading the Chinese revolution was the result of a bitter struggle with opponents who by age, revolutionary experience, or connections with the international communist movement had equal claims to the leadership role. During the course of China's revolution, therefore, Mao had been compelled to make acceptance of his ideas and programs the test of willingness to accept his leadership, setting a precedent for the later period of testing that led to the Cultural Revolution. To In addition, in the post-Liberation

 $<sup>^{71}</sup>$ As noted below, Ho frequently took the lead in defining the priorities of the Vietnamese political agenda, but let his colleagues work out the details with his assistance and close supervision.

<sup>72</sup>The dual nature of charismatic authority and the importance of the followers' view of the leader is cogently presented in the following summary of Max Weber's theory of charisma as "a relationship, a process of interaction. The results of the leaders' action induce the follower's belief and the followers' belief becomes the criterion of charismatic authority." Dankwart A. Rustow, ed., Philosophers and Kings: Studies in Leadership (New York: George Braziller, 1970), p. 16.

period, the scope of government was so large that a gap between policy and implementation inevitably arose, and Mao became increasingly frustrated in trying to simultaneously set out general policy guidelines and ensure that they were carried out.

Whether or not this frustration caused Mao to claim an increasingly dominant role in the details of the policy making process, it is clear that his dissatisfaction with some of his colleagues escalated as policy problems became more complex and intractable. At the 1959 Lushan Plenum, when Mao gave up his position as State Chairman, he said,

I ought not to make excuses, but I shall too, because I am not the head of the Planning Commission. Before August of last year my main energies were concentrated on revolution. I am a complete outsider when it comes to economic construction, and I understand nothing about industrial planning. At the West Tower [in Chung-nan-hai, the compound housing the PRC leadership in Peking] I said: "Don't write about [my] wise leadership, I do not control a thing so how can you talk about wisdom?" [Emphasis added]. But comrades, in 1958 and 1959 the main responsibility was mine and you should take me to task. In the past the responsibility was other people's — En-lai, xx — but now you should blame me because there are heaps of things I didn't attend to. 73

While Mao was announcing his withdrawal to the "second line" of leader—ship, therefore, his intention was not to free himself from specific policy problems and concentrate solely on larger theoretical matters ("making revolution") but to look into the complexities of economic problems so that he could regain the leadership initiative and control that had been dispersed among his subordinates. Some of Mao's subordinates resented

<sup>73</sup> Schram, Chairman Mao Talks to the People, p. 143.

this, and some felt the problem was too much interference by Mao rather than too little control. At the same Lushan Plenum, Minister of Defense P'eng Te-huai attacked Mao's policies and, by implication, his stature as a leader. In a conversation at Lushan, Chang Wen-tien<sup>74</sup> told P'eng that, "Comrade Mao Tse-tung was very brilliant and also very strong handed at rectifying people (probably he meant anti-dogmatism) like Stalin in his late years." P'eng agreed with this observation and replied that, "Comrade Mao Tse-tung was more familiar with Chinese history than any other comrade in the Party, and that the first emperor of any dynasty in the past was always strong-handed and brilliant."

It is difficult to separate the magnified image of Mao from the inner Party disputes which used the debate on collective leadership and the cult of the individual to advance policy positions. During the Cultural Revolution, for example, Lin Piao was accused of having used an inflated image of Mao's "genius" to advance his own position and policies. 77 References

 $<sup>^{74}</sup>$ A leader of the "28 bolsheviks" and ambassador to Moscow, 1950-1954.

<sup>75</sup> Union Research Institute, <u>The Case of P'eng Te-huai</u> (Hongkong: URI, 1968), p. 36.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

An example of the rhetoric, presumably inspired by Lin Piao, is the following PLA encomium to Mao. "They pointed out that Chairman Mao is the great teacher of the Chinese people and all the revolutionary people in the world, the most outstanding leader of the proletariat in our era, the greatest genius of our time and the red sun in our hearts, and that the brilliant thought of Mao Tse-tung has not only opened up the only correct road for the Chinese people to win nation-wide victory, but it has also lighted up the road toward true emancipation for the world's proletariat and the oppressed people of the world. They pledged infinite love for, faith in, loyalty to and esteem for Chairman Mao and his thought. They said that they would always uphold Mao Tse-tung's thought as the absolute authority and would give their lives to defend it." Ibid., p. 146.

to Mao's thought were deleted from the revised Party Constitution of 1956. P'eng Te-huai became the surrogate target for the protests against efforts to oppose the propagation of an imperial image of the Party leader. P'eng is alleged to have objected that,

"By saying that the east is red and that Mao Tse-tung is the great savior of the people, we promote nothing but idealism.", He also opposed chanting, "Long live Chairman Mao!" He opposed large sculptures of Chairman Mao saying, "We shall remove them as Stalin's were removed."

Chairman Mao's words belong to the highest level, enjoy the highest prestige and possess the greatest might. Every word is truth and every sentence spoken by him is worth ten thousand sentences spoken by any other man. Yet P'eng said, "Not every sentence spoken by Chairman Mao is useful. Chairman Mao isn't a god!" He also said, "Those who write history should not believe in the cult of the individual. We shouldn't attribute everything to Chairman Mao."78

The question of Mac's image as leader of the Chinese people is analytically distinct from the question of his relation to his close colleagues. But, as the case of P'eng Te-huai shows, the two aspects of Mao's leadership are closely linked.

Mao's personal leadership position and his relations with his subordinates had another aspect, however. Because he regarded inner Party conflict as an inevitable and even normal occurrence, Mao does not appear to be particularly disturbed about the loss of organizational unity entailed in tolerating this situation. In late 1958 Mao told his colleagues

<sup>78</sup> The Case of P'eng Te-huai, p. 155.

<sup>79</sup> In May 1958 Mao told the Eighth Party Congress that, "We are not afraid of splits, as they are natural phenomena... The splits of Ch'en Tuhsiu, Lo Cheng-lung, Cheng Kuo-t'ao and Kao Kang were helpful to us. The two Wang Ming lines and the three 'leftist' lines during the civil war period taught our party a lesson. All these opposities [sic] had their benefits. Naturally it is not necessary to create Ch'en Tuhsiu, Kao Kang, etc., artificially. They will emerge when the climate is favorable. There is nothing to fear. We will overcome them." Miscellany, p. 114.

on the Central Committee "partial splits occur everyday. There will always be splits and destruction. The absence of splits is detrimental to development." Thus he expected opposition, and even encouraged it on the grounds that the best way to deal with opposition was to bring it into the open. Mao recalled that Teng Tzu-hui, head of the rural work department, used to argue with him in Central Committee meetings, and there was of course the example of P'eng Te-huai.

Arguing with Mao, however, was a hazardous undertaking, as the debaters discovered in the Socialist Education campaign and the Cultural Revolution. 83 As Mao began to confront his opposition in the Socialist Education Movement he saw "the first great struggle since land reform" taking form and noted that, "This time it is from within the Party to the outside." Finally, on the eve of the Cultural Revolution in late 1964, he flatly stated, "There are at least two factions in our party:

<sup>80 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 146. Mao revealed that, "Since last year splits occurred within the leadership group in half the provinces of the nation." <u>Ibid.</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>81</sup>In listing all those leading Party figures who had opposed him (13 names in all), Mao distinguished between those who opposed him openly, like Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and those who were secretive, like Kao Kang, adding that, "Those who are secretive will come to no good end." In this context, Mao said that, "Cliques and factions of whatever description should be strictly excluded." Schram, Chairman Mao Talks to the People, p. 267.

<sup>82&</sup>lt;sub>Miscellany, p. 387.</sub>

Teng Tzu-hui's Rural Work Department was dissolved, for example, and P'eng Te-huai removed from his post as Defense Minister.

<sup>84</sup> Miscellany, p. 314.

one is the socialist faction, and the other is the capitalist faction." $^{85}$ 

Although Mao's suspicions about the reliability of his probable successors were not completely confirmed until the Cultural Revolution, it is evident that he started preparing for the political succession some time earlier. Mao raised the issue of retiring from his post as State Chairman and withdrawing to the "second line" of leadership in February 1958, and formally proposed this step at the end of the year. <sup>86</sup> "Rather than chaos after death," Mao is reported to have said, "it is better to have chaos now while the person [e.g., Mao] is still here... Actually, I am only serving as half a chairman, without charge of daily affairs." It is not clear whether political pressures resulting from the setbacks in the Great Leap influenced the timing of this decision, though the fact that Mao had proposed the move prior to the Leap, and had not yet been directly criticized for its failure suggests that the decision was his own. <sup>88</sup>

<sup>85&</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 427. In the same speech, however, Mac offered the view that, "One must not consider that his own opinion is right when he gains power... Why then should there be meetings? Because opinions are divided. If they are unanimous, why should they meet?" Ibid., p. 428.

Richard H. Solomon, <u>Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political</u>
<u>Culture</u>, p. 374.

<sup>87</sup> Miscellany, p. 136.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>88</sup>This conclusion is reinforced by Mao's informal comments on the resignation. "The official report will be published three days later, so that the lower levels will not find it a total surprise. Things are really odd in the world! One can go up but not come down. I expect that part of the people will agree and another part disagree. People do not understand, saying that while everyone is so full of energy in doing things, I am withdrawing from the front lines. This is not true. I am not withdrawing. I want to surpass the U.S. before I go to see Marx!" Ibid., p. 148.

In addition to his desire to test his political successors' capacity for leadership, Mao's "withdrawal" to the second line of leadership was probably influenced by a feeling of personal frustration arising from his difficulties in charting a successful course of action and getting it implemented. The difficulties resulted both from the size and unwieldiness of the political structures of leadership and in the reluctance of some of his colleagues to carry out his programs. Prior to the Great Leap, Mao spoke of opposition to his policies, such as "boldly advancing" in the "socialist upsurge" that led to the rapid completion of cooperativization in 1955-56 and revealed that his method of combating recalcitrance was "passive resistance" and also "criticism at small meetings" to get directly at the obstructionists. 89 At the time he thought his target was the sluggish state bureaucracy and specified that, "My attack is directed chiefly at cadres at the ministerial level and above in the central government and is not levelled at everyone." It was the bureaucrats who "set up blockades," abetted by the fact that "the majority in the Political Bureau are red but not expert."91

By the end of the Socialist Education campaign, Mao had come to a quite different conclusion about his colleagues. He acknowledged that he bore "some responsibility" for their shortcomings because,

<sup>89</sup> Miscellany, p. 80.

<sup>90&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>

<sup>91</sup> <u>Ibid</u>

First, it was I who proposed that the Standing Committee [of the Politburo] be divided into two lines and that a secretariat be set up. Everyone agreed with this. Moreover, I put too much trust in others. It was at the time of the Twenty-three Articles [January 1965] that my vigilance was aroused. I could do nothing in Peking. I could do nothing at the Centre. 92

Mao's "passive resistance" was unable to evoke the response he desired from his subordinates, and he concluded that the Party bureaucracy run by his colleagues was also immobilized by "departmentalism" and vested interests. 93

The very size of the leadership group made such "departmentalism" inevitable. The Politburo, already divided into a Standing Committee and a larger group, was further divided into a "first" and "second" line. Mao himself alluded to a rather special situation resulting from the large size of the leadership by complaining that although Party Secretary-General Teng Hsiao-p'ing was "deaf," "at meetings he would sit far away from me... Teng Hsiao-p'ing shows me respect but prefers to remain at a distance from me." Moreover, Mao accused Teng of not consulting with him on anything since 1959. To the warning of a colleague (T'ao Chu, who himself became

<sup>92</sup> Schram, Chairman Mao Talks to the People, p. 270.

<sup>93&</sup>quot;In 1962 they were unable to speak of classes and class struggle... how unsteady would each department be!" Miscellany, p. 345.

Mao Tse-tung Speech to the Central Committee Political Work Report Meeting, October 24, 1966, in <u>JPRS</u>, "Selections From Chairman Mao," <u>Translations on Communist China</u>, No. 90, February 12, 1970, pp. 12, 13.

<sup>95&</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 10. The original says 1949, but Schram's note to his abridged version of this important speech concludes that this may be a copyist's error. Chairman Mao Talks to the People, p. 342. The Schram text has T'ao Chu telling Mao that "supreme power (ta ch'uan) has slipped from your hands." Ibid., p. 266.

a victim of the Cultural Revolution shortly thereafter) that he had "let power fall into the hands of subordinates," Mao replied that "I deliberately let it fall that way. However they have now set up independent kingdoms. There were many things they did not consult me about."

At the nadir of his personal political fortunes, the Lushan Plenum of July 1959 which assessed the failures of the Great Leap, Mao did not acknowledge that his policy had been wrong, but said, "Now I should be attacked because I have not exercised supervision over many things." More in sorrow than in anger, Mao acknowledged the failures of his subordinates to meet the standards he had set. "I wanted to establish their prestige before I died," he said, "I never imagined that things might move in the opposite direction." 98

Even though the failure was ascribed to his subordinates, Mao admitted that he himself had not clearly perceived the remedy to his dissatisfactions even as late as 1963 and, indeed was only beginning to formulate the problem; "how should class struggle be led." Having withdrawn to the "second line" to take a deeper look at China's problems, Mao began the move toward the Cultural Revolution. At a May 1963 speech in Hangchow

<sup>96&</sup>quot;Selections From Chairman Mao," <u>Translations on Communist China</u>, No. 90, p. 10.

Solomon, Mao's Revolution, p. 395. This is translated by Schram in a passage cited above as "you should blame me." (cf. Chairman Mao Talks to the People, p. 26).

<sup>98</sup> Schram, <u>ibid</u>., p. 266.

<sup>99</sup> Miscellany, p. 319.

he said, "Only now do I understand a little, and that is that there is a two road struggle between planning and production and management."  $^{100}$ 

As a result of the perceived shortcomings of most of his closest associates, Mao felt compelled to step back to the "first line" and take a direct role in all aspects of decision making. 101 By so doing he, in effect, admitted his failure in transmitting his political heritage to his chosen successors, Liu Shao-ch'i and later Lin Piao. In traditional terms, the function of the supreme leader was to preside over a system that would effectively utilize the talents of gifted subordinates, and the art of the leader lay in deploying these talents to maximum advantage. Mao's refusal to stay on the second line was clearly the result of his belated conclusion that the current leadership system was not pursuing correct policies, but it was also due to his own activitist impulses, and discomfort at being cast in an increasingly ceremonial role. "It's not so bad that I am not allowed to complete my work," he complained, "but I don't like being treated as a dead ancestor."

While the post-Liberation course of China's revolution pushed Mao to take an increasingly activist role in decision making, and his emphasis on

<sup>100 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>. When K'ang Sheng tried to put the blame on Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing for the fact that the 1956 Eighth Congress political report "contains the theory of the disappearance of classes," Mao replied, "I read the report, and it was passed by the congress; we cannot make these two Liu and Teng solely responsible." Schram, <u>Chairman Mao Talks to the People</u>, p. 269.

At a speech to the Ninth Central Committee Plenum in 1961, Mao said that, "Even correct policy is no help if the circumstances are not understood." Miscellany, p. 242. In his view the problem was not to get people to do the right thing, but to do so for the right reason.

<sup>102</sup> Schram, Chairman Mao Talks to the People, pp. 266-67.

class struggle and "one dividing into two" split the CCP leadership, the parallel course of events in North Vietnam was moving in a quite different direction. The tensions within the leadership resulting from the errors in the land reform led to the demotion of Party Secretary General Truong Chinh and several other leading figures. When the temporary crisis was resolved, however, they soon re-emerged in leading roles. 103

Ho took the position of Party General Secretary after Truong Chinh's self-criticism and resignation at the October 1956 10th Plenum until Le Duan was formally confirmed in that post in 1960. There does not appear to have been a sharp demarcation between "first" and "second" lines of leadership in Vietnam. As Party Chairman, Ho - like Mao - was the statutory leader of the Party. His decision to assume the position of Party Secretary General in the 1956-59 period probably did not significantly alter his special role in the DRV political system, since the leadership group was quite small, and Ho had always taken a close interest in both

Truong Chinh was demoted from the position of Secretary General but remained a member of the Politburo and Secretariat (Nhan Dan, October 30, 1956.) He became the third ranking figure in the Politburo, and the head of the National Assembly Standing Committee in 1960. Le Van Luong was demoted from the Politburo, the Secretariat, and as head of the Central Committee's Organization Department, to become an alternate member of the Central Committee. Ibid. By May 1960 he had become the "chef de cabinet" or head of the Central Committee Office (Chanh Van Phong Trung Uong Dang). Nhan Dan, May 27, 1960. At the Third Party Congress in September 1960 he was re-appointed to the Secretariat. Hoang Quoc Viet, who was dropped without formal announcement from the Politburo in October 1956 remained a Central Committee member and head of the Vietnamese Confederation of Trade Unions, but despite his prominence in the early years of the revolutionary movement and close association with Ho, he was not restored to a high Party position in 1960.

policy and operational matters.

In view of Ho's deep involvement in the details of government, the contrast in the apparently uneventful political resolution of the problems caused by the land reform errors, and the internal conflicts and criticisms of Mao's leadership that the Great Leap precipitated within the CCP leadership, is striking. Although Mao acknowledged that the Great Leap was done on his initiative, he blamed himself not for policy misjudgments but for failure to closely "supervise." The land reform errors in Vietnam were attributed both to faulty execution of Central Committee policy and to the errors of specific leaders directly responsible for the land reform. Truong Chinh accepted the blame, and there was no suggestion of error on the part of Ho. The rectification of errors was accompanied by a leadership reorganization that, in addition to appointing Ho as Party Secretary General, decided to "add to the ranks of the Politburo and reorganize the Secretariat of the Central Committee."

The factors underlying the difference between Mao's often tense relalationship with his principal subordinates and the harmonious relationship between Ho and his colleagues are products of the different patterns of revolution. In Vietnam the external enemy and independence struggle forged

<sup>104</sup>At the 1959 Lushan Plenum Mao said that the Peitaiho Resolution which launched the Great Leap "was drafted according to my suggestion." Stuart Schram, Chairman Mao Talks to the People, p. 145.

<sup>105</sup> Nhan Dan, October 30, 1956.

<sup>106 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>.

a unity that was strengthened by the venerability of its leader and his links with the past that helped legitimize his authority, while in China the internal focus of the social revolution and its rejection of the past resulted in internal discord and conflict at key stages of the revolution, and a lack of complete consensus on the role of Mao as the principal leader. 107 Ho's relationship with his closest aides began in the mid-1920's in Canton where he recruited,

his first students from among the Vietnamese who were staying there; the basic content of his training program was the way to national salvation; the mission he gave to the first class of cadres was the national salvation mission. It was precisely thanks to the incredibly powerful force of the transmitted tradition (truyen thong) of patriotism and on the basis of that tradition that the working class and the Vietnamese people were able to overcome the shortcomings caused by a backward agricultural economy and take to Marxism-Leninism. 108

From among the 400 students trained by Ho in Canton came many of the leading figures of the Vietnamese revolutionary movement. The principal leaders of the DRV after 1954 were not, however, members of a personal clique formed in this early period. Truong Chinh and Vo Nguyen Giap, for example, did not meet Ho until 1940, and some post-1954 Politburo members probably did not meet Ho until the August 1945 Revolution. 109

Moreover, in China the pre-Liberation revolutionary experience became a divisive issue during the Cultural Revolution. Suspicions were directed at those leaders doing underground work under Liu Shao-ch'i particularly those who were jailed by the KMT. Ho mentioned with pride the fact that 31 members of the Second Central Committee had spent a cumulative total of 222 years in jail. Nhan Dan, January 7, 1960.

Le Si Thang, "Ho Chu Tich va su nghiep truyen ba chu nghia Mac Le-nin vao Vietnam," (Chairman Ho and the Propagation of Marxism-Leninism in Vietnam) Nghien Cuu Lich Su, No. 145, July and August 1972, p. 57.

<sup>109</sup>Cf. biographical data on DRV leaders in Appendix.

The very high attrition rate of the top ICP leaders in the 1930's, themselves Ho's pupils, further stretched the generation gap to the point that upon Ho's return to Vietnam in 1941 at the age of 50, his principal subordinates meeting him for the first time had to debate between calling him "venerable" and "uncle." In turn Ho called his closest comrades by kinship terms which indicated a distance of a full generation. The intricate web of social relationships reflected in the personal pronouns required by the structure of the Vietnamese language could be untangled by the expedient of using the impersonal "comrade" (dong chi). This formal and explicitly political term only supplemented the use of kinship terminology, it did not replace it. As a result, the generational and political seniority of Ho over his closest colleagues was reinforced daily by the use of the language of social hierarchy.

Upon his return to Vietnam in 1941, Ho took personal command of the anti-Japanese struggle, but delegated extensive responsibilities to sub-ordinates working in distant and hazardous areas, where communication was

<sup>110</sup> Ho always addressed young audiences as "cac co" (you young ladies) and "cac chu" (you young gentlemen). "Chu" literally means father's younger brother, but can also be reversed to mean "younger person," indicating a subordinate relationship. Ho frequently called his colleagues "chu". An example is cited in Chung ta co Bac Ho, p. 137, when after making a point to some state farm workers, Ho turned to Pham Van Dong and Truong Chinh and said, "You young fellows remember to take note of that." ("Cac chu nho ghi lai viec nay").

<sup>111</sup> Unlike Chinese, which has an impersonal "I" and "you," the Vietnamese language requires the speaker to define his relationship with his interlocutor in every sentence with a paired set of personal pronouns which specify the relationship: "uncle" says to "nephew," "younger brother" tells "older sister," etc.

problematic. By the time of the August Revolution in 1945, much of the top ICP leadership was in prison. After the DRV was proclaimed on September 2, 1945, therefore, none of the ICP leaders had extensive experience in governing and administering a country. The memoirs of General Giap and others make it clear that the basic social and economic programs, as well as the political strategy in this unsettled period were personally formulated by Ho from the initial cabinet meeting in which Ho "took from his pocket a small piece of paper on which he had jotted down his ideas" and, "Casting aside the usual formalities, he immediately dealt with the substance of the meeting." As Giap remarked, in those early days the "cadre's ranks were still thin and besides they were inexperienced in administrative matters. In many instances, it was Uncle himself who thought of the problems or solutions, typed up the document, put it in an envelope and sent it off himself." 113

The prolonged nine year Resistance solidified the leadership group that had formed around Ho in the Japanese occupation. Pham Van Dong who, apart from Hoang Van Hoan, was the post post-1960 Politburo member who had been with Ho in the 1920's in Canton, was appointed Vice-Premier in 1949 to assist Ho in governmental tasks and became Premier in 1954. However, Pham Van Dong was not elected as an alternate member of the Central Committee until 1947 and did not become a full member until 1949. He was elected to

 $<sup>^{112}</sup>$ Vo Nguyen Giap, <u>Unforgettable Months and Years</u>, p. 32.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>113</sup>Ibid., p. 35.

the Politburo at the Second Congress in 1951. 114 Truong Chinh had been Party Secretary General since 1941, while Le Duan had been a member of the Standing Bureau of the Central Committee -- in effect the Politburo of the time -- since 1939. General Giap did not become a Central Committee member until 1945, and joined the Politburo in 1951. The post-1954 DRV leadership structure was basically formed by the time of the 1951 Second Party Congress although the key figures were geographically separated. The main center was with Ho in the Viet Bac, assisted by Pham Van Dong, Truong Chinh and Giap. Le Duan and Le Duc Tho were in the South and Nguyen Duy Trinh became the leading figure in Central Vietnam in 1950, replacing his predecessor Nguyen Chi Thanh. Ho's leadership position during this period is indicated by a caption to one of the famous photographs of the Resistance, showing Ho, Dong, Chinh and Giap standing over a map table planning strategy in preparation for Dien Bien Phu. 116 The picture shows Ho and Giap pointing to possible moves, while Dong and Chinh watch attentively. The photographs and descriptions of the leadership

<sup>114 &</sup>lt;u>Vietnam Advances</u>, No. 8, 1962, p. 10.

<sup>115</sup> Vietnam Advances, No. 9, 1962, p. 9.

<sup>116</sup> The caption reads, "Meeting of the Politburo, directed by Chairman Ho, discussing the tactical concept of the 1953-54 Winter-Spring Campaign, and deciding to step up the mission of preparing to mobilize new forces to open the Dien Bien Phu campaign." Ho Chi Minh, Vi Doc Lap, Tu Do, Vi Chu Nghia Xa Hoi (For Independence and Freedom, and For Socialism) (Hanoi: Su That, 1970), facing page 97. Another photograph of the same meeting shows Dong, Ho, Chinh and Giap seated. Giap is pointing out the proposed move, while Ho listens attentively. The picture caption refers to Ho "chairing" a Politburo meeting. Chu Tich Ho Chi Minh, facing page 81.

group in this period illustrate its small size and intimacy, a situation which probably facilitated full and unlimited discussion of both general policies and specific details. 117

For a revolutionary movement in which military struggle played a leading role, the prominent military leaders of the Resistance were surprisingly underrepresented in the top echelon of the Party. The only military officers on the Politburo were General Giap and Nguyen Chi Thanh. After 1960 Thanh moved into the field of agriculture, leaving Giap as the only full member of the Politburo with a military identification. How the Mao increasingly turned toward the military as a counter-weight to the Party civilian bureaucracy which frustrated him, Ho resolutely kept the military out of politics. It may be surmised that no other DRV institution outside the Party offered a sufficiently large and complex political base to introduce pressures from bureaucratic interest groups into Politburo deliberations. Ho's political dialogue with his colleagues must, therefore, have rested largely on personal relationships, based on Ho's estimate of his subordinates' abilities and their acceptance of the leadership role which Ho assumed. Ho

<sup>117</sup> The picture of Ho delivering the political report at the 1951 Second Congress shows him surrounded on the dais by only 12 persons.

<u>Ibid.</u>, facing page 96, and - as noted earlier - the entire Central Committee had only 19 full members and 10 alternates.

 $<sup>^{118}</sup>$ Thanh was the head of the VPA's Political Department from 1950 to 1960.

<sup>119</sup> The subtle interplay between Ho's authority and unquestioned leadership and the initiative of his subordinates is revealed in Giap's recollection of informing Ho of the arrangements to install him as head of the government. "With some pleasure mixed with amusement, he said as though to ask us again: 'I'll be the President [chu tich]'?" <u>Unforgettable Months and Years</u>, p. 17.

Ho's contacts with his subordinates were frequent and regular. In 1945-46, "His morning working session began with a consultation with the Standing Committee. Uncle attached great importance to the collective system of work. He had told the comrades in the Standing Committee to come see him every morning at 6 o'clock to exchange ideas before they went wherever they had to go." During his working day, Ho would listen to:

... cadres from all specialized branches and localities report the results of implementing the policies of the Party and government and give a briefing on their own work. If there are any inaccurate or vague points in the report, Uncle requests a re-investigation. Uncle usually takes the state of public opinion as reflected in the newspapers and many other sources that he has gathered, to supplement the cadre reports and contribute very concrete ideas to the solution of problems. Sometimes Uncle even supplies valuable experience and documents of foreign countries to the specialized branches. <sup>121</sup>

This method of consultation was not, strictly speaking, collective decision making. It seems to be Ho's method of influencing policy decisions by keeping well informed about operational matters and letting his opinions be known at an early stage - a point which will be explored in the following section. While there are numerous accounts of these individual meetings with Ho, which reflect Ho's tactful but authoritative manner of making policy recommendations, there is a striking lack of information on the collective deliberations of the leadership, in contrast to the abundance of Chinese materials on this subject.

One of the extremely rare descriptions of a Politburo meeting is worth

<sup>120&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid., p. 35.</sub>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>121</sup>Nhan Dan, May 19, 1957.

citing for the glimpse it affords of Ho's interaction with his colleagues in a collective setting. An expanded Politburo meeting was called to prepare for the 1962 Third National Congress of Literature and the Arts. The Politburo discussed a formal agenda related to this problem for three days. Ho attended all meetings and, "in the final session, it came Uncle's turn to present his ideas." As he was speaking, Ho suddenly appeared to recall something and pulled a letter out of his pocket, and handed it to To Huu<sup>122</sup> to read. The letter was from a woman who had been a liaison agent during the Resistance but now found that women in her village could no longer be active in political life because of male chauvinism from their husbands and families, including beatings and insults. She wrote that although she knew Ho was busy with affairs of state, she did not know where else to turn.

After the letter had been read, the staid and serious meeting room of the Politburo suddenly became animated. The comrades sitting here were people who had experienced all kinds of ups and downs in their revolutionary struggle, and now had to daily investigate and resolve many great problems related to the future of the country and the livelihood of the people. Yet faced with the story of the family miseries of an ordinary woman from the countryside, no one could suppress their emotions and agitation. Through the case of this woman, the comrades could see a major problem, and a social ill that still existed in rather serious form in our society. Uncle said, "Our Party has the aspiration of building up a regime that will make people equal and give them respect. Is it possible for us to let barbarous habits like this continue to exist forever?" The Politburo meeting which had been discussing the literature and arts mission simply came to a halt, and the conversation switched to resolving the problem of the woman from Vinh Phuc.  $^{123}$ 

 $<sup>^{122}\</sup>mathrm{One}$  of the DRV's premier poets, and a member of the Secretariat in charge of Literature and the Arts.

<sup>123&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, January 25, 1963.

The resolution took the form of Ho giving the letter to Pham Van Dong and directing him to personally investigate the problem carefully and resolve it in a quick and appropriate manner.

This rare anecdote about the collective deliberations of the Politburo reveals several important points about Ho's relationship with his subordinates and his leadership style. The first is that Ho attended all meetings, keeping informed of the details of the conference, and putting himself in a position to guide the discussion at each step to form a consensus. Possibly the summing up role which falls to Ho when it comes "his turn to speak" at the end of the sessions provides Ho the opportunity to formulate, summarize and, therefore, influence the decisions of the meeting. Politburo agendas (or, at least, expanded sessions of the Politburo with outsiders sitting in) appear to be highly structured and formal. Possibly the important exchanges on the difficult decisions take place in personal meetings with leaders directly involved. Finally, the resolution of the problem suggests Ho's faith in his principal subordinates. Having made his point, he entrusts the solution of the problem entirely to the judgment and discretion of Premier Pham Van Dong.

Until the last year of his life, Ho was intimately involved with decision making. Not until 1968 when his colleagues saw that his health

<sup>124</sup> Ho's wide contacts with cadres at the working level presumably kept him well informed about the performance of the Party and government bureaucracy without having to rely on his principal subordinates, thus forestalling sudden shocks or revelations of the type that prompted Mao to purge the PRC leadership.

was failing, did Ho move back to the "second line," when the Politburo proposed that in order to preserve his strength he "only preside over the most important Party and state matters, while other matters would be discussed by the Politburo and then reported to Uncle [Ho]."125 Ho did not require his subordinates to undergo the trials and testing that Mao's subordinates were subjected to. One reason is that Ho's personality, leadership style, and his leadership position in relation to his colleagues, were very different from Mao, and he did not feel challenged by subordinates. Another important reason is the different stages of each revolution and, therefore, the different tasks each confronted. Mao minimized the external danger and emphasized the internal threat to his vision of a socialist China; Ho evidently felt that the growing foreign intervention in Vietnam's affairs did not permit any complications within the leadership that would detract from its unity and ability to respond rapidly and decisively to new challenges. While Mao was testing the CCP leadership in preparation for a political succession. Ho explicitly stated that the succession would have to be postponed as long as the external danger existed. 126

<sup>125</sup> Le Van Luong, "Nhung nam cuoi cung cua Bac" (The Last Years of Uncle Ho), Nhan Dan, May 19, 1973. Even after this curtailment of his direct participation in the details of decision making, Ho took an active role in the drafting of the Higher Level Agricultural Producers' Cooperative Statute, and "in his own hand corrected" the regulations. Chu Tich Ho Chi Minh, p. 107.

<sup>126</sup> In his acceptance speech after being nominated to run for the National Assembly in 1964, Ho said, "In principle I should yield to a younger group to come forward and take on the burdens of the nation's work. But at present, while our kith and kin in the South, from the old people to mothers, down to the young people and children, are bravely sacrificing and giving all out in combat to oppose the U.S. countrystealing imperialists and their lackey gang to gain their independence and freedom, I can't possibly 'Enjoy a life of leisure, without a care in the world ...'." Nhan Dan, April 15, 1964.

Both leaders were logical products of their revolutions in leadership style and in policy orientation. China's social revolution and internal conflict was recapitulated in Mao's revolt against the burden of tradition and his struggle to achieve a dominant leadership position in order to ensure that his vision of the Chinese revolution would be adopted rather than those of his early rivals. Because competitive versions of the road to socialism were espoused by top Party leaders, Mao interpreted disagreements on policy as challenges to his leadership.

During and after the Great Leap his concern was again aroused by what he saw as a new form of struggle "between the two roads" and, in the process, his successively appointed heirs fell precipitously from grace and power. Ho's stress on unity in the face of the external threat and his own reluctance to outline his vision of Vietnam's road to socialism in theoretical detail meant that there was no ideological standard to attack or uphold that was specifically associated with him.

During the course of the Vietnamese revolution and the post-Liberation consolidation, Ho tried to transform society, but did it within the boundaries of the Vietnamese political culture. He was an intimate, avuncular reconciliation figure, who opposed foreign aggression and selectively employed foreign doctrines and techniques, to effectively safeguard the national essence of Vietnam. Unlike Mao, Ho was able to assure that no gaps between a first and second line of leadership emerged. The subsequent ease of the first phase of the political succession following Ho's death showed the force of his unifying legacy. He elected to "rou-

<sup>127</sup>Cf. David Elliott, "North Vietnam Since Ho," <u>Problems of Communism</u>, July/August 1975.

tinize" his charismatic leadership into a political system, whose institutions were modeled along the lines of the Administrative State and emphasized pragmatic rather than ideological criteria for policy determination. The specific results of the contrasting leadership styles of Ho and Mao may be seen by an examination of the process of policy formation in the DRV and the PRC.

## SECTION II

## POLICY SYSTEMS AND DECISION MAKING

Ho Chi Minh and Mao Tse-tung, as leaders of their respective parties, stood at the apex of complex policy systems which identified, formulated, investigated and resolved the major issues confronting North Vietnam and China. Despite the institutional similarities between the two policy systems their respective decision making processes differed in significant respects. The role of Ho as a decision maker and the impact of his leadership style on the policy system contrasted with Mao's. His own preference for incremental decision making and stress on problems of implementation differed from Mao's approach, which oscillated from careful planning and deliberate implementation to a campaign style of "advancing in waves" through large scale political mobilization. In the DRV, Ho's style was apparently the preferred approach of his colleagues as well, while some elements in the PRC leadership were opposed to Mao's periodic campaigns.

In addition, the policy environments of the two countries were dissimilar. Vietnam and China were at different revolutionary stages and, therefore, the salience and priority of specific issues was not the same. While the reunification problem permeated every political issue in the DRV, China's main preoccupation was the building of socialism and, in Mao's view, training revolutionary successors to maintain the momentum of the socialist revolution. As previous sections have attempted to illustrate, increasing

concern with the threat of external intervention in Vietnam's revolution influenced DRV policy, while China turned inward to resolve the "contradictions" in its own society even though the threat of war in Asia was escalating.

Contrasts in the structure and process of policy making are the result of the different leadership roles of Ho and Mao, and the different policy environments of their respective political systems. Because Ho and his colleagues were in accord on the major political priorities of the fundamental issues facing them, problems of implementation could be worked out in an orderly fashion. The external threat placed limits on the amount of internal conflict that would be tolerated and, more importantly, reduced the salience of internal issues likely to occasion disagreement and discord. From the time of the Great Leap, serious disagreements arose within the CCP concerning the present and future course of the revolution. Mao's decision to bring the "struggle between the two lines" into the open was a logical consequence of his view that the main threat to China's future lay within a misguided segment of the leadership.

## The Policy Environment.

The problems confronted by each policy system are, in large part, a product of the context or policy environment in which they arise. The resolution of these problems is also influenced by the policy environment. Among the factors that shape this environment are the international situation and its linkages with internal affairs, relations with allies and opponents, population and domestic resource base and availability of ex-

ternal assistance. Both China and Vietnam face a problem common to many developing countries, a rapidly expanding population and limited resource base. Thus, the fundamental task of each political system is the management of scarcity. Each system strives to maximize welfare for its constituents. But in each case there is a vital corollary (and often competitive) aim. In the case of Vietnam it is the completion of the task of national liberation and reunification. For China, it is the pursuit of tighter national integration and an international environment that will enhance both its national security and its global prestige.

A favorable international environment is, of course, the fervent aspiration of the DRV. As a small country, however, it has learned through painful experience the limits of its capabilities in shaping this environment. Self-reliance is an important goal of the DRV, but where it has conflicted with the larger goal of national liberation and reunification, the constraints of close ties to external benefactors have been accepted. North Vietnam's early policy toward South Vietnam was clearly affected by its reliance on Soviet and Chinese aid, and the lack of enthusiasm of its allies for renewed conflict in Vietnam. Unlike China which emphatically rejected its former benefactor when the conditions of continuing aid infringed too much on the PRC's freedom of action in international affairs and its domestic vision of development, the DRV was obliged to take a less uncompromising stance. North Vietnam finally rejected Soviet counsels of restraint, in large part because the developing conflict in the South had generated a spontaneous momentum of its own, but normal relations with the USSR were maintained and Russian aid eventually became an

even more important factor in DRV decision making than did China's. 1

As a result of the external constraints of obligations to benefactors and the diversion of organizational resources to cope with the escalation of U.S. involvement in the South, the policy making environment of the DRV leaders had more sharply delineated boundaries than that of the Chinese leaders. Whereas the main focus of policy formulation in the PRC was on matters related to "the struggle between the two lines," in Vietnam the major policy problem was the trade-off between support for national libera-

 $<sup>^{1}</sup>$ Soviet aid totaled 5,294 million yuan to China from 1950 to 1959. Cheng Chu-yuan, Economic Relations Between Peking and Moscow, 1949-63 (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 76-78, cited in Prybyla, The Political Economy of Communist China, p. 100. China's 1959 total output value was reported at 241 billion yuan, or about 96 billion dollars (Edgar Snow, Red China Today, p. 197). U.S. Government estimates of North Vietnam's "GNP" in the 1963-64 period was 1,688 million dollars. Pentagon Papers, Senator Gravel edition, Vol. IV, p. 225. Assuming that this refers to total output, the DRV economy is equivalent to about 1 percent of the Chinese economy. During the years of 1966-72 the PRC supplied North Vietnam with a total of 620 million dollars in economic aid, while the Soviet Union supplied 1,915 million in economic aid during the same period. Congressional Record, May 14, 1975, No. 77, p. 2. The DRV's own figures indicate that China gave 900 million JMP (or \$360 million) in grants and 300 million JMP (120 million dollars) in long term credits during 1955-59. Nhan Dan, February 1, 1961. The Soviet Union gave 400 million rubles in grants for the same period. Nhan Dan, January 21, 1960. A 350 million ruble credit was arranged in 1960. Nhan Dan, June 16, 1960. The 900 JMP million in grants given by China was equivalent to the total DRV budget (minus foreign aid) for the years 1955, 1956, and 1957. Whan Dan, September 28, 1959. A detailed sectoral breakdown of foreign aid to the DRV is given in Vietnam Advances, No. 8, 1963, pp. 29-32. For the period from 1955 to 1965, the DRV received a total of 4,229,786,023 dong, or somewhat over 100 million dollars in grants and credits. Ibid., p. 29. Of this total, 1,708,721,000 dong were granted by the Soviet Union, 1,871,037,000 dong by the PRC and the remainder by other socialist countries. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam On the Road of Socialist Industrialization (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1963), p. 62.

tion in the South and the building of socialism in the North. These goals were not incompatible, but even while pursuing them simultaneously, the question of policy priorities was ever present. The DRV, as noted earlier, deferred its First Five-Year Plan until 1961 in the hope that the economic and social systems of the two regions of Vietnam would not become so different that reunification would be hindered.

The PRC also had its irredenta — Taiwan. But the reclamation of Taiwan was not at the center of the policy environment. China's problems of domestic development were considered more pressing. And since following an incorrect line domestically could lead to undesirable views on foreign policy, it was necessary to focus on the root of the problem closest to home. Not only, therefore, were the limits and constraints of these two policy environments different, the core issues at the heart of each political system were not the same. But although the high priority accorded to reunification by the DRV influenced the timing and scope of its Five-Year Plan, its strategy of economic development was based on the policy orientation of the leadership and North Vietnam's distinctive economic problems.

Soviet economic development strategy had been based on extracting a surplus from agriculture to build up the industrial sector. This was feasible for the Soviet Union "because she had started from a relatively strong resource base, particularly a sizable grain surplus, and had a slow rate of population growth." For China, the "crucial problem was not just

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>K. C. Yeh, "Soviet and Communist Chinese Industrialization Strategies," in Donald Treadgold, <u>Soviet and Chinese Communism</u>, p. 350.

to collect and convert the agricultural surplus into industrial capital as in the USSR, but to create a large surplus in the first place."

Vietnam, like China, suffered from a heavy population pressure on scarce economic resources. In 1954 the DRV assumed control of an economy whose industrial component was only 1.5 percent of the total output, while China's 1949 industrialized sector produced 17 percent of total output. Only 12 percent of North Vietnam's territory was arable as of 1960, 4 and of 1.8 million hectares under cultivation, 734,000 hectares, or less than half, were ricefields. 5 In 1958, China had a similar percentage of its territory under cultivation. 6 China's population growth in the mid-1950's was between 2.1 and 2.3 percent. 7 For North Vietnam, the estimates of annual population growth went as high as 3.4 percent. 8

The high rate of population growth, the limited arable land, and the modest level of industrialization presented North Vietnam and China with

<sup>3&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

<sup>4</sup>Nhan Dan, June 2, 1960.

<sup>5&</sup>lt;u>Nhan Dan</u>, June 3, 1960.

<sup>6</sup>China had 11.29 percent of its land under cultivation or 108,000,000 hectares. Owen L. Dawson, Communist China's Agriculture (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 50. In the three southern rice growing provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Fukien, whose ecology is more or less similar to North Vietnam, the cultivation index was also 11-12 percent. Ibid., p. 53.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, An Economic Profile of Mainland China (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 353.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>Vo Nhan Tri, <u>Croissance economique de la Republique Democratique</u> <u>du Viet Nam 1945-1965</u> (Hanoi: Editions en langues etrangeres, 1967), p. 30.

the problem of managing scarcity. Economic development required measures to break out of the cycle of poverty, while political development was oriented toward distributive justice and social integration. These two goals were often difficult to reconcile. In the case of the Soviet Union, a high level of savings was extracted from the peasantry to finance industrialization, at the cost of alienating the rural sector of the population, and wide disparities in remuneration were tolerated. China and North Vietnam, by contrast, did not attempt to place undue burdens upon the peasantry because this was the source of political strength that brought the revolutions to power. Moreover, unlike the Soviet Union, there was no appreciable agricultural surplus to be diverted into industrial development. This is reflected in the respective rates of capital accumulation at different periods of economic development.

Capital Accumulation as a Percentage of Total Accumulation/Consumption

| Soviet Union   | China       | DRV         |
|----------------|-------------|-------------|
| 1928-32 : 26.9 | 1952 : 18.2 | 1957 : 11.0 |
| 1933-37 : 26.4 | 1953 : 21.4 | 1958: 14.5  |
| 1938-42 : 28.8 | 1954 : 22.3 | 1959: 19.2  |
| 1946-50 : 27.0 | 1955 : 20.9 | 1960 : 18.4 |
| 1951-55 : 24.0 | 1956 : 22.5 | 1961 : 18.4 |
|                | 1957 : 21.0 | 1962: 17.3  |
|                | 1958 : 33.3 |             |

Figures on the Soviet Union are from Nhan Dan, June 17, 1960. Figures on China are from Ta-chung Liu and Kung-chia Yeh, The Economy of the Chinese Mainland: National Income and Economic Development 1933-39 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 233. DRV figures are from Vo Nhan Tri, Croissance economique de la Republique Democratique du Viet-Nam, p. 522. Tri's figures for 1957-59 differ from those given in Nhan Dan, June 17, 1960, which are (1957), 14.1; (1958), 13.7; (1959), 17.6

Commenting on the fact that their rate of accumulation was considerably lower than that of the Soviet Union and also lower than the PRC, Nhan Dan pointed out that Vietnam's economy was still producing at a very low level partly because of war damage, and partly because of the small size of the state sector of the economy prior to the First Five-Year Plan. In addition, it was felt that "taking the first steps in raising the living standard of the laboring masses is a very essential matter. In this situation, the accumulation ratio cannot possibly be high." 10

Because the DRV had a low level of production and industrialization and an economy whose state sector was still weak, it would therefore be difficult to accumulate sufficient capital for economic development without lowering the standard of living of an important segment of the population, or seeking outside assistance. The DRV chose the latter course. Since the DRV came to power "with empty hands" in 1954, "therefore the fraternal countries aided us (with non-repayable grants).. This truly demonstrates that the victory of our people in restoring and developing the economy is linked to the sincere and wholehearted aid in every sector from the Soviet Union, China and other fraternal countries." Nevertheless, Nhan Dan concluded, "we must principally rely on the internal economy of our country for our source of accumulation."

Nhan Dan, June 17, 1960. An attempt to reconstruct specific policies which fit the putative Liuist "line" lists as the first point, "The rate of investment would have been reduced to restore balance and to minimize economic and political tensions." Jack Gray, "The Two Roads: Alternative Strategies of Social Change and Economic Growth in China," in Stuart R. Schram, ed., Authority, Participation and Cultural Change in China, p. 149.

<sup>11</sup> Nhan Dan, June 17, 1960.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

Although self reliance was affirmed as an important goal of economic development, DRV economic recovery was substantially accelerated by foreign aid. In 1955, aid from socialist countries comprised 39.5 percent of the state budget. By 1964 the budget had expanded to 3.9 times the size of the 1955 figure, and the percentage of the budget comprised by foreign aid dropped to 15-20 percent during the 1961-64 period. During China's First Five-Year Plan of 1953-57, "only a negligible portion of China's budgeting revenues came from foreign economic loans" which, according to one estimate, accounted for "not more than 1.5 percent of China's capital investment from 1953 through 1957."

China's dissatisfaction with Soviet assistance and planning techniques was evident by at least 1956 when it stressed that, "All the experience of the Soviet Union, including its fundamental experience, is bound up with definite national characteristics, and no other country should copy it

Doan Trong Truyen and Pham Thanh Vinh, L'edification d'une economie nationale independante au Vietnam (1945-1965) (Hanoi: Editions en langues etrangeres, 1966), p. 167. Bernard Fall gives the following 1962 figures, without citation, of the percentage of the DRV budget comprised by foreign aid; 1955: 65.3 (38.6); 1956: (40.0); 1957: 60.8 (36.9); 1958: (31.3); 1959: (27.0); 1960: 21.0; 1961: 19.9 (17.7); 1965 (estimated): 15.0. The Two Viet-Nams, p. 177. Figures in parentheses are identified by Fall as 1960 figures and are considerably lower. Vo Nhan Tri gives the figures for foreign aid as a percentage of the budget as 39.4 (1955-57); 19.7 (1958-60); and 19.4 (1961-63). Croissance economique, p. 556.

<sup>14</sup> Prybyla, The Political Economy of Communist China, p. 133. The industrial plants furnished China by the Soviet Union in the 1950's amounted to 3 billion dollars in value. Most of the Soviet aid was in credits, not grants. The Joint Economic Committee's report concludes that the "accumulated Chinese debt to the USSR through 1960 was only about \$1.5 billion, and less than one third of this debt was connected with economic assistance." An Economic Profile of Mainland China, pp. 22-23.

mechanically."<sup>15</sup> In 1957 Mao instructed economic planners to "learn those things that are suitable to China's conditions."<sup>16</sup> China's Great Leap Forward, and Mao's insistance that the Chinese situation was like "a blank sheet of paper on which the most beautiful words can be written" was an implicit rejection of Soviet planning methods. The rejection was made explicit after mid-1960 when Soviet technicians were withdrawn.

For a number of reasons, North Vietnam continued to accept aid as an important part of their budget and investment program. The low level of economic development and the extensive war damage alluded to above was one reason. Another was the distortion of the economy by the colonial regime, which left a weak indigenous bourgeoisie. In addition, the DRV wanted to demonstrate the superiority of the socialist system as an incentive for reunification with the South. All these considerations contributed to the DRV decision to accept a fairly high level of foreign assistance. Yet, at the same time, the overwhelming dependency of South Vietnam on U.S. aid provided an object lesson concerning the proper limits of dependency on external support. Nevertheless, noting the low level of capital accumulation of the DRV compared with the Soviet Union and China, some economists

<sup>15</sup> Cited in K. C. Yeh, "Soviet and Chinese Industrialization Strategies," in Treadgold, ed., Soviet and Chinese Communism, p. 341. An example of "mechanical copying" is cited by Yeh, quoting an official at the Ministry of Communication who stated during the Hundred Flowers period that, "since Russia during their first FYP allocated 1 percent of the investment to communications we doctrinally (sic) and subjectively did the same." Ibid., p. 340.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid

evidently advocated seeking an even higher level of foreign aid, and felt that "the reason we have many material difficulties with consumer necessities is because we don't 'skillfully bring in' the assistance of this or that country."

This proposal to solicit more aid was rejected on the grounds that it would lead to Vietnam becoming "a vast countryside producing only agricultural raw materials and consuming industrial products from foreign countries."

The DRV goal was an independent economic system and balanced economic growth. It was willing to accept a higher level of external advice and assistance than China because the need was greater and the results more immediate, and also because the Vietnamese had learned the fine art of domesticating foreign inputs over many centuries of dealing with powerful external forces. Reliance on foreign aid, particularly that of the Soviet Union, may have affected critical policy decisions, such as the timing and level of support to revolutionary forces in South Vietnam. Yet after this policy of restraint and non-involvement had been reversed in 1959-60, the DRV continued to solicit Soviet aid and advisors.

The DRV apparently attempted to compartmentalize different types of policy problems.  $^{19}$  Although they denounced the 1963 nuclear test ban

<sup>17&</sup>lt;sub>Nh</sub>an <u>Dan</u>, August 1, 1963.

<sup>18&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

An overview of the salient DRV policy problems of the 1963-64 period can be found in John C. Donnell, "North Vietnam, A Qualified Pro-Chinese Position," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., The Communist Revolution in Asia (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965).

treaty, which the Soviet Union viewed as the critical test of the socialist countries' attitudes toward the Sino-Soviet dispute, the DRV continued to seek and obtain Soviet aid for domestic development, and Soviet advice on internal organizational matters. The DRV attempted to play a mediating role in the Sino-Soviet dispute, which was an extension of Ho's internal stress on the theme "unity is victory." There is little doubt that North Vietnam was disturbed about the split between its most powerful allies, and distressed that such a serious breach in the principle of socialist internationalism had occurred. Yet, to some extent the DRV freedom of action in responding to events in the South was made possible by the latitude for maneuver between the Russian and Chinese positions. Moreover, Ho's prestige as a senior figure in the communist movement which allowed him to adopt a mediating role in this

Around the time of the Liu Shao-ch'i - Ch'en-Yi visit to Hanoi (May 1963), a Soviet article appeared (cited in an earlier section) quoting Hoang Quoc Viet's statement that the DRV would continue to model its Procuracy along Soviet lines. A delegation from the Supreme Procurate of the Soviet Union visited the DRV for two weeks in October 1963. Nhan Dan, October 26, 1963.

The DRV position on the Sino-Soviet dispute is most authoritatively stated by Hong Chuong, "Tang cuong doan ket phong trao Cong San quoc te," (Strengthen Unity Within the International Communist Movement), Hoc Tap, No. 3, 1964. This article takes, in Donnell's phrase, a "qualified pro-Chinese position." "Modern revisionism" is singled out as the main target, along with a strong critique of "peaceful co-existence" and the "parliamentary road." The article complains that "modern revisionism is splitting the ranks of the international communist movement, and attacking the communists who resolutely uphold Marxism-Leninism by calling them 'dogmatists' and 'warmongers'. They look for ways to force the communist parties and workers to accept their false viewpoint, and push the international communist movement into ideological chaos and organizational disunity."

Ibid., p. 34.

dispute, must have also strengthened the DRV's independence of action.

The mid-1963 criticisms, noted above, in the DRV press of those who advocated seeking a higher level of foreign aid were probably related to a DRV decision to insulate its internal decision making as much as possible from external influences. Truong Chinh published an assessment of the August Revolution in the September 1963 issue of <u>Hoc Tap</u> which noted the uniqueness of the Vietnamese revolutionary road, implying that Vietnam would continue to pursue its own revolutionary course. But in the 1963-64 context of the escalating threat of war and problems in domestic economic development, it was not always possible to separate the leading policy issues. Nguyen Chi Thanh linked together the external and internal problems of the revolution in one of the major ideological statements of the post-1960 period. Two major problems, he noted, were a lack of understanding of the class struggle and of the importance of self-reliance.

It is because of a lack of a firm class viewpoint that some comrades have not yet firmly grasped the spirit of long term struggle fraught with hardships, in order to unify the Fatherland. A very small number of comrades lack confidence in the correct form of struggle that has been chosen by the people in the South, to say nothing of the fact that there are a few comrades who tremble in the face of the fierce struggle in the South. With regard to the complex recent events occurring in the world, a small number of comrades have not clearly understood the nature of the imperialists, and have not firmly grasped the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism and, because of this, have been influenced by revisionism and opportunism in a number of important revolutionary matters.

<u>Second</u>, with regard to economics, a very small number of comrades have, at times, had their confidence shaken, or even had doubts about the Party's policy on socialist industrializa-

This is discussed in Donnell, "North Vietnam, A Qualified Pro-Chinese Position," in Scalapino, ed., The Communist Revolution in Asia, pp. 158-159.

tion. They wanted to reduce the speed of industrialization and to reduce the level of accumulation to increase consumption, and did not take seriously the spirit of self-reliance. Some comrades went so far as to reject the slogan of self-reliance on the grounds that it was "catching the disease of narrow nationalism" and was contrary to international cooperation...

Although it is not entirely clear that Thanh was referring to specific
Party members simultaneously holding all views criticized in this article,
there does appear to be a logical connection between the erroneous ideas
listed by him. The criticisms of those who doubted the wisdom of the
DRV's limited support for the struggle in the South and were labelled as
under the influence of "revisionism and opportunism," were possibly not
aimed at advocates of a "parliamentary road and peaceful coexistence,"
as the terms imply, but rather at those who did not have sufficient
faith in the Party's policy of self-reliance for the Southern revolutionaries
and emphasis on political rather than military struggle. Those who wanted
to solicit more foreign assistance may have done so not to become ensnared
in the Soviet peaceful coexistence line, but to pressure the Soviet Union

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>Nguyen Chi Thanh, "Nang cao lap truong, tu tuong vo san, doan ket, phan dau, gianh thang loi moi" (Raise the Proletarian Standpoint and Ideology, Unite and Strive to Win New Victories), <u>Hoc Tap</u>, No. 10, 1963, p. 6.

<sup>24</sup> Criticisms of DRV policies such as cooperativization were made on the grounds that they were done "too soon." This was linked with the criticism that not enough foreign aid had been sought. With regard to South Vietnam there were both those who "stood aside" and did not acknowledge their responsibility, and those who were "suspicious," "worried" and "scared of long term (struggle) and hardships." Nhan Dan, February 3, 1964. The "suspicions" and "worries" were clearly about whether or not the current low level of DRV involvement would guarantee revolutionary success in the South.

into a higher level of political and material support for Vietnam's reunification struggle.<sup>25</sup>

By 1964, the DRV had entered a critical phase of decision making. Changes in the internal and external situation required new choices to be made on a wide range of related subjects and in a rapidly changing policy environment. The overthrow of Diem and the political crisis in South Vietnam was followed by increased U.S. involvement and the threat of escalating U.S. military intervention. The First Five-Year Plan's program of industrial construction was meeting difficulties because of lack of managerial expertise, and apparently prompted criticism on the grounds that the required savings were depressing living standards in North Vietnam. Whether this was related to the view that more foreign aid should be sought, or is evidence of a cutback in foreign aid that had to be replaced with internal savings is difficult to determine. <sup>26</sup>

This, indeed, was probably the purpose of Le Duan's trip to the Soviet Union in early 1964. The high level DRV group included Politburo members Le Duc Tho and Hoang Van Hoan, as well as To Huu, the Secretariat member in charge of ideological and cultural matters. The Soviet leaders who saw the group off at the airport included Suslov and Kirilenko as well as Andropov and Ilyichev, suggesting that the main topic of discussion was inter-party relations and the international communist movement. Nhan Dan, February 12, 1964. Nevertheless, it seems likely that the questions of aid and DRV policy in the South were also discussed in this context.

The DRV's economic difficulties are indicated in the following figures which illustrate what one DRV economist calls "a crisis of economic growth." Taking each preceding year as 100, the growth in national income between 1958 and 1963 was: 1958: 108.58; 1959: 114.88; 1960: 102.70; 1961: 106.9; 1962: 107.5; 1963: 101.8. Vo Nhan Tri, Croissance economique, p. 578. According to these statistics, economic growth in the DRV had come to a standstill in the middle of the First Five-Year Plan. Whether this was related to a Soviet reduction of aid cannot be determined on the basis of available evidence.

It is clear that by 1963-64, the DRV had reached a major crossroad, and had to determine how to best proceed with North Vietnam's economic development while retaining sufficient flexibility to respond to the rapidly changing situation in the South. The warnings against "rightist" tendencies and ideological "revisionism" should be analyzed in the light of the Party's concern for tightening its organizational discipline during a period of crisis rather than as a signal to accelerate class struggle within Party ranks. This is implicit in the text of Nguyen Chi Thanh's speech, and made explicit in a contemporary speech by Le Duc Tho, head of the Party's organization section, which stated that in order to struggle against the influence of modern revisionism "we have to oppose rightist ideology in absorbing and carrying out the policy line, programs and organizational principles of the Party."27 This would, in Tho's words, "be the essential requirement for consolidating our Party, raising its combat strength, and strengthening solidarity and unity throughout the entire Party, to make the Party increasingly purer ideologically and stronger organizationally, in order to gain unceasing and ever greater victories for the building of socialism and the struggle to unify the country."28

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>Le Duc Tho, "Tang cuong mat tran tu tuong de cung co Dang" (Strengthen the Ideological Front to Consolidate the Party), <u>Nhan Dan</u>, February 4, 1964.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid. Tho specifically warned against being overzealous in attacking Party members for "rightist opportunism" and laid out guidelines for the expression of dissent from the Central Committee, stressing that patient persuasion must be used to bring them to see the light.

Nhan Dan, February 5, 1964. This illustrates that the importance placed on internal unity by the Party did not entail punishing or suppressing dissidents, since that would harm rather than help the cause of Party unity.

North Vietnam's policy environment, the context in which it made its decisions, changed considerably during the period 1954-65. But the basic elements of the environment remained constant; a divided country, a scarcity of resources, a need for foreign assistance, and an external threat from U.S. interventionism. The basic components of the PRC's policy environment changed dramatically during the same period. Mao noted that in the 1950's:

in those days the situation was such that, since we had no experience in economic construction, we had no alternative but to copy the Soviet Union. In the field of heavy industry especially, we copied from the Soviet Union and had very little creativity of our own. At that time it was absolutely necessary to act thus, but at the same time it was also a weakness — a lack of creativity and lack of ability to stand on our own two feet. Naturally this could not be our long term strategy. From 1958 we decided to make self reliance our major policy and striving for foreign aid a secondary aim. 29

The timing of this turning away from Soviet assistance coincided with Mao's conclusion that the Soviet Union was no longer a reliable ally, and possibly a potential antagonist. Mao dates his disenchantment with the Soviet Union from "the second half of 1958," which was also the time that Khrushchev "wanted to set up a joint fleet so as to have control over our coastline and blockade us." "We spent the whole of 1960 fighting Khrushchev" said Mao, and because of this did not pay enough attention to "correcting our mistakes" because "our attention was diverted to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup>Stuart Schram, <u>Chairman Mao Talks to the People</u>, p. 178.

Ibid., p. 190. Other accounts have dated the origins of the Sino-Soviet split to late 1957 when the Soviet Union refused to honor a previous commitment to assist China in nuclear research. Cf. Solomon, Mao's Revolution, pp. 379-85.

opposing Khrushchev."31

From 1960 until the Cultural Revolution, much energy was devoted by Mao and other PRC leaders to the Sino-Soviet polemics. At the same time, PRC foreign policy generally followed a "third force strategy" which, from 1963 until the Cultural Revolution aimed at presenting China as "the organizer and potential leader of a rival coalition in opposition to Russia and America" by creating a broad international united front. 32 As the U.S. intervention in Vietnam escalated and the dangers of war in Asia became more immediate some Chinese leaders like Liu Shao-ch'i and Lo Juich'ing "were more willing to risk intervention and cooperation with Moscow if that were necessary to preserve the third force strategy and hence China's bid to become an independent great power."33 Mao, however. was more concerned with the problem of the future political orientation of China's youth and "revolutionary successors," and felt the internal danger of Soviet revisionism's influence in China was greater than the external danger posed by United States escalation in Vietnam. As Mao told Edgar Snow in January 1965, "China's armies would not go beyond her borders to fight... Only if the United States attacked China would the Chinese fight... Chinese were very busy with their internal affairs."34

<sup>31</sup> Schram, Chairman Mao Talks to the People, pp. 190-91.

<sup>32</sup> David Mozingo, China's Foreign Policy and the Cultural Revolution, International Relations of East Asia, Interim Report No. 1 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1970), p. 25.

<sup>33&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

<sup>34</sup> Edgar Snow, The Long Revolution, p. 216.

The contrasting priorities of internal and external problems that had characterized the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions at the outset were evident in 1965. Mao had chosen to place the greatest emphasis on the social revolution and the internal political orientation of China's leaders and masses, despite growing tensions in Asia. Once more, the Vietnamese revolutionaries were obliged to divert their attention from the internal problems of consolidating the social revolution and direct their major energies to coping with the intrusion of an external power. Nevertheless, the contrasting policies pursued by the two countries after Liberation, particularly in the post-1960 period following China's Great Leap and Vietnam's agricultural collectivization, were not only due to the changing policy environments. The policy styles and decision making procedures of the respective leaderships also had a profound influence on the policies that they formulated.

## Policy Styles: Ho and Mao.

As the principal leaders of each political system, Ho and Mao had a pervasive influence on the decision making process, and their individual policy styles often determined both the priority and salience of problems and the manner of their resolution. In addition, their close colleagues had distinctive policy styles and political orientations that supplemented, and sometimes contradicted, the initiatives taken by their leaders. In the case of Vietnam, divergent orientations within the leadership were seen as essentially complementary, and Ho attempted to employ each of his colleagues in a political role that would maximize strength and minimize

weakness. Mao, as noted in the previous section, came to consider his colleagues' policy initiatives as a test of their political reliability. Whereas Ho recognized that no one could replicate his policy style, Mao demanded that his subordinates do so. As he noted in 1961, "Even correct policy is no help if the circumstances are not understood." In the early phase of the Cultural Revolution, Mao said that, "People may be excused for failing to understand the implications," but warned that now having made matters clear, "I will feel very sorry if you do not pass the test." 36

Although Mao's policy style has been frequently characterized by
Western observers as "ideological" as opposed to the "pragmatic" style
of Liu and other top level Party functionaries, this dichotomy is misleading. In fact, Mao's policy style was explicitly oriented toward
problem solving, and the codification of his "thoughts" were principally
directed at instituting a self reliant, problem solving mentality among
not only the leaders, but also the led. One arresting characterization
has described this as a sort of "protestantism" which eschews the intermediary of a specially appointed cadre of adepts to interpret the gospel. 37

<sup>35&</sup>lt;sub>Miscellany</sub>, p. 242.

 $<sup>^{36} &</sup>quot;Selections From Chairman Mao," <math display="inline">\underline{Translations}$  on  $\underline{Communist}$   $\underline{China},$  No. 90, p. 15.

<sup>37&</sup>quot;The Cultural Revolutionary 'protestants' maintain that all men are equal before Mao, and that the Revolution cannot survive, let alone succeed, unless the masses are filled with enthusiasm and are not fettered by orders from above. The 'catholics' in the Party hierarchy are no less left-wing. They are equally devoted to Mao and the Revolution, but they believe that organization and discipline are what distinguish Leninists from petty bourgeois anarchists, and that they are essential if any progress is to be made." Martin Bernal, "Mao and the Writers," New York Review of Books, October 23, 1969.

The policy style of the DRV leaders was "pragmatic," in the sense of emphasizing problems of implementation more than the ideological foundations on which policy problems were formulated and assigned priorities. While Mao was principally concerned about his colleagues' grasp of the underlying ideological basis of policies, Ho summarized his views on the relative scale of importance of the basic elements of managerial leadership in the slogan, "the plan = 1, implementing measures = 2. firm resolve = 3,"38 or as Nhan Dan interpreted Ho's formula to its readers, "drawing up a plan is only a part, concrete measures are half again as important and resolve to finish a job twice as important."39 Minister Pham Van Dong used a similar formulation in announcing the slogan for the 1959 Spring harvest, "target 10, implementing measures 15." 40 This instrumental stress on implementing measures is "pragmatic," but at the same time places great reliance on the cadre hierarchy which will carry out the directives from above. While the Maoist approach is "protestant," the DRV approach is "catholic."

Both Ho and Mao attached great importance to the vital role of voluntarism in the implementation of Party and state policies. There were, however, significant differences in the way each leader incorporated his view of voluntarism into the policy process. Ironically, Mao became impatient with the cumbersome mechanism of the mass line which he

<sup>38 &</sup>lt;u>Nhan</u> <u>Dan</u>, February 5, 1961.

<sup>39</sup> Nhan Dan, March 3, 1959.

<sup>40</sup> Nhan Dan, April 2, 1959.

himself had devised. "From the general to the specific" and "from the masses to the masses" were the main characteristics of the mass line. 41 But the transmission belt from local to national problems and from China's countless masses to the Chairman was long, cumbersome, and littered with obstacles along the way. Mao's impatience with both Party and state bureaucracies, as noted earlier, grew from passive resistance to the assault on the Party itself in the Cultural Revolution, and from an effort to define general policy priorities to an increasing intervention in policy implementation and, finally, an attempt to communicate directly to the masses without a bureaucratic intermediary.

Many of the characteristic PRC methods and slogans of leadership stemmed from Mao's policy style. The "dare to do" spirit of local self reliance, the mass campaign which periodically mobilized the entire country around a single basic theme, the selection of advanced "models" and the rejection of a "balanced" approach were among the consequences of Mao's thoughts and actions. The voluntaristic aspect of Mao's thought achieved

<sup>41</sup> John W. Lewis, <u>Leadership in Communist China</u> (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1963), pp. 70-83.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup>In his "Sixty Points on Working Methods" (January 1958) Mao wrote, "Disequilibrium is a general, objective rule... Disequilibrium is normal and absolute whereas equilibrium is temporary and relative." Jerome Ch'en, ed., Mao Papers, Anthology and Bibliography (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 65-66. The failure of the Great Leap, however, somewhat chastened Mao. In February 1959 he confessed that, "In economic construction, like a child without experience, we declared war on the earth, unfamiliar with strategy or tactics. We must frankly admit such defeats and errors. Some people tried to console me by asking whether the Ch'eng-tu conference did not propose the combination of labor and leisure and the advance of production in waves? But no concrete timetable was proposed, which was not good." Miscellany, p. 157.

increasingly greater stress from the time of the Socialist Education campaign. A subsequent account of the lessons of Mao's leadership defines his conception of the proper "work style" as "daring to think and do and of dauntlessly going forward," and daring to "shatter old conventions and break with traditional ideas." During a major emulation campaign in the early 1960's, the DRV stressed that "while the purpose of the campaign was to promote the spirit of 'dare to do', it must be tempered by experience and 'know how to do' in organization and management."

Some of Mao's colleagues did not agree with his approach. In the Cultural Revolution, "non-Maoist" policies were amalgamated into a "revisionist line" identified with Liu Shao-ch'i. Whether or not these charges were literally true, the crucial point of distinction between China and the DRV was that in China there were distinct and coherent alternative policy styles and divergent strategies that became the center of

<sup>43</sup> Peking Review, No. 28, July 12, 1974.

<sup>44</sup>Nhan Dan, March 30, 1961.

<sup>45&</sup>quot;In his big poisonous weed Why Do People Make Mistakes? written during the period of the democratic revolution, Liu Shao-ch'i talked a good deal about 'to go beyond the limit is as bad as to fall short' and made Confucius' doctrine of the mean his philosophical maxim."

Peking Review, No. 15, April 12, 1974, p. 19. Liu was said to have attacked the Great Leap Forward "with such phrases as 'going crazy' and 'going too hastily and getting into trouble', while Lin Piao allegedly criticized the communes by saying that they were 'left products' and 'doings based on illusion'." Ibid., p. 20.

political struggle. 46 The essence of the Maoist criticisms of the opposing "Liuist" line was that it "permitted efficiency and order to take precedence and even subvert the achievement of equality and revolution," and "overemphasized organizational constraints to the neglect of ideological or normative incentives." The Liuist system:

The "Maoist" line was opposed on every point or, to put it differently, the purported "Liuist" line was a general rubric to describe everything that Maoism was not.

Mao's disenchantment with the "Liuist" application of the mass line was apparent by the time of the Great Leap Forward, though Liu was not

The literal accuracy of the charges is examined in detail by Lowell Dittmer, Liu Shao-ch'i and the Chinese Cultural Revolution, p. 285. Another analysis concludes that "so far as the documents permit us to judge, the problem of agricultural mechanization is the only problem for which the Liuist wing of the Party seems to have offered a specific and elaborated alternative solution to the Maoist model." Jack Gray, "The Two Roads: Alternative Strategy of Social Change and Economic Growth in China," in Stuart R. Schram, ed., Authority, Participation and Cultural Change in China, p. 149.

<sup>47 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>., p. 285.

<sup>48&</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>., pp. 285-286.

identified as the principal culprit in that period. Increasingly frustrated with the bureaucratic details of an orderly and regularized policy process, Mao singled out the atypical and outstanding examples of development as models of achievement. His attitude toward research and investigation changed considerably from the careful analyses of the 1920's and 1930's to the increasingly limited observations and precipitate actions of the 1950's and 1960's. During a visit to a Honan commune, escorted by the zealous province secretary who had proposed the Sputnik Commune as a model:

Chairman Mao smiled and said to Wu Chih-p'u [First Secretary of the Honan Province Party Committee and governor of the province]: "Secretary Wu, you really have hopes. You in Honan all seem to be as good as this!" Wu Chih-p'u said: "If there is one commune like this, then we won't have to worry about many other communes like this." Chairman Mao said: "Correct. If there is a commune like this, then there can be many of them."49

The decision to launch the Great Leap was an example of this transformation, since investigation, planning and the other requisites of considered decision making were largely neglected. Referring to the order that launched the commune movement, Mao admitted that:

The Peitaiho Resolution was drafted according to my suggestion. At that time, it was as though I had found a treasure in the regulations of the Cha-ya-shan [commune]. When I was in Shantung a reporter asked me, "Are the people's communes good?" I said, "They are good" and he published it in a newspaper. There was a spot of petit-bourgeois fanaticism there too. In the future reporters should keep away. 50

<sup>49</sup> Cited in Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization, p. 475.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup>Mao Tse-tung, "Speech at the Lushan Conference," in Stuart Schram, ed., Chairman Mao Talks to the People, p. 145.

But the subjective errors of the Great Leap were not entirely due to overzealous reporting. Mao himself had encouraged "petit-bourgeois fanaticism" by his uncritical assessment of overinflated production pledges by anxious-to-please local cadres. 51

Part of the reason that Mao departed from the "Party-mediated mass line" is that it was an extremely unwieldy leadership technique for China's vast population and administrative scale. At the 1959 Lushan Plenum, Mao commented that:

There are about 700,000 production brigades; if each brigade makes one error, and you wanted to publish all 700,000 errors within a year, how could it be done? Moreover, some articles are long and some short; it would take at least a year to publish them all. What would the result be? Our state would collapse and even if the imperialists didn't come, the people would rise up and overthrow us.<sup>52</sup>

Just as "Buddhas are made several times life-size in order to frighten people," Mao's ideal models and his guidelines for decision making were carefully selected and magnified to "several times life-size" to illustrate the desired Maoist goals of the revolution.

As Mao's leadership image became increasingly inflated and stylized,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup>In December 1958 Mao commented that, "Cadre make mistakes mostly by practicing coercion, telling lies, and making false reports, reporting either more or less than the actual figures." However, Mao condoned overzealous reporting. "It is not very serious to report less for more, but it is very serious to report more for less." Miscellany, p. 140. Several days later, Mao qualified this by saying that, "One must not resort to false reporting in order to get through. The proper method is to surpass the norm." Ibid., p. 153. In both cases, however, Mao stressed the achievement orientation, and reinforced the cadres' tendency to strive for visible results which was the basic cause of false reporting.

<sup>52</sup> Chairman Mao Talks to the People, pp. 138-139.

his influence in the PRC policy system grew until by the time of the Cultural Revolution the "Party-mediated mass line" was dispensed with in favor of an attempt at direct communication between Mao and China's masses. In mid-1965 Mao told Andre Malraux, "I am alone with the masses, waiting." Lin Piao, presumably voicing the Maoist line of the period said, "... as Liu Shao-ch'i and his gang of counter-revolutionary revisionists blocked Chairman Mao's instructions, the broad revolutionary masses could hardly hear Chairman Mao's voice directly." 53 What was needed was not an elaborate bureaucracy to implement the mass line, but direct communication between the leader and followers. "Once the masses grasp it," said a Cultural Revolution editorial, "Mao Tse-tung's thought will be transformed into a mighty material force... when the workers master the political telescope and microscope of Mao Tse-tung's thought, they are invincible and ever triumphant. None of the monsters can escape their sharp insight no matter what the tricks used or what the clever camouflage employed, 36 strategies or 72 metamorphoses."54

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup>Cited in Richard H. Solomon, Mao's Revolution, p. 452.

Cultural Revolution (Tokyo: Tuttle, 1968), p. 360. This was not a new theme of Mao's, but a development of an earlier conviction. During the Liberation period, Mao had expressed disapproval of "hand and fist commands" from the upper echelons. "The longer the chain of command, either geographically [e.g., administrative scale] or in terms of the formal hierarchy, the more advisable it becomes to allow greater independence to the lower levels in their actual operations." Leo Goodstadt, Mao Tse-tung: The Search For Plenty (Hong Kong: Longman, 1973), p. 84. Mao's discovery in the post-Liberation period, particularly during the Great Leap, was that such local flexibility must be guided by a formal operational doctrine (namely Mao Tse-tung thought), otherwise it would lead to dispersionism and the entrenchment of a local Party elite.

An example of Mao's leadership style during the Great Leap period is his reception of cooperative representatives in Peking. Mao asked for the estimated wheat yield, and was told it would be over four times the yield of the previous year. Mao then asked what assurances the cooperative had of reaching that high target, and was given a list of requisite conditions, including a twenty-fold increase in fertilizer, improved irrigation and seed varieties and, most importantly, the ideological zeal of commune members. To this Mao replied, with no further investigation or analysis, "Splendid. Your five conditions are all in order." The cooperative representative reported his pledge of attaining 800 catties per mou and was interrupted by another cooperative member who proudly stated that, "The masses Ying Chu Cooperative have now pushed up the target of the yield to 1,000 catties, while striving to reach the figure of 1,200 catties." Mao answered, "Even 800 catties represent improvement four times already." Nonetheless Mao accepted the estimate and overambitious goal and offered encouragement. "Lighting a cigarette, Chairman Mao said to Ts'ui affectionately: 'Try to avoid getting haughty and excited. Cadres and the masses should be closely united. Always hoist the red flag in your cooperative and let the red flag fly high."56

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup>Yu Min-sheng, "Director of Agricultural Cooperative in Honan Meets Chairman Mao Tse-tung," NCNA, Chengchow, June 30, 1958, in SCMP, No. 1808, July 10, 1958.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid. Another example of Mao's superficial investigations during the Great Leap period was his visit to Hsushui cooperative in Hopei. Mao was informed of another impossibly inflated production goal. His response was to ask the cooperative leaders what they proposed to do with their large anticipated surplus. "Laughing, Chang Kuo-chung said, 'We have been considering only how to grow more food crops'. Chairman Mao said, 'You have to consider the problem of eating them too!' People in the room whispered to one another, 'How profoundly and thoroughly Chairman Mao looks at problems!'" JMJP, August 11, 1958 in SCMP, No. 1839, August 25, 1958.

Ho Chi Minh's leadership style of pragmatic cost-benefit calculations forestalled the occurrence of such subjective errors. A province level agricultural planner recalled that:

In 1958 the following case of dogmatism emerged. At that time it was right in the middle of the high tide of the Great Leap movement, the stage-jumping (dot chay giai doan) of China where Mao said that a day would be the equivalent of twenty years. It had a real influence on the Vietnamese movement. In our Vietnamese movement there were a number of agricultural cadre teams, with agricultural engineers or heads of the Province [Agricultural] Service who had closely studied the Chinese experience. I didn't know how they intended to put it into practice, but they wanted to use the Great Leap approach of the Chinese, and also said that one day would equal twenty years. But thanks to the clear sightedness of Chairman Ho Chi Minh, the North was able to oppose that dogmatism...I remember that at that time Thai Binh province set up a Winter-Spring plan of 2 1/2 tons [of paddy per hectare]. But I don't know whether because of the influence of China, or because of the newspapers, but suddenly down in the huyen, some huyen went up to 5 tons, and others, like Kien Xuong, planned for 20 tons per year per hectare. They said that if you know how to really get into mobilizing the masses, the creative initiative of the masses would become increasingly clear. Some villages even dared to push it up to 100 tons a hectare! 57

Hearing of this situation, Ho determined to pay an on the spot visit to investigate at the province town of Thai Binh, and convened a meeting of the leading province officials who outlined their vastly accelerated program for Ho's approval:

At the outset, Ho<sup>58</sup> only said, 'Correct. You are right in saying that the farther down one goes the more you see the creative initiative of the masses. Now tell me how much of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup>Interview No. 13, conducted in Saigon, January 1972.

 $<sup>^{58}</sup>$ The respectful and affectionate term  $\underline{\text{cu}}$  (venerable) was used throughout the narrative except in the direct quotations. It is rendered here as "Ho." In the direct quotes, Ho uses the "Uncle-nephew" form of address, which is rendered here simply as "I" and "you."

the 1957 Winter-Spring production targets you achieved, as well as the plan for fertilizer, and how many draft animals you have? <sup>59</sup>

As Ho went through each aspect of the plan in statistical detail, it became obvious that the province plan was built on enthusiasm, not facts. When told, for example, that fertilizer application would be doubled Ho asked how increased supply could be obtained. Further questioning revealed that it would throw the overall province plan out of balance by neglecting animal husbandry. Ho finally concluded, "What you have told me gives a one-sided presentation, you have listened to the masses in a one-sided way."

Ho's insistence on a detailed and realistic presentation of facts, and his effort to ensure that policy be formulated and executed in a systematic and cost-effective way contrasts with Mao's more casual endorsement of plans primarily based on political enthusiasm. In part, the different approaches are attributable to the unique time and circumstances of the episodes related above. The Great Leap campaign was a relatively

Interview No. 13, with a province agricultural planning cadre, conducted in Saigon, January 1972. This is an eyewitness account from a participant in the meeting.

<sup>1</sup>bid. In the case of Thai Binh province, mentioned above, Ho discovered that the Party newspaper, Nhan Dan, had helped inspire the abortive provincial Great Leap by publishing pictures of production miracles in China, which some provincial leaders decided to emulate. Ho insisted that the agricultural technical services try to duplicate the results on a limited experimental basis. The result was total failure. The interview respondent commented, "At that time it was still more obvious that without Chairman Ho's extremely clear sighted idea, Thai Binh province would have been in deep trouble." Interview No. 13.

short phase of the fifteen year period from China's Liberation to the Cultural Revolution, and represents the most extreme contrast in leader-ship behavior and policy styles. But it also illustrates the more fundamental problem that distinguishes the Chinese leader from his Vietnamese counterpart. The enormous scale of administration in China and the consequent problems of communicating and overseeing state affairs, make it necessary for the Chinese leader to address selective problems, and disseminate his appraisal and solution in simplified and symbolic terms.

Because of the Maoist emphasis on highly visible models of political behavior and economic management, his post-Great Leap policy style might be termed "achievement oriented." Policy formulation was aimed at selecting a limited range of priority goals, which the localities would implement by faithful but creative application of Maoist doctrine. most successful examples of initiative and zeal became national models and, in turn, a component of new policy goals such as "in agriculture, learn from Tachai." The policy style of Ho which stressed organizational discipline and successful policy implementation might be termed "performance oriented." For Ho, the important object of leadership was to ensure the effective functioning of "Party-directed mass line." While the "telescope and microscope" of Mao's thought was omnipresent in China, in Vietnam it was the personal dedication of Ho reflected in the performance of the Party cadre structure that permeated the masses. Ho said that, "Our Party is great because it knows how to figure out the big issues such as changing the backward economy and cultural level of our country into a progressive economy and culture, while at the same time it always shows concern for

the little things, such as bean paste, pickled eggplant, fish sauce, and salt — the necessities of the people's daily life." This homely tribute illustrates Ho's conviction that the leadership must take into account even the most mundane details of the population's livelihood. And though he was a leader who corresponded to the traditional "protector" image, it was not Ho who saw to these details, but the Party acting in his name.

The most important contrast between the policy styles of Ho and Mao is that Mao ultimately concluded that the opposition to his policies and even to his "work style" formed a coherent revisionist political opposition to his leadership. Thus an important element of Mao's policy style was the conflict with and testing of his colleagues to ensure that they not only produced good policy decisions, but did so for the right reasons. Ho's more direct intervention in the early stages of the policy planning process forestalled the development of clearly opposed policy lines. Moreover, the tolerance of diverse policy orientations among his principal subordinates did not lead to factional conflict because their activities were largely compartmentalized and directed toward the area most appropriate to their policy preferences. 62

Nhan Dan, February 8, 1961.

Thus Le Duan who expressed great concern for the movement in the South was made First Secretary and put in charge of directing the revolution from an overall perspective, Truong Chinh who emphasized strict adherence to doctrinally correct policies was placed in charge of state structure, and the pragmatic Pham Van Dong whose chief concern was getting the assigned job done was placed in charge of policy implementation. A similar division of labor had been made by Mao, but he ultimately found compartmentalization unsatisfactory.

## Policy Line and Policy Methods

An important contrast in policy orientations that did exist in the upper levels of the DRV leadership was shown in the different relative weights that various leaders put on developing the "forces of production" as opposed to consolidating the "relations of production." The significance of this debate lay in the use of these terms as surrogate code words for specific policy proposals. Giving priority to developing the "forces of production" tended to imply a willingness to use incentives and a wide range of pragmatic measures in order to increase production, while those who stressed the importance of the "relations of production" were registering concern about the dangers of using non-Socialist forms and methods in the increases of obtaining immediate results. 63 Ho did not appear to

<sup>63</sup> Jack Gray has persuasively argued that Mao has always placed strong emphasis on increasing production and attached great importance to technological inputs in economic policy, and feels that "renewed class struggle was closely related to the new policy of transforming agricultural technology." "The Economics of Maoism," in China After the Cultural Revolution (New York: Vintage, 1970), pp. 118-121. In the context of a comparison with the case of Vietnam, however, the striking point is that the DRV leadership has rarely expressed the view that class struggle is an effective means of increasing production. In addition, the Tachai brigade, made a national model by Mao in 1964 ("in agriculture learn from Tachai") had almost static production during the 1958-63 period (208 to 210 tons), Peking Review, No. 40, October 4, 1974, p. 23. Although this period included the natural calamities of the "three difficult years" (1959-61) and another calamity in 1963, it seems clear that Tachai's main significance did not lie in its production exploits, but in its remarkable perseverance and self-reliance in the face of adversity, and putting "politics in command." Currently, when Chen Yung-kuei, the original guiding force of Tachai and now a member of the Politburo, returns to Tachai, "He asks after production and how the people are getting along, but he is most of all concerned about our ideological progress." Peking Review, No. 41, October 11, 1974, p. 22.

take an identifiable position on this issue, while in China the struggle between the Liuists, allegedly favoring private plots, "profits in command," and a wide range of material incentives were denounced as revisionist by Mao. 64

Two of the DRV's principal leaders became identified with opposite sides of this issue. Party First Secretary Le Duan stated in 1960 that although according to the general laws of socialist development, "the productive forces develop in contradiction with the backward relations of production which restrict them" nevertheless "in the concrete situation of our North at present, the development of the forces of production is more backward than the development of the new relations of production." Truong Chinh, however, adhered to the conventional view and asserted that "at present, the matter that is the first rank of importance" in the countryside "is still the reform of the relations of production in agriculture." In 1962, Pham Hung, a Politburo member and also head of the Agricultural Board of the Premier's Office, delivered an orthodox exeges of this

A detailed list of the policy approaches labeled as the "Liuist model" is given by Jack Gray, "The Two Roads," in Schram, ed., Authority, Participation and Cultural Change in China, pp. 149-150. "Persistently advocating material incentives the two ringleaders of the revisionist line, Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao, tried to corrupt the working class, deceive the workers and lead them astray down the road of revisionism. Actually the workers were against giving bonuses and prizes which held back their enthusiasm for socialism. But Lin Piao maligned the workers and said that they 'think only about how to make money'." Peking Review, No. 24, June 14, 1974, p. 15.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>65</sup>Nhan Dan, February 18, 1960.

<sup>66</sup> Nhan Dan, August 10, 1960.

doctrinal problem, giving greater stress to the determining role of the relations of production. <sup>67</sup> The same year Le Duan reiterated his opposing position, and complained that in the first few years of agricultural cooperativization "very many places have only looked to reforming the relations of production and, moreover, have given too much emphasis on opposing the spontaneous development of capitalism." <sup>68</sup> For Le Duan, increased production was the major criteria for judging the success of policies and programs, a position which accords with the views imputed to Liu Shao-ch'i and, later, to Lin Piao. <sup>69</sup> No definite resolution of the different approaches of various DRV leaders to this central issue was made,

 $<sup>\</sup>frac{67}{\text{Nhan Dan}}$ , March 11, 1962, "... the relations of production have a definite influence on the speed and nature of the development of the forces of production."

<sup>68&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, September 11, 1962.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup>In a 1961 speech, Le Duan stated, "If there is no technological transformation and increase in labor productivity and development of production... the newly established socialist relations of production cannot possibly be pushed forward. Our people, cadres, and Party members must clearly recognize the great significance of the mission of stepping up production in this new period, and taking that as the starting point for every action of one's own locality or branch. Whether production increases or does not increase is the fundamental criterion for evaluating whether or not our job is well done." (Emphasis added). Nhan Dan, March 30, 1961. A speech made the previous day by Truong Chinh emphasized that the forces of production "require a thoroughgoing transformation of the relations of production." Nhan Dan, March 29, 1961. During and after the Cultural Revolution, Liu Shao-ch'i and later Lin Piao were strongly attacked for "putting production first." Liu's error was that he allegedly felt that "the principal contradiction at home was no longer one between the advanced socialist system and the backward productive forces of society." Peking Review, No. 48, November 30, 1973, p. 12. Mao is said to have "sternly criticized" this view when Liu advanced it at the 1956 Eighth Party Congress. Ibid.

and the DRV policy process continued to be suffused by a balanced tension between opposing views.  $^{70}$ 

To the Vietnamese leadership, the idea of balanced development was quite important. Le Duan outlined this view in the following terms:

... to build socialism in the North, we have no other way than to carry out socialist industrialization, set up a balanced and modern socialist economy, coordinate industry with agriculture in good proportions and take heavy industry as foundation... (We) must guarantee a gradual balance in our economy in general; and in industry in particular, we must coordinate in a balanced way heavy industry with light industry; in heavy industry itself we must also build in good proportions its component branches such as iron and steel, electricity, engineering, chemicals, building materials. Moreover, there must be a balance between industry, agriculture and transport and communication, etc. At present, we are pressed by the necessity of securing a gradual balance in the building of the material and technical basis of socialism. As agriculture develops a step, the law of balance requires that we must speed up industry a step further and conversely. /1

Like the Chinese, the DRV found themselves confronted with difficult decisions concerning the relative priorities of heavy industry, light industry, and agriculural development. As the DRV's First Five-Year Plan was being discussed, it was noted that, "there are some ideas to the effect that 'our country is still poor, the living standards of our people are still low, and therefore priority should not be given to heavy industry', it is said that 'since at present we have the assistance of the socialist camp

For a discussion of the continuation of this debate after 1965, see David Elliott, "North Vietnam Since Ho," <u>Problems of Communism</u>, July/August 1975.

The Duan, On the Socialist Revolution in Vietnam, Vol. II, pp. 182-183.

we can rely on the heavy industry of the fraternal countries'."<sup>72</sup> Other people were confused as to how the DRV could simultaneously "give priority" to developing heavy industry and "go all out" in developing light industry. The formula devised in 1960 to answer these reservations and objections was that the state would "take agriculture as the foundation and industry as the leading factor" - a slogan and policy that did not become current in China until 1961. Perhaps benefitting from China's experience, the DRV put more emphasis on light industry in its own plan

<sup>72</sup>Nhan Dan, June 8, 1960. In an important speech on this subject, Le Thanh Nghi noted that light industry and consumer goods has been slighted in the first post-Geneva years, and were only given adequate attention after the 1956 10th Plenum. But, at that time, another mistake was made, slighting the development of the means of production for heavy industry. In late 1957 and early 1958 the requirements in agriculture for machinery and farm implements was underestimated. This was corrected only in mid-1958. Nhan Dan, June 2, 1960.

<sup>73&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

The relative priority of industry and agriculture will be discussed in the following section on cooperativization. Le Thanh Nghi presented the DRV view of the relative priority of industry and agriculture in the following terms, "The Party's mission of economic development at the central level in the upcoming period will gradually move to take leadership in industry as the central task, and at the same time pay attention to agricultural leadership, but at the same time the local areas... with the exception of a few large cities and industrial zones... must still take the mission of leadership in agriculture as the central task for a long time to come, while simultaneously strengthening its leadership in industry." Nhan Dan, June 11, 1960. (Emphasis added).

than China had in its First Five-Year Plan. 75

Capital Investment by Sector in First Five-Year Plan 76

|                        | Agriculture | Transportation/<br>Communications | Industry | ( <u>Heavy</u><br><u>Industry</u> ) | ( <u>Light</u><br><u>Industry</u> ) |
|------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------------|----------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Soviet Union (1928-32) | 19.2%       | 18.4%                             | 40.9%    | (34.8%)                             | (5.3%)                              |
| China<br>(1953-57)     | 14.9%       | 15.1%                             | 47.9%    | (40.7%)                             | (7.2%)                              |
| Vietnam<br>(1961-65)   | 21%         | 12%                               | 48%      | (38.4%)                             | (9.6%)                              |

DRV: 1960 (65.8); 1962 (62.5); 1964 (60.4) China: 1953 (62.7); 1955 (58.3); 1957 (51.6)

(DRV figures are from Vo Nhan Tri, <u>Croissance economique</u>, p. 393. PRC figures are from Prybyla, <u>Political Economy</u>, p. 137).

<sup>75</sup> In its FYP the DRV put 20 percent of investment funds for industry into the light industry sector, while China had only allocated 15 percent in 1953-57. (Truyen and Vinh, L'edification, p. 134, and Prybyla, Political Economy, p. 137). Output value of light industry was a larger percentage of total industrial output in the DRV, as the following figures show.

The Soviet and Chinese figures are based on data supplied in K.C. Yeh, "Soviet and Communist Chinese Industrialization Strategies," in Treadgold, Soviet and Chinese Communism, p. 334 (Table 1). The further breakdown of investment in industry as a percentage of total investment into light and heavy industry categories is based on Yeh's statement that "85 percent of total capital investment in industry was allocated to heavy industry in both countries during their first FYP periods." Ibid., p. 336. The Vietnamese figures are based on data supplied in Doan Truong Truyen and Pham Thanh Vinh, L'edification d'une economie nationale independante au Vietnam (1945-65), p. 134.

The DRV directed a larger percentage of its investment into agriculture in its First Five-Year Plan than either the Soviet or the PRC, but this may be due in part to the higher level of external assistance to North Vietnam's industry, and the relatively smaller role of non-agricultural production in the DRV economy. 77

Another prominent aspect of DRV policy formulation was the incremental method of decision making which is summed up in Le Duan's characteristic formula, "step-by-step." This policy method was closer to the Soviet approach than the cyclic surges of Chinese development. During the period of the Great Leap, in fact, the DRV explicitly endorsed the Soviet

Non-Agricultural Production as a Percentage of National Product:

1952 1955 1957 1960 1964

|   | <u>1952</u> | <u>1955</u> | <u>1957</u> | <u>1960</u> | <u>1964</u> |   |
|---|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|---|
| Vietnam<br>Non-agricultural<br>production |             | 17.2        | 31.5        | 41.8        | 50.3        | • |
| Agriculture                               |             | 82.8        | 68.5        | 58.2        | 49.7        |   |
| China                                     |             |             |             |             |             |   |

| 11611041141                 |      | 02.0 | 00.5 |
|-----------------------------|------|------|------|
| China                       | •    |      |      |
| Non-agricultural production | 52.1 |      | 61.0 |
| Agriculture                 | 47.9 |      | 39.0 |

(DRV figures are from Truyen and Vinh, L'edification, p. 164; PRC figures are from Prybyla, Political Economy, p. 122).

In response to the ideological challenge of the Chinese, Khrushchev stated that the progress toward communism must be made "step-by-step" and warned that the socialist pace of development could not be "violated or bypassed at will." Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-61 (New York: Atheneum, 1964), p. 129. DRV leaders, and Le Duan in particular, frequently used the phrase "step-by-step" to characterize their policy orientation, but it is rarely encountered in the post-Great Leap Maoist writings.

method and implicitly rejected the Maoist way. Commenting on the Khrushchey doctrine on the advance toward communism presented at the 21st Congress of the CPSU, Nhan Dan wrote that, "Fully grasping the arguments in comrade Khrushchev's report is absolutely necessary for us to set our course for every action in a more exact way, and to eliminate confusion in understanding which would lead us to trying to cut short the two stages and attempt to jump (lit. "burn." dot chay) stages. 79 This critique echoed the Chinese own repudiation of leaping stages in the December 1958 Wuhan Revolution, and led the DRV leadership to urge "learning from international experience" and correctly employing "these laws in a manner appropriate to the special characteristics of our country in its past and present historical context, currently in a temporary situation of being divided."80 Politburo member Pham Hung pointed out that "the revolutionary spirit does not only mean always wanting to advance, but also means that you must know how to base yourself on reality and to see all of the facilitating factors while, at the same time, seeing all of the difficulties."81

China's Great Leap was an example of "jumping stages." The major fluctuations between mobilization and retrenchment in the course of China's

<sup>79&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan, February 21, 1959.</sub>

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

Nhan Dan, February 19, 1960. Hung added that, "In the course of revolutionary practice, in addition to the aspirations of the leadership and the masses, there are objective factors (like the level of development of productive forces, the level of enlightenment of the masses, the strength of the opposition to the new and progressive, etc...)."

post-Liberation development have been termed a "policy cycle" by some Western academics. Skinner's formulation of this idea rests on a view that there is a regular cyclic pattern of moves from inspirational appeals to the peasantry to evoke a response to government goals and campaigns (normative power), which are transformed into authoritarian measures when the initial response flags (coercive power), and ultimately require the government to restore incentives and appeals based on self-interest (remunerative power). 82 Applying this concept more specifically to the economic sphere of the PRC, Alexander Eckstein concludes that "mainland China's economic history since 1949 could be viewed as a perpetual confrontation between Mao's cosmology, Mao's vision, the vision of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on the one hand and the realities of the country's economic and technical backwardness on the other. It is the conflict between these two sets of forces, and continuous attempts to resolve and reconcile this conflict that ultimately produces cyclical behavior in the patterns of economic growth." $^{83}$  Underlying both these views is the assumption that policy in China was made by a unified group of ideologues, who are repeatedly compelled by peasant resistance and harsh economic reality to temper their mass mobilization efforts with economic incentives and

<sup>82</sup>G. William Skinner, "Compliance and Leadership in Rural Communist China: A Cyclical Theory," in Amitai Etzioni, ed., Complex Organizations: A Sociological Reader (New York: The Free Press, 1961), pp. 410-438.

Alexander Eckstein, "Economic Fluctuations in Communist China," in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., China in Crisis, Vol. I, Book 2 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 695-696.

other rationalizing measures.

As the Cultural Revolution finally showed, China's leadership was seriously divided on issues of basic policy, and the fluctuations represented a "struggle between the two lines" as well as an adjustment to economic realities. The most specific Chinese acknowledgement of a policy cycle was Liu Shao-ch'i's theory of the "U-shaped" curve in economic development, enunciated at the beginning of the Great Leap. 84 Richard Solomon observes that this pattern is "more political than economic" because "underlying the economic policies of these years (1955-58) is a sequence of leadership debates and policy shifts which shaped the Party's approach to promoting social change."85 The policy shifts, caused in part by disagreements at the highest levels of the CCP, were not cyclical. were alternating phases of a dialectical process of resolving basic questions of political orientation, that increasingly became questions of political power. Thus, the most detailed study of the Socialist Education period leading to the Cultural Revolution notes, "five discernible, though not wholly discrete, stages, prior to being officially merged with the

<sup>84&</sup>quot;The development [of the economy] is 'U-shaped', i.e., high at the beginning and end, but low in the middle. Didn't we see clearly how things developed on the production front in 1956-1957-1958 in the form of an upsurge, then an ebb, and then an even bigger upsurge or, in other words, a leap forward, then a consolidation phase, and then another leap forward? The Party and the masses have learned a lesson from this U-shaped development." Cited in Richard H. Solomon, Mao's Revolution, p. 346. As noted in the following section, the DRV explicitly rejected the concept of a "U-shaped" development pattern.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>85</sup>Ibid., p. 347.

Cultural Revolution."<sup>86</sup> During this period, the central rhythm of policy is not a cyclical pattern of initiatives from the leadership and reaction by the masses, but of an evolving political confrontation within the leadership itself, based on the lessons of the recent past and the different responses in learning from and adjusting to these lessons.

Because Ho was not a partisan actor in the policy debates of the LDP, differences in policy orientations and leadership styles among the key figures of the Politburo did not become transformed into issues of political power. In addition, the consensus on the overriding importance of the reunification of Vietnam was a strong unifying factor, and a consideration which probably served to preclude any major political challenges to the collective course agreed upon. <sup>87</sup> There were fluctuations in the rhythm of policy initiatives in the DRV. The excesses of the land reform were followed by a Rectification of Errors campaign. It was then concluded

<sup>86</sup>Richard Baum and Frederick C. Teiwes, <u>Ssu-ch'ing: The Socialist</u>
<u>Education Movement of 1962-1966</u>, China Research Monograph, No. 2 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), p. 47.

Reunification may well have been a divisive issue when it became apparent in 1956 that the Geneva Agreements would not be observed and a more active policy would have to be pursued toward the South. This "forward policy" was pursued after the 15th Central Committee Plenum in January 1959, which evidently reflected a basic consensus on the problem of the South until 1964, when changing circumstances posed important new policy questions (whether to continue to place primary emphasis on political and guerrilla struggle, or to move to large unit warfare to accelerate the collapse of Saigon and thus obviate U.S. intervention). The period 1956-58 may have been one in which debate on the South took place, but there is no public record of this, and other issues such as the Rectification of (Land Reform) Errors must have absorbed much of the leadership's attention.

that the policy pendulum had swung too far, in the opposite direction.

In a retrospective analysis of the Land Reform and Rectification of Errors campaigns Truong Chinh implied that the failure of the land reform was that it was not done within the context of an overall plan of economic development and political integration.

We didn't completely grasp the importance of cooperativizing the countryside after the land reform. When errors in the land reform were discovered and the organization was revised, we lost a period of more than a year in completing the land reform well... During the Rectification of Errors, at the beginning we divorced the task of mobilizing for Labor Exchange Teams and Cooperatives from the Rectification of Errors campaign; it was not until phase 3 of the Rectification of Errors that it was coordinated with the reorganization of the Labor Exchange Teams and the Cooperatives. 88

From this experience, the DRV leadership concluded that better policy coordination required a more incremental style of policy formulation. To avoid the great fluctuations of the "campaign style" of deciding on one pre-eminent goal and mobilizing all resources to serve that goal during a defined period of time, the DRV placed increasing emphasis on balancing priorities, and coordinating multiple policy objectives.

The prominence of the mass mobilization campaign in China was partly due to Mao's periodic interventions, aimed at getting the revolution back on course. By their nature, mass campaigns were incompatible with incremental and balanced policy methods, since they focused all energies on one paramount goal during an upsurge in activity of limited duration. There

<sup>88</sup>Nhan Dan, May 22, 1959. By early 1959 only 21 percent of the rural population was still in Labor Exchange Teams as opposed to 53 percent at the end of 1955. This drop was specifically attributed to the Rectification of Errors Campaign. Nhan Dan, May 27, 1959.

was a close connection between the Maoist rejection of the Administrative State model of the Soviet Union, and Mao's commitment to mass campaigns. Discussing the draft Constitution of 1954, Tung Pi-wu "remarked that the Chinese Communists had in the past lived by movements, but after the constitution had been adopted they would live by law." After the land reform was completed in 1952, Liu Shao-ch'i asserted that, "Big movements are not possible again hereafter. The main thing is to concentrate energy on economic construction." However, Mao's view was that "progress is made in a zig-zag spiral pattern" and that "imbalance is the law of human progress." In 1959 Mao repeated that, "Economic construction proceeds in a wave-like fashion, with its ups and downs, and one wave chasing another. This is to say that there are [sic] balance, disruption, and balance restored after disruption."

<sup>89</sup> Edgar Rice, Mao's Way, p. 126.

<sup>90&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid., p. 127.</sub>

<sup>91</sup> Mao Tse-tung, "Talks at the Nan-Ning Conference" (January 13, 1958), Miscellany, p. 80.

<sup>92</sup> Miscellany, p. 224. Mao cautioned, however, that, "Of course, wave-like advances cannot be too big. If too big, suddenly it will become a venturesome advance and suddenly it will become a conservative advance." Ibid. This may have been Mao's comment on the retrenchment from the Great Leap, at a time when he was particularly sensitive to his responsibility for the policy. In may 1959 Mao said, "In 1957 we opposed adventurism. As a result, progress took a saddle-like [U-shaped] form. In that year we had to lower production targets. Work should proceed in a wave-like motion. This year we have also lowered the production target slightly. In 1961 we will have another great leap forward. Socialist construction should proceed in a wave-like motion. 'As heaven wanes, so man's life is prolonged; as spring comes upon the world, so blessing visits the home'. We cannot have a high tide every day. I am not against progress in a wave-like motion, but I am against adventurism." Miscellany, p. 179.

The rhythm of the DRV policy system was more a movement of ripples than of waves. Alternation between expansion and consolidation phases of fixed duration was the primary method employed by the North Vietnamese leadership. There were, of course, major campaigns, such as land reform and agricultural cooperativization, but these were regarded as essential stages along the path of socialist transformation rather than models of accelerated political and economic development. In preparing for the agricultural cooperativization campaign at the time the Great Leap was being launched, Nhan Dan editorialized that, "we don't advocate expanding the labor exchange team movement in a bombastic, superficial manner as has previously been done in many places." During agricultural cooperativization, Le Duan warned against a "hot headed attitude, an adventurist and daredevil (mao hiem) ideology, lack of investigation and research, and lack of balanced evaluation."

<sup>93&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan, June 21, 1958.</sub>

<sup>94</sup>Nhan Dan, March 30, 1961. (Emphasis in original). Under some circumstances, the DRV used the short duration, total mobilization campaign method with success, however, most notably in the area of water conservancy. These campaigns came at a slack period of the agricultural year, however, and did not conflict with other priorities. An example is the 1958 decision of the Hung Yen Province Committee to "weld together" (gan lien) the water conservancy and cooperativization programs, and underline the importance of the former with a mass campaign. From 1955, the province had spent over 2.6 million dong (over U.S. \$700,000) on water conservancy, the verdict of this campaign was that "because of the resolute concentration of leadership, cadres, and labor power to push water conservancy forward, Hung Yen was able to create conditions for developing production at a rate faster than many other provinces." Nhan Dan, December 5, 1962. This type of campaign was the exception, not the rule, in the DRV. The 1958 campaign in Hung Yen, marked by a well publicized visit by Ho, was part of an attempt to discover and dramatize methods to combat a serious drought.

Mao selected models as the focus of emulation campaigns largely on the basis of unusual or atypical achievements. Two examples of this are the Sputnik Commune which was singled out as a model of the voluntaristic zeal that Mao wished to promote in the Great Leap, and the Tachai production brigade which became a national model of self sufficiency in agricultural development in 1964. The DRV equivalent was the Dai Phong cooperative. This model, however, was selected precisely because it was representative of the problems and conditions that most DRV cooperatives faced. Nhan Dan presented Dai Phong as a model with the comment that, "The economic, political and organizational structure of Dai Phong cooperative clearly is nothing special, compared to the majority of cooperatives in our North. Dai Phong is not the key point (trong diem) of the province or huyen." The basic reason for its selection as a model was its good economic management and correct implementation of central policies. 96

During the Dai Phong emulation campaign, it was pointed out that:

If there are no advanced targets, then there will be no way to develop the creative potential of the masses, and they will be hemmed in and held back. On the other hand, if targets are set out that are not based on reality, that is being divorced from the masses. The Dai Phong campaign is not just a campaign with noisy mobilization of the masses, but is a campaign to rationalize labor power, and organized [emphasis

<sup>95&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, February 25, 1961.

<sup>&</sup>quot;The reason Dai Phong became the leader in the Agricultural Cooperativization Campaign in our North was primarily because the economic management work of the cooperative was extremely good. Dai Phong cooperative correctly solved many matters concerning the Agricultural Cooperativization Campaign set forth by the Party Congress and the Politburo." Nhan Dan, May 24, 1961.

added] mass mobilization. 97

Emulation of the Dai Phong model was done in many different ways, including the selection of local "Dai Phongs" suitable for a particular area, and the selection of multiple models within a province, each exemplifying a different aspect of solving problems of agricultural production.

China's selection of models was based on different criteria, as the cases of the Sputnik Commune which became a symbol of the overblown expectations of the Great Leap, and the extraordinary Tachai brigade illustrate. China's evolution from the "Sputnik" model of the Great Leap to the "Tachai" model of the Socialist Education campaign was a change in focus, not in concept, of the emulation model. Whereas Sputnik was an unrepresentative example of communes because its production record was favored by special circumstances and beyond the reach of most rural communities, Tachai was unrepresentative in the extraordinary zeal and socialist consciousness of its members. Thus both Sputnik and Tachai were not examples of typical problems, solved by means that were within the grasp

<sup>97</sup> Nhan Dan, May 17, 1961. Another example of the DRV conception of the "Party-directed mass line" distaste for "noisy mobilization" is a Nhan Dan editorial criticism of the gap in performance levels between two cooperatives in roughly the same political and economic situation. "Where can the cause of this uneven development be found if not in the leadership of the Party Committees and government?... The creative force of the masses being brought into play (phat dong) in combination with the correct Party line in agricultural development is the general reason for success of all advanced model cooperatives... Leadership using models can avoid bureaucratism and superficiality, and reduce the practice of loud appeals and vacuous motivation drives (loi ho hao, co dong suong) as well as overgeneralized programs." Nhan Dan, January 2, 1964.

of a large majority of other rural communities. They both differed from the Vietnamese model of agricultural development whose role was primarily educational in a technical and organizational sense. It is not, of course, expected that all production brigades in China will match the unique achievements of Tachai. They are only supposed to emulate the "spirit of Tachai." In the DRV, however, it is the leadership techniques of Dai Phong that are being disseminated for consideration and adaptation by other agricultural cooperatives and, therefore, the model must be representative in its problems and realistic in its solution to them. This approach was the result of both the leadership concepts of Ho and his colleagues and the logical consequence of the policy system they constructed.

## Policy Systems: Structure and Process

The principal reason that Mao abandoned the "Party-directed mass line" was that the great distance between central policy formation and local policy implementation made the process of investigation, policy formation-

<sup>98</sup> The extraordinary spirit of collective zeal and self-sacrifice brought Tachai to national attention precisely because it was atypical. In 1963 when calamity struck Tachai, the Party branch returned the state relief supplies that were sent to them so that they could be given to more needy brigades. "When the landlords and rich peasants heard this they muttered: 'What's all this! Men die for riches, birds die for food! But these cadres of ours turn back goods delivered right to our doorstep just because they want to become models'." Peking Review, No. 41, October 11, 1974, p. 20. The DRV singled out a cooperative because its "unusual actions are not isolated and blind actions of a small minority, but have to be self motivated and organized activities of the majority of the masses." Nhan Dan, May 17, 1962.

implementation-revision too slow and too vulnerable to bureaucratic distortions and delays. 99 The mass campaign was one method used by Mao to ensure that priority be given to his preferred policies. Another important method of circumventing the bureaucracy was to go outside the formal decision making structure to change the "locus of decision making." One study of this subject concludes that "in the 1960's, due to dissension in the top leadership, political power in China was diffused to a considerable degree; consequently the arena of political conflict expanded, and Party officials were, to a greater extent than in the 1950's, drawn into participation through the Central Work Conferences, in the decision making process and the resolution of conflicts." This expansion of participation of lower level leaders in policy making and Mao's increasing intervention in formulation of policy parallels Ho's practice of wide consultation and personal guidance in the early stages of the policy process. The fundamental difference was that while Ho was attempting to avoid sharp clashes on policy by influencing ideas and proposals before they became hardened into formal programs, Mao's intervention in the policy process was apparently aimed at the partisan goal of gathering

For the details of pre-Cultural Revolution cycle of investigation and policy formulation, see Lewis, <u>Leadership in Communist China</u>, pp. 72-73.

<sup>100</sup> Parris H. Chang, "Research Notes on the Changing Loci of Decision in the Chinese Communist Party," The China Quarterly, No. 44, October-December 1970, p. 180.

support for his programs at the working level.  $^{101}$ 

The explanations for Mao's progressive disenchantment with the established structure of the policy system are outlined in his own statements. He was irritated at the bureaucracy's monopoly of information relevant to important policy decisions and, in early 1958, complained that the "finance and economics departments do not keep the Political Bureau informed." Noting that "Chang Po-chun intends to set up a bourgeois planning council," Mao made it clear that, "Our planning council is the Political Bureau which operates through an exchange of information." Nonetheless, Mao felt that the Politburo had become a mere "voting machine." "You give it a perfect document," he said, "and it has to be passed." A year later Mao observed that, "The State Council and the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held meetings and solved

<sup>101&</sup>lt;sub>One</sub> example of Mao's frustration against having his proposals ignored and his recognition of the necessity for personally participating at working level sessions was his statement in January 1958 that, "I must have the opportunity to speak. From January to November of 1956 it was opposition against 'bold advances'. The Second Plenary Session of the Central Committee devised seven articles. It was a compromise formula, and the solution was not thorough. The conference of provincial and municipal party committee secretaries admitted that part of the money was not properly spent. However, the discussion was not carried out thoroughly, thereby causing the trend of opposing 'bold advances' to spread all over. Liao XX reflected to me that there seemed to be no regrets although the forty articles had been blown away." Miscellany, p. 83.

<sup>102&</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>., p. 77.

<sup>103&</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>., p. 79.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid., p. 80.

many isolated questions, but they did not grasp the essential questions." At the outset of the Great Leap Mao was still attached to a stable policy structure and regularized policy process. In May 1958
Mao told the conference of heads of delegations to the Second Session of the Eighth Party Congress that, the "Central Committee holds four meetings a year, with one party congress. The provinces hold six meetings, with two big check-ups on the results and four small meetings." Nonetheless, only two plenary sessions of the Central Committee were held between 1961 and 1966, and the Ninth Party Congress was postponed until 1969. The locus of decision making was often moved outside formal channels during the 1960's. 107

Expansion of participation in top level decision making clearly raises the possibility of formation of cliques and a retrogression into factional politics. The charges against Liu Shao-ch'i (and later Lin Piao) and their "renegade traitor cliques" and "gangs" suggest that there was, at least, a perceived potential for this type of traditional political behavior to re-assert itself in China. Some studies have concluded that a sort of institutionalized system of bargaining among segments of the top leadership group served to channel and mediate conflict within the elite

<sup>105&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid.</sub>, p. 202.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>106</sup>Ibid., p. 123.

<sup>107</sup> Another example of the changes in structure and process in the policy system is that, "The State Council met frequently in the 1950's but less often in the 1960's." Michel C. Oksenberg, "Policy Making Under Mao," in John M. H. Lindbeck, ed., China: Management of a Revolutionary Society, p. 109.

until Mao shattered the system with the Cultural Revolution. 108 In 1962, Mao had asserted that the only limitations on letting people "speak out" were that "we must observe Party discipline, the minority must obey the majority, and the whole Party should obey the Centre" and the "prohibition on organizing secret groups. 109 Mao added that, "We are not afraid of open opposition groups, we are only afraid of secret opposition groups. 110 But, as Mao acknowledged in the same speech, "In the beginning truth is not in the hands of the majority of people, but in the hands of the minority. 111 Acting on this principle, Mao went outside the Party organization and initiated the Cultural Revolution.

The DRV policy system is characterized by the maintenance of a sharp boundary between policy and operations in theory and in the structure of the policy system, while in the actual working of the system there is a continuous interplay between the two. Although Ho did not have distinctive and identifiable policy "line" and was not, therefore, a partisan

<sup>108</sup> Andrew J. Nathan, "A Factionalism Model For CCP Politics," The China Quarterly, No. 53, January-March 1973, p. 59. Nathan stresses that this is not a faction in the sense of an "organized opinion group" and disavows an intention to formulate a power struggle model. He feels that, "Through its limitation of sanctions and its shifting alliances, factionalism bound the movement together and prevented its fragmentation into permanently hostile rival movements." Ibid.

Mao Tse-tung, "Talk at an Enlarged Central Work Conference," in Stuart Schram, ed., Chairman Mao Talks to the People, p. 183.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

actor in policy controversies, his frequent and informal interventions in the early stages of the policy process appears to have forestalled the hardening of issues into irreconcilable options despite the fact that there were clear differences in policy orientation between his principal subordinates. The "step-by-step" incremental approach to policy formulation required close coordination between the separate phases of the policy process (problem identification, investigation, decision and implementation), and the stress on the importance of the implementation phase had as its corollary the identification of new problems, which launched a new round of this policy sequence.

An example of this "feedback model" of policy formulation is the agricultural cooperativization campaign which will be discussed in detail in the following section. After the campaign had been underway nearly one year, Ho still paid close attention to its problem areas. He advocated that a few cooperatives in various localities should be selected as models to observe the implementation of the cooperative regulations (which should be "really simple and close to reality") and, after that, the results reported directly back to him. 112 Concurrently, Ho chaired a meeting of the State Council to listen to the State Planning Commission report on the 1959 State Plan and the plan for 1960. 113 The State Council then delegated the responsibility to the Office of the Premier to implement the Plan and disseminate its contents to the ministries, regions, and

<sup>112&</sup>lt;u>Nhan Dan</u>, January 22, 1960.

<sup>113&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>

provinces. This set of decisions illustrates both the close personal involvement of Ho in the policy process and the tightly defined institutional boundaries of the policy system. The Office of the Premier during this key period in DRV planning seems to have a position relative to the State Council analogous to the Secretariat's relationship with the Politburo. Thus the locus of decision making was clearly identified and a formal separation made between policy and operations, even though the small size of the leadership group must have blurred this distinction in actual practice.

The organizational system for carrying out decisions made at the center was a logical extension of the Administrative State model. As noted in an earlier section on the role of state and Party institutions in political integration, the DRV leaders followed a pattern of level-by-level leadership, which was guided by formal regulations, and which attempted to maintain a clear boundary between the Party and the state. Maintaining a close linkage between the center and basic levels depended on an efficient and dedicated cadre structure. In China, Mao increasingly sought to circumvent the state and Party hierarchy of cadres, who became intensely pressured by Maoist attacks and Liu's alleged efforts to "hit

<sup>114</sup> Ibid.

<sup>115</sup> After the Third Party Congress in September 1960, Premier Pham Van Dong was listed as the head of the State Council, but Ho - as State Chairman - undoubtedly continued to preside over its meetings. While the State Council reports to the National Assembly's Standing Committee headed by Truong Chinh, Article 67 of the 1960 Constitution provides that the State Chairman has the authority to preside over State Council meetings "when necessary."

out at the many to save the few" by putting the blame for rural problems on the cadres at basic levels. 116 Mao criticized Stalin's emphasis on cadre leadership in a 1958 speech and asked "if 'cadres decide everything' then what about the masses?" The DRV, by contrast, specifically endorsed this slogan. 118

Second only to the importance of cadres in the DRV philosophy of leadership was the role of planning. In the words of a former province level cadre,

Planning plays a very important role. Chairman Ho and Premier Pham Van Dong said that the contents of official documents and of the words of the Party are one thing, but they must be manifested in figures and in a plan which the comrades carry out annually — in a way which is either right or wrong. And later we thought, making a plan is really right because it is a guide for leadership, but we had to manifest it in figures, and those figures were welded to the line and policy of the Party Central Committee, as well as with the capabilities and aspirations of the masses. You combined these into one result which is reflected at the end of the year. Then after we had heard (the plan) we went back to pass it on to the cadres in our organization, and then down to huyen, and sometimes met with village cadres to pass it on. 119

<sup>116</sup>Cf. Richard Baum and Frederick Tiewes, "Liu Shao-ch'i and the Cadre Question," Asian Survey, No. 4 (April 1968), pp. 323-345.

<sup>117</sup> Miscellany, p. 105.

Nhan Dan, May 29, 1960, wrote that, "in the upcoming five year plan, it is clear that the crucial issue to be resolved is nurturing and training a large army of cadres for economic construction and trained workers on a grand scale, in a balanced ratio with the development of each branch of the state economy, at an accelerated rate. Just as comrade Stalin said as the Soviet Union was entering its first five year plan, 'cadres decide everything'."

<sup>119</sup> Interview No. 13.

Planning played an important role in determining the rhythm and sequence of the policy process, since the last three months of the year were spent assessing the plan fulfillment and setting out the quotas and guidelines for the coming year. The DRV press frequently criticized the tendency to coast for the first half of the year, and rush to meet targets in the last half.

The hierarchical nature of the "Party-directed mass line" had an inherent tendency to limit the reciprocity embodied in the formula "from the masses to the masses." Le Duc Tho noted a "tendency to rely on the upper levels and simply carry out what they pass down in a mechanical way," and related this to the fact that "the upper levels do not pay sufficient attention to the zeal and initiative of the lower levels." Attending a provincial congress on cooperativization, Ho criticized the cadres for being "subjective" and failing to follow the mass line. "The targets set out are not yet coming from the bottom up, but are dumped down from above." 123

<sup>120&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

<sup>121</sup>A 1963 Nhan Dan editorial on "mobilizing the masses" criticized cadres for using the number hours of meetings spent in discussions among themselves, and the number of "suggestions from the masses" they received as indicators of success. "Some people were worried that mobilizing the masses too intensely might create tension within the unit... In the mobilizations, these comrades want to hear themselves speak more than they want to listen to the masses." The editorial suggested ideological mass mobilization as the basis for resolving organizational and technical problems, thus strengthening rather than circumventing the Party leadership hierarchy. Nhan Dan, August 18, 1963.

<sup>122</sup> Nhan Dan, August 19, 1959.

<sup>123</sup> Nhan Dan, November 21, 1959.

Nonetheless frequent complaints of overblown and inaccurate reporting from lower levels made the central leadership reluctant to put too much faith in grass roots initiative. A typical report by a province level unit complained that "recent experience has shown that subjective methods and thoughts of cadres, huyen and villages reporting to higher levels don't reflect the whole problem." In addition, it was recognized that some lower level cadres had, as in China, set unrealistically high performance targets. 125

After a brief and unsatisfactory experiment with encouraging "achievement oriented" cadre behavior in the early stages of cooperativization (discussed more fully in the following section), the DRV leadership reasserted hierarchical controls on the lower levels, and by 1962 Le Duan still complained that it was difficult to impress on the lower levels that passing a resolution at central level did not "settle everything,"

<sup>124</sup>Nhan Dan, September 22, 1959.

Nhan Dan, July 25, 1959. The editorial found "commandism" widespread, and criticized cadres who "forced the masses to agree to production plans beyond realistic possibilities." This is reminiscent of the 1956 critique, identified during the Cultural Revolution as being inspired by Liu, that "one should not indulge in idle fantasies unrelated to reality, plan one's actions beyond the conditions dictated by the objective situation or force oneself to do the impossible." JMJP editorial, June 20, 1956, cited in Solomon, Mao's Revolution, p. 354. This editorial identified "hastiness" as existing "not only among the cadres of the lower levels but primarily among the cadres of the higher levels," (original emphasis) and added that in many cases the hastiness manifest at the lower levels "is the result of pressure from the higher levels." Ibid. This is an ironic contrast to the accusations leveled at Liu's purported attempt in 1964 to "hit at the many to protect the few" and divert attention from higher level cadres by placing the blame for leadership errors on the lower levels.

and that many cadres "carried out the directives and resolutions of the higher levels in an inflexible, mechanical manner, lacking initiatives and clinging to the strict interpretation of each word and each sentence." The fault did not lie entirely with the lower level cadres, however, because the policy system itself encouraged such "bureaucratism" among the basic level cadres. The DRV stress on hierarchy and balanced incremental policy formulation insulated the policy system against the excessive concentration on one task that often resulted from the campaign style of leadership, and ensured better coordination of local and outside resources. It also placed a heavy burden on the basic level leadership. A village cadre's view of the bottom end of the policy pipeline illustrates the problem,

Every time there is a major task, we receive three or four bulky circulars and directives. The directive sent by the Center is thin, the province directive is a little thicker and has added the province situation, the <u>huyen</u> directive is still thicker yet and has added the <u>huyen</u> situation... There are too many papers being sent from above into the village, and we can't read them all. It would be better to only mention the main points and general intention, and the concrete tasks for the village. 127

<sup>126&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, September 11, 1962.

Nhan Dan, August 4, 1960. The village cadre also criticized the multiplicity of general meetings which absorbed everyone's time and proposed that only those concerned with a specific task should attend the meetings related to it. In addition, the proliferation of ad hoc leadership bodies was criticized. "Recently a number of new sections (ban) were set up: the harvest collection, the anti-flood, the water conservancy, sports, sanitation and preventive medicine, statistical sections, etc. Each of the sections is headed by the Chairman of the Village Administrative Committee, and if he went to everyone of them he would spend the whole day in meetings." Ibid.

Because of the accumulation of directives and tasks at the lowest levels, it is little wonder that in some places village organizations came to resemble "a little <u>Huyen</u> Committee." 128

One obvious method of ameliorating this tendency toward bureaucratic immobilism was to send higher level cadres to the lower levels. The PRC first attempted this on a large scale with the <a href="https://docs.org/16.25">https://docs.org/16.25</a> first attempted this on a large scale with the <a href="https://docs.org/16.25">https://docs.org/16.25</a> first attempted this on a large scale with the <a href="https://docs.org/16.25">https://docs.org/16.25</a> first attempted this on a large scale with the <a href="https://docs.org/16.25">https://docs.org/16.25</a> fang ("sending down") campaign, and subsequently added new variations such as sending work teams to a point." These leadership devices were employed both to exercise closer supervision over the lower levels and to get rapid feedback "from the masses" in order to check on the feasibility and suitability of programs that were sent down "to the masses." In China, however, the <a href="https://docs.org/16.25">https://docs.org/16.25</a> In China, however, the <a href="https://docs.org/16.25">https://docs.org/16.25</a> In China, however, the <a href="https://docs.org/16.25">https://docs.org/16.25</a> fang campaign came to be regarded by Mao as a therapeutic cure for "bureaucratism" rather than a measure to improve the efficiency of the administrative system. The work teams sent to the communes by Liu Shao-ch'i in

<sup>128&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

One standard study of bureaucracies notes that, "Since some leakage of authority usually occurs wherever orders are passed down through any level of the hierarchy, such leakage tends to become cumulative where many levels are involved." Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967), p. 134. Downs notes that, "Most attempts by higher-level officials to discover what is really happening below them involve redundancy, by-passing or both." Ibid., p. 147. The work team is an example of both, since it duplicates the formal reporting and control system in many respects, and bypasses the intermediate levels of authority.

As one survey of the subject concludes, <u>hsia</u> <u>fang</u> began in late 1956 as "a movement for administrative retrenchment" and, after the Rectification Campaign of 1957, became a movement not merely to 'transfer to the lower levels' but to 'transfer to the bottom most level to engage in physical labor'." Rensselaer W. Lee III, "The Hsia-fang System: Marxism and Modernization," <u>The China Quarterly</u>, No. 28, October-December 1966, pp. 43-45.

the 1963-64 period to check on local cadre performance were severely criticized in the Cultural Revolution. Mao's distinctive approach was to attempt to restore the mass line as a form of direct communication between himself and China's masses, who would apply his concepts to local problems. The restoration of the Poor and Middle Peasant Associations, as the basis for political power in the villages in 1963-64 presaged Mao's attack on the Party as a bureaucratic obstruction to the mass line, and represented an important aspect of his desire to replace the administrative hierarchy with a spirit of self-reliant community action. 131

When the <a href="hsia-fang">hsia-fang</a> campaign was initiated in China, the DRV was sufficiently impressed to borrow this leadership technique, along with its two distinctive rationales -- cadre therapy and closer administrative control of the lower levels. But whereas in China the therapeutic aspect of "sending down" gradually became dominant (until it was institutionalized in the May 7th cadre schools of the Cultural Revolution), in the DRV it was increasingly oriented toward improving the flow of information between higher and lower levels or, in the DRV's terminology, "exercising close leadership" (lanh dao sat). The DRV felt that a "Party-directed mass line" was appropriate to its circumstances, and that the linkages in

<sup>131</sup>Cf. Baum and Teiwes, Ssu Ch'ing, pp. 15-17.

The Province Party Secretary of Thai Nguyen, for example, related that, "We have determined a policy of changing our old ways of leadership. It is necessary to go down to the village. Going down to the village is the duty of every cadre, going down in order to avoid bureaucratism, to exercise firm leadership, and for the cadres to understand the masses and better understand practical realities." Nhan Dan, June 19, 1958.

the mass line cycle of problem identification-investigation-decision-implementation could be made in two steps; from center to province and from province to village.

As the PRC experimented with elaborate systems of periodically rotating higher cadres from their offices to lower levels or sending them to "squat on points" at the basic levels for extended periods, and with work teams, the DRV continued its method of level-by-level leadership, supplemented with frequent inspection tours by province and <a href="https://www.nuemo.cadres.133">https://www.nuemo.cadres.133</a>
Typically a work schedule would be determined by the next higher level, which would then supervise and inspect its implementation. 134 This method had the disadvantage of not always underlining the most important priorities,

<sup>133&</sup>lt;sub>The</sub> province level cadre interviewed said that of the more than 300 villages in his province, he knew the local situation and the capacities of the village cadres in about 200. Interview No. 13.

 $<sup>^{134}</sup>$ The DRV term for work schedule is  $\underline{1ich}$  (calendar or almanac), bringing to mind the I-ching comment that "the superior man puts the calendar in order and makes the seasons clear." Nhan Dan, June 8, 1960, reports on a huyen setting out the work schedule (lich) for the villages. In a more technical sense, the Phu Tho Province Committee reports sending down an almanac of projected weather conditions and harvest schedules to the huyen, for each level and cooperative to take the initiative and set out a production plan for each period, and to guarantee that it will be in tune with the seasonal situation. "Also, we have taken the lead in carrying out the setting up of a ledger of weekly production progress, to help the cooperatives compare the rate of sowing in one week with the previous one, this year with last year... [and] strengthened the investigation mission all the way down to the cooperative and production team level, along with organizing mutual interchanges of visits among them." Nhan Dan, November 3, 1962. The "calendar" also had to be agreed on between agencies at the central level. The State Council announced its acceptance of the calendar proposed by the Ministry of Agriculture and passed it back to the Ministry to "closely lead in the area of the seasonal tasks and gain experience in leading the local areas for feeding back into planning in following years." Nhan Dan, January 29, 1964.

as in mass campaigns, and led some village cadres to complain that "all we see from the <u>huyen</u> is pressure, but no specific guidance on how to get the job done. There are one hundred things to do and we don't know where to start." But the DRV also discovered through experience that large, short term infusions of cadres were no help. <u>Nhan Dan</u> editorialized that, "Upon seeing that a number of cooperatives were really poor, cadres from higher levels poured in to assist the movement, but because they didn't pay attention to following up and giving prior assistance, therefore at present the situation has given rise to many complex matters, and much time and energy is lost consolidating the movement." 136

The DRV attempted to compromise between too much intervention from above and victimization by "rosy reports" (bao cao to hong) from basic level cadres by regularizing investigation and inspection procedures, and strengthening the statistical and reporting system. At the outset of cooperativization there were widespread complaints about this problem and the reduction of plan implementation to "a formality." Over the course of the early 1960's this problem was remedied. As a former province cadre describes it:

<sup>135&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, February 2, 1960.

<sup>136&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, May 17, 1964.

Surprisingly, at a time when Chinese statistical work is generally thought to have been reduced in importance and accuracy, the 1960 DRV-China technical assistance agreement included aid from China in the area of statistical work. Nhan Dan, January 25, 1960.

<sup>138&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, February 2, 1960.

Previously in the matter of accurately grasping the situation at the lower levels there was a tendency not to reflect reality. There could be an error of, perhaps, 9-10 percent over the real situation because they wanted to report to the higher levels like that to score achievements for their own local area. This created tremendous difficulties for the leadership at higher levels and was very dangerous. But from the time that the statistical agencies were strongly expanded, they formed a "system" (he thong). For example, in my province there were 5,000 statistical cadres at the production team level, who could be easily called together to form a "system." Later on we got on top of this situation, and the statistics in my province and in the DRV as a whole are extremely objective. 139

Another important inducement to accurate reporting and frank assessments in the DRV "performance model policy system" was the stability in tenure of basic level cadres, in contrast to the high rate of turnover in the more "achievement oriented" PRC system, as the following section will discuss, since in a hierarchical system the higher levels must also accept responsibility for deficiencies in policy implementation.

North Vietnam's compact scale of territorial administration made it relatively easy for the central leadership to maintain direct contact with the provincial leaders, and the latter to make their influence felt at the village level. The central link with the provinces frequently took the form of Politburo members visiting provinces to transmit important directives. This enables the central level leaders to better appreciate the specific problems of policy implementation, but at the same time contributes to a more centralized decision making process, since the problems are less diverse than in China's vast territory and therefore more amenable

<sup>139</sup> Interview No. 13.

to resolution at higher levels. 140 At the same time, the closer contact of the highest level decision makers with local problems of implementation facilitates the flow of information which makes a "Party directed mass line" approach a flexible policy instrument. 141

In addition to the visits of Politburo members to the provinces, and periodic conferences of province leaders at central level, the Sectariat of the Central Committee appears to play an important role in the

Some random examples can be cited as illustrative of this process. Nguyen Chi Thanh went to Nghe An province to "contribute ideas" to the Province Committee about how the forthcoming basic level Party Congresses should be carried out, and then "exchanged ideas" on this subject with Secretaries of the Village Party Chapters. His critique was that the Province Committee did not directly assist the Village Secretaries but went through "too many echelons." The solution was to have direct province leadership at the village level. Thanh also discovered that the Province Committee and some Huyen Committees were vacillating in carrying out a key central directive on reducing the size of basic level Party Chapters and that "documents are passed down too slowly and pile up at the huyen level." Having discovered this bottleneck in the policy process, Thanh outlined specific organizational remedies for the problem. Nhan Dan. April 9, 1960. In Nghe An province, "after getting supplementary instructions from the Center" the Province Party Committee held an expanded meeting and then met with representatives of the Village Party Committees. Nhan Dan, April 20, 1960. These examples demonstrate how directives could be communicated from highest to lowest levels with a minimum of intermediaries.

Another example of involvement of central leaders at the province level is Truong Chinh's visit to Nam Dinh province to speak at a production conference and give specific details on how to carry out Central Committee resolutions, and what priority to give to each task. (The first ten days were to be spent on census work, the next ten on ideological work connected with consolidating cooperatives, and the last ten on organizational work in consolidating cooperatives with emphasis on correcting errors that had occurred in implementing this policy.) Nhan Dan, March 12, 1960. In a report on another province situation with which he was clearly familiar, Truong Chinh noted that the strong point of Vinh Phuc province was "transmitting Central Committee directives quickly to all echelons." Nhan Dan, April 4, 1960.

details of province planning. The Phu Tho Province Committee, to cite an example, "determined the direction of agricultural development in the First Five-Year Plan after receiving guidance from the Central Committee Secretariat." The Province Committee was viewed as the key link in the transmission of central policies to the lower levels. The communique of the important 5th Central Committee Plenum, which assessed the initial results of the agricultural cooperativization campaign, declared that the provincial leadership would be strengthened "in order to enable the cadres at provincial level to give guidance down to the village level." The huyen level had the role of "helping the provincial level to keep close to, lead, control, and supervise the village level."

The exchanges between the higher level cadres disseminating policies, and the lower level cadres entrusted with carrying them out were often frank and spirited. In Hung Yen province, where Province Committee members came down to the village cooperatives,

We were able to see that the comrades in the Standing Bureau of the Province Committee solicitously took care of the comrade village cadres when they went up to province. This fraternal behavior of superior to subordinates can never violate the adherence to principle in carrying out the job. On some matters, the Province Committee had to carry out three or four days of discussions — which occasionally became very heated arguments — because (the cadres) are not yet in accord. If a cadre cannot carry out his job, then though he is a village Party Chapter Committee member, a <u>Huyen</u> Committee member, or a

<sup>142&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan</sub> <u>Dan</u>, October 18. 1962.

<sup>143&</sup>quot;Agricultural Problems," <u>Vietnamese Studies</u>, No. 2, 1964, p. 163.

<sup>144</sup> <u>Ibid</u>

Province Committee member, he must be replaced. [Emphasis in original] In 1960, the Hung Yen Party Headquarters disciplined 30 Party members, 13 of whom had committed the error of not correctly implementing Party policy. The entire Party Committee of Trung Dung village (Tien Ly huyen) had to be replaced because of its laxness in carrying out the state plan. 145

This report illustrates the "performance" orientation of the DRV policy system. There is considerable "feedback" from the lower levels, as the arguments of lower level cadres with the Province Committee indicate. Yet it is through the Party hierarchy that the "mass line" flows. But despite the hierarchical nature of the DRV policy system, there does not seem to be a great degree of intimidation of lower levels by their superiors at higher levels. 146

The DRV "performance oriented" policy system placed heavy emphasis on correct bureaucratic implementation of plans from above, and appears to have rewarded compliance more than spectacularly visible, but isolated

<sup>145&</sup>lt;u>Nhan</u> <u>Dan</u>, April 7, 1961.

<sup>146</sup> Specialists from province level for example were not automatically accorded deference. A deputy chief of the Ninh Binh Province Water Conservancy Service complained to Nhan Dan that he had made an urgent trip to a huyen to inspect the dikes. Arriving at 2:00 AM he found three Huyen Committee cadres sleeping in the Party headequarters, but had little success in rousing them out to look at the dike. "A fresh wind like this," one said, "is all the better for a comfortable sleep." Nhan Dan, July 27, 1960. In the Ninh Binh Party Congress "many comrades showed their anger about the fact that the spring harvest was poor and the people suffering deprivation, and felt it was because the higher levels of leadership was not close (khong sat). Some comrades attacked the drawing up of the new plan and said that it sounded great, but couldn't be done... Many comrades struggled resolutely." Nhan Dan, September 27, 1960.

achievements. 147 Thus the short and intense mass campaign was eschewed in favor of the problem solving "phases" (dot) of an extended campaign.

After the brief DRV experimentation with mass mobilization in 1959 Le Duan concluded that while ideological mobilization was necessary:

This is not to say that we only need to mobilize the masses to enthusiastically stretch out their working hours and step up the degree of labor in an excessive manner. This can naturally not be sustained, and if it is kept up will adversely affect the health of the working people and reduce their labor productivity. The winter-spring harvest just past has given us a powerful lesson in this regard. 148

In late 1959 <u>Mhan Dan</u> editorialized that "consolidation is the crucial step in the mission, following a phase of expansion, which will overcome the unavoidable negative factors that crop up in the process of expansion, and enables a summarizing of successful experiences to be exploited, and lays down the conditions for advancing to another expansion phase." By 1963, the DRV had determined a fixed schedule of campaigns; two campaigns every three years consisting of three "phases" each. Cadre enthusiasm about campaigns was limited and in a major campaign of 1963

<sup>147</sup> Even the organizational means for guiding and disseminating examples of ideologically motivated achievement were drawn into more immediate tasks of program implementation. Nhan Dan disapprovingly commented on the tendency to use cadres in the Propaganda and Indoctrination (Tuyen Huan) branch to help out in immediate leadership tasks, leaving no time for work in their own field. Nhan Dan, January 15, 1962.

Nhan Dan, February 18, 1960. In the 1962 Duyen Hai campaign in industry, the stress was also on rationalizing production, and it was held that "campaigns make a lot of noise for a few days and then collapse." Nhan Dan, September 20, 1962.

<sup>149</sup> Nhan Dan, December 12, 1959.

<sup>150</sup> Nhan Dan, April 7, 1963.

aimed primarily at industry, "not a small number of cadres and higher level organs are still hesitating in the face of difficulties and regard the 'three-pro, three-anti' campaign as 'another burden that creates obstacles in fulfilling the production plan' and because of this they only worry about leadership in the immediate production task, and look lightly upon the leadership of the campaign." This campaign, occurring at the same time as the Socialist Education campaign in China, was intended to be "a class struggle in a new form," but Nhan Dan frankly admitted that "it has not yet created a strong and boiling revolutionary spirit among the masses." It concluded that ideological work would have to be closely linked to organizational and technical work. 153

In the DRV "performance oriented" policy system, production was the final arbiter of success, and the bureaucracy held the key to evaluating this success. China's "achievement oriented" system stressed the most visible successes of atypical units as models for emulation, and embarked on mass mobilization campaigns which sometimes violated principles of production efficiency. During and after the Cultural Revolution, Liu Shao-ch'i, and later Lin Piao, were strongly attacked for "putting production first." Liu's error was that he allegedly felt that "the principal contradiction at home was no longer one between the proletariat and the

<sup>151&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, September 18, 1963.

<sup>152</sup> Nhan Dan, April 28, 1964.

<sup>153</sup> Ibid.

bourgeoisie but one between the advanced socialist system and the backward productive forces of society." This, indeed, was the position taken by Le Duan, and the basis of his view that "production is the basic criteria to evaluate whether our tasks are well or badly done."

The "Liuist" method of receiving feedback on Party and state policies was to organize spot testing. While Mao implied that all China could emulate the spirit and follow the example (if not duplicate the achievements) of such highly visible and atypical models of achievement as Tachai, the Party bureaucracy stressed the situational diversity of China. The Later Ten Points on the implementation of the Socialist Education campaign (September 1963), frequently associated with Liu's colleague Teng Hsiao-p'ing, pointed out that, "Experiences gained in such spot testings have amply proved that comrade Mao Tse-tung's analysis and instructions on such problems as classes, class contradictions and class struggle in a socialist society, have great revolutionary and historic significance... At the same time, in spot testings at various places, a number of problems concerning concrete policies have been brought out." Brushing aside

<sup>154</sup> Peking Review, No. 48, November 30, 1973, p. 12. "Collaborating with Ch'en Po-ta behind Chairman Mao's back, Liu Shao-ch'i smuggled this revisionist trick into the resolution of the Eighth Party Congress (1956), but it immediately met with Chairman Mao's stern criticism." Ibid. In 1957 Mao said that, "The resolutions of the 8th Party Congress declare that the main contradiction is the contradiction between the advanced social system and the backward productive forces. Speaking reasonably, one cannot speak in that manner." Miscellany, p. 75.

<sup>155</sup> Richard Baum and Frederick Tiewes, <u>Ssu-ch'ing</u>, p. 63. (Emphasis added).

such quibbles, Mao spoke at the important Central Committee meeting of February 1963 that decided on the implementing measures of the first stage of the Socialist Education Campaign. "Comrade Mao introduced the successful experience attained in Honan and Hopei provinces. He said, 'Once class struggle is grasped, miracles are possible'." 156

The fact that the policy systems of North Vietnam and China were quite different does not signify that the approach of either system would have been more suitable in the context of the other's problems. Moreover, in comparison to other countries, the two systems have many more similarities than differences. Both have used a three component strategy of political integration, including (1) a central leadership for determining priorities and directions, (2) largely self-contained participatory communities and work units at the basic level, and (3) a Party that links the two. 157 The DRV "performance oriented" policy system and its Administrative State governmental structure was effective in a system with a high level of goal consensus, homogeneity and integration. 158 China's "achieve-

<sup>156&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

<sup>157</sup> See David Elliott, "Political Integration in North Vietnam: The Cooperativization Period," in Joseph Zasloff and MacAlister Brown, eds., Communism in Indochina: New Perspectives (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1975), pp. 171-74.

Anthony Downs asserts that, "Greater goal consensus, therefore, actually means an increase in the productive capacity of the bureau. Top level officials can retain the same quality and quantity of output as before, but reduce the controls, reports and other performance checks used to maintain it. This results in greater delegation of discretion to subordinates, and leads to the proposition that strong goal consensus is a vital part of any true decentralization of authority." Inside Bureaucracy, p. 223.

ment oriented" system was a reflection of Mao's policy style and his conviction that true integration could only be accomplished on the basis of class struggle. While the lack of goal consensus and the disruptions of the "struggle between the two lines" appears to be dysfunctional to the policy system, it could be argued that Mao's attempt to codify his "thoughts" and have them accepted as the basic guidelines for action throughout China actually served a unifying function as a counterweight to the historically "dispersionist" tendencies of China's widely diverse regions. By attempting to inculcate a problem solving "protestant" mentality within primary organizations at the basic levels, Mao was actually trying to create greater unity of action and goal consensus. 159

For the DRV, the Maoist approach appeared wasteful of energies and not relevant to a political system with an extraordinarily high level of goal consensus, due in large part to the external threat. With a small territory and a narrow resource base, there was little prospect of

<sup>159</sup> This rationale is not unknown to Western analysts of organizational problems, who find that there is "some indication that differentiation of hierarchical status in groups attenuates the very characteristics that have been hypothesized to be responsible for the superiority of groups over individuals in problem solving. This interpretation implies, consequently, that the more pronounced the hierarchical differences in a group, the less effectively it will perform." Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 123. The authors added, "The superiority of groups over individuals in certain types of task performance has been attributed primarily to three factors: (1) the sifting of suggestions in social interaction serves as an error-correction mechanism; (2) the social support furnished in interaction facilitates thinking, and (3) the competition among members for respect mobilizes their energies for contributing to the task." Ibid., p. 121.

generating significant capital surpluses through mass mobilization.

The important thing was to manage the distribution of scarcity and lay a more sophisticated technological foundation for economic development. Here the DRV's small territory was an advantage, since a relatively low level of technological inputs could have a dramatic impact, while in China they would be swallowed up in the vastness of the country. For China self reliance and simple and intermediate techniques were the key to a form of development that would not lead to class and regional inequities, or create a stratum of privileged "experts" - a problem which the DRV leaders were much less concerned about. Before turning to the question of the connection between policy orientation and the future of each regime, however, it is useful to examine the foregoing generalizations on leadership, policy styles, and policy systems in the framework of a more detailed case study of the agricultural cooperativization campaigns in China and Vietnam.

## SECTION III

## AGRICULTURAL COLLECTIVIZATION IN VIETNAM AND CHINA

Agricultural cooperativization in China and Vietnam offers a particularly good opportunity to explore the similarities and contrasts in concepts and techniques of leadership, and in the social and political legacies of the two revolutions. Both countries were faced with the challenge of breaking the cycle of poverty in a predominantly rural society. In both cases, the major period of agricultural cooperativization started about five years after Liberation following a thoroughgoing land reform and was basically completed within a relatively short period of time - a year in the case of China and two years in North Vietnam. In contrast to the coercion of Soviet style agricultural transformation, and to the harshness of their own Land Reform campaigns, the major changeover from private to cooperative agricultural organization in China and Vietnam was accomplished with remarkably little direct coercion. Moreover, coming four years after China's transformation, agricultural cooperativization in the DRV had a convenient fund of experience to draw on.

Beneath the similarities, however, lie some important differences. The progress of cooperativization in the DRV was a steady uphill climb, while cooperativization in China surged dramatically ahead in response to Mao's major July 1955 call for faster implementation of the cooperatives policy. China's policy toward the rich and middle peasants was

more stringent than Vietnam's, and the social composition of lower level cadres and their attitudes toward cooperativization were different. And while the goals of agricultural policy in the years following cooperativization and its organizational forms in China continued to undergo periodic major changes, both policy and organization in the DRV remained relatively stable.

## Agricultural Conditions and Models of Cooperativization

As the first Asian country to independently attempt agricultural collectivization, China had some reservations about the applicability of the earlier Soviet experience. The major differences between the Chinese and Soviet approaches have been well analyzed and documented. They include the Chinese decision to collectivize before achieving the mechanization of agriculture, the great contrast between the exploitative Soviet methods of extracting a surplus from agriculture and the milder Chinese approach, the weakness of the rural cadre in the Soviet Union and the greater reliance on outside intervention, and the thorough organization and political preparation for collectivization by the Chinese during the land reform and mutual aid team period. Despite these important differences, Mao felt compelled to rebut opponents of his accelerated cooperativization program by flatly asserting that, "The Soviet Union's

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Thomas Bernstein, "Leadership and Mass Mobilization in the Soviet and Chinese Collectivization Campaigns of 1929-30 and 1955-56: A Comparison," The China Quarterly, No. 31, July-September 1967.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Ibid.

experience is our model."<sup>3</sup> This Soviet model, however, was liberally amended by China, and the PRC collectivization program owed more to Mao than to Stalin.

Confronted with the necessity of countering criticism of collectivization by cadres who used the relatively advanced state of industrialization and mechanization in the Soviet Union at the time of agricultural collectivization to argue against an acceleration of the cooperativization program, Mao asserted that this was a mis-representation of the Soviet Union's own experience and that, "In agriculture, under the conditions prevailing in our country, cooperativization must precede the use of big machinery." Mao added, "I think we certainly should pay attention to this Soviet experience. We must oppose any impatience and rashness, any step taken without preparation and without considering the levels of understanding which the peasant masses have reached. What we should not do is to allow

Mao Tse-tung, "The Question of Agricultural Cooperativization," report of July 31, 1955, in Robert R. Bowie and John K. Fairbank, eds., Communist China, 1955-1959: Policy Documents With Analysis (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 102.

<sup>&</sup>quot;Some comrades disapprove of the Party Central Committee's policy of keeping agricultural cooperativization in step with Socialist industrialization, the policy which proved correct in the Soviet Union. They consider that the prescribed rate of development for industrialization is all right, but that there is no need for agricultural cooperativization to keep in step with industrialization, and that it should develop very slowly. That is to disregard the Soviet Union's experience. These comrades do not understand that Socialist industrialization is not something that can be carried out in isolation, separate from agricultural co-operativization." Ibid., p. 100.

<sup>1</sup>bid., p. 101. "We again have the experience of the Soviet Union to draw on," said Mao, "but some of our comrades take no notice of it."

some of our comrades to cover up their dilatoriness by quoting the experience of the Soviet Union." Nonetheless, the Chinese did depart from the Soviet experience, most notably in decreeing that mechanization was not a prerequisite to collectivization.

Despite the relative success of the Chinese cooperativization program, and the availability of relevant experience to guide their own policy deliberations, the North Vietnamese leadership underwent a quite similar challenge to their collectivization policies. Three years after the launching of agricultural cooperativization in the DRV, Le Duan reported that,

Recently there have been influences that have led a number of our cadres to have doubts and worries. And previously some cadres who had never studied [Marxist-Leninist] theory then got to study at the Party school. Seeing that the theories in the course textbooks said that industrialization must precede cooperativization, they concluded that it appeared as though our Party's Central Committee wasn't aware of that theory and that now they had just discovered a very new idea; and suspicions arose in their minds about the cooperativization movement in our country. 6

These doubts of a "small minority" of cadres were apparently well below the level of the top leadership. They were somewhat belated as well, coming only after bad weather, crop failures, and organizational problems in the 1960-62 period had created doubts about the viability of the agricultural cooperativization program. This was an important difference from the Chinese case, where the policy disagreements are alleged to

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

Nhan Dan, September 11, 1962. This important address is translated and reprinted in Le Duan, On the Socialist Revolution in Vietnam, Vol. 11, pp. 125-170.

have been at the highest levels of the Party, and doubts about the wisdom of a large-scale cooperativization movement had been expressed from the outset. Even more explicit and serious reservations were raised about Mao's concurrent proposal to place greatly increased emphasis on agricultural development. Mao's twelve-year agricultural development plan was apparently overruled in early 1956 by "a majority of those who saw the key to China's progress in industrialization."

In its Five-Year Plan that closely followed the decision to collectivize, the DRV envisaged mechanizing the cultivation of 10 percent of the crop area of the cooperatives (state farms were not included in this target). By 1959 when China's collectivization program had been completed, roughly 5 percent of total arable land (including state farms) was cultivated by tractors. The DRV felt that for North Vietnam the

There is some disagreement as to the extent of opposition to Mao's agricultural policies at the time of the cooperativization campaign. Charges leveled against Liu Shao-ch'i during the Cultural Revolution branded him as an implacable opponent (along with Teng Hsiao-p'ing and others) of accelerated cooperativization and priority to agricultural development. One analysis of this controversy, however, concludes that "Debate was over rates of development - a matter of degree - rather than fundamental approach." Frederick C. Teiwes, "Chinese Politics 1949-65; A Changing Mao," Current Scene, February 1974, p. 9.

Solomon, Mao's Revolution, p. 262. Cf. also Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization, p. 143.

Third National Congress of the Vietnam Workers' Party. Vol. III, p. 210. Some local cadres felt that this was insufficient and asked how this level of mechanization could possibly lead to raising the poor peasant's standard of living to that of a upper middle peasant during the course of the plan. Nhan Dan, July 9, 1960.

<sup>10</sup> Prybyla, The Political Economy of Communist China, p. 161.

alternatives of collectivizing or mechanizing agriculture were not mutually exclusive, and envisaged a fairly high level of mechanization before the completion of collectivization. The goal of widespread agricultural mechanization was more easily attainable for the DRV than China because of its smaller land area. DRV planners calculated at the outset of the First Five-Year Plan that it would take 40,000 to 50,000 tractors to completely mechanize its agricultural land area, while the Chinese estimated that their total requirements ranged from 800,000 to 1.2 million tractors. He Mechanization was not regarded as merely a labor saving device by the DRV, although by assuring the rapid completion of essential tasks during the critical planting season, a large reservoir of labor would not be required during the slacker periods of the agricultural calendar. It was also an important factor in achieving double cropping. Moreover, it was found that mechanized plowing

Both figures in 15 hp units. The DRV acknowledged that, "During the first period, as we cannot yet produce enough machines we must rely on the assistance of the brother countries." Third National Congress of the Vietnam Workers' Party. Evidently this assistance came primarily from the Soviet Union, was unexpectedly modest, and was essentially terminated by 1964. The level of Chinese assistance in this area cannot be determined from the available documentation. The DRV figures are from ibid., p. 112, and the Chinese figures are from Benedict Stavis, Political Dimensions of the Technical Transformation of Agriculture in China (Columbia University, Ph.D. dissertation, 1973), p. 141. The Chinese figures are based on the assumption that a standard 15 hp tractor could service 100 hectares, while the North Vietnamese figure is apparently based on the assumption that, taking into account its predominantly wet rice crop conditions, a single standard tractor could cultivate an average of 40 hectares. Le Duan cites the calculation that it takes a 15 hp tractor one day to plow 3 1/2 hectares, a task that would require 30 men to do the equivalent work. On the Socialist Revolution in Vietnam, Vol. III, p. 192.

raised yields from 20 to 40 percent in crops such as corn, and made rice become more resistant to cold and drought.  $^{12}$ 

Vietnam's total requirements represent less than three years' output of the Loyang tractor factory, which illustrates the vast discrepancies in the order of magnitude of the task of mechanization in the two countries. 13 Even so, the Vietnamese apparently scaled down their mechanization goal. In 1962, Le Duan termed the 10 percent mechanization goal "a preliminary calculation" and said that "whether or not this figure will be raised and by what means is still a problem," indicating that the issue of mechanization was being reconsidered. 14 At the time, attention had shifted to improvement of rudimentary farming implements, "the weakest link in the chain of agricultural production" and "for a long time to come" the "most indispensible factor in raising production." 15 By 1963 only 1 percent of arable land was mechanically cultivated, and only 4 percent by 1968. 16 Possibly the DRV position in the Sino-Soviet dispute

<sup>12</sup> Nguyen Xuan Lai, "Interdependence Between Agriculture and Industry," Vietnamese Studies, No. 27, 1971, p. 139.

The annual capacity of the Loyang tractor plant in the early 1960's was said to have been around 15,000 "East Is Red" 54-hp units. Prybyla, The Political Economy of Communist China, p. 161.

Le Duan, On the Socialist Revolution in Vietnam, Vol. II, p. 142. As noted below, by 1961 the DRV had focused on water conservancy and irrigation as the "main technical means" of increasing production. In 1961 Nguyen Chi Thanh supported this position with the statement that even "by going all out, by 1965 only 15% of the [cultivated] area can be plowed by machine." Nhan Dan, September 7, 1961.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Nguyen Xuan Lai, in <u>Vietnamese Studies</u>, No. 27, p. 139.

was the cause of a low level of Soviet assistance to the DRV in the area of agricultural mechanization, which undoubtedly affected DRV development, and was a prospect that was probably not anticipated by DRV planners in the late 1950's and early 1960's. 17

An important question related to the rate of mechanization in agriculture is the effect it will have on labor utilization. Truong Chinh noted in mid-1960 that the DRV had a rural labor surplus (disguised unemployment) of 50 percent, and argued that this supported his position that production could only be increased by strengthening the collective organization of the rural labor force. The average number of work days for the DRV peasant during the first two years of cooperativization ranged from 90 to 103 days. The main reason for this low utilization of labor was, as elsewhere in Asia the pressure of a large population on the small amount of arable land. In 1960 the DRV had the low average of only .117 hectare per person, compared with .180 for China and 1.19 for the Soviet

<sup>17</sup> Soviet trade statistics show a low level of support for DRV agricultural mechanization from 1960 to 1963, and a sharp drop in 1964, possibly reflecting the DRV "qualified pro-Peking" position of the previous year. Tractors supplied to the DRV in 1960 were 42; 1961 = 40; 1962 = 109; 1963 = 47; 1964 = 0. In 1963, by contrast, the Soviet Union supplied 259 tractors to Burma and 1,009 in 1964. Soviet exports to the DRV dropped from 51 million rubles in 1963 to 42.5 million in 1964. Statistics are from Joint Publications Research Service, Foreign Trade of the USSR (Statistical Survey), 1963, No. 647; 1964, No. 1202; 1965, No. 7902; and 1966, No. 34,214.

<sup>18 &</sup>lt;u>Nhan Dan</u>, August 10, 1960.

Vien Kinh Te, <u>Kinh te nong nghiep xa hoi chu nghia</u> (Socialist Agricultural Economics) (Hanoi: Khoa Hoc, 1962), p. 112.

Union.<sup>20</sup> In the early years of cooperativization the DRV cited the experience of the Soviet Union as evidence that the cultivated land could be enlarged by "30 to 40 and even 50 per cent" and said that cooperativization had expanded arable land from 2.7 to 3.1 million hectares in its first three years (1959-1961).<sup>21</sup> Pham Hung's 1960 report viewed the low utilization rate of land (only 44 percent in two crop ricefields) and low percentage of cultivated land as indicating "unlimited possibilities" for a comprehensive development in agriculture.<sup>22</sup> But although a total of 840,000 hectares had been brought into cultivation between 1954 and 1964, by 1967 the average of cultivated hectares per capita had actually fallen to only 0.108.<sup>23</sup>

Cooperativization ultimately raised by about 60 percent the annual average of peasant workdays to 163 by 1963. However, most DRV planners concluded from the outset of cooperativization that increased production would come not from the application of more labor power, or from a dra-

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 62. The 1967 figures on per capita cultivated hectares are from Nguyen Xuan Lai, "The Family Economy of Cooperative Farmers," in Vietnamese Studies, No. 13, Vol. II (Agricultural Problems), 1967, p. 124. Figures on additional hectares in cultivation since 1954 are from Nguyen Xuan Lai, "Interdependence Between Agriculture and Industry," Vietnamese Studies, No. 27, 1971, p. 140. The 1960 figure for total cultivated hectares (published in 1961) is given as 2,137,000 hectares by Vo Nhan Tri, Croissance economique, p. 9.

Le Duan, On the Socialist Revolution in Vietnam, Vol. II, p. 133.

Third National Congress of the Vietnam Workers' Party, Vol. III, p. 171.

Nguyen Xuan Lai, in <u>Vietnamese</u> <u>Studies</u>, No. 13, p. 124.

<sup>24</sup> Nhan Dan, September 25, 1964.

matic expansion of arable land, but by improving the organization and technique of agricultural production. This would involve giving priority to a program of more intensive cultivation and better use of the existing cultivated land. The DRV land utilization ratio reflecting the number of crops that could be grown annually on the cultivated area, was only 1.45 in 1957, rising to 1.6 in 1961, with a goal of 2 (an average of two crops per year on all cultivated land) for "forthcoming years." 25

In order to increase the utilization of land, technological inputs and improved labor management were necessary. In the view of the DRV leadership, this required cooperativization to organize intensive farming and, if possible, the introduction of a small amount of mechanization. But despite the obvious fact that China's agricultural situation was much closer to North Vietnam's, the DRV most frequently referred to the theoretical lessons of the Soviet Union's experience, possibly due to Hanoi's disillusionment with the results of the Great Leap. By the early 1960's, it became clear to the DRV leaders that even a modest level of mechanization and expansion of land would be difficult to achieve, and the Chinese experiences in intensive cultivation became especially relevant.

Although the DRV had the experience of the Soviet Union and China to draw upon, it did so quite selectively. While the DRV used Soviet textbooks in the Party training school, the problems of collectivization

<sup>25</sup> Le Duan, On the Socialist Revolution in Vietnam, Vol. II, p. 141.

During the period of Vietnamese agricultural transformation, only two other countries were considered to have similar conditions; China and North Korea, like Vietnam, were countries "carrying out agricultural cooperativization without passing through the stage of capitalist development." Despite the similarities, said Le Duan, "Because this is a matter currently in progress, it is still only an experience, can still only be spoken of as an experience, an experience which is still insufficient to generalize into a theory." In a slightly different context, in the previous year (1961) the Party First Secretary was even more specific, "The day before yesterday I told comrade To Huu [Secretary of the Central Committee in charge of propaganda and education] that we have learned much fron China, now as in the past, but that we do not

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The above mentioned quotation on Party members "discovering" the "law" of mechanization prior to collectivization shows that while Soviet texts were being used in Party theoretical training and Soviet advisors had inaugurated the higher level Party training school, their guidelines on major points were not being followed in practice. (Le Duan noted that, "The theory of agricultural cooperativization currently presented in the textbooks is an extension of the typical experience of the Soviet Union, but in the Soviet Union the total cooperativization movement took place at the same time that the State sent waves of tractors and equipment to collectivize State farms." Nhan Dan, September 11, 1962). In Le Duan's 1962 speech, he pointed out that while Stalin had said that agriculture must be made the base for industrialization, "when we speak of this matter, it is with a content not entirely similar to that of Russia in earlier times," primarily due to the fact that the Soviet Union already had an impressive industrial base when they embarked on collectivization. Nhan Dan, September 11, 1962.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid

<sup>28&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

model ourselves on the Chinese. In other words, we have to learn from others, but only what suits us." $^{29}$ 

At the outset of the DRV cooperativization program, the Chinese experience in organizational matters was clearly uppermost in the minds of the DRV leaders. In mid-1958 a series of articles on all aspects of the Chinese experience in political and economic development by Tran Luc (also published in book form) ran for several months in Nhan Dan. 30 Ho Chi Minh referred to the success of a Chinese hsien in transforming itself from an area completely lacking in water to an "enough to eat" and rich area because of the "resolve in emulation" of its people, and asked, "do the cadres and people of Bac Ninh province have resolve to do the job equal to Lai-pin?" 31 The DRV leaders noted with interest that the productivity of China's rural labor force was double that of North Vietnam. 32 At the same time, large scale mobilization of labor was rejected.

Le Duan, On the Socialist Revolution in Vietnam, Vol. III, pp. 56-57.

In his lengthy series of articles Tran Luc cited examples of spectacular economic progress, and devoted a section to the question, "can we believe this?" The answer was yes. Tran Luc, May kinh nghiem Trung Quoc ma ta nen hoc, p. 41. Nevertheless, the author limited his recommendations to studying the "good experiences of China in a creative way," in such areas of immediate interest to Vietnam as labor exchange teams, which the DRV was consolidating at the time in preparation for the cooperativization movement. Ibid., p. 39. He added that, "Naturally, it is necessary to follow the principle of voluntarism and self-motivation" and avoid bureaucratism and commandism. Ibid. Articles by Tran Luc appeared much less frequently in 1959, and stopped in the 1960's.

<sup>31</sup> Nhan Dan, July 8, 1958.

For every North Vietnam  $\underline{\text{mau}}$  (3,600 square meters) it took North Vietnamese peasants an average of 120 work days to provide 900 kilograms of paddy, or only 7.5 kilograms a day - half the Chinese productivity. Nhan Dan, July 28, 1959.

The DRV noted that in some areas that had tried to organize entire hamlets and even villages on a unified work schedule, over 70 percent of
the labor was wasted in delays and other inefficiencies. 33 When Ho
was asked by an interviewer in early 1959 if North Vietnam planned to
introduce communes, he replied, "In the immediate future we have no plans
to set up 'people's communes'. We have a plan for cooperativizing the
countryside." 34

When the Chinese began to reassess the communes and the Great Leap, the DRV leaders took a closer look at the applicability of Chinese experience in Vietnam. Nhan Dan reprinted the CCP 6th Plenum resolution on "Some Problems in People's Communes," and the following day reported on Ho's visit to Moscow where he noted that in 1924 when he first went to the Soviet Union, the Russian people were "much more miserable than Vietnamese are today." A brief experiment with the "good experience of China" in setting up a "network of cooperatives" with interchanges of technical and organizational experience, guided by a district cadre, was made in one province but did not become a national project in the DRV. 37

In 1959 Truong Chinh delivered a major report on cooperativization

 $<sup>^{33}</sup>$ Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Nhan Dan, January 27, 1959.

<sup>35</sup> <u>Nhan Dan</u>, January 5, 1959.

<sup>36 &</sup>lt;u>Nhan Dan</u>, January 6, 1959.

<sup>37</sup> Nhan Dan, May 4, 1959.

in which he advocated following the "advanced experiences" of other socialist countries, and most of all China, in such things as deep plowing, close planting and other technical matters, but referred to the pace of agricultural development in the DRV not as a Great Leap, but as a "long step" (buoc dai). 38 Because the problems encountered by the PRC during the Great Leap occurred at the very time the DRV was embarking on its agricultural cooperativization program, it was natural that the Chinese experience would be subjected to close scrutiny, but the critical factor may have been that the PRC campaign approach was not suited either to the DRV policy style or to their objective situation. The following statement by Hoai Thanh, a leading cadre in the ideological and arts field, is probably not atypical of DRV views. Recounting a trip to the Soviet Union in 1958, he recalled that, "At the time our Vietnam had entered the phase of the socialist revolution for 3 or 4 years. When I went through China, the Chinese people were in the middle of the Great Leap campaign and the spirit of the socialist revolution was very high. But, frankly speaking, it was only when I set foot on the soil of the Soviet Union, the ground that had undergone 40 years of endeavors after the October Revolution, that I was able to picture what socialism was all about."39

In embarking on the process of agricultural cooperativization, the DRV leadership set their own course, and concluded that much of the Chinese experience in collectiviation of agriculture was not suitable

 $<sup>^{38}</sup>$ Nhan Dan, May 22, 1959. (Emphasis added).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup>Nhan Dan, October 17, 1961.

for their needs. Bernard Fall, visiting the DRV in 1962, related that in his talks with experts from the State Planning Board, "It was pointed out that the North Vietnamese policy of village-size cooperatives had been set before the Chinese began to implement their communes policy and that there existed no intention (nor the physical means) of putting such a policy into operation in the D.R.V.N." When Fall pressed his hosts for an assessment of the commune program in China, he was given a response replete with understated irony, "We are still too unsophisticated politically and economically to be able to judge the merits of the communes policy." While Fall interpreted this as an evasive reply, it seems more probable that it was a statement of mild disapproval under the guise of self-depreciation, a characteristic Vietnamese style of political comment and criticism.

 $<sup>^{40}</sup>$ For example, the DRV economic planners accepted the Soviet experience of state run Machine Tractor Stations servicing the cooperatives, while noting the fact that China had disbanded its MTS network in 1958 and transferred the tractors to the communes. Vien Kinh Te, Kinh tenong nghiep xa hoi chu nghia, p. 44. (The book was evidently written before the Chinese restored the MTS system in 1961.)

Bernard B. Fall, The Two Vietnams, p. 161.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

Subsequently the Vietnamese criticism of Chinese economic methods became increasingly blunt. Frances Fitzgerald writes that during a 1975 visit to Hanoi, "When I asked one economist what models the Chinese revolution might provide for Vietnam the man stared at me for a few moments, his eyes wide with disbelief, and then said, 'Well, what would you suggest? The Cultural Revolution? People's Communes? The local manufacture of pig iron?' And yet the economist had spent two or three years studying in China." "Journey to North Vietnam," The New Yorker, April 28, 1975, p. 99.

Unlike the Chinese, the Vietnamese held closely to their original collectivization plan, and implemented it in gradual incremental steps. The original goal of proceeding step by step to village level higher stage cooperatives was adhered to throughout. The steps were, from (1) seasonal labor exchange teams, to (2) permanent labor exchange teams with a work point system, to (3) lower level cooperatives (still paying rent for tools and land), to (4) higher stage cooperatives and (5) finally moving all agricultural cooperatives from hamlet to village size. In the PRC, both the original pace of cooperativization and its basic direction were significantly altered by major policy changes such as the rapid acceleration of cooperativization in 1955-56, and the decision to move to communes in 1958. Although the original Great Leap vision of a federation of communes linked up at the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/journal.com/sines/">https://doi.org/10.1007/journal.com/sines/</a> Although the original Great Leap vision of a federation of communes linked up at the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/journal.com/sines/">https://doi.org/10.1007/journal.com/sines/</a> Great Leap markedly altered the initial scheme of agricultural collectivization.

Mao had called for great upsurges in the paces of agricultural collectivization in 1955 and again in 1958. The DRV leaders concentrated on consolidating the movement at each step and, after the movement was set in motion, issued directives primarily aimed at ensuring the consolidation and balanced development of collectivization. The major directives and instructions were:

November 1958: Resolution 14 decides to launch the agricultural cooperativization program and to "basically complete lower level cooperatives during 1960" (Nhan Dan, December 12, 1960).

February 25, 1959: Whan Dan says consolidation calls for increase in production and peasant income.

- April 1, 1959: Central Committee directive: expansion of cooperatives must be "fast but sure."
- April 17, 1959: "many places have not yet placed sufficient stress on consolidation, and some places have one sidedly stressed expansion and quantity more than quality."
- May, 1959: Implementing details of cooperativization decided on at 16th Plenum.
- August 27, 1959: Nhan Dan follows up Secretariat directive on consolidation with editorial citing Stalin statement that outwardly socialist forms of organization do not guarantee socialist attitudes.
- <u>December 12, 1959:</u> <u>Nhan Dan</u> editorializes that "consolidation is the crucial step in the mission"
- March 30, 1960: Nhan Dan editorial, "expansion must be accompanied by consolidation and [organization] revision along with production," follows previous day's statement that expansion must be "moderate." Provinces with over 50 percent of farm families in cooperatives should consolidate while those with under 50 percent should expand the program.
- April 3, 1960: reveals that the 1960 plan calls for doubling the number of cooperatives by the end of the year. Labor exchange teams where not existing or already transformed into low level cooperatives should not simply be "moderately developed" but "developed all out."
- June 1960: Lower level cooperatives "basically completed as of June," Nhan Dan, October 8, 1960.
- June 3, 1960: announcement that cooperatives will be expanded to village level.
- June 19, 1960: Nhan Dan editorial and Truong Chinh statement on necessity of consolidating cooperatives.
- August 21, 1960: Secretariat resolution on basically completing lower level cooperativization in Autumn Harvest and enrolling 70-75 percent of all farm families in cooperatives by that time. In this period, expanding cooperatives will become the main task.
- September 30, 1960: Nhan Dan cautions "be very careful in preparing to advance to higher level cooperatives.
- April 3, 1961: The most rational size for planning and accounting is the hamlet level cooperative of 100-150 families.

July 1961: Resolution of 5th Plenum states that, "With regard to organization, in the first years of the Five-Year Plan, i.e. in 1961 and 1962, efforts should be devoted to strengthening and satisfactorily developing hamlet-size co-operatives comprising from 150 to 200 households in the delta and midlands; stabilizing organization; strengthening the material and technical bases; improving management and raising it to a higher level; and stepping up production. The promotion of the co-operatives to a higher rank must be done on the basis of effective production, and conducted steadfastly along the line established in the resolution taken at the 16th Session of the Party Central Committee and the decisions of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee of February 1961. (Italics in original).

December 4, 1961: 68.5 percent of cooperatives have reached hamlet level.

January 11, 1962: The cooperative mission for 1962 is to "go all out in continuing to consolidate cooperatives" and increase the income of cooperative members. By the end of 1962, 40 percent of cooperatives should be in higher stage.

April 19, 1962: 40 percent of cooperatives will be raised to higher level in 1962.

April 3, 1963: hamlet will remain accounting unit of cooperatives.


February 22, 1964: Nguyen Chi Thanh speech on "continuing the struggle between the two roads in the countryside in order to consolidate the cooperatives and expand production."

May 17, 1964: Nhan Dan editorial on importance of consolidating sub-par cooperatives.

June 15, 1964: 50 percent of cooperatives should be in higher stage by the end of 1965.

Nearly all of the important statements on cooperativization emphasized caution and consolidation as well as concern about the impact of new programs on production. The steady expansion of cooperativization in the DRV contrasts with both China and the Soviet Union as the following chart illustrates,

# Percentage Rates of Collectivization of Peasant Households in the Soviet Union in 1929-30, in China 1955-56, and in the DRV 1959-60\*\*



Key: O dates or time-periods for which specific data are available

<sup>---- 7</sup> of households in Chinese cooperatives

<sup>---- %</sup> of households in Soviet collective farms

<sup>44</sup> Adapted from chart in Thomas Bernstein, "Collectivization Campaigns," The China Quarterly, No. 31, 1967, p. 2, which illustrates the comparison between Soviet and Chinese rates of collectivization. The DRV data are from Nhan Dan, issues of 21 June, 1959; 3 August, 1959; 10 November, 1959; 3 December 1959; 29 May, 1960, 1 August, 1960; 24 September, 1960; 8 October, 1960; and 2 March, 1961.

North Vietnam's agricultural conditions were much closer to China's, of course, and the collectivization campaigns in both countries were quite similar in concept and rationale. The similarities are even more striking in contrast with the forced draft collectivization of the Soviet Union. Since the Chinese did not themselves follow the Soviet example in agricultural collectivization, they were navigating in largely uncharted waters, and it is not surprising that major changes in the pace and direction of its collectivization program were made. The DRV took note of these changes, but did not follow the Chinese experience when they decided upon the pace and methods of their own program. Nevertheless, the motivations of both countries for initiating agricultural cooperativization after the completion of land reform were similar.

#### Political Rationale for Cooperativization

After the land reform in China, there was a pause for political and economic consolidation. During this period, however, many of the inequities that had led to the land reform began to re-emerge. In his July 1955 cooperativization speech, Mao said:

Everyone has noticed that in recent years there has been a spontaneous and constant growth of capitalist elements in the countryside and that new rich peasants have sprung up everywhere. Many well-to-do middle peasants are striving to become rich ones. Many poor peasants, lacking sufficient means of production, are still not free from the toils of poverty some are in debt, others selling or renting their land. If this tendency goes on unchecked, the separation into two extremes in the countryside will get worse day by day.<sup>45</sup>

As one study of agricultural collectivization concluded, in China, "During

<sup>45</sup> Bowie and Fairbank, Communist China, p. 103.

the land reform almost all the activists recruited were poor peasants.

After land reform many of these poor peasants, having received land and other property, became middle peasants; some even became rich peasants.

In China, this resulted mainly from a spontaneous process of evolution. 47 In North Vietnam, the same process was accelerated by deliberate state policy. The Rectification of Errors campaign in 1956-57 aimed to re-instate rural cadres who had been dismissed on grounds of undesirable class background. This period also saw a general relaxation of the earlier discrimination against upper-middle and rich peasants, which ultimately led to a re-emergence of economic inequalities in the countryside. Truong Chinh, in his May 1959 report on the initial phase of the cooperativization campaign explained that:

The situation in the countryside in the past few years has proved that if individual farming is permitted to drag on, the land will gradually become concentrated in the hands of a few people, and classes in the countryside will become fragmented in a serious way... If we let a small segment of of the population exploit and become rich and distinct from us, the majority of peasants will become impoverished and fall into decline, and will be resentful of us [emphasis

<sup>46</sup> Thomas Bernstein, "Collectivization Campaigns," The China Quarterly, No. 31, 1967, p. 23.

In China, there was a policy of relaxation of class struggle after land reform. At the Eighth Party Congress, the Minister of Security, Lo Jui-ch'ing, said that "for about a year between the Spring of 1954 and the Spring of 1955, owing to overestimation of the blows that had been dealt against counter-revolutionaries...for a brief period of time we relaxed our fight against counter-revolutionaries." Cited in Thomas Bernstein, Leadership and Mobilization in the Collectivization of Agriculture in China and Russia: A Comparison (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1970), pp. 410-411. (Hereafter cited as Leader-ship and Mobilization).

added] and the worker-peasant alliance will suffer. 48

In Vietnam, as in China, cooperativization was seen as a measure to reinforce political, social and economic integration in the countryside.

This was the primary political reason for the acceleration of the cooperativization program in both countries.

Class categories in Vietnam were similar to the definitions used in China. Landlords were those who exploited others, did not participate in labor, and lived off their land rents. Rich peasants were those who participated in labor, but could not individually farm all their land and thus required semi-permanent hired labor for assistance. A middle peasant was able to work all the land he owned, and to be self-sufficient on the proceeds. A poor peasant did not have sufficient land to feed his family and was forced to hire himself out as a laborer. A very poor peasant, or sharecropper, had little or no land and was completely dependent on working for others. An important difference between the Chinese and Vietnamese situations was that China defined rich peasants as well

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup>Nhan Dan, May 22, 1959.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup>The PRC "Decisions Concerning the Differentiation of Class Status in the Countryside" (August 1950) also "recognized subgroups such as 'well to do middle peasants', on the basis of economic criteria, although political ones were also used. For example, the land of 'reactionary rich peasants' could be confiscated. It is not likely that the regime wanted political criteria to dominate, however. The main reason was that at least some members of the old elite were likely to try to evade land reform by seeming to display political enthusiasm and support for the new regime, thus retaining their influence within the villages." Bernstein, Leadership and Mobilization, p. 122.

as landlords as class enemies while Vietnam did not.  $^{50}$ 

Land reform eliminated the most glaring inequities in landholding, but did not completely eliminate the economic advantage enjoyed by the rich and middle peasants, who retained more land per capita, and had more members in the family to produce income. A comparison of the land holding situation before and after land reform in China and Vietnam shows the following:

Average Percentage of Land Owned Before and After Land Reform<sup>51</sup>

| CHINA (per family) |              |        |       | VIETNAM (per capita) |              |        |       |
|--------------------|--------------|--------|-------|----------------------|--------------|--------|-------|
|                    | % land owned |        |       |                      | % land owned |        |       |
| Class              | % of rural   | Before | After | % of rural           | % of rural   | Before | After |
|                    | families     | LR     | LR    | families             | population   | LR     | LR    |
| Landlords          | 2.6          | 26.8   | 4     | 2.1                  | 2.5          | 53.2   | 10.3  |
| Rich Peas.         | 3.2          | 10.0   | 6.5   | 1.2                  | 1.7          | 27.9   | 22.2  |
| Mid. Peas.         | 35.8         | 23.5   | 38.0  | 31.9                 | 36.2         | 10.5   | 22.5  |
| Poor Peas.         | 57.1         | 18.9   | 46.0  | 44.1                 | 42.7         | 4.1    | 20.1  |
| Very Poor<br>Peas. |              |        |       | 16.7                 | 13.0         | 2.2    | 19.7  |
| Other              |              |        |       | 3.7                  | 3.5          | 2.0    | 5.6   |

Schurmann notes that when the CCP had wanted to create stable production in the village (as after the "high tide" of 1955 and in 1961 after the Great Leap) they have tended to adopt more permissive attitudes toward the rich peasants. This support has sometimes been disguised by expedients like referring to them as "prosperous middle peasants," common in the mid-1950's. When the main focus was on social or economic transformation, poor peasant support has been called for, often at the expense of the rich peasants as in the land reform during the late 1940's, the mid-1955 "high tide" of cooperativization and the Great Leap. Schurmann, Ideology and Organization, p. 430.

Vietnamese data are compiled from Vo Nhan Tri, <u>Croissance economique</u>, p. 201, and Tran Phuong, <u>Cach mang ruong dat o Viet-Nam</u>, p. 163. Chinese data are from Thomas Bernstein, <u>Leadership and Mobilization</u>, p. 125. Both sets of figures are based on limited surveys; 1,508 and 112 villages respectively for class and land data in the DRV, and 35 <u>hsiang</u> and 23,446 families for the Chinese data.

Although these figures are not strictly comparable they do indicate that the DRV did not discriminate against rich peasants and in favor of poor peasants in its land distribution to the extent that this was done in China.

The DRV elected to minimize the post-land reform class differences. Le Duan noted in 1962 that rich peasants comprised only 0.5 percent of the rural population and added that they "held as the main means of production no more land than that of the working peasants." The DRV also took a more benign view of the middle peasant during cooperativization than did China or the Soviet Union. Le Duan warned against "uselessly dealing with generalities or repeating the object of socialist transformation in the Soviet Union or China. He who brands a middle peasant who builds a cistern as a would-be capitalist displays an inconsiderate attitude." There is some evidence that the DRV attempted to manipulate class labels to de-emphasize the role of the rich peasants as well as that of the poor peasants, by shifting the majority of rural population into the middle peasant category. And in contrast to the Chinese case, where rich peasants were considered class enemies, the Vietnamese rich peasants were considered full members of the united front with all po-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup>Le Duan, <u>On the Socialist Revolution</u>, Vol. III, p. 14. As noted in an earlier section, Le Duan added that in Vietnam, "Since the urban bourgeoisie and the rich peasants did not make up a sizeable and potent force as in other countries, it was not necessary at all to put up a bitter class struggle." <u>Ibid</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup><u>Ibid</u>., p. 15.

In addition to the 0.5 percent figure for rich peasants given by Le Duan, Vo Nhan Tri gives the figure for rich peasants as 1.2 in 1957 and 0.9 in 1959, while the middle peasant category rose from 34.0 to 61.5.

Croissance economique, p. 208. Toward the end of the land reform, the figure for rich peasants was given as 3-4 percent. Nhan Dan, May 23, 1956.

litical rights.<sup>55</sup>

As suggested earlier, the evolution of the situation in South Vietnam was also an important factor in the timing of the decision to embark upon a major program of agricultural cooperativization. The excesses of land reform had been curbed, at least in part, because of the bad impact they might have on Southern views of re-unification, and the Rectification of Errors campaign was a policy designed to undo the damage. When it became clear that the Diem government and the United States were implacably opposed to implementing the reunification provisions of the Geneva Agreements, there was no further justification for delaying the socialist transformation of the North on the grounds that it was incompatible with imminent unification. This, added to the concern about the increasing class polarization in the countryside, led the DRV to decide upon a major

<sup>55</sup> Ibid. After the "experimental phase of mass mobilization in rent reduction of early 1953" the Party policy toward the rich peasants was determined. In addition to having full political rights, they were legally allowed to lend money and hire labor. The land reform regulations forbade confiscation of rich peasant land, and stipulated only that it could be "requisitioned with compensation" in areas where there were few landlords. During the land reform, this distinction was not always observed. Ibid. The rich peasant classification was spelled out in greatest detail in Nhan Dan, April 15, 1957, which said that during land reform the individual rich peasant was classified on the basis of his economic status in the year 1951. In the Rectification of Errors, the subsequent economic position of rich peasants was given greater consideration and various aspects of exploitation were more narrowly defined, resulting in a greater possibility of changing status to middle peasant. Rich peasants who had ceased exploiting others' labor for three years were allowed to become middle peasants. <u>Ibid</u>. After the Rectification of Errors was announced the landlord category was also reconsidered, and the time period for changing classification for "law abiding landlords who had ceased exploiting" was dropped from five to three years. Nhan Dan, November 8, 1956.

program of agricultural cooperativization at the November 1958 14th Plenum, and to issue the implementing details at the May 1959 16th Plenum. 56

An important preparation for cooperativization was the currency exchange of early 1959, which confirmed that there were substantial income differentials in the rural areas. As a result of this exchange, it was discovered that landlords, rich and upper middle peasants had substantial savings which, the National Bank reported, "created difficulties in market management and monetary circulation in the rural areas." This money was being diverted into speculation in land and rice, or lying dormant, at a time when capital was in short supply in the rural areas. The currency conversion, in effect, liquidated this stagnant reservoir of capital and eliminated the gross discrepancies in income which had led to the transfer of land from poor peasants to wealthier peasants. This was the first step in gaining control over the rural economy, and a foundation for the collectivization of land, draft animals, farming implements, and the primary sector of the rural marketing system that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup>The intervening 15th Plenum of January 1959 reversed the policy of reliance on pure political struggle (to achieve peaceful unification as outlined in the Geneva Accords) and freed the Southern resistants to employ armed force in protecting their position. This chronology further supports the interpretation that the timing of the cooperativization program was closely linked to the issue of unification and the situation in South Vietnam.

<sup>57</sup> Nhan Dan, May 22, 1959.

followed.58

Still, the income differential between middle and poor peasants was well over 30% at the outset of cooperativization. The conflict between the material interests of the middle and the poor peasants was, in fact, the main political problem of the first phase of cooperativization. Since the lower level (first stage) agricultural cooperatives continued to pay rent for land, draft animals and farming implements contributed to the cooperatives, the income of middle peasants — who had more to contribute — remained substantially higher than that of the poor peasants. Moreover, middle peasants (as in China) tended to be better and more experienced managers of agricultural production, and thus tended to dominate the management of the early cooperatives.

China had faced a similar problem during its cooperativization.

Shortly after land reform, Mao introduced a more detailed classification of middle peasants, with the inclusion of the category of "lower middle"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup>Vo Nhan Tri writes that, "As for the rich peasants, who only constituted a small number, they lost part of their economic power. But their living conditions and production activities were still superior to those of the other peasants. They possessed good ricefields, strong buffaloes and farming equipment. After an investigation by the State Bank, it was found that it was the rich peasants who held the most liquid cash. They had then, the means to practice clandestine usury, and to hoard and speculate..." Croissance economique, p. 209.

Nhan Dan, April 1, 1963. By 1963 it was 30 percent, and was evidently higher before the move to higher level cooperatives. Middle peasants owned an average of 4 sao (1 sao=360 square meters) of land after land reform, as against 3 sao (about 1/4 of an acre) for the poor peasants. Vietnamese Studies, No. 13, 1967. Thus they received more income for land shares.

peasants, "thus creating a theoretical majority base of support consisting of 60-70 percent of rural households." This attempt to bridge the gap between poor and middle peasants apparently succeeded all too well. The result was a backlash against middle peasants during the "high tide" of collectivization in 1955. After Mao's July 1955 speech there was "a switch in emphasis from attention to the interests of the well-off middle peasants to concern for 'unleashing' of the socialist enthusiasm of the poor and lower-middle peasants," and the press "vigorously denounced discrimination against poor peasants and favoritism toward middle peasants."

## Initial Stage of Cooperativization

A political and economic struggle also took place between poor and middle peasants during the initial stage of cooperativization in Vietnam. In some cases, poor peasants interpreted the cooperativization decision as a reversal of the previous lenient class line and criticisms were

<sup>60</sup>Bernstein, "Collectivization Campaigns," The China Quarterly, No. 31, 1967, p. 36. Mao, in the Chinese view, "creatively used Marxist class analysis to draw the correct conclusion that majority support existed for cooperatives." Kenneth R. Walker, "Collectivization in Retrospect: the 'Socialist High Tide' of Autumn 1955-Spring 1956," The China Quarterly, No. 26, April-June 1966, p. 33.

<sup>61&</sup>quot;In some cases the class line between 'the people' and 'enemies' became so blurred that rich peasants and even former landlords succeeded in entering cooperatives and even assuming leadership positions." Bernstein, "Collectivization Campaigns," The China Quarterly, No. 31, 1967, pp. 24-25.

<sup>62&</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>., p. 41.

levelled at "some comrades" who were "only worried about resolving problems of the middle peasants, while ignoring those of the poor and landless peasants" during the Rectification of Errors campaign. 63

Because in the lower stage cooperatives middle peasants continued to take in a higher income, some poor peasants commented that, "there is real benefit in joining the cooperatives — but only for the middle peasants." 64

Some middle peasants, in turn, criticized cooperatives as "entirely composed of water-drinkers" [e.g., too poor to afford tea] and were worried that if they entered the cooperatives they would be constrained "like a bird in a cage, and would have to ask permission every time they wanted to go to the market or go out for pleasure, and would have other people directing their work." 65

Whereas in China the initial safeguards of middle peasant interests were abandoned during the upsurge, the DRV leadership responded quickly to prevent this important group from being alienated by overzealous action from poor peasants. Nhan Dan stressed that voluntary action was the key to cooperativization, that coercive measures must not be used. The keystone of Party policy during the first stage of cooperaticization in 1959-60 was, (1) voluntary entry into cooperatives, (2) mutual benefit to those who joined, and (3) democratic discussion between cadres and

<sup>63&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, June 6, 1959.

<sup>64</sup> Nhan Dan, August 7, 1959.

<sup>65</sup> Nh<u>an</u> <u>Dan</u>, May 15, 1959.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

peasants. Nhan Dan instructed that:

"We must not only guarantee the principle of voluntarism with regard to peasants entering the cooperatives, but in all things relating to the carrying out of tasks in the cooperatives. Some comrades and cadres have not yet understood this and therefore there have been times when there has been commandism and coercion of peasants into the cooperatives. And in the cooperatives little attention has been paid to educating the peasants, and there has not been a zealous consolidation of the cooperatives to make peasants ever more self-instructed and enlightened and closely linked to it."67

While it is difficult to estimate the extent to which peasants were actually coerced into the cooperatives, one province investigation (Phu Tho) revealed that 7 percent of those joining the cooperatives in early 1959 had been coerced. <sup>68</sup> It seems unlikely that the figure for this early stage was much higher in other areas, since the option of with-drawal remained and, as noted below, was widely exercised during the calamitous agricultural year of 1961.

Since the poor peasants generally saw it in their interests to join, it was the middle peasants who were the real test case of how faithfully the principles of voluntary entry, mutual benefit, and democratic discussion would be observed. In order to forestall the domination of the cooperatives by the more prosperous peasants, Party policy during the initial stages of cooperativization was to guarantee that two-thirds of the leadership positions in coops would be held by middle and poor peasants. This measure was felt to be necessary because some middle

<sup>67&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, August 3, 1959.

<sup>68</sup> Nhan <u>Dan</u>, August 13, 1959.

peasants were "reluctant to carry out the Party's class policy and transmit it to the cooperative members," which resulted in a high concentration of upper middle peasants in leadership positions. <sup>69</sup> The primary purpose of this quota system was not to discriminate against the middle peasants, but to bring the poor and lower middle peasants into active participation in the cooperatives and ensure their representation in the countryside proportionate to their numbers - 60 percent of the rural population. <sup>70</sup>

The political and economic conflict of interest between the poor/
lower middle and middle peasants was reflected in a policy debate at the
lower levels of the Party which arose during the very early stages of the
program. Some cadres contended that peasant response to cooperativization had turned into a "mass movement" while others asserted that it
merely had the potential of becoming one. In general, those cadres who
argued that cooperativization had almost immediately turned into a mass
movement were the ones who supported poor peasant interests at the expense
of middle peasants, and urged a faster pace of cooperativization. This
view appeared mostly at the sub-province level.

A more cautious view was taken by the province cadres, who were more aware of the complexities of the problems arising during the initial phase of cooperativization. These included the acute shortage of Party members and trained cadres in the countryside, and in some cases the reluctance of even Party members to enthusiastically support cooperativization.

<sup>69&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, February 26, 1959.

<sup>70</sup> Vo Nhan Tri, Croissance economique, p. 276.

This situation was particularly prevalent in the old Resistance areas, where many people had joined the Party primarily from patriotic motivations, and at an early stage of the Resistance before the question of social reform became prominent.

The social composition of the Party in the rural areas, especially the old base areas, posed a problem within the Party itself. In Ha Tinh province, for example, some Party members "asked why they always had to rely on the poor peasants" and why poor peasants must have a fixed percentage of positions in the Party Committees, and there was friction between middle and poor peasant Party members. Ironically, the vanguard role of the Party was hampered by its deep social roots. The case of "comrade Chiem" was singled out in the Party press as an example of the problem. Chiem had been an outstanding cadre during the Resistance, but was unenthusiastic about joining the cooperative. This problem exemplified the fact that, "Most Party members and specialized cadres in our Party are people who came from all classes in the countryside, and at present most have many close ties with their families in the countryside in many ways."

<sup>71</sup> Nhan Dan, April 10, 1959.

Describing the early cooperativization period, the Thai Binh Province Party Secretary recalled in 1967 that, "A lot of resistance had to be broken down. We have barely emerged from a feudal society, and sometimes our cadres — in other words ourselves — are feudal-minded and hidebound in many matters, acting like elders or even betrayers of trust. On the one hand, then, it is essential to arouse enthusiasm and appeal to everyone's creative initiative; on the other, we must be capable of showing firmness and exercising discipline." Gerard Chaliand, The Peasants of North Vietnam (Middlesex: Penguin, 1969), p. 63.

<sup>73</sup> <u>Nhan Dan</u>, February 23, 1959.

some problem. In Ha Nam province, some province cadres went home to sell off some of their ricefields (before they were cooperativized) and some district cadres urged their families to sell off their buffaloes. 74

Conflict between the interests of poor and middle peasants underlay disputes within the Party over the pace of cooperativization. To go too fast would alienate the most experienced agricultural producers at a critical time; too slow progress would dampen the enthusiasm of poor peasants for cooperativization. In early 1959, some overzealous cadres at the local levels attempted to move too quickly from labor exchange teams to higher levels of cooperativization. Nhan Dan editorialized that it "is absolutely necessary for us to set our course for every action in a more exact way, and to eliminate confusion in understanding which would lead to trying to cut short the two stages and attempting to jump over stages (dot chay giai doan)." In China, this had been done both during the high tide of cooperativization and during the first phase of the communes, with results that probably alerted the Vietnamese to the pitfalls of this approach. The communes of the communes of the pitfalls of this approach.

<sup>74&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

<sup>75&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan, February 23, 1959.</sub>

Kenneth Walker notes that after flouting the principle of step-by-step development in the land reform, during the "high tide", "Once again cadres became preoccupied with "high level forms" and their ability to report "great development" of cooperatives to their superiors. Disregarding the principle of stages, they discriminated against mutual aid teams in order to accelerate their disintegration and promote the growth of cooperatives." "Collectivization in Retrospect," The China Quarterly, No. 26, 1966, p. 18. The underlying reasoning for this, Walker feels, were that, "cadres failed to reconcile the competing interests of the poor and middle peasants." Ibid., p. 36.

In some rural areas <u>huyen</u> cadres neglected their subsidiary responsibilities (water conservancy and drought prevention, for example) in an effort to gain impressive results in enrolling peasants into cooperatives. The Province Party Secretary of Thai Binh (the largest rice producing province in the North), a man of long experience in the province attempted to moderate the ardor of his subordinates. The <u>huyen</u> cadres fought back, publicly accusing their superior of adversely "affecting the determination" of the <u>Huyen</u> Committee. The major point at issue was whether the <u>huyen</u> cadres were responding to mass demand for cooperatives or whether they were pushing the peasants faster than organizational resources and peasant acceptance of the new program would permit. 77

The issue was debated for several months. Huyen cadres expressed their irritation at inadequate and "timid" (rut re) support from the province, while the province committee criticized the huyen for being "over hasty" (nong voi). The Province Secretary replied, "I know we are slow, but if you don't have conditions for a leap, you might break a leg." Despite the opposition of the Province Secretary to a faster paced mobilization campaign, the debate dragged on for three months.

<sup>77&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan, March 30, 1959.</sub>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup>Possibly an implied criticism of the mobilization style of the Great Leap in China. It should be recalled that it was at precisely this time that China itself was re-orienting its agricultural policies, and that its early mistakes may have been a cautionary experience for higher level DRV cadres.

<sup>79</sup> Nhan Dan, March 31, 1959.

The publication in March 1959 of two lengthy articles pointedly supporting the lower level criticism of province leadership gave added weight to the <u>Huyen Committee</u>'s position, and forced the Province Committee to fully justify its own stand. Not until May 1959 did a definitive resolution of the issue take place, coinciding with the publication of the Province Secretary's self-criticism and rebuttal. To underline the point that the Province Committee view (amended by concessions to its critics) was now official policy, it was published on the same day as the Central Committee Resolution summing up the first phase of cooperativization and setting the goals for the forthcoming period. Noting that the number of cooperatives had expanded "rather quickly" while the quality had lagged behind, the Central Committee endorsed the view that the pace of cooperativization should be slowed.

Friction over the pace of cooperativization also developed in areas like Thanh Hoa province, with the largest population of any DRV province and the highest number of Party members. Unlike Thai Binh which had been under varying degrees of French control during the Resistance, Thanh Hoa had been a solid Viet Minh base area throughout the First Indochina War. As a consequence of its large size and political history, the social composition of its Party members and cadres was mixed. Cadres recruited during the anti-French struggle came from all social classes and reflected the society from which they emerged to positions of leadership. Cadre

<sup>80</sup> Nhan Dan, May 15, 1959.

ambivalence about socialist transformation and the fact that Thanh Hoa had national attention focused on its program from the start resulted in an early decision to slow down the pace of cooperativization. A major national conference in Thanh Hoa on the programs of cooperativization concluded that some middle and lower level cadres had been "hot headed" and wanted to "skip over things" (luot qua). Only 70% of the Party members in the province joined, setting a bad leadership example. The conference noted that there were "still some upper middle peasant party members who did not enthusiastically participate in the cooperatives."81

Such problems critically affected the pace of North Vietnam's cooperativization program. In some areas, local Party cadres impatient with the organizational and political complexities of defending middle peasant economic interests and anxious to show impressive results in cooperativization, urged a rapid advance to higher level cooperatives. In the old Resistance areas, many cadres of middle peasant background dragged their feet. In the first case allowing cooperativization to continue at a rapid pace would be self defeating. In the second case ensuring that there was forward movement in cooperativization was difficult. After the initial few months of cooperativization a pause was required to iron out these problems and conflicts.

Consolidation of Lower Level Cooperatives and Transformation Into Higher Level Cooperatives

For this purpose, a period of consolidation of the initial gains

<sup>81 &</sup>lt;u>Nhan</u> <u>Dan</u>, May 22, 1959.

was needed. As the DRV leadership recognized, the length of consolidation depends on what comes up during the expansion phases of a campaign, <sup>82</sup> and the first major phase of agricultural transformation inevitably produced a wide range of problems. The 16th Plenum of May 1959 determined that while the cooperativization campaign was basically sound, "the number of cooperatives has expanded rather fast, but the quality is generally still poor." A consolidation phase was then initiated, and the gradualist views of the beleaguered Thai Binh Province Party Secretary vindicated, and his warnings against falling into a "U-shaped" pattern of development endorsed as national policy. <sup>84</sup>

Consolidation continued throughout 1959 and early 1960. The numbers of peasant families joining cooperatives continued to increase but at a measured, steady pace. In April 1960, the DRV government announced the intention of doubling the number of cooperatives during 1960. While this target was achieved, it was done not by a sudden upsurge, but by a continuation of the steady growth that had characterized the DRV cooperativization program from the outset. The primary mode of the campaign did not revert back to an expansion phase, except with respect

<sup>82</sup> <u>Nhan Dan</u>, April 4, 1960.

<sup>83</sup> Nhan Dan, May 19, 1959.

<sup>84</sup> Nhan Dan, May 20, 1959.

<sup>85</sup> Nhan Dan, April 3, 1960.

 $<sup>^{86}</sup>$ The number of rural peasant families in cooperatives (higher and lower level) went from 45.4% (1959) to 85.8% (1960). Vo Nhan Tri, Croissance Economique, p. 285.

to the labor exchange teams which were to be rapidly developed to form the basis for transformation into lower level cooperatives. The Party Secretariat decreed that "only moderate development" of the cooperatives was in order. Provinces with over 50 percent of peasant families in cooperatives should stop to consolidate, and only those provinces with less than 50 percent of rural households in cooperatives should continue to expand recruitment of peasants into cooperatives, while only "a few" higher level cooperatives should be formed. The was stressed that the main requirement was to emphasize agricultural production, and that the expansion of cooperatives should be subordinate to this goal - a characteristic example of the DRV view that the "forces of production" should take priority over the "relations of production."

Continuing problems in the cooperatives soon required a reversion to consolidation. In June 1960 Truong Chinh announced that the summer season would be spent on consolidation of cooperatives. The Party's policy on class composition of the leadership of cooperatives was not being correctly implemented. In some places, even landlords and former village officials of the colonial regime were being taken into cooperatives, while in elections for the Cooperative Administrative Committee the two-thirds rule guaranteeing the participation of poor and lower middle peasants in leadership positions was being flouted, and the Committees had to be reelected. The third reserved for ordinary middle peasants was in many cases being filled with upper middle peasants who were being

<sup>87&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, March 29, 1960.

made Cooperative Chairmen, heads of the Oversight Committee, or accountants. Resolution of the Party Secretariat in August 1960 decreed that the establishment of lower level cooperatives must be basically completed during the autumn harvest season. During this season, expansion would be the main mode of the cooperativization campaign, and 70-75 percent of rural families would become members of cooperatives. This goal was easily fulfilled as was the goal of doubling the numbers of cooperativized peasants during 1960. By the end of the year, 85 percent of rural households had joined a cooperative.

With this goal achieved, the DRV addressed the qualitative problem. In January 1961, a conference on the agricultural cooperativization movement concluded that the main priority in cooperativization would again be switched to consolidation; "strengthening of the relations of production" [e.g., the structure and organization of the cooperatives] and the development of production. This approach was confirmed a month later by the February Politburo Resolution and extensively codified by the Central Committee in the 5th Plenum Resolution of July 1961.

This resolution marked the end of the first stage of cooperativization. By mid-1961, 88 percent of peasant households had joined cooperatives, and the DRV leadership felt the time had come to review

<sup>88&</sup>lt;u>Nhan</u> <u>Dan</u>, June 19, 1960.

<sup>89&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, August 21, 1960.

<sup>90</sup> Nhan Dan, January 14, 1961.

the progress in agricultural collectivization and set forth new guidelines for the development of agriculture in the First Five-Year Plan
(1961-1965). Rather than transform the collectivization campaign
immediately into a push to establish higher level cooperatives, the DRV
opted to consolidate the gains already made. While in China 60 percent
of rural families were members of higher level cooperatives a year after
the onset of the "upsurge," in North Vietnam at the time of the 5th
Plenum, two and a half years after the start of the major collectivization campaign, only 24 percent of peasant households were in higher stage
cooperatives. 91

The inevitable organizational problems of a vast campaign of social and economic transformation had been compounded by calamitous weather. The 5th Plenum acknowledged that, "With regard to foodstuffs, because of two crop failures we have met with temporary difficulties." The serious setbacks encountered in agricultural production demanded a gradualist approach. Moreover, while the rapid pace of China's cooperativization was aided by generally favorable weather conditions, the first stage of North Vietnam's agricultural cooperativization coincided with the climatic disasters that had forced China to "retreat" from the ambitious organizational goals of the Great Leap. Problems of

<sup>91</sup>Resolution of the Fifth Plenum of the Party Central Committee (July 1961) on the development of agriculture in the First Five-Year Plan (1961-65), in <u>Vietnamese Studies</u>, No. 2, 1964, p. 154.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., p. 156.

leadership, management, and production resulted in both cases. But whereas China attempted to solve the problem by a vast ideological campaign (the Socialist Education campaign of 1962-65) which resulted in an extremely high rate of turnover among cadres at the production level, the DRV launched a program of improving the management of cooperatives, and the technical level of the cadres on the front line of production.

#### Economic and Social Problems of Cooperativization

As the first stage of North Vietnam's agricultural cooperativization came to an end, the problems facing the DRV leadership were closely inter-related, and any solution to them would have to take this into account. In addition to the production difficulties and managerial problems, the question of integrating the poor peasants with the more prosperous sectors of rural society was still an important issue.

Alienating the prosperous peasants (middle, upper middle and rich peasants) would deprive the cooperatives of badly needed managerial experience and production skills. Moving too quickly into higher level cooperatives would eliminate the immediate resentments of the poor peasants toward those that continued to gain a larger income share through rentals of land, buffaloes and tools, but would create dissatisfaction among the more prosperous peasants, and reduce the material incentives to increase production that became an increasingly important part of DRV agricultural policy.

Truong Chinh, speaking to an ideological "reorientation" conference

in early 1961 expressed the view that the development of productive forces in agriculture as well as other sectors of the economy would require the "systematic transformation of the relations of production." <sup>93</sup> The following day, Le Duan addressed the same conference and presented the view that socialist transformation had now "won a decisive victory" and that the watchword of the DRV would be "everything to serve production." <sup>94</sup> Because of this, "... the mission of expanding production has become the most important task of the socialist revolution... If there is not a technological transformation, an increase in labor productivity, and a construction of the material and technological bases of socialism, there can be no consolidation of the newly formed relations of production, and no acceleration of the socialist economy. <sup>95</sup> Le Duan added a critique of "adventurism" and "reckless" behavior, lack of careful investigation and research and failure to ensure a "studied and balanced" approach (thieu can nhac than trong). <sup>96</sup>

<sup>93&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, March 29, 1961.

<sup>94&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, March 30, 1961.

<sup>95&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid. Le Duan also warned against the opposite faults of "conservatism and timidity" but the context makes clear that the above mentioned faults were considered more serious. In 1962, Le Duan said, "The other day I went to a hamlet where the per capita land holding is only 180 square meters. It then occurred to my mind that given our present poor technical capacities it would be better to let the peasants there till their land individually - cooperativization would create too many difficulties - to raise production and resettle an appreciable number of them in other places." On the Socialist Revolution, Vol. III, p. 18.

This speech and the other critical policy decisions on agriculture during the first half of 1961 initiated a series of policies designed to allow more participation in cooperative management by the more prosperous and experienced peasants, and increased reliance on material incentives to stimulate production in agriculture. Ideological devices, such as the intensification of class conflict between poor/lower middle peasants and upper middle/rich peasants, employed in China during the Socialist Education campaign, and tighter control measures such as increasing the number of rural economic activities that came under state quotas and guidance, were implicitly rejected. Subsequently it was acknowledged that in the initial period of cooperativization the "leftist mistake" of restricting private economic activities had been committed, because of "an over-simplified equalitarianism which assumes that the more the means of production are collectivized the better the cooperative will function, and that the more vigorously labor is controlled, the more production will increase, that under a socialist regime, everything should be concentrated in the cooperative, all the cooperative members getting the same income."97

As a result of the 5th Plenum decisions, class based quotas for allocating leadership positions in cooperatives were dropped. The Plenum concluded that,

The significance of close unity with the middle peasants must be more fully grasped. We must lay stress on "uniting poor and middle peasants under one roof" and on the spirit of socialist cooperativization in order to urge everyone to

<sup>97</sup> Nguyen Xuan Lai, "The Family Economy of Cooperative Farmers," Vietnamese Studies, No. 13, p. 127.

display all his talents and efforts for the establishment of cooperatives, the development of production, and the creation of conditions for the suppression of the difference in income between the various strata of the toiling peasantry.

Attention should be paid to reserving for active elements among the poor and lower-middle peasantry the key roles in the cooperatives and to promoting the most advanced middle peasants. We must not discriminate among Party members between poor and middle peasants, but judge everyone according to his ideological stand. Any of them who have won the confidence of the co-op members and have been appointed by the Village Party Committee can hold key positions in the cooperatives.

The 5th Plenum also decided to allow greater latitude to the supplementary private economic activities of cooperative members and to stress an incentive system of "distributing income according to work done" as well as to "apply the system of bonuses and penalties and combat equalitarianism." 99

Because of catastrophic weather conditions, the first year of full scale cooperative farming in the DRV was exceptionally difficult. Agricultural output decreased by 30 percent and, according to Le Duan, "the food problem met with difficulties but generally speaking we had enough food to eat or lacked it slightly."

The pressures of population growth (estimated in 1960 at 3.5 percent) made increasing production an urgent priority.

A reasonably good spring and fall harvest season in 1961 helped to avert

<sup>98&</sup>quot;Resolution of the Fifth Plenum," <u>Vietnamese Studies</u>, No. 2, p. 159.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid.

Le Duan, On the Socialist Revolution in Vietnam, Vol. II, p. 92. Paddy production fell off by 900,000 tons, and 400,000 tons of subsidiary crops in paddy equivalent. Ibid.

<sup>101&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, October 26, 1960.

catastrophy and bring the free market price of rice close to the state price, but the problem of increasing production remained critical. In 1962 an extensive "free market" still existed in urban areas for "many kinds of food produce." Even during this period of economic hardship, however, the basic structure of the cooperatives remained intact. 103

Peasant welfare and economic development were linked in an intricate cycle of planning considerations. Increased future production required some sacrifice of current living standards, but the lower the level of production, the more difficult it was to break out of the cycle of poverty by accumulating savings. The strategy of economic development required more efficient use of labor, more intensive use of land through increasing double cropping, and increased output on a given area of land. Since large scale mechanization either through foreign assistance or through internally generated resources became less and less plausible as a solution, the DRV turned their attention to expanding the irrigated areas as "the technological measure of the first rank" at the 5th Plenum of July 1961. 104

<sup>102&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, August 2, 1962.

Nham Dan, January 4, 1963 reported that the number of "unsettled farm families" (nong ho khong on dinh) was 2.6 percent of total farm families as of June 1962, and had dropped to less than 1 percent by the end of 1962. Presumably this refers to families who wanted to leave the cooperatives, although another source asserts that the percentage of families actually submitting applications to leave did not exceed 1.6 percent even "at the most difficult times." Nguyen Khac Vien et.al., "The Agricultural Cooperativization Policy," in Vietnamese Studies, No. 13, 1967, p. 85. Nhan Dan, January 2, 1964 gives the total of families requesting to leave the cooperatives as 3,000 for 1961, over 1,000 for 1962, and only 400 for 1963.

<sup>104 &</sup>lt;u>Vietnamese</u> <u>Studies</u>, No. 2, 1964, p. 44.

In addition, the Central Committee decided to enlarge the cultivated area by 1.5 million hectares (to a 3.1 million total) and turn 1 million hectares of fields averaging 1 1/2 crops per year into two crop fields, 105 but, as noted above, population growth appears to have negated this gain.

Augmenting the number of labor days of cooperative members was also envisaged. The average number of work days of the North Vietnamese peasant rose from 90 (in 1959) to 103 (in 1960), 124 (1961), 140 (1962), 163 (1963), and 160 (1964). The number of cooperatives attaining an average of 200 work days per year for their membership rose from 8.3 percent in 1961 to 16.2 percent in 1963. The key to better utilization of labor was not, however, simply working more days, but achieving higher labor productivity. If more work days were invested in relatively static production, the value of the day's labor would decline. Thus the DRV tried to increase the average number of work days, while increasing or holding steady their value. The average value of a work day was 0.75 dong

<sup>105</sup> Le Duan, On the Socialist Revolution in Vietnam, Vol. II, p. 93.

The 1960-63 figures are from Nhan Dan, September 25, 1964. Tran Duc, "May y kien ve van de phan cong lao dong trong nong nghiep" (Some Ideas About the Assignment of Labor in Agriculture), Hoc Tap, No. 1, 1965, says that the average of labor days in cooperatives was 160 days, and the value of a labor day "had not yet reached 1 dong."

Nhan Dan, December 6, 1964.

Le Duan pointed out that if increasing labor inputs can be done "in such a way that six million and a half (sic) peasants work not only 130 days but 200 in a year and besides if the value of a working day rises from one dong to two dongs for example, then it is clear that the social labor productivity will increase sharply without any technique." On the Socialist Revolution, Vol. II, p. 22.

in 1961, and remained "about the same" in  $1962.^{109}$  By 1962 the 50 percent disguised unemployment had fallen to about 30 percent, but remained at that level through  $1964.^{110}$ 

Annual growth in rice production rose slowly, with the exception of 1963 when another catastrophic weather year set back the harvest. 111 The average yield per hectare, however, remained almost static. 112 As a result, gains in the rural standard of living could not be financed entirely out of the collective economy while at the same time accumulating funds for local investment in the cooperatives. The level of accumulation in the lower level cooperatives regulations was envisaged as about 5 percent of net annual income, raising to 10 percent as production increased. 113

By 1962 Nhan Dan pointed out that,

Previously a number of cooperatives only paid attention to matters of immediate interest and did not treat seriously the matter of accumulation to expand production. In distribution, they generally wanted to go beyond the limit, and some places even divided up the capital shares and left

<sup>109</sup> Nhan Dan, January 15, 1963.

Nhan Dan, November 29, 1962. Nguyen Chi Thanh said in 1964 that the "excess labor" was between 30-40 percent of the total. Nhan Dan, November 12, 1964.

Taking 1960 as 100, rice production was 102.8 (in 1961), 113.8 (1962), 88.9 (1963), 118.9 (1964). Vo Nhan Tri, Croissance economique, p. 451.

 $<sup>^{112}</sup>$ In 1957 it was 18.01, 18.44 in 1960 and 18.94 quintals per hectare per crop in 1964. <u>Vietnamese</u> <u>Studies</u>, No. 13, 1967, p. 9.

<sup>&</sup>quot;Agricultural Problems," <u>Vietnamese Studies</u>, No. 2, 1964, p. 174. The social welfare fund was to be no more than 1 percent of gross income, increasing to 2-3 percent as production expanded.

a very small amount for accumulation. Preparing to merge with other cooperatives to expand to a larger scale, a number of cooperatives divided out the entire accumulation fund or only left a little of it... In the present circumstances, the accumulation and social welfare funds should be about 5 to 7 percent of gross income.

It seems unlikely that many cooperatives were able to set aside even 5 percent of gross income for accumulation in the 1959-65 period, although comprehensive statistics are not available on this point. 115 Nguyen Chi Thanh, summarizing in 1964 the DRV experience of five years of cooperativization, noted that although the level for accumulation funds had been set at 5-7 percent of income in 1961, "in the recent past, there has been an incorrect tendency in many cooperatives to not want to increase the accumulation fund, or if an increase is made, to put it into the social welfare fund without increasing the accumulation fund." 116

### Incentives, Taxes and Peasant Income

Since peasant welfare could not be assured through expanding the collective sector, a relatively high level of private economic activity was tolerated and even encouraged. This accorded with Le Duan's view that expanding production was the key to consolidating the cooperatives. The average annual rise in gross agricultural production from 1958-61

<sup>114</sup> Nhan Dan, May 21, 1962.

One of the vanguard units, the Viet Trung Cooperative, was cited as a model of success by Nguyen Chi Thanh, though its rate of savings of gross income was only 4.4 percent. Nhan Dan, December 13, 1961.

<sup>116 &</sup>lt;u>Nhan Dan</u>, November 11, 1964.

was 4.4 percent, while average peasant income increased 2.5 percent annually during the same period. <sup>117</sup> In 1961 peasants derived 30-40 percent of their income from private economic activities, <sup>118</sup> and produce grown outside the collective accounted for 65 percent of the total marketed. <sup>119</sup> In 1962, 55.5 percent of peasant income came from private activities, <sup>120</sup> and by 1964 about 50 percent. <sup>121</sup> In contrast with the Chinese case, where the alleged encouragement of private plots and incentive guarantees to individual peasants after 1961 became a major issue in the Cultural Revolution, the DRV leaders evidently viewed this concession to private enterprise as an unavoidable necessity, at their level of economic development.

In Vietnam, despite the fact that, by 1963, 30 percent of poor peasant families had raised their income to the level of upper-middle peasants 122 - a major goal outlined by the 1961 5th Plenum - a 30 percent average

<sup>117</sup>Le Duan, On the Socialist Revolution, Vol. II, p. 134.

<sup>118</sup> Nhan Dan, September 19, 1961.

<sup>119</sup> Le Duan, On the Socialist Revolution, Vol. II, p. 97.

Vo Nhan Tri, <u>Croissance economique</u>, p. 409.

<sup>121</sup> Nhan <u>Dan</u>, November 13, 1964.

Nhan Dan, April 30, 1963.

difference still remained between the incomes of the two groups. 123

Because of three successive years of bad crop weather, the overall rural standard of living remained about the same as early 1959 (which, it should be remembered, was the second of two good harvest years). 124

|      | Living Standard of DRV Rural Families |                         |   |  |  |
|------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------|---|--|--|
| Year | Food surplus                          | Just enough             | Underfed                                |  |  |
| 1959 | 22.08%                                | 53.39%                  | 23.83%                                  |  |  |
|      | Good living standard                  | Average living standard | Suffering some deprivation (thieu thon) |  |  |
| 1963 | 25%                                   | 56%                     | 19%                                     |  |  |

<sup>123</sup> Nhan Dan, April 1, 1963. A detailed inquiry into a single cooperative jointly conducted by Nhan Dan, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Economic Institute of the State Planning Commission in 1964 found that poor peasants comprising 67 percent of the cooperative members had an average of 1.58 adult workers per family, while middle peasants totaling 31.5 percent of the cooperative membership had an average of 2.13 adult workers per family - yet the middle peasants totaled less work days for the cooperative (and more days on their profitable private plots) than the poor peasants. Since this cooperative "does not distinguish between poor and middle peasants in mobilizing labor, why the difference? We see that almost all middle peasants here have a very solid family economic base: a sizable orchard of fruit trees, and many pigs being raised. Because of this, generally speaking, the middle peasants can set aside a lot of labor time to work on their 'supplemental family economy'." Nhan Dan, May 28, 1964. This situation was apparently widespread, and encouraged by the relaxation of control of family secondary economy during the bad crop years of the early 1960's. The result was to perpetuate the economic advantages of the middle peasants.

The 1959 figures are extrapolated from Nhan Dan, May 22, 1959 and weighted according to figures cited in Tran Phuong, Cach mang ruong dat o Viet-Nam, p. 162. The 1963 figures are from a National Assembly report, Nhan Dan, April 30, 1963. It is assumed that food surplus or sufficiency is closely correlated with the measure of living standards, making the two sets of figures roughly comparable.

Since the poor peasants showed a 30 percent rise in income from a relatively constant economic "pie" it must be assumed that there was a drop among the middle peasant income as a result of the cut-off of land and buffalo rental income. In the lower level cooperatives, 25-30 percent of income was allocated to paying land rents, 125 as more cooperatives were moved to the higher level stage, this source of income was reduced. 126 The percentage of families in higher level cooperatives rose steadily, and by the end of 1964, 86.7 percent of peasant families were in higher level cooperatives, accounting for 15,510 of the total of 31,900 cooperatives. 127

During the first five years of cooperativization, the system of calculating remuneration, particularly the work point system, changed considerably. In the early stages of cooperativization there was much experimentation to determine the value of work points in different agricultural jobs. As in the labor exchange teams, work points were arrived at by discussion and totaled at frequent intervals in small groups in accordance with the "evaluate work, assess points" (binh cong cham diem) method. As cooperativization proceeded, an effort was made to simplify the administration of this system, while still retaining incentives. In 1960, probably in-

<sup>125</sup> Nguyen Khac Vien, et.al., "The Agricultural Cooperativization Policy," <u>Vietnamese Studies</u>, No. 13, 1967, p. 100.

In Thai Binh province, for example, the proportion of income paid out in land rent decreased from 30 percent (1959), to 15.2 percent (1962), 8 percent (1964), and 0.3 percent (1965). <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 101.

<sup>127</sup> Vo Nhan Tri, Croissance economique, p. 418.

fluenced by China's "three-fixes-one guarantee," the "three contracts" system was introduced, assigning goals for labor, production expenses. and production quotas to teams and even individual families, thus decentralizing the management of production tasks to the lowest level. 128 This system placed a great burden on the managerial capacities of the cooperatives and the production teams. Some cooperative cadres were evidently lax in managing this system, and relied on undifferentiated "equalized" rewards which did not reflect the amount of labor actually performed. By 1964 only 60 percent of cooperatives in the delta and midlands were able to set up a production plan with balanced accounting (matching revenues and expenditures). 129 Both the "contracts" system and "balanced accounting" management were methods of simplifying and rationalizing the complex work point system. The "three contracts" system was apparently designed to reduce the frequency of calculating work points from daily or weekly computations to a longer interval based on the seasonal tasks of agriculture. "Balanced accounting," bringing receipts into line with expenditures, was apparently intended as a method of preventing the inflation and overvaluation of work points in relation to the actual cooperative production. 130

<sup>128&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, August 18, 1960.

Nhan Dan, December 6, 1964. Counting only cooperatives in the delta and midlands, however, the number of cooperatives achieving this level of managerial competence went from 48 percent at the end of 1961 to 66 percent by early 1962. Nhan Dan, April 15, 1962.

<sup>130</sup> One cooperative noted that in its early years the point value of "contracts" had been determined by theoretical calculations. After several harvests this was changed to a cost accounting method based on actual production levels and expenses. Nhan Dan, April 17, 1964.

Prior to the setting of a fixed limit on the amount of cooperative production that was taxed directly or indirectly by the state, the ccoperatives tried to conceal their production and divide a high percentage of income among the members. In 1961 the Secretariat ordered that at least 50 percent of the total income divided among cooperative members must be calculated on the basis of work points. 131 Nguyen Chi Thanh described a three scale standard for evaluating work points based on a combination of physical difficulty, importance to production, and skill required. 132 This was intended as an incentive measure to "oppose egalitarianism," based on the principle of rewarding according to labor performed. In 1962, it was decreed that 60 percent of total cooperative income must be reserved for dividing among members, 133 and in 1963 a limit was set on compulsory state sales (at a low fixed price) until the end of the Five-Year Plan, 134 making it possible to calculate with certainty the dividable annual income, and regularize the procedures for allocating cooperative income according to work points. Nguyen Chi Thanh calculated that the basic goal was to have each rural worker perform at least 200 work days for the cooperative and 50 days of unremunerated "labor service" (lao dong nghia vu), leaving about 50 days labor to devote to the "family

<sup>131&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, August 1, 1962.

<sup>132&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan <u>Dan</u>, December 13, 1961.</sub>

<sup>133</sup>Nhan Dan, February 15, 1962.

<sup>134</sup> Nhan <u>Dan</u>, April 26, 1963.

economy." Thanh acknowledged that the labor point system was "rather complicated" but should be structured so as to offer production incentives for the individual worker. The higher level cooperatives, to 80 percent of the family income derived from labor points was paid in food, and the remainder in cash. The China, the "part supplies part wages system" tended to further reduce inequalities in income, and it seems likely that this occurred in the DRV as well. This was offset, however, by the considerably larger portion of peasant income in North Vietnam derived from private economic activities, ranging from 40-60 percent in the 1959-65 period, while the Chinese peasant derived only 20-25 percent of total income from private sources. 139

<sup>135&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, September 25, 1964.

<sup>136&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, November 11, 1964.

<sup>137</sup> Nguyen Xuan Lai, "The Family Economy of Cooperative Farmers," Vietnamese Studies, No. 13, 1967, p. 114.

<sup>138</sup>Cf. Peter Schran, <u>The Development of Chinese Agriculture</u>, 1950-59 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1969), p. 167.

This estimate is given for the 1956-57 period in ibid., p. 166. Another calculation covering the post-Great Leap period puts the figure at 20 percent. Benedict Stavis, Making Green Revolution: The Politics of Agricultural Development in China (Ithaca, New York: Rural Development Committee, Cornell University, 1974), p. 56. While there are no comprehensive income statistics for the 1959-65 period in the DRV, some scattered figures can be cited. DRV planners estimated that in order to completely eliminate the food scarcity normally occurring just before the harvest season as food supplies from the previous harvest run low, and assure an adequate standard of living, it would be necessary to raise the average monthly income of all North Vietnamese peasants from 10 dong (1961) to 16 dong (the average monthly income of an upper-middle peasant at that time). Nhan Dan, September 7, 1961. Average peasant income in North Vietnam rose from 10.80 dong per month in 1957 to 12.04 dong in 1962. Nhan Dan, August 4, 1964. In the 1958-60 period an upper-middle peasant earned 165 dong per annum (or 13.80 dong a month), a middle peasant earned 145.70 dong annually (or 10.6 dong per month). Nhan Dan, April 1, 1963.

Using incentives to stimulate production and ensure adequate state procurement was beneficial to the peasants, but meant that the amount of the surplus accumulated for economic development by the agricultural sector was limited. In order to compete with the "free market" prices, the state raised its purchase price for sales of agricultural produce beyond the assigned quota from 10-20 percent above the compulsory sale price in 1960, to 30 percent and finally to 60 percent in 1964. 140 It was acknowledged that, "if you do not bring the principle of material benefit into play, you will become divorced from the masses and will not be able to encourage their enthusiasm in production." 141 This pricing policy accompanying the changes in fixing the state quotas, mentioned above, had an important incentive effect, since the peasants could retain a greater share of everything they produced over the quota. 142 Before 1963, "the state always based itself on each yearly and seasonal production plan to determine the level of state purchases, which resulted in the peasants not having peace of mind in producing, because they saw that the more they stepped up production, the higher the State compulsory sales quota would rise."143 Fixing a quota on compulsory sales for the 1963-65 period probably improved peasant welfare. The new policy resulted

<sup>140&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan, November 14, 1964.</sub>

<sup>141</sup>Nhan Dan, April 17, 1963.

<sup>142</sup> The direct tax rate had been fixed in 1962, and averaged 7.2 percent of average total food production (and 4.8 percent of total agricultural production) for the 1960-62 period. This rate was reaffirmed in October 1963, and fixed for the remaining years of the Five-Year Plan ending in 1965. Nhan Dan, March 3, 1964.

<sup>143&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, May 21, 1966.

in an added income of 80 million dong to the peasants in the three years 1963-65. 144 It also, as noted required the state to pay higher prices for the surplus, thus reducing the total capital available for investment in economic development. The incentives policy did, however, result in a higher level of compliance in state deliveries from cooperatives. In years prior to the 1963 policy change (direct) tax collection sometimes reached only 90 percent of the target, and compulsory sales to the state reached only 60-70 percent of the assigned goal. 145 After 1963 the achievement of compulsory sales targets did not go below 96 percent. 146

In China, during the post-1960 period, the policy of fixing limits to the state sales quota was determined for periods ranging from three to five, or even ten years. 147 The percentage of commune output delivered to the state under this fixed quota ranged from 40 percent in communes with low production to 60 percent in more prosperous areas. 148

<sup>144</sup> Ibid. Dividing this by the 1960 number of agricultural workers (6,377,000), it appears that the individual yearly income gain was modest (about 4 dong). State sales of manufactures to the peasants at subsidized prices had a total value of 60 million dong, and certainly contributed to peasant welfare.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid

<sup>146</sup> Ibid. The quantity of rice and corn over the compulsory quota collected by the state rose 7 times in 1964, and in 1965 was 10 times the quantity of 1963. Between 1955 and 1964, volume of production less than doubled while volume of farm products delivered to the State Trade and buying and marketing cooperatives increased 10 times in this period. Vietnamese Studies, No. 13, 1967, pp. 18, 22.

<sup>147</sup> Stavis, Making Green Revolution, p. 147.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid.

As production increased through more efficient farming fixed deliveries to the state as a percentage of total production appear to have dropped. 149 While the DRV felt it necessary to raise its "bonus price" differential to 60 percent over the compulsory sales price to ensure adequate supplies, the Chinese differential was only about 30 percent. 150 The Cultural Revolution attacks on Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing for attempting to institute "fixes," "guarantees" and other measures to serve as incentives for agricultural production, however, suggests that overt reliance on production incentives was frowned on. 151 North Vietnam shared the Chinese disapproval of the excessive spread of private plots, but ultimately concluded that the production incentive of a fixed ceiling on state extractions from the cooperatives' production was both necessary and compatible with socialist agricultural organization. In practice, the differences in taxation and "food policy" (compulsory deliveries at the low state price) between China and North Vietnam in the 1950-65 period may not have been great, but the ideals diverged widely. Tachai was

<sup>149</sup> Ibid.

<sup>150&</sup>quot;Between 1956-1963, the state's purchasing price of grain rose by about 27 percent; most of this rise probably occurred in the 1960's. Between 1958-59 and 1963 the scissors relationship fell 10 percent in favor of the country dwellers." Audrey Donnithorne, China's Grain Output, Procurement, Transfers and Trade (Hong Kong: Chinese University, 1970), p. 10, cited in Stavis, Making Green Revolution, p. 143.

<sup>151</sup> Teng Hsiao-p'ing was attacked for his alleged advocacy of a "set yield" policy in which "the production assignment target of the commune is about 20 percent lower than the actual target. Thus the members of the commune obtain the benefit from the excess and the masses' interest is aroused." Prybyla, The Political Economy of China, pp. 204-205.

selected as a national model for agriculture for, among other things, refusing state grain relief supplies and other aid despite a calamitous production year in 1963 caused by adverse weather, and even managed to increase their deliveries to the state. 152 The DRV cited a district as the model of fulfilling the state deliveries, but stressed what it felt to be the relatively small percentage of total food production that this represented, and emphasized that the food retained by each person had significantly risen. 153 In a major report on a cooperative intensively investigated by Nguyen Chi Thanh, the ranking Politburo figure concerned with agriculture in the early 1960's, it was pointed out that the total rice extractions of the state in taxes and compulsory sales had ranged from 19.5 percent to 25 percent of total rice production from 1960 to 1962, while total income rose 36 percent during the period. 154

The major difference between the Vietnamese and Chinese approach was the DRV's heavy reliance on the private production and the much higher incentive levels of surplus sales. Moreover, while the Chinese instituted

Kuo Feng-lien, "The Tachai Road," Peking Review, No. 40, October 4, 1974. The accompanying charts (p. 23) show that in 1963 Tachai raised the percentage of its grain putput sold to the state from 45.7 percent in 1962 to 57.1 percent in 1963. The percentage (which does not distinguish between compulsory deliveries and sales of excess grain at the "incentive price") shows a significant reduction in the percentage of grain provided to the state (1965 = 43.2 percent, 1973 = 39 percent). This is due, in part, to increased total production. Even though the absolute amount delivered is greater, its percentage of the total is reduced.

 $<sup>\</sup>frac{153}{\mathrm{Nhan}}$  Dan, June 4, 1964. While state deliveries had gone up 150 tons over 1962, total production had increased by 1,000 tons. Average paddy ration per person had risen 3 kilos from the 1962 level to 14-15 kilos per month in 1963.

<sup>154&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan, April 15, 1963.</sub>

a welfare floor of a guaranteed percentage of work points allotted to families, the DRV work point system seems to have rested largely on the basis of work performed, although as noted above, the distribution of up to 80 percent of cooperative income in the form of food had an equalizing effect. In the early years of the people's communes, 50-80 percent of disposable commune income was allocated to members in the form of subsistence supplies, and 20-50 percent in the form of wages based on work performed. The net result of China's agricultural policy was that rural income roughly doubled in fifteen years, averaging an increase of about 5 percent a year, resulting in a per capita income of 80-100 yuan. The Interms of basic welfare, the Vietnamese rural inhabitants receive an average of 344 kilograms of paddy per person a year, of which 252 kilos are for individual consumption (a 30 percent increase over 1955) or 0.69 kilo a day. The China, by 1973 the available food grains per capita was about 0.57 kilo per day.

<sup>155</sup> Schran, The Development of Chinese Agriculture 1950-59, p. 36. The distinction between earned work points and basic welfare points, and the separate question of the percentage of income paid in cash and in kind must be kept in mind. In the DRV case, 70-80 percent of total earned income from work points was paid in kind (in higher level cooperatives) while in the above case 1990-30 rescent of total income was paid in this form.

<sup>156</sup> Stavis, Making Green Revolution, p. 58. This appears to be roughly equivalent to the DRV peasant income. If it is assumed that the average 1961 dong annual per capita income rose to 150 dong by 1965 (based on the 1960-63 rise from 100 to 130 dong in the resource poor province of Quang Binh) and if we apply the 1 yuan - 1.48 dong exchange rate, the results are roughly comparable. Quang Binh figures in Nhan Dan, September 5,1964.

<sup>157</sup> Nguyen Xuan Lai, "The Family Economy of Cooperative Farmers," Vietnamese Studies, No. 13, 1967, pp. 109, 114.

<sup>158</sup> Benedict Stavis, <u>People's Communes and Rural Development in China</u> (Ithaca, New York: Rural Development Committee, Cornell University, 1974), p. 23.

The most important aspect of collectivization in both Vietnam and China was the devolution of authority over a wide range of decisions affecting peasant welfare and daily life to the basic levels. This had an economic incentive effect, since the benefits of increased collective production were retained by the peasants. The collective production were retained by the peasants. In China, the decision in 1962 to make the production team the "basic unit of accounting" meant that "an individual's income would be based on the productivity of a small piece of land farmed collectively by about 20 families. In the DRV by 1964 the average size of a cooperative was about 83 families, divided into several production teams, and the recommended size of the production team was 30-40 individuals (representing about 15-20 families). The scale of economic organization had an important impact on the political sphere of life as well, and was a major aspect of political leadership and political participation in the countryside.

## Problems of Organization and Leadership in Agriculture

During the course of collectivization in China, there were constant

<sup>159</sup> Stavis estimates that about 65 percent of the increments in productivity over the basic tax and fixed deliveries to the state are retained by the localities. Making Green Revolution, p. 140.

<sup>160</sup> Ibid., p. 111.

Vo Nhan Tri, Croissance economique, p. 418.

Nhan Dan, April 15, 1964.

fluctuations in the organizational forms of the collectivized units, from lower to higher stage cooperatives, then to communes, and finally a retreat to production brigades and then production teams as the key units in agricultural organization. A high rate of turnover in local level cadres accompanied these transformations. Oksenberg's data suggests that though "many village leaders had long tenure in office, by 1962-65 there had been a considerable turnover among the village leaders who achieved their positions during the early revolutionary years." Moreover, there was an even higher rate of cadre turnover at the subvillage level. Such high rates of turnover certainly had destabilizing effects on the countryside, but they also provided a form of integration by bringing significant representation from a younger generation into lower level leadership positions in each major rural campaign.

Comparison with Vietnam is difficult, because the timing, pace and goals of the DRV's collectivization campaign were different. In the initial phases of agricultural cooperativization, cadres who had emerged during the land reform provided the basic lower level leadership in much

Michel Oksenberg, "Local Leaders in Rural China 1962-65," in A. Doak Barnett, Chinese Communist Politics in Action, p. 183.

<sup>&</sup>quot;Interviews with refugees pointed overwhelmingly to a short tenure in office at this level, and to the appointments of youths below twenty-five to sub-village posts. The drop in the average age of sub-village leaders...also suggests a rapid replacement of subvillage leaders between the mid-1950's and mid-1960's by younger men... As many as 70 to 80 percent of subvillage leaders, for example, may have been removed from office in some provinces during the 'Four Clearance Movement'."

1bid., p. 184.

of China's countryside, and the rate of attrition - among Party members at least - was quite low, despite the relatively more rigid class line policies of the PRC, and the decision to conduct a formal rectification campaign in concert with the "upsurge" of 1955-1956. Because of the uneven geographical pattern of Party development in China at the time of Liberation, and after the land reform, it was important that "...recruitment of new cadres during the upsurge played an important part not only in generating mass support, but also in providing new leadership for the producers co-operative." As noted above, however, many of these cadres had been replaced by the early 1960's.

While China's collectivization can be divided into three distinct evolutionary stages (cooperativization, communes, and the "retreat" period), the DRV had only one, the cooperativization campaign that began in 1959 and continued throughout the period of the First Five-Year Plan (1961-65). Unlike China, the majority of rural cadres had periods of service predating the land reform campaign. As mentioned earlier, by late 1962 Party members recruited during the Resistance still comprised about 70 percent of the total membership, while members under 26 represented only 10 percent of the total membership, 8.95 percent of the rural membership, and as little as 2.95 percent of membership in strong Resistance areas

Bernstein notes that, "it is unlikely that more than 1 percent of <u>hsiang</u> (village) Party-members was expelled, during this campaign. "Collectivization Campaigns," The China Quarterly, No. 31, 1967, p. 25.

<sup>166 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>., p. 21.

like Ha Tinh. <sup>167</sup> The cooperativization campaign did introduce more youths into rural leadership positions, however. In 1963, 72 percent of new Party members had come from the Labor Youth <sup>168</sup> and 81 percent in 1965. <sup>169</sup> By 1964, 22-30 percent of production team leaders and deputy leaders were youths. <sup>170</sup>

Despite the common problems in agricultural production during the difficult years of the early 1960's, and some parallels in the policy responses to these problems, a fundamental difference in the political organization of the countryside in China and Vietnam persisted. The main distinguishing feature of the commune form of organization was the amalgamation of village government and the cooperative administration into a single unit. In Vietnam these two functions remained separate. And, in addition to the village government (the Administrative Committee), the

 $<sup>^{167}</sup>$ Vu Oanh, "Ra suc 1am tot cong tac phat trien Dang," <u>Hoc Tap</u>, No. 11, 1962. A more extended discussion of the age structure of the Party is found in Part Two, Section III.

<sup>168</sup> Nhan Dan, March 26, 1964.

Nhan Dan, February 4, 1966.

Nhan Dan, March 26, 1964. In 1963 in Hung Yen province, basic level Party Committee members under age 40 were nearly 80 percent of the total (70 percent of village level Party members were poor peasants). While 105 of the 153 village Party Secretaries were poor or very poor peasants, 130 of them had been Party members prior to 1954, indicating that a post-Liberation village leadership had not yet emerged. Nhan Dan, September 23, 1963. In Vinh Phuc province, the percentage of youths at the Party Committee level rose slightly from 19 percent in 1962 to 23 percent in 1963 - hardly a major rejuvenation of the leadership. Nhan Dan, January 2, 1964.

Vietnamese retained a Village Council (popularly elected, which elects the Administrative Committee). In the PRC, the basic level representation is the Brigade (and Commune) Congress which elects the Management Committee. In the DRV the Cooperative Congress remains separate from the Village Council.

There was some confusion and duplication of function in the DRV rural leadership between the cooperative, and state organizations. Prior to the fixing of compulsory sales quotas in 1963, the Village Administrative Committee and the Cooperative Administrative Committee jointly had responsibility for determining the plan for deliveries to the state and division of income among cooperative members. 171 Village cadres were initially reluctant to serve in the administrative committees of the cooperatives, and regarded it as a demotion. 172 In 1963, about the same time attacks were being leveled by the Liuist work teams on basic level cadres in China, criticism was directed against "departmentalism" in the DRV, and against cadres in the cooperatives who "did not see the unity between the interests of the cooperatives and the interests of the state. 173 Perhaps for this reason, the Village Administrative Committees were retained to guard state interests at the basic levels. Yet, at the same

Cf. Nhan Dan, November 10, 1962. The Village Administrative Committee also remained the basic unit for such tasks as distributing the annual cloth rations. Nhan Dan, December 2, 1962.

<sup>172&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, November 22, 1962.

<sup>173</sup> Nhan Dan, April 5, 1963.

time, the rural Party organization was criticized for not being integrated into the cooperative organization.  $^{174}$ 

This dispersion of the leadership organization created problems in Party organization, the most common being the diversion of basic level Party members from production leadership. In the major mid-1963 investigation of cooperative organization by Nguyen Chi Thanh, mentioned above, it was found that in the cooperative studied, only 6 of 14 Party members actually performed leadership roles in the cooperative while the remainder worked on administrative tasks of the village, and in the production teams no leader or deputy leader was a Party member. 175 A comprehensive review of Party organization in the rural areas during the same period concluded that in order to lead cooperatives ranging in size from 70-80 to 150-200 families, each cooperative must have a Party chapter and, if the production teams are to fulfill their "three contracts," they must have a Party cell. But, the report concluded, "at present there are still very many cooperatives that do not have Party Chapters and production teams that do not have Party cells. In many places a Party Chapter must lead two or three cooperatives and a Party cell must lead two or three production teams." To remedy this deficiency, the DRV

<sup>174</sup> Ibid

Nhan Dan, April 17, 1963. An earlier investigation revealed that in Ha Dong province, 71 percent of Party Committee members (at village level) did not participate in the Management Committees of the Cooperatives. Nhan Dan, May 5, 1961.

<sup>176</sup> Nhan Dan, April 5, 1963.

set a goal of having a Party Chapter for every cooperative and a Party cell for every production team by 1965.

Underlying this leadership problem was a basic scarcity of Party members in the countryside. Even as late as 1963 Party membership in many provinces constituted a mere 1-2 percent of the population, and in some provinces it was less than 1 percent. The Moreover, a 1964 report by a leading Party organizational expert noted that, "we must acknowledge that 50 percent of the Party members in the countryside have not yet definitively resolved the question of 'who emerges victorious' with respect to ideological matters touching on their own selves." These

<sup>177</sup> Nhan Dan, April 6, 1963.

 $<sup>^{178}</sup>$ In Thai Binh province, for example, only 50 percent of the APC production teams had a Party cell, and the number of team leaders who were Party members was only 40 percent. Pham Bai, "May kinh nghiem xay dung Chi Bo Dang trong cuoc van dong cai tien quan tri hop tac xa san xuat nong nghiep" (Some Lessons in Building Up Party Chapters in the Movement to Strengthen Administration of Agricultural Producers Cooperatives), Hoc Tap, August 1964, p. 34. In Hai Duong, the ratio of Party members to population was only 2 percent and in some districts as low as 1.3 percent. Nguyen Chuong, "Xay dung Dang manh la nhan to quyet dinh moi thang loi" (Building Up the Party Is the Decisive Factor in Gaining Victories), Hoc Tap, August 1964, p. 28. In Son Tay, a French controlled area during the Resistance, almost every village had a Party Chapter after 1955, but the average number of Party members was small, 11 to 25 in a Party Chapter or 7 for every 1,000 peasants. Some had no Party members (39 out of 383 hamlets in Quoc Oai district had none, and in Phu Tho district 15 percent of the hamlets had no Party representation). The average of "poor" quality Party members was high - 27.4 percent. Almost no Party members were recruited after the land reform. Whan Dan, May 21, 1959.

Vu Oanh, "Tang cuong suc chien dau cua to chuc co so cua Dang" (Step Up the Combat Strength of the Party's Infrastructure Organizations), Hoc Tap, August 1964, p. 18.

problems were due to the fact that the Party was deeply rooted in the society it was trying to transform. The report on Party organization in the rural areas found that, "There are at present, a number of Party infrastructure organizations which are lacking unity and solidarity in their internal affairs... in some places to a serious degree. In these places, Party members are split along family, factional and neighborhood lines." 180

The DRV answer to the problems it encountered in the organization of agricultural production was to improve the system of "democratic management (quan ly dan chu). Although cooperativization had proceeded relatively smoothly, the anticipated material gains were not achieved, and the "absolute superiority" (tinh hon han) of the cooperatives not yet convincingly demonstrated. Reviewing the progress of cooperativization in its early stages, a DRV economist writes that, "if, in 1962, this superiority was still not plain to everyone, the principal reason was bad management of the cooperatives." 181

A Politburo resolution in April 1962 initiated a movement to "improve cooperative administration and improve technology." This directive noted that the basic reasons for the mediocre production performance of the cooperatives was ineffective management of production. In order to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>180</sup>Ibid., p. 20.

Vo Nhan Tri, Croissance economique, p. 416.

<sup>182</sup> Nhan Dan, April 7, 1963.

improve the management of the cooperatives, a greater stress on "democratic management" was ordered, including the expansion of participation of cooperative members in decision making, and a strengthening of the oversight committee (ban kiem soat) composed of ordinary cooperative members to perform an inspectorate function with regard to the operations of cooperative leadership. 183 Phu Tho province, which became a model of good cooperative management, managed to clarify the lines of responsibility between the local Party organization and the cooperative administrative committee which had been "stepping on each other's toes," by achieving more participation among both Party members and ordinary cooperative members in the planning and operations of the cooperatives. 184 By the end of 1963, 19 percent of cooperatives had completed the "improve administration, improve technology" campaign, 185 and 75 percent by the end of 1965. 186 By the end of 1964, a survey of 18 delta provinces found that the proportion of well managed cooperatives had increased from 30 percent (1963) to 36 percent (1964). Evidently the improvement was largely in the average cooperatives, since the percentage of "satisfactory" cooperatives actually declined from 51.7 percent to 48 percent while the

<sup>183</sup> Ibid.

<sup>184</sup> Nhan Dan, May 8, 1963.

<sup>185</sup> Nhan Dan, January 10, 1964.

<sup>186&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, December 18, 1965.

The 1963 figures are from Nhan Dan, January 10, 1964, and the 1964 figures from Vo Nhan Tri, Croissance economique, pp. 416-17.

number of "poor" cooperatives dropped only slightly, from 18 to 16 percent.  $^{188}$ 

From the outset, Vietnam's collectivization program envisaged the culmination of rural agricultural organization at the level of the village-sized higher level cooperative. At the close of the first phase of cooperativization in July 1961, the 5th Plenum noted that 24 percent of rural households were organized into higher level cooperatives, and while 9,000 cooperatives had reached the hamlet level in size (out of 12,000 hamlets) only 100 village sized cooperatives (out of 6,000 villages) were in existence. The resolution of the Plenum decreed that:

At present and within a few years to come, mainly hamlet sized cooperatives covering from 150 to 200 households will be organized. Therefore, if possible, a Party cell will be set up within each of these cooperatives, led by the Village Party Committee. When these cooperatives have been amalgated and involve a whole village, a Party cell may be set up within each of the production brigades [e.g., teams]. 189

One year later the recommended size of cooperatives was reduced somewhat. Whereas the 5th Plenum had recommended a size of 150-200 families, Le Duan in an August 1962 speech reduced this to 100 to 150 households, and laid new stress on the hamlet as the appropriate size for a cooperative unit.

The hamlet level cooperative was described by Le Duan as a "unit of planning and accounting," in mid 1962. While the PRC in that year de-

<sup>188&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>

<sup>189</sup> Vietnamese Studies, No. 13, 1967, p. 163.

volved "planning and accounting" responsibility to the lowest level production unit, the production team, the DRV retained these functions at the next highest level (the cooperative level, roughly equivalent to China's production brigade). Le Duan asserted that the move from "simple cooperation (hop tac don thuan) of a 30 family unit to one of over 100 families represented a new distribution of labor and a significant qualitative change in the forces of production. The hamlet, according to Le Duan, was the most natural scale of cooperative organization, because

... the hamlet is a unit of residence, administration and production which has existed in Vietnamese society for a long time; in a hamlet there are intimate relationships [among inhabitants] with regard to land, and in a hamlet there are close fraternal bonds in the family and with relatives, and the land makes a concentrated and complete unit. With respect to surface area, the land is not too small and that allows the expansion of assignments for labor production, and at the same time it is not too big (averaging 50-100 hectares throughout North Vietnam). One hundred hectares is not too big, and does not surpass the management capabilities of our peasants... But doing everything on the basis of the hamlet level cooperative is not good. The hamlet cooperative is a unit of planning and accounting [original italics]. Only by taking the hamlet sized cooperative as a unit of planning and making labor and production assignments and, of course, distributing the harvest, can the new forces of the hamlet sized cooperative be expanded. But in directing production, carrying out technical measures, and directing labor, it would not be good to take the hamlet as a unit but, rather, there should be a division into teams, taking the production team as a unit [original italics].

While the PRC had lowered the level of accounting to the production team in 1962, the DRV retained it at the level of the hamlet cooperative,

 $<sup>190</sup>_{\rm Nhan\ Dan}$ , September 12, 1962. A slightly different translation of this passage and the entire speech may be found in Le Duan, On the Socialist Revolution in Vietnam, Vol. II, pp. 125-170.

equivalent in size to the Chinese natural village. By the end of 1963,
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73 percent of cooperatives in the delta and midland areas were at the hamlet level, 191 and by 1965 the average size of cooperatives was 85 families cultivating an average area of 49 hectares. 192

In the course of moving from lower to higher levels, many problems concerning leadership and the distribution of cooperative income emerged. Some cooperatives tried to divide their accumulation funds among members prior to merging with another cooperative. The problem of labor management and allocation of resources was complicated by the increased size. In the case of one DRV cooperative:

Problems arose when the co-op grew to the size of a village (1961-64). Between the hamlets, there were inequalities with regard to cultivable acreage and available funds. Each one felt himself wronged when he got into a single co-op with others. Moreover, problems of organization and management were given rise to by the broadening of the co-op. And the cadres were lacking in experience. Faced with difficulties, peasants asked to get out of the co-op. Some time was needed to put the organization in order and stabilize production. 193

<sup>191</sup> Nhan Dan, January 10, 1964.

Vietnamese Studies, No. 13, 1967, p. 113. The average North Vietnamese village has a population of about 5,000 people, and is composed of several hamlets. The natural village in China, which has an average population of 500 (100 families), is often the basis of the production team which may vary in size from 20 to 60 families. A single commune may have from 80 to 200 production teams. Stavis, People's Communes and the Development of China, pp. 34-38. While there are approximately 12,000 hamlets in North Vietnam, China has about 1 million natural villages. Ibid., p. 38. The area cultivated by a PRC production team ranges from 20-50 hectares in the northern wheat growing regions to 10-20 hectares in rice growing areas. Ibid., p. 34.

<sup>193&</sup>lt;sub>Pham Toan</sub>, "The Ngo Xuyen Cooperative," in <u>Vietnamese Studies</u>, No. 27, 1971, p. 212.

To minimize the problem, the DRV leadership in 1961 advocated stabilizing the size and composition of the basic unit of the cooperative -- the production team -- for at least one year to allow it to accumulate funds and experience. 194 The production team has been based on the original neighborhood seasonal labor exchange groups, but by 1963, as the size of the collective unit had expanded well beyond the boundaries of the original cooperative, intensive debate on the role of the production team was carried out in the Party press, centering on the issue of whether the original teams should be kept intact to avoid disruption and facilitate long range planning, or whether in the larger cooperative new distribution of labor, tools and land was needed to reduce inequalities in working conditions and income. Although no definitive recommendation was made, the powers of the cooperative as the basic level of ownership and its role in determining the organization, plans and production responsibilities of the teamwere emphasized, 195 and production team cadres who had "organizational and production experience" but were lacking in "political awareness and only see the interests of their team but not those of the

<sup>194&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, July 30, 1963.

Ibid. A member of the State Planning Commission offered the personal view, supported with figures, that increasing the amount of labor on a given plot of land during the planting season would increase productivity. Nhan Dan, July 1, 1964. The debate on the best method of labor organization to achieve more intense cultivation continued however, most notably in a major public discussion of the problem in the pages of Nhan Dan by specialists, province, huyen and cooperative cadres jointly sponsored by Nhan Dan's editors and the Ministry of Agriculture, without arriving at a uniform conclusion. Nhan Dan, March 29, 1965. Cf. also Nhan Dan, July 15-17, 1965. Another round of these problem solving articles was launched in Nhan Dan, May 9, 1966.

whole cooperative"were criticized. 196 As a general rule, the recommended size of production teams was 30-35 workers (or up to 40 in two crop areas), with a mixture of strong and weak workers, men and women, and a redistribution of the fields if necessary to equalize income opportunities on the basis of the two criteria of "developing production" and "mutual benefit." 197

In substance, the Vietnamese agricultural collectivization program had many similarities to China's. Although the DRV remained attached to the Soviet model in some matters, such as the tractor stations, in areas that were central to the North Vietnamese agricultural economy the Chinese experience was clearly more relevant. Yet the DRV rejected the idea of eventually establishing people's communes, and proceeded with their cooperativization campaign at a measured, steady pace that stood in sharp contrast to the "wave like" upsurges in the PRC's collectivization program. The role of class struggle in North Vietnam's collectivization was relatively less important than in China, and the central government took several initiatives to protect the interests of the wealthier peasants in the interests of maintaining an acceptable level of production. The DRV also made greater concessions to the "capitalist" tendencies of the peasantry than was the case in China. This meant of course that the percentage of agricultural production available for accumulation and

<sup>196&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, August 1, 1963.

 $<sup>\</sup>frac{197}{\mathrm{Nhan}}$  Dan, July 31, 1963. The lower and upper limits of a production team were set at 30-60 agricultural laborers.

investment by the state was reduced. Surprisingly, it was only in 1963 that the DRV instituted the basic incentive of fixing the amount of collective produce to be delivered to the state at the lower compulsory sale price, which the Chinese had initiated briefly just prior to the Great Leap, and returned to in the early 1960's. After they had done so, however, the DRV was compelled to escalate its incentive price for state sales above the quota to roughly double the Chinese level, indicating either a greater scarcity of food, or less control over the marketing system, or both. 198

Despite its admitted managerial problems, North Vietnam retained a governmental structure down to the village level even after cooperativization. Possibly the small scale of territorial administration and the short administrative distances between the province and the villages encouraged them in this. While China experimented with the "Liuist" approach of work teams and large scale cadre transfers to the lower levels, the DRV maintained a regularized "level by level approach." And while Mao revived the class struggle in the villages during the Socialist Education campaign by re-instituting the Poor and Lower Middle Peasant Association as an important component of the local power structure, and

<sup>198</sup> In 1962, for example, the rice price in the "free market was double the official price." Nhan Dan, October 4, 1962. During this period, the amount of rice collected in taxes and compulsory sales to the state appears to have been quite low. In one cooperative, intensively studied by Nguyen Chi Thanh, the amount collected by the state was: 21.5 percent of rice production (1960), 19.5 (1961), 25.1 (1962). In another cooperative in the midland region, the amount collected was: 20.6 (1961), 16 (1962), 17 (1963). Nhan Dan, April 17, 1964.

attempted to get China's communes to emulate the spirit of Tachai, the DRV concentrated on the organizational aspects of improving cooperative administration and production techniques through a campaign to "improve management, improve techniques." 199

Comparison of the collectivization campaigns in Vietnam and China is especially difficult because the DRV was able to assess and borrow from China's experience in three quite different aspects of collectivization; the initial cooperativization stage, the Great Leap, and the agricultural reorganization of the early 1960's. The DRV learned from all these aspects of Chinese experience in agriculture, but produced a collectivization program that was a distinctive blend of its own problems and solutions, and influences from other countries. DRV development policies during the 1959-65 period thus raises the question of the extent to which North Vietnam's leadership was responding to transitional problems that were part of their less advanced socialist development, and the impact which the political orientation of its leaders had on their policies. These orientations are not only a product of the past experience of the Vietnamese revolutionary leaders, but of the political

Although one article in Nhan Dan introduced Tachai to its readers and concluded that "if the brothers in China" can increase production, "then our peasants can certainly do it if they try," it also noted that the relevant comparison of soil conditions was with Kwangtung. Nhan Dan, April 7. 1965. The main interest of DRV economic planners was in China's high rice producing provinces, such as Kwangtung, Fukien and Chekiang which produced from 60 to over 70 hundred kilos per hectare per crop, nearly double that of the DRV's most productive cooperatives (37 hundred kilos per hectare per crop). Nhan Dan, July 15, 1965. The average DRV production per hectare per crop in 1965 was 18.94 hundred kilos. Vietnamese Studies, No. 13, 1967, p. 9.

culture of Vietnam as well. The attitudes of the DRV leadership toward Vietnam's future as well as its past help place the 1954-65 period into a broader context, and it is on this question that the analysis of Vietnam's "revolutionary re-integration" concludes.

PART FOUR
REVOLUTIONARY SUCCESSORS

## SECTION I

## THE REVOLUTIONARY ROAD: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

This study has so far attempted to outline the nature of the revolutionary experience of the principal Chinese and North Vietnamese leaders and the lessons they derived from it. It has suggested that analyzed in a comparative perspective, the Chinese case was more heavily weighted toward the "anti-feudal" task of social revolution, while the Vietnamese revolution was primarily focused on fulfilling its "anti-imperialist" mission of liberating the country from foreign domination. These contrasting priorities were perpetuated into the post-Liberation period, and affected almost every area of policy in both China and Vietnam, as Mao became increasingly preoccupied with his concern that succeeding generations "never forget class struggle," and Ho and the DRV leadership were forced to respond to the escalating threat of U.S. intervention in Vietnam's unfinished revolution. In the concluding part of this analysis, the interaction between the respective leaderships and the society and political culture that produced them will be examined in an attempt to discover to what extent contrasting policies and orientations are due to the personal orientations of the principal leaders, or were products of transitory circumstances, and to what extent the revolutionary roads of China and Vietnam are based on unique and persisting characteristics of the two countries.

Revolutionary Evolution and Revolutionary Essence: The Stages and Nature of Political Development

In the course of analyzing various aspects of post-Liberation programs and policies in North Vietnam and China, a fairly consistent pattern has emerged. China's development is characterized by a "struggle between the two lines," Maoist and Liuist or socialist and revisionist, while the DRV's course of action suggests a high level of consensus among the principal leaders. If anything, the DRV development pattern more closely approximates the "Liuist" pattern of step by step problem solving, in a hierarchical system which highly values expertise and freely employs material incentives as a stimulus to economic development. Mass mobilization campaigns are not a prominent part of the repertoire of leadership techniques in DRV, and "balanced and rational" development is preferred to "advancing in waves." Class struggle was de-emphasized after the land reform period in the DRV, particularly when it appeared to threaten the immediate production requirements, whereas it was periodically revived in China.

There were significant periods in post-Liberation China, and in Mao's own intellectual evolution, during which orientations subsequently ascribed to Liu or classified as non-Maoist were dominant or influential. The basic point of difference, however, is that in China the elements that comprised the rival lines ultimately hardened into antagonistic political positions, whereas Vietnam's leaders chose to compromise potential points of conflict and emphasize the importance of maintaining unity within the leadership above all else. And the fact that the general orientation of the DRV leadership had many parallels with the "Liuist" line does not

mean that this was a conscious or systematic political comment on China's political approach. The DRV leaders followed a path which was consistent with their personal experience and their view of Vietnam's requirements.

Comparison of DRV policy positions with a checklist of "Liuist" approaches to a wide range of problems does, however, suggest several points of similarity between the two.

- -The rate of investment would have been reduced to restore balance and minimize economic and political tensions.
- -An increased private sector would have been permitted in the rural economy.
- -Control of state resources by the local communities would have been checked.
- -Planning would have become "genetic" rather than teleological" -- that is, it would become primarily a projection of trends and probabilities and would not seek to create new aspirations and increased efforts.
- -Development, even local development, would be financed through state taxation rather than out of community funds.
- -Cadres' participation in labor would cease to be encouraged.
- -Political education of experts and intellectuals would have become nominal.
- -An elitist element would have been accepted in education, the locally financed production-oriented schools discouraged, formal academic standards maintained throughout the education system, and work study minimized. 1

These points are taken from a longer list (16 points) drawn up by Jack Gray to summarize the putative "Liuist" policies, though as Gray points out most of the charges against the "Liuist" line describe tendencies rather than formally defined policies. Jack Gray, "The Two Roads: Alternative Strategies of Social Change and Economic Growth in China," in Stuart Schram, ed., Authority, Participation and Cultural Change in China, pp. 149-150.

This is not a list of actual policies, but rather of tendencies, or points of emphasis. Given some latitude to select among alternatives, the DRV leadership seems inclined to emphasize the "Liuist" rather than the "Maoist" approach. This does not, however, mean that the DRV leaders are "revisionists" or that the Maoist policies are rigidly derived from ideological rather than pragmatic rationales.

Policy orientations, which have been determined by Mao to be unsuited to China's political and economic requirements, have been found by DRV leaders to be congruent with Vietnam's needs. The contrasts in policy orientations can be largely attributed to the different stages of development of the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions.

After 1954, the DRV leadership was diverted from concentrating solely on internal political and social problems because of the unresolved situation in South Vietnam and the escalating threat from the United States. The hard line on class struggle of the land reform period gave way to a renewed emphasis on the unity of social classes against foreign intervention when in 1956 it became clear that the external danger to the future of Vietnam's revolution was greater than the internal social problem. Although the DRV concluded, by 1958 at least, that the problem of the South would take a long time to resolve, and that North Vietnam's internal development could no longer be postponed, the anti-imperialist aspects of the revolution continued to moderate the policies of social transformation.

The unresolved situation in the South demanded greater unity in the North, and partly explains the DRV reluctance to push for a higher level

of capital accumulation which, by exacerbating the scarcity of food, would create greater tensions in the countryside, in a rural economy already strained by adverse weather conditions. The DRV decision to proceed with collectivization at a slow but steady pace, and the continued emphasis on consolidation was certainly related to the leadership's concern that the inevitable strains of such a major transformation would not create unnecessary political problems. Thus the central government intervened in the early stages of cooperativization to protect the interests of the middle peasants at a time when poor peasants were pressing for an immediate end to the economic advantages of the more prosperous peasants. Economic incentives were widely used because the alternative would have been extensive ideological mobilization and institutional controls which North Vietnam's leadership evidently felt the rural society was not yet prepared for.

Political integration of intellectuals, religious and ethnic minorities in the post-Liberation period was also affected by the fact that Vietnam's anti-imperialist revolution was uncompleted. All these groups posed special problems for the DRV, and the impact of the way in which these problems were resolved on the development of a united front against the U.S. sponsored regime in South Vietnam was given great consideration. In the case of the intellectuals, the crackdown on the Nhan Van dissidents was prolonged over a period of five years. The case was finally resolved in 1960, and the harshest penalties imposed were on a small group of intellectuals allegedly engaged in espionage. No rectification campaign was launched directed toward intellectuals as a group. It is

significant that at least some of the internal opposition to DRV policies was directed at the cautious policy toward the South. Some of the dissidents called for a more active response to the failure of the U.S. and South Vietnamese governments to honor the provisions of the Geneva Agreements.

The Catholic community posed a continuing problem of integration in North Vietnam, but the attitude adopted toward them by the government was basically conciliatory. This is due, in part, to the government's awareness of the political importance and influence of the Catholic minority in the South. There is some evidence that there were pressures within the DRV leadership to pursue a more assimilationist policy toward the ethnic minorities after the decision to proceed with socialist transformation had been made, but these pressures evidently subsided in 1963-64 when the threat of U.S. escalation made it imperative to preserve political unity with and within the vulnerable border areas.

It may be that there are deep "contradictions" in North Vietnamese society, and that the resolution of crucial political questions has only been deferred by the prolonged preoccupation with the "anti-imperialist" aspect of the revolution. In the case of China, it was not until 1957, eight years after Liberation, that Mao identified the principal contradictions in Chinese society and not until the Cultural Revolution that the full scope of these problems became apparent. Perhaps when Vietnam is "returned to the obscurity it so richly deserves" (in John Kenneth Galbraith's condescending phrase) it too will turn inward and bring hitherto concealed social and political conflicts out in the open.

There are, however, several reasons which suggest that the DRV leaders' basic orientation toward these potential issues will not undergo fundamental change. An obvious but important fact to consider is the extent to which what has already been done has set a precedent for the future. The DRV has been in existence for three decades. During the course of this period, many of North Vietnam's social problems have been resolved even though they were not always the top priority issue. Class distinctions, for example, were reduced in stages by socialist transformation, and the prolonged anti-foreign resistance also had an integrative impact that facilitated and consolidated this social change. And because the social issue was often subordinated to the immediate needs of the anti-imperialist revolution, the composition of North Vietnam's leadership had a significant component drawn from the non-basic classes who inevitably were influenced by their petit-bourgeois or traditional backgrounds.

Another reason for suggesting that the past orientations of the DRV leadership will continue into the future is the nature of Vietnamese society and political culture which constitute the environment in which Vietnam's revolution was shaped. A leadership group, however dedicated or talented, is both influenced and restricted by the society from which it comes. Social transformation cannot be based simply on a doctrine or program, but must respond to the particular characteristics and problems of the society concerned. Even in the course of revolutionary change there is a tendency for both the leaders and the society to follow patterns of behavior shaped by a political culture which has evolved from distinctive

historical and social conditions.

## Historical Themes and Political Ideals

For the purpose of outlining the significant assumptions and expectations that influence a society's political behavior, a few historical themes that are of special relevance to understanding the extent to which political ideals voiced by revolutionary leaders are consistent with these assumptions and expectations will be briefly considered. The themes of cultural identity and social dissonance, for example, are treated in the literary classics of China and Vietnam. Contemporary political interpretations of two roughly analogous works, China's 18th century Dream of the Red Chamber and Vietnam's early 19th century literary masterpiece, the Tale of Kieu illustrate the contrasting treatments of these themes, with contemporary Vietnamese interpretations stressing the aspect of cultural identity and the Chinese analysis focusing on class contradictions. The related question of the role of language in political life will also be considered and several illustrations of contrasting attitudes toward history and the past in China and Vietnam will be noted.

"Unity," said Ho, "is the most beautiful tradition of our people." To recapitulate a theme developed in the first section of this analysis, this linkage of "unity" and "tradition" is a reflection of Vietnam's painfully learned historical lesson; whenever Vietnam is disunified, foreign intervention will follow. China too had experienced periods

Nhan Dan, December 19, 1958.

of foreign intervention and domination. But until the incursions from the West, China had been successful in culturally absorbing the outsiders and making them Chinese. The immense size of China and the universally acknowledged greatness of its civilization were considered an insuperable barrier to the "loss" of China to foreigners. In Vietnam, the recurrent theme of the Vietnamese nationalist movement was the "loss of country" (mat nuoc) which was the rallying cry for the scholar opposition as well as the modern nationalist groups. Ironically, it was the Vietnamese Communists, with their ideology of class struggle, who pushed for unity with opposition groups, while the Nationalists who offered only an antiforeign program strenuously resisted united action.

Because the Vietnamese communist movement absorbed the mainstream of the nationalist movement, it was able to play the role of the guardian of the enduring values of the Vietnamese race and culture. Nowhere is this made clearer than in the case of the DRV's treatment of Vietnam's premier poet, Nguyen Du, whose 19th century masterpiece "The Tale of Kieu" continues to grip the emotions and imagination of Vietnamese of all classes and political orientations. During the 1920's and 1930's, Vietnamese radicals attacked the use made of this story by Pham Quynh - the principal intellectual and artistic spokesman of the collaborateur intellectual elite. Quynh argued that foreign domination could never

 $<sup>^3</sup>$ The DRV pointed scornfully to attempts by the Diem government to do away with "backward customs" associated with the Tet New Year celebrations, and contrasted the DRV respect for this traditional rite with the Diem view of it. Nhan Dan, January 27, 1960.

penetrate to the inner core of "Vietnamese-ness" and thus, despite the colonial tutelage, Vietnam's traditions and cultural values would endure. He was severely attacked for using - to illustrate his point - the Kicu story of a daughter from a declining scholar-official family who, to save her family, sold herself into bondage and underwent countless episodes of degradation, emerging in the end spiritually unscathed by the experience because of her inner purity of soul. The parallel between Kieu, the indicadual victim of circumstances, and Vietnam, the collective victim of circumstances, was evident. The radicals protested vigorously against this "defeatist" interpretation, and the Kieu story, whose literary merit was unquestioned, became mired in dispute and acrimony.

By the time of the Resistance war against the French, Kieu was again restored to a place in the patriotic literary pantheon of Vietnam. After 1954, Kieu was assigned an even more prominent place in Vietnamese cultural life. During the land reform in 1955, the birthdate of Kieu's author was commemorated. In 1957 a prominent Party literary critic pronounced Kieu "a story of the masses." As the Second Indochina War gradually escalated, a somewhat different explanation of the compelling force of the Kieu story was added; "In particular, in a period of declining and disintegrating feudalism, a number of people belonging to the aristocratic class which was being split and divided, declining and

Mhan Dan, October 2, 1955.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Hoai Thanh, "Suc cam thong la lung cua nha thi hao dan toc" (The Strange Power of Sympathetic Attraction of the Poet of the Nation), Nhan Dan, September 9, 1957.

4.

pushed around, and who lived side by side with the people, usually sympathized with the misery of the oppressed poor. Because of this, their world outlook changed." The parallel between this socially concerned early 19th century segment of a fragmented traditional elite, rent asunder by forces of great historical change, and its 20th century counterpart, the "upright scholars" who provided the critical impetus for the Communist-led national revolution, is obvious. Moreover, the story of Kieu was seen in the DRV as an integrating cultural symbol, which linked all social classes in a common appreciation of their national heritage.

In the literary history of nations, a work as widely disseminated as the <u>Tale of Kieu</u> — appreciated in the old days by [everyone] from kings, mandarins, and scholars, to the poorest and most miserable illiterates, as well as by the entire nation in the present time — is an unprecedented phenomenon. Kieu is recited when people are homesick for country and family; it is read when going on trips to trade; it is also memorized and embellished upon when ploughing fields or even fighting the enemy; to say nothing of using Kieu to predict fortunes when meeting obstacles in love, etc. The <u>Tale of Kieu</u> from past to present has remained a matter for spirited conversation and intense

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>Ha Huy Giap, "Chung ta quyet bien thanh hien thuc niem mo uoc cua Nguyen Du la giai phong nhan dan bi ap buc" (We Will Resolutely Transform Into Reality the Dream of Nguyen Du, the Liberation of Oppressed People), Hoc Tap, No. 11, 1965, p. 19. (In commemoration of the 200th anniversary of Nguyen Du's birthdate).

The article, whose author himself came from an "upright scholar" background, and is the leading Party figure in the arts (a Central Committee member and Deputy Minister of Culture), comments that, "Living in a society like that, Nguyen Du who was a clean, virtuous, talented and intelligent scholar, could not avoid feeling pained and angry."

<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 22.

discussion. 8

The Chinese parallel was the Dream of the Red Chamber, which also described the life of a feudal family in decline. In the early 1950's, a sharp controversy arose over the issue of whether this was simply a story of the vicissitudes of an individual family, as one prominent intellectual critic asserted, or whether it was a work in which "the author depicted the conflicts in China's feudal society and criticized the entire social structure." There were, of course, different emphases in the original Chinese and Vietnamese works, which are in themselves indicative of different literary traditions and cultural orientations. It is, however, the contemporary analysis of these works which is of interest in this context. Both works were seen from a Marxist perspective which stresses class conflict and feudal decay. But there is an important difference in the terms of reference of the criticisms and the political uses to which they were put. The modern controversy over the Kieu story essentially revolved around the issues of cultural identity and the response to external constraints of the environment. The critical debate over the significance of the Dream of the Red Chamber centered on the degree to which contemporary criticisms should emphasize orthodox Marxist

<sup>8 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 25. The author's class analysis is notable conventional here, a reflection of the traditional scholar, peasant, merchant, soldier division of society. This traditional classification has emerged through the modern accretion of Marxist analysis on at least one important occasion when, as noted earlier, Ho made a united front appeal to compatriots in the South.

<sup>9</sup> Merle Goldman, <u>Literary Dissent in Communist China</u>, p. 116.

interpretation as opposed to traditional canons of Chinese literary appreciation -- an issue which, in the case of Kieu, had been fundamentally resolved by the end of the Resistance period. Because the issues concerning <a href="Dream of the Red Chamber">Dream of the Red Chamber</a> were defined in these terms, it became a standard by which political commitment of intellectual critics could be measured, and the PRC's chief spokesman in literary matters at the time announced in 1954 that, "The present discussion of <a href="Hung Lou Meng">Hung Lou Meng</a> [Dream of the Red Chamber] is the start of an ideological struggle in academic circles against the bourgeois class." 10

The use of the <u>Tale of Kieu</u> as an integrative symbol of cultural unity illustrates several important points about the socialization process in Vietnam, notably the centrality of language and tradition in defining Vietnamese identity, and the connection between the ideological stress on tradition and cultural heritage and the political emphasis on internal unity. Unlike China, whose many dialects have posed a formidable obstacle to breaking down regional identifications and have thus far frustrated attempts to create a romanized writing system that would expand knowledge and access to knowledge to much broader segments of society than the restrictive and difficult to learn character system, the Vietnamese language is (despite regional accents and variations) comprehensible throughout the country. As a result, a romanized writing system was adopted which made possible the elimination of illiteracy, bridged the gap between educated and uneducated, and provided a major vehicle for

<sup>10&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>., p. 41.

the expansion of the political influence of the ICP and sympathetic intellectuals through the "Association For the Propagation of the Romanized Script" in the 1930's and 1940's, which linked together language and revolution, culture and politics. Premier Pham Van Dong pointed up the integrative aspects of language in the following terms:

The two sources of the richness and beauty of the Vietnamese language (tieng Viet) are that it is the spoken word (tieng noi) of the popular masses, full of sentiment, imagery, color and tone, it is natural and captivating, and full of meaning. At the same time it is the language (ngon ngu) of literature and the arts that writers and poets of our people (dan toc) like Nguyen Trai, Nguyen Du, etc., contemporary writers and poets of the North and South, have raised to a very high artistic level, giving it an extraordinary clarity and beauty. 11

Pham Van Dong notes the close relationship between the development of the Vietnamese language and the sense of Vietnamese national identity.

"Our Vietnamese," he says, "reflects the formation and maturing of Vietnamese society and the Vietnamese people, of the small collective, the family, relatives, neighbors, and the large collective, the people (dan toc) and the nation (quoc gia)." 12

Such a close connection between language and national identity has extremely important implications for the process of socialization, whereas in China's non-Mandarin speaking areas the language of the family

<sup>11</sup> Pham Van Dong, "Giu gin su trong sang cua tieng Viet" (Maintain the Clarity of the Vietnamese Language), <u>Hoc Tap</u>, April 1966, p. 8. "Tieng Viet" is a non-Sinitic word for Vietnamese language (tieng = sound), "tieng noi" is "sound of speaking," "ngon ngu" = "words" or, by extension, language.

<sup>12 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 7.

is not the language of politics or the language of the nation. And as noted above, the lack of a unified spoken dialect makes romanization impractic; ble as a national solution to expanding knowledge and educational opportunity. In Vietnam, language is both form and content; it serves as a vehicle to disseminate information and as an agent of social integration, and has a powerful emotive force as well. The spoken dialect of Mandarin is, for non-Mandarin speaking Chinese, primarily a tool of communication. Traditionally the unity of the Chinese written language has served as an integrative mechanism, and has symbolized the cultural unity of China. Yet it is only at the elite level that this has been possible. Between the literate and the populace at large there was a vast gulf, which the various language reforms and simplifications growing out of the May 4th Movement addressed, but did not effectively bridge. 14

<sup>13</sup>C. P. Fitzgerald writes, "The disadvantages of abandoning the ideographic script were thus very formidable. It would mean a serious blow at the cultural unity of the nation. While provinces of the South would be divided from the nation, and from each other, even further among themselves, by new language, written as well as spoken. It was obvious that such a development might have political as well as cultural consequences. The literature of the past would be lost... The Communist Party and government... cannot have ignored the dangers of provincial separatism, the threat to national unity...to the ideal of 'All China'... in any proposal to abandon the ideographics." "Flood Tide in China," in Ralph C. Crozier, ed., China's Cultural Legacy and Communism (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 125.

<sup>14</sup> In "Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art," Mao criticized feudal literature and art, which he defined as "literature and art for the landlord class." "To this day," he added, "such literature and art still have considerable influence in China." Selected Works, Vol. III, p. 76. Mao complained that the writers and artists in Yenan were "lacking in understanding knowledge... What does understanding mean? Not understanding the language, that is, not being familiar with the rich lively language of the masses." Ibid., p. 72.

Although Mao instructed that, "We must take over all the fine things in our literary and artistic heritage" and "critically assimilate whatever is beneficial," he constantly stressed the instrumental use of the past (defining "new culture" as "national in form and new-democratic in content") and the necessity of "democratizing" and popularizing culture. In one of his most important statements about the role of the past in socialization, Mao said:

China's present new politics and new economy have developed out of her old politics and old economy, and her present new culture, too, has developed out of her old culture; therefore we must respect our own history and not lop it off. However, respect for history means giving it its proper place as a science, respecting its dialectical development, and not eulogizing the past at the expense of the present or praising every drop of feudal poison.

As far as the masses and the young students are concerned, the essential thing is to guide them to look forward, and not backward. (Emphasis added).

Mao's personal experience with the difficulties of carrying out a revolution in a country as vast and complex as China, his own internecine battles with rivals of different views as well as his struggles with the KMT must have impressed him with the fragility of revolutionary change.

Nationalist revolution emphasizes the glories of the past, while social revolution denigrates them. Because China's revolution was both, with the social revolution playing an increasingly decisive role, the Maoist

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 81.

Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 381.

view of China's history became gradually more ambivalent.

# Revolutionary Leadership and the Transmitted Tradition

As might be expected in a political movement with a history of struggle directed principally against a foreign intervention, the Vietnamese Communist Party sees itself as a contemporary expression of the national historical tradition of opposing foreign aggression. In a 1959 article on Vietnam's Museum of the Revolution, Nhan Dan wrote, "The Indochinese Communist Party is the inheritor of the transmitted tradition of indomitable struggle of the nation (dan toc) which has lasted over several thousand years of opposition to the feudal regime and decades of opposition to the colonialist regime." Ho Chi Minh said in 1960 that, "Our Party can take pride in being the inheritor of the glorious transmitted tradition of our nation and the opener of the road for our people to advance to a brilliant future." These encomiums were not, however, indiscriminate endorsements of Vietnam's past as a guide for contemporary political action.

Several key themes were singled out as exemplifying the Vietnamese traditions that had continuing relevance to the present. Le Duan commented in a 1962 speech that, "Ours have always been a heroic people, possessed of a tradition of unity and single-mindedness in the face of foreign invasion... History is there to bear witness, from Le Loi to

<sup>17</sup> Nhan Dan, January 11, 1959.

Nhan Dan, September 6, 1960.

Quang Trung; as in our Resistance War. Though largely different nowadays as to the content this tradition has simply developed on the same basis." DRV ideologists naturally endorsed the Marxist-Leninist view that social values have a historical and class character, but argued that this doctrine also "acknowledges the value of the moral standards (dao duc) that have been transmitted through the generations, and the advances of each generation." Applying Vietnam's historical legacy to the contemporary situation, a Nhan Dan article pointed to "simultaneously producing, opposing foreign aggression, engaging in literary and artistic pursuits" as "one of the beautiful transmitted traditions of our people." This definition parallels Woodside's characterization of the ideal Vietnamese ruler as "part rebel, part guardian of agricultural fertility, and part cultural innovator."

In Vietnam, the Communist Party saw itself as the legitimate inheritor of the "transmitted tradition," while the CCP felt it necessary
to struggle against the heavy weight of China's past. The contrasting
attitudes toward the past are a product of the situation and society
that produced each leadership group, as discussed in the opening section
of this analysis. Each leadership group was conscious of its identity
as a unique political generation and its place in history. The definition

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>Le Duan, On the Socialist Revolution in Vietnam, Vol. III, p. 43.

Nhan Dan, September 8, 1962.

<sup>21</sup> Nhan Dan, March 14, 1964.

Alexander Woodside, <u>Vietnam</u> and the <u>Chinese Model</u>, pp. 11-12.

of the Vietnamese leadership generation has been given by Party First Secretary Le Duan,

You still remember, I am sure, that in 1930 most of the comrades in the Central, Zone, and Provincial Committees and primary branches were youths only from eighteen to twenty or twenty-one years of age. That young generation enthusiastically took part in revolutionary activities and set up the first revolutionary bases of our country in the 1930-31 movement which culminated in the Nghe-Tinh insurrection, the 1936-40 and 1940-45 movements, the August Revolution, the nine years of sacred Resistance war, and the six years of economic and cultural rehabilitation, transformation and development. 23

The political generation in China that produced "the 800" of the post-Liberation top leadership were those who had become politically active in the May 4th period of struggle against Confucianist traditionalism, and were the survivors of the CCP's epic Long March, the anti-Japanese struggle and the final struggle against Chiang Kai-shek in the Third Revolutionary Civil War.

The basic point of difference between the two political generations that produced the post-Liberation leaders of China and Vietnam was, then, their respective views of the Party's role in history. In his early writing on the Chinese Communist Party, Mao observed that it was suited to lead China's revolution because of all China's social strata and political groupings, "the proletariat and the Communist Party are the ones most free from narrow-mindedness and selfishness, are politically the most far sighted" and able to "learn with an open mind from the

Le Duan, "The Youths Are the Mainstay of the Revolution," in On the Socialist Revolution in Vietnam, Vol. III, p. 190.

experience of the vanguard class, the proletariat..."<sup>24</sup> The difference between the Vietnamese and Chinese leaders' conception of the role of the Party is not one of substance but of emphasis. While Mao stressed the "open mindedness" of the CCP to learn from the vanguard, Ho stressed the position of the Vietnamese Communist Party in the context of Vietnamese tradition.

Mao's subsequent disenchantment with the degree of open-mindedness of the CCP and his attack on the Party in the Cultural Revolution is the product of a complex web of precipitating factors, whose common denominator was the diversity in background and viewpoint of the political generation of the "800." One factor was the extensive political power of the army in China's revolution. Liu Shao-ch'i said at the Seventh Party Congress in 1945 that there was a tendency among some comrades to regard "the army as a special power standing outside or above the people," resulting in a "purely military approach to the relationship between the revolutionary army and the revolutionary government, seeking to place the army above the government and to run the government by the army, just as the warlords would do."<sup>25</sup>

In the course of Mao's search for a reliable institution to be a model in training revolutionary successors, Lin Piao and the army emerged as rivals to the Party and, for a time, supplanted the Party in the

Mao Tse-tung, <u>Selected Works</u>, Vol. III, p. 192.

Cited in J. M. H. Lindbeck, "Transformations in the Chinese Communist Party," in Donald W. Treadgold, ed., Soviet and Chinese Communism, p. 77.

Cultural Revolution. 26 One authority, struck by the novelty of the unprecedented dismantling of the Communist Party in the Cultural Revolution, and the terms on which it was reconstructed in 1969, wrote that "there will indeed be a Communist Party in Mao Tse-tung's new. pure. 'proletarian' China. but a Party of a rather singular sort, explicitly deriving its authority from the leader." The 1974 re-emergence of the archtypal Party bureaucrat, former Party Secretary General Teng Hsiao-p'ing, suggests that this judgment was premature. Nevertheless, the same author persuasively argues that the "divorce between Mao and the Party apparatus, which lies at the basis of the Cultural Revolution, was already developing" in 1955, when Mao wrote the commentary on the collection of documents gathered in 1955 at the time of the upsurge in agricultural collectivization. According to Mao, "In many localities there is a practice prevalent almost to the point of being universal: right opportunists within the Party, working hand in glove with the forces of capitalism in society, are preventing the broad masses of poor and lower middle peasants from taking the road to the formation of cooperatives..."28

There is little evidence of major dissatisfaction with the Party as an institution among the DRV leaders, and the most severe criticism

The critical date in the emergence of the army as a dominant force according to Schram was June 1964. Stuart R. Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, p. 105.

<sup>27&</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>., p. 108.

<sup>28 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>., p. 322.

leveled at its members was that since many came from and were influenced by petit-bourgeois backgrounds, they manifested a "rightist ideology" and "individualist" behavior. In the case of agricultural collectivization, it was the Lao Dong Party hierarchy that put a check on the "broad masses of poor and lower middle peasants" in North Vietnam when they tried to move too quickly along the road of cooperativization. To a large extent the Vietnamese Party was the instrument of discipline in guiding Vietnam to fulfill its revolutionary aims and ensuring that the anti-imperialist mission was not undermined by the shocks of social transformation, while the CCP was an instrument of mobilization ensuring that the momentum of social transformation was continued.

The different emphasis on the role and task of the Communist Parties in China and Vietnam is related to the different views of the PRC and DRV leaderships on the connection between revolution and tradition, which is central to the problem of transferring leadership from one political generation to the next. The extent to which the political ideals of the generation that brought the first phase of revolution to victory are absorbed by their successors is critically affected by the degree to which their ideals can be transmitted through an extended social and institutional network. It seems likely that the greater the degree of congruence between revolutionary ideals and those which have in the past been successfully passed from generation to generation, the more likely the values are to take root in future generations. Conversely, the more novel the ideals are within the context of traditional political culture, the more transformation of values is required, with the final

outcome less certain.

"China is poor and blank," Mao stated in 1958. While, as suggested earlier, this may have been aimed at underlining China's determination to abandon the Soviet model and pursue its own course, it was also a statement of the linkage between social revolution and the rejection of the past,

The former exploiting classes have been completely swamped in the boundless ocean of the working people and must change, even if unwillingly. Undoubtedly there are people who will never change, who would prefer to keep their thinking ossified down to the Day of Judgement, but that does not matter very much. All decadent ideology and other incongruous parts of the superstructure are crumbling as the days go by. To clear away the rubbish completely will take some time, but there is no doubt of their inevitable and total collapse. Apart from their other characteristics, the outstanding thing about China's 600 million people is that they are 'poor and blank'. This may seem a bad thing, but in reality it is a good thing. Poverty gives rise to the desire for change, the desire for action and the desire for revolution. On a blank sheet of paper, free from any mark, the freshest and most beautiful pictures can be painted.<sup>29</sup>

If China's people were "a blank sheet of paper," then the inculcation of the new values of social revolution would not pose great problems. But

Schram notes that Mao originally used the term in 1956 to suggest the disadvantages caused to China's by "her 'semi-colonial' past and economic backwardness, and only then suggested that her 'poverty and blankness' also had a positive side," while in 1958 "he saw only the advantages in purity and revolutionary zeal to be derived from China's backwardness." The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, p. 91. Schram asserts that this concept was anticipated by Li Ta-chao's 1918 view that it was precisely because the Soviet Union was culturally backward that "she had 'great surplus of energy' for future progress." He concludes that, "From this statement it is not far to the conclusion that since China is even more backward, she must have even more surplus energy'." Ibid., p. 31. The text cited above is found in Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tse-Tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1971), pp. 499-500.

Mao acknowledged that "to clear away the rubbish completely will take some time" -- though his confidence in its "total collapse" was greater in the heady year of 1958 than it was to become in succeeding years.

While objecting to the uses of the past for unacceptable political purposes, such as the criticism of Mao's dismissal of P'eng Te-huai in the guise of a Ming dynasty play, Mao advocated using the past to serve the present. Even during the post-Cultural Revolution attack on Confucius, the major counterpoise was Ch'in Shih-huang-ti, a juxtaposition which symbolizes the dual nature of China's past. For every Confucius there is a Ch'in Shih-huang-ti; for every Mao, a Chiang Kai-shek. The use of the past by a contemporary Chinese leader is restricted by the fact that he must select one from among several competing cultural themes of China's history.

For Ho and the leaders of the Vietnamese revolution, there was one dominant stream; the resistance to foreign aggression. While most of China's culture heroes were dynastic founders and consolidators, Vietnam's culture heroes were overwhelmingly those who had distinguished themselves resisting foreign invasion. In the Chinese case, the dynastic founders emerged triumphant from civil war; in the case of Vietnam

This has probably influenced Mao's dialectical view of history. In 1956, he noted that, "A state of affairs with only one side could not exist. For 10,000 years to come there will always be two sides. Each age has its two sides." Stuart Schram, Chairman Mao Talks to the People, p. 81. In another context, Mao acknowledged the variety of China's past, "As for despising the past, this is not to say that there was nothing good in the past... But always to put so much stress on the past... I don't believe in this way of looking at history." Ibid., p. 93.

the great resistance figures rallied and unified a people in defense of their nation.

A common spoken language was made possible by the modest territorial extent of Vietnam. The small size of Vietnam also made it vulnerable to threats of domination from outside and stamped a consciousness of ethnic identity and cultural distinctiveness on Vietnam from early times. In contrast, China was a cultural ecumene -- "all under heaven" (t'ien hsia), with a more diffuse focus of identity. China's origin myth, for example, never played the central role of its Vietnamese equivalent. As in China, Vietnam's mythical progenitor is the God of Agriculture. This is now interpreted not as indicating Chinese ancestry, but as a mythological expression of the agricultural origins of Vietnamese society. 31 It is to the Hung Vuong dynasty whose origins (probably in the first millenium B.C.) are lost in legend, speculation, and historical manipulation, that the unity of the Vietnamese people is attributed. All Vietnamese history, including the modern revolution, is seen as un unbroken continuation and development of this heritage. The leading DRV historian wrote, "We could say that without Hung Vuong 32 we would not have had the subsequent Dinh, Le, Ly, Tran

Tran Huy Lieu, "Mot vai y nghi ve ngay gio to Hung Vuong" (Some Thoughts on the Hung Vuong Ancestral Day Ceremony), Nhan Dan, April 20, 1956.

Hung Vuong refers to the progenitor and founder of the 18-reign Hung Vuong dynasty, as well as to the dynasty itself.

and Nguyen [dynasties] and would not have today's Democratic Republic of Victnam." Stressing the importance of the continuity of Vietnamese traditions and history, Tran Huy Lieu concluded, "the indomitable patriotic tradition of (our) people has surged forth in the several thousand years of opposing the Chinese feudalists, and surged forth even more in the one hundred years of French rule." This strong expression of respect and obligation to the ancestors is certainly related to the division of Vietnam, and the continuing prominence of external threats to its unity and independence.

Although China feels equally pained by the separation of Taiwan from the mainland, it has not been the central theme of political life in the PRC since 1949. Moreover, major domestic policies in China have not been affected by the reunification problem to the same extent as in Vietnam. The PRC has not felt a strong political compulsion to place the theme of cultural unity at the top of the list. And, in view of the ambivalence of China's historical legacy and the variety of lessons it offers, the use of history as a vehicle for imparting the values of social revolution to the younger generation has been limited. This also means that some traditional socialization channels, like the family, who quite naturally imparted a reverential respect for China's past, could not be reliably used to inculcate the preferred new values, since in many cases these values contravened the traditional lessons of history. And, being

Tran Huy Lieu in Nhan Dan, April 20, 1956.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

oriented toward social revolution and class struggle, they often involved a renunciation of a family's own past and heritage.

The importance of the LRV's acceptance of the main stream of its history is made possible by the extent to which Vietnam's revolution has been outer-directed, a struggle of "us" against a foreign and external "them." It has meant that, unlike the case in China, the traditional socialization process can be relied on to transmit desired goals to succeeding generations. This, in turn, has had profound consequences in the sphere of education which, in the DRV, has had the primary role of imparting specialized knowledge, because the burden of inculcating desired values and attitudes is lightened by the efficiency of social mechanisms in performing this task.

#### SECTION II

### SOCIETY, CULTURE AND REVOLUTIONARY TRANSFORMATION

The critical linkage between political generations is the process of socialization which transmits values from age to youth. This process can be structured by the state, or accomplished by other societal mechanisms, or both. A noted sociologist writes that, "society shapes the socialization process by establishing the standard which the socialized individual is expected to achieve in physical development, in skills and capacities, in emotional expression, in intellective and conative activity, and in the patterning of his relations with others." Under the auspices of the state, this process is referred to as indoctrination. In the course of transmitting social values from generation to generation, the values themselves undergo changes and are reinterpreted in the light of the contemporary circumstances of each succeeding generation. Value change also may be the result of a systematic attempt by the governing authorities to transform attitudes and behavior. degree to which such transformation can succeed depends on the relevance of old ideals to new circumstances and the extent to which more familiar patterns must be contradicted and displaced.

Most research on socialization concentrates on the object of the transmitted values, and attempts to determine the degree of receptivity

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Alex Inkeles, "Society, Social Structure, and Child Socialization," in John A. Clausen, ed., <u>Socialization and Society</u> (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968), p. 75.

to them. Moreover, socialization research encounters difficult problems in distinguishing between general orientations and specific political beliefs, and between childhood impressions and adult behavior. The principal point of concern here, however, is the policies and attitudes of the political leaderships of China and North Vietnam toward the question of imparting their preferred values to succeeding generations, and training "revolutionary successors." Attitudes toward the future, as well as attitudes toward the past, provide an implicit commentary on the political present and important clues to the preoccupations of each political leadership. The policies and processes of socialization are one of the bridges between generations, and a reliable indicator of what each revolution signifies at the deepest social and cultural levels beneath the political surface.

# Learning Values - Youth, Family and Society

Learning the code of expected social behavior is the first stage of the process by which children are imbued with values and orientations toward politics. Among the very young, the family plays a crucial role in imparting standards of expected behavior. In both traditional China and traditional Vietnam, the model of society reflected by the family microcosm was that of a highly structured pattern of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Cf. Donald D. Searing, Joel J. Schwartz and Alden E. Lind, "The Structuring Principle: Political Socialization and Belief Systems,"

The American Political Science Review, June 1973, No. 2, pp. 415
432.

authority relations, in which the male siblings dominated their younger brothers and sisters. In the Confucian tradition, the family was explicitly expected to provide an example in microcosm of the authority patterns prescribed for the larger society.

There were, however, differences between the Chinese and Vietnamese family structures. Of these, the most important is the significant role played by the clan in Chinese social organization, and its relative unimportance in Vietnam. The clans were weak in Vietnam for a variety of reasons, some economic (lack of sufficient community wealth to support an elaborate clan structure), and some social (the prominent role of women in Vietnamese society) leaving most authority centered on the two or three generation family, dominated by the father or grandfather, depending on age and circumstances. In China, the clan had a "profound impact on the type of social values communicated to the young. First, the patriarch's authority extended over a vast scope, and early inculcated a sense of awe and deference on the face of authority. Second, the clan was a product of wealth differentiations in society, made possible by the accumulation of surplus wealth, and both reflected and

Alexander Woodside notes that, "the Sung neo-Confucian Vietnamese father... was supposed to teach his son that self-cultivation at home prefigured and presignified service to others. A man should cultivate himself (tu than) and regulate his family (te gia) before he thought about the government of the country (tri quoc)... Behind all the panoply of Confucian moralization, the traditional familial and bureaucratic systems were inseparably intertwined." Vietnam and the Chinese Model, p. 38.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>The reasons for the weaker role of the extended lineage group or clan in Vietnam are discussed by Woodside, ibid., pp. 37-46.

reinforced those values." <sup>5</sup> C. K. Yang portrays these characteristics in the following terms:

In comparison with the smaller family and the limited kinship circle of the common man, the big family presented a close, effective integration of members which stood as a source of social and economic strength. It is significant that this form of family organization was intimately associated with the classes having social, economic, and political dominance. Another significance of the big family was its function of serving as an exemplary model of traditional family organization for the common people, thus encouraging them to maintain a strong tie with members of the near-kinship circle in an effort to simulate the advantages of the big family which traditionally brought prestige and success. In this sense, the big family played an important role in the functioning of the traditional kinship system.

The clan system impressed on society the importance of size, wealth, and status. But rapid social and economic change in nineteenth and early twentieth century China eroded many of the foundations on which the clan structure rested. The successful Communist revolution accelerated these changes by eliminating the clan's surplus wealth, making the nuclear family the basic social and economic unit, and elevating the status of youth and women. The revolution thus undermined the role of the clan welfare unit that had been based on lineal ties and hierarchically

Woodside comments that, "On the whole, in nineteenth century Vietnam there were fewer specific local institutions, fewer examples of apparatus that might ensure a life cycle for everyone that would be managed on Confucian terms than there were in China... China, because of its cities, its wealth, its professional differentiations, and its accumulation of skills, was, at the same time, prodigious. In the eyes of poorer Southeast Asians, the very size of Chinese society had exerted effects upon Chinese culture which raised it above the level of that of any Southeast Asian society." Ibid., pp. 42-43.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>C. K. Yang, <u>Chinese Communist Society:</u> <u>The Family and the Village</u> (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965), p. 9.

structured along lines of age, sex and wealth, and introduced more egalitarian forms of social organization. As C. K. Yang concludes, "The youth of modern China, by contrast, have been increasingly susceptible to a new ideology incompatible with the organizational principle and value standard of the traditional family."

In Vietnam (as in China) the Communists were accused of being "without family, without religion, and without a fatherland." This charge
ignored the deep social roots and patriotic motivations of the Communist
movement in both countries, which tended to strengthen the nuclear family
and to re-invigorate the society. The degree to which this "modern"
form of social organization (the nuclear family) and political thought
(nationalism) departed from its antecedents was different in each case.
In China, there was a sharp difference between family and clan organization. China's more prosperous gentry class possessed not only the
surplus wealth that made clan organization possible, but also became
a social group performing welfare functions and forming an intermediary
channel between the individual and the formal governmental administration.

In Vietnam, too, the central government only extended to the huyen

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup><u>Ibid</u>., p. 172.

Marion J. Levy, Jr., The Family Revolution in Modern China (New York: Atheneum, 1968), p. 49. Levy says that, "The Chinese clan or tsu is a radically different type of unit from the chia-t'ing [family]." Subdivisions of the tsu "are always segmented replicas of the tsu and are never merely enlarged chia-t'ing. It is the tsu, or subdivision thereof, and not the family, which maintains large relief and educational funds, representation and lodgings in district places frequented by the members, and so forth." Ibid., pp. 49-50.

level. But as pointed out in an earlier section, the smaller Vietnamese scale of organization made it possible for the central government in Vietnam to penetrate closer to the village level. If in Vietnam the "emperor's law stopped at the village gate," in China central authority in the rural areas was in practice largely confined within the walls of the <a href="hsien">hsien</a> magistrate's <a href="yamen">yamen</a>, encircled by strong networks of gentry-dominated clan organizations based in the market towns. In Vietnam, the wealthier and more prestigious elements in village society dominated the village behind the screen of bamboo fence surrounding it, but they were not <a href="in principle">in principle</a> acting as representatives of a particularist group, based on kinship affinity, but were (in theory) acting as guardians of the welfare of the village as a collective unit.

This distinction had profound consequences for both the revolutionary and post-Liberation period. Because the traditional village leaders were supposed to act impartially on behalf of the entire village community, it was a simple matter for revolutionary propaganda to point out the gap between pretension and reality. Indeed, this was one of the principal forms of political indoctrination during the Vietnamese revolution. The problem was not so much how to inculcate new "revolutionary" values among the villagers, as to demonstrate how the traditional village officials had betrayed their mandate by collaborating with foreign invaders and enriching themselves at the expense of the local community. Growing inequality of land ownership and wealth, accelerated by the impact of a colonial regime, as well as misappropriation of communal lands, further underlined this. The growth of absentee landlordism

often severed the fragile ties remaining between the newly prosperous and the rest of the village community.

It was not, therefore, accidental that the leadership of the revolutionary movement arose from the non-collaborationist elements of the former elite - the "poor but honest scholars." They had remained faithful to the traditional mandate by setting a moral example, since they did not enrich themselves at the expense of the community despite having the opportunity to do so. In this way, the ties between this revolutionary disenfranchised segment of the elite and the non-elite peasant community were strengthened by shared hardships and shared values. As the revolutionary movement swept to power, and their propaganda castigated the collaborateur landlords and officials for enriching themselves to the detriment of country and community while offering an effective program to remedy these abuses, it was reaffirming the principle of national unity and community solidarity which, though often trammelled during the turbulent course of Vietnamese history, had never ceased to have force as an ideal.

In China - especially Southern China - clan organization represented a mixture of individual, family, and community values that made it incompatible with the goals of China's revolution. This is well described by Hsiao Kung-chuan's survey of the role of the clan in late imperial China:

...since the family group was extended far beyond its natural dimensions, whatever natural sentiments or affection existed in the family were bound to be diluted to the vanishing point in the clan. The clan was therefore held together more often by utilitarian considerations than by sentimental attachements among its members. As our survey

of clan activities shows, a good deal of the behavior of kinship groups was not motivated by unselfish principles. In many instances the clan organization was promoted and maintained to advance or protect the interests of a minority of the clansmen. And even where the interests promoted were those of the entire group, these were selfish in that the clansmen assumed that their welfare was paramount to that of the community in general.

Thus the primary form of kinship (and social) organization throughout a large part of China was predicated on the assumption that one part of the community should benefit at the expense of the rest. While clan organization was not equally powerful throughout China, it is revealing that the revolution in China got its initial impetus from the South, with its aggravated social cleavages, but ultimately succeeded first in the North, with its more homogeneous population during a period of great dislocation caused by external forces.

Still, as argued above, China's revolution in comparison with that in Vietnam was more oriented toward social revolution and class struggle. Some of the causes for this may be found in the intractability of the powerful local clans, who had traditionally competed with the imperial authority and were now competing with the revolutionary authority. Socialization in the nuclear family was more compatible with revolutionary transformation, but because of the realities of the social structure that had undergirded the clan system, the family remained encased in a network of kinsmen even though the formal organizational expression of these relations had disappeared.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>Kung-chuan Hsiao, <u>Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth</u> <u>Century</u> (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967), p. 356.

 $<sup>^{10}</sup>$ This resistance, and the communist methods of combatting it, are described by C. K. Yang, Chinese Communist Society.

In traditional Vietnam, the context of socialization was the family in the village setting, not the family in the clan setting. The power and authority of kinship ties was considerably diluted. Moreover, the father in the Vietnamese family was not the authoritarian patriarch of the model Chinese gentry family. According to Richard Solomon, the imposing patriarchal family head had a profound impact on the views of children toward authority which they carried into later life. In his view:

The legacy of this pattern of childhood punishments and anxiety in the face of family authority which it developed was that the child acquired an attitude of passivity toward those with power over him. He tended to follow their guidance rather than internalize their standards of behavior so that he might act independently of their control... From such a childhood pattern of relations with family authority seems to grow the adult Chinese concern for the presence of a strict, personalized, and unambiguous source of (political) authority who will impose order on potentially unruly peers and provide a clear source of guidance for all. 11

While Solomon's analysis, based as it is on Taiwan and Hong Kong data on Chinese socialization patterns, may be questioned as a reliable guide to contemporary PRC society, it probably does reflect traditional patterns of socialization, in which "a growing child soon learns that his relations with other members of the family are clearly structured in hierarchical fashion and that group authority derives from the authority of the family head, usually the father." 12

<sup>11</sup> Richard Solomon, Mao's Revolution, p. 52.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 54.

In the Vietnamese family, the role of the father was circumscribed by an extended web of competing influences. This is described by Phan Thi Dac in the following terms:

In principle, the father sovereignly decides the fate of all his children; in fact, he always listens to their opinion... In case of disagreement, the father seeks to persuade rather than impose. It is not rare that he will withdraw in the face of a sweet, but obstinate, refusal from his children- or in the face of a general family disapproval of his proposal, because the father himself must take into account the advice of the mother, the grandmother, the aunt, the elder cousin, a respected teacher, etc. His paternal power does not suffer by giving way to the tenderness of the heart, and custom requires that he know how to 'raise the whip high, and strike gently'. 13

In part the difference in family structure in the two countries was due to economic factors, and the relatively greater prominence of the traditional gentry family in China. In addition, there were important cultural differences, and a greater intimacy among the members of the Vietnamese family. And the important role of the wife in the Vietnamese family reflected the more prominent role of women in Vietnamese society generally. The family was thus a communal group in which both affect

Phan Thi Dac, <u>Situation de la personne au Viet-Nam</u> (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1966), p. 19.

Cf. Ngo Vinh Long, <u>Vietnamese Women in Society and Revolution</u>; <u>I. The French Colonial Period</u> (Cambridge: Vietnam Resource Center, 1974). Woodside asserts that, "Respect for the rights and the powers of women had always been more the mark of Vietnamese social conventions than of Chinese... Some have argued that it palely reflected ancient matriarchal biases in Vietnam culture from before the Chinese conquest. Others have argued that it was influenced by newer matriarchal trends in the Cham society that was being defeated by the Vietnamese in the late 1400's. And some have even suggested that it sought to reward Vietnamese women for their role in agriculture and handicraft enterprises, in support of Vietnamese soldiers, during the exhausting war with China in 1406-1427." Vietnam and the Chinese Model, pp. 44-46.

and authority was more equitably distributed between parents than in the traditional Chinese family. 15

Social and economic transformation in post-Liberation China and Vietnam is somewhat reducing these contrasts. In a socialist system the gentry style of patriarchal authority is quite difficult to maintain. This erosion of patriarchal authority and the tendency toward more intimate nuclear families is characteristic of economically developing systems of the non-socialist type as well. <sup>16</sup> Cultural differences still persist, however, as suggested in an earlier section on the leadership models of the magistral, authoritative Chairman (Mao) and the intimate, avuncular reconciliation figure (Ho).

Differences in family authority patterns, and in the relationship of the family to its social environment have two important consequences for the process of political socialization. The first is the relative salience of parental behavior models, both in terms of the individual example set by the parents and the archetypal models of behavior which the parents hold up before their children. The personal example in the case of the Vietnamese family is of diffused authority in a complex set of social

<sup>15</sup>Richard W. Wilson writes that in Taiwan, "Many adults told me that as children they remember their father as a supreme but distant individual. Mothers were quite close to their children but the separation between a father and his children was quite great." Learning to Be Chinese: The Political Socialization of Children in Taiwan (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970), p. 74.

Wilson says that his own observations of modern family life in Taiwan lead him to "wender whether traditional concepts of Chinese family patterns can be accepted in their entirety." Ibid.

interactions. Although at the center of the family, the father is a guide and arbiter, not an unassailable fount of authority. It is also clear from reports from China that the major social reforms of the marriage law (protecting the rights of women and legalizing divorce) and the new political importance of youth has largely eroded the traditional stereotype of the patriarchal father.

Several factors guarantee the continuing importance of the nuclear family as a key agent of socialization. In the countryside, the nuclear family remains the basic unit of production, the principal basis of the welfare system, and an important repository for the possession of private property still allowed in a socialist system. These economic factors help ensure that social life is still centered in the nuclear family. As one anthropologist puts it, "The influence from generation to generation is carried on with less interruption than it might be in a system not so highly organized. This generalization about the nuclear family is true for Vietnam as well. The only significant difference between the policies of the two countries toward the family occurred in conjunction with the family law reform in the early 1950's, in the Great Leap and again in the Cultural Revolution.

These points are presented and analyzed in William L. Parish, Jr., "Socialism and the Chinese Peasant Family," <u>Journal of Asian Studies</u>, No. 3, May 1975, pp. 616-25.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 621.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>Parish attributes the fluctuations in PRC policy toward the family in part to the "campaign approach to politics whereby for a period of a few weeks to a year massive governmental efforts are concentrated around a single theme," with family policy receiving only periodic attention. Ibid., p. 630.

"though the women's and youths' journals fretted about how a generation [of] revolutionary successors was to be properly trained, the emphasis was still on training within the family. The old were simply not to let the youths forget about past sufferings." 20

In the DRV the family's role as the principal agent of childhood socialization was never questioned. As the title of an article in Nhan Dan put it, "the family is the school that comes first and is closest to the young." The role of the parents was to set a good personal standard of conduct to inculcate basic moral precepts of behavior. The family was viewed as the "solid foundation for the socialist school to carry out education with good results." An example of the importance of the family in reinforcing socialization in the schools is the letter from a Nhan Dan reader who pointed out the frequent discrepancy between good behavior in school and bad behavior at home. The letter cites some schoolchildren's descriptions of the social pressures from peers and teachers that make socialization in the school effective: "When I go to school," said one, "I have to make an effort to do the work chores in order to get good marks for conduct. If the marks for conduct aren't either a 5 or a 4 [on a 5 point scale] then it's all over (hong bet)."

<sup>20&</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>., p. 629.

<sup>21</sup> Nhan Dan, October 18, 1960.

Makarenko, a Soviet specialist in this field, was cited as an authority on this point. Ibid.

<sup>23&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

<sup>24</sup> Nhan D<u>an</u>, October 13, 1958.

Another said that, "When you go out and don't do the labor chores, your friends will ridicule you and you'll be criticized by the teacher." <sup>25</sup>

These social pressures did not apply to family life and often, after returning from doing these chores, "not a few" schoolchildren would lounge around the house and refuse to help their parents in house work. <sup>26</sup> This was regarded as weakening the socialization process, since standards of behavior learned at school were not enforced at home.

The values which the DRV authorities desired to impart to the young mainly concerned standards of conduct and acceptable social behavior that would contribute to the solidarity and effective functioning of the new socialist society. Emphasis was placed on teaching children only those things compatible with their level of understanding. During the Resistance, Ho had defined the socialization goals for children as teaching them to "love the Fatherland, have affection for your compatriots, be fond of work, maintain discipline, know about sanitation, and study about cultural matters." Ho added that, "At the same time, the happy,

<sup>25&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

<sup>26&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>

<sup>27</sup> Ho Chu Tich voi thanh va thieu nhi (Chairman Ho With Youths and Children) (Hanoi: Thanh Nien, 1961), p. 69. These were (in summarized form): (1) always maintain a high revolutionary spirit, (2) have full confidence in the strength and intelligence of the collective, strengthen unity and help each other, (3) always enrich revolutionary virtue, modesty, and simplicity, (4) strive to study and raise the level of political, cultural, scientific and technical, and military competence to be able to contribute ever more to the Fatherland and the people, (5) always pay attention to leading and educating the young people and children, and set a good example for your "younger brothers" to follow. Ha Huy Giap, Mot vai suy nghi ve dao ly lam nguoi cua Ho Chu Tich, pp. 55, 56.

active, spontaneous, motivated, and youthful nature of the children must be kept intact (do not by any means make them turn into 'old men before their time')." $^{28}$ 

Most of the values imparted in childhood socialization were not explicitly political and when they were, it was not always a distinctively modern message that was delivered. A Nhan Dan article in 1961 criticized the books written for children on the grounds that they were "heavy on the old and light on the new," and concentrated largely on the patriotic episodes in Vietnam's history. Although it was acknowledged that "education that lacks this basic store [of knowledge] is like planting young trees whose roots don't take in the fertile soil," nevertheless "at the same time great attention must be paid to reflecting the new and current social activities of our children and the people to directly teach them a socialist spirit and give them a consciousness about the struggle to carry out the unification of the Fatherland." 30

The DRV theoretical view of the role of the family in the socialization process was that the socialist revolution had eliminated the former opposition between family interests (gaining wealth and power) and the

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup>Nhan <u>Dan</u>, September 24, 1961.

Another similar but more detailed 1965 critique is given by Nguyen Khanh Toan, "Mot so van de ve cong tac giao duc va viet sach cho thieu nhi" (A Number of Matters Concerning Educating and Writing Books For Young People), in Xung quanh mot so van de, pp. 498-555.

interests of society. <sup>31</sup> Moreover, the influences between family and society were reciprocal. The parents reinforced the school, and the children brought back the standards they had been taught into the home. Parents were advised not to worry about being considered "backward" by their children, but to strive to set a good example for them, and not to worry about losing "prestige" but to act in such a way that they deserve it. <sup>32</sup> DRV educators ridiculed the charge of "bourgeois educators" that communism "confiscated the authority" of the family to educate their own children. <sup>33</sup> In fact the DRV authorities made strenuous attempts to ensure that families took a greater interest in the job that school and teachers were doing, and criticized the "many people who gave a 'blank check' to the school, the Labor Youth Group and the Young Pioneers in the education of their children on the grounds that they are 'too busy with work'." <sup>34</sup>

The values officially sponsored in schools and social activities were compatible with traditional family ideals, and indeed reinforced family authority by advocating the virtues of discipline, politeness and obedience. The principal point of conflict between parents and

A good statement of this view is presented by Truong Thi, "May y nghi ve nhiem vu cua gia dinh trong cong tac giao duc thieu nhi" (Some Thoughts on the Task of the Family in the Job of Educating Young People), Nhan Dan, June 1, 1961.

<sup>32&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

<sup>33</sup> Nhan Dan, October 11, 1962.

<sup>34 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>. The Vanguard Teenagers' Group (Doi Thieu Nien Tien Phong) is translated here as "Young Pioneers."

teachers was parental attempts to secure preferential treatment for their children in school. 35 Another problem was the use of cursory discipline consisting of rebukes and threats in both the home and the schools, which resulted in obedient and "good" behavior only when an authority figure was actually present. 36 The importance attached by the DRV to tightening the linkages between the family, the schools and the youth groups was due to the recognition that formal training could not have a lasting impact unless it was reinforced throughout the entire range of the child's experience. As Ho remarked in a 1959 conference on young people, effective socialization requires the coordinated efforts of the Labor Youth and peer groups, the schools, the family, and society. 37

By 1964 it was felt that the role of the family in education had still not been given sufficient attention. <sup>38</sup> A "unified" program of "virtuous behavior" (dao duc), roughly equivalent to the French courses in "morale" (ethics) or civics in the American context, was instituted in 1961. <sup>39</sup>

Yet parents still complained that their children who received high marks in conduct while in school behaved badly at home. <sup>40</sup> Thus the educators were reminded that although "teaching virtuous behavior is still the

<sup>35&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

<sup>36&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, June 1, 1964.

<sup>37&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, February 21, 1959.

<sup>38&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan, June 1, 1964.</sub>

<sup>39</sup> Nhan <u>Dan</u>, October 11, 1962.

<sup>40</sup> Nhan Dan, November 16, 1962.

first task of the schools," it could only be done well in close connection with the family. All Both home and school served as agents of socialization. Teachers and parents could set personal examples, and peer groups could enforce accepted standards of behavior. But the standards themselves had to be illustrated in the form of ideal models, explained and clarified. This was particularly true in areas where the existing social concepts of behavior were to be reinforced or transformed.

# Civic Ideals and Parochial Loyalties

One reason why the linkages between the principal agents of socialization could be close in North Vietnam was that the content of the "virtuous behavior" was congruent with many accepted traditional virtues which enjoyed wide social acceptance. The family in both China and Vietnam continued to inculcate values that were considered socially unacceptable, such as "getting ahead" at the expense of others, and considering the value of education in selfish terms rather than weighing its value to society. 42 But the sense of a collective obligation beyond the boundaries

 $<sup>\</sup>frac{41}{\text{Ibid.}} \quad \underline{\text{Nhan}} \quad \underline{\text{Dan}} \quad \text{noted that some teachers visited pupils' homes} \\ \text{on a daily basis.} \quad \underline{\text{Ibid.}} \quad \text{A former principal of a Level Two (Junior High) school in the Red River delta, interviewed in Saigon in 1972,} \\ \text{emphasized that much of his time was spent visiting pupils' homes and} \\ \text{discussing their work and conduct with the parents.} \quad \text{Interview No. 39.} \\$ 

Nhan Dan, October 18, 1960. Andrew J. Watson, "A Revolution to Touch Men's Souls: The Family Interpersonal Relations and Daily Life," in Stuart Schram, ed., Authority, Participation and Cultural Change in China.

of kinship groups had always been stronger in Vietnam than in China.

The contrast between the social orientation of Vietnamese and Chinese villagers is vividly illustrated by their respective symbols of parochial loyalty, the dinh (village community house) and the ancestral hall. Although village temples and local gods were a near universal feature of pre-Liberation China, they did not provide the major or exclusive focus of village loyalties and devotion. A turn of the century classic on village life in China observed that, "It is a common saying, illustrative of Chinese notions on this topic, that the local god at one end of the village has nothing to do with the affairs at the other end of the village."43 The primary social focus of traditional rural China was the ancestral hall, with its inherently particularistic symbolism. In Vietnam it was the dinh, or communal house, which is still viewed as the cornerstone of village life. In 1964, a Nhan Dan article recalled that, "The village dinh was the center of cultural and social activities in the countryside in former times. In particular, the village festivals with their merry games next to the dinh clearly revealed a healthy, enduring cultural tradition which was richly endowed with the laboring spirit of our people."44 "Of course," the article notes, "it should be remembered that the dinh was also a locus of feudal oppression. But the dinh was also a center of revolutionary activities,

<sup>43</sup>Arthur H. Smith, <u>Village Life in China</u> (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970), p. 100.

<sup>44</sup> Nhan Dan, April 25, 1964.

and the main center of the rural revolution that supported the Viet Minh seizure of power in 1945. And, the first National Conference of the Viet Minh which announced the decision to take power in August 1945 and was, in effect, the first National Congress, was held in a dinh in the mountains of Tuyen Quang." The dinh was such an important symbol of the spirit and traditions of rural Vietnamese villages, that Ho signed an order, shortly after the DRV came into existence, for the protection and preservation of dinh and pagodas, and forbade their dismantling for purposes of building schools and clinics. 46

 $<sup>^{45}</sup>$ "As the nationalist consciousness of the people became ever clearer, the dinh and pagodas also seemed to increase in stature (dinh chua cung lon len). Countless dinh and pagodas were the sites where the scholar officials mobilized the anti-French Can Vuong [Restoration] Movement. During the periods of clandestine activities, many dinh and pagodas hid the revolutionary warriors. In the conflagration of the August General Uprising of 1945, every dinh and pagoda was an assembly place for the people on their way to seizing power in the districts and provinces. The dinh in Vo Liet (Nghe An) was the place where the partisans of the Nghe-Tinh Soviet operated; Tan Trao dinh (Tuyen Quang) was the place where the first National People's Congress met. They all have become revolutionary monuments that are welded together with the history of our people. During the 9 years of Resistance, many dinh and pagodas wrote the record of the army-people spirit throughout the country, during the stop-overs of the troops on their way to fight. Since Liberation many dinh and pagodas have witnessed many large political mobilization and cultural movements in the countryside. And today, the sound of the drum in the dinh resounds on election days for the National Assembly, People's Councils of all levels, and the celebration days and harvest festivals or cultural entertainment evenings." Ibid.

<sup>46&</sup>quot;On November 2, 1945, only three months after the success of the August Revolution, Chairman Ho signed a decree ordering the protection of dinh, pagodas, temples and other cultural landmarks. It was thanks to the attention of the Government and Chairman Ho that throughout the Resistance period we were able to preserve most of the national cultural edifices, despite the unbridled destructiveness of the French pirates." Ibid.

Such strong links with the past were not without their drawbacks. The DRV naturally did not wish to stress the "feudal" aspects of village tradition, and often had difficulties in separating undesirable remnants of the past from the valued mainstream of tradition. During the Rectification of Errors campaign, it was observed that "in the recent past, particularly since Tet, in many areas too many village festivals have proliferated, which waste manpower and resources and have a bad impact on many assignments."

The aspects of the village festivities that reinforced community solidarity, such as re-enacting traditional rites symbolizing mutual cooperation, or founder myths symbolizing village cohesion, however, were retained. 48

The village environment, always an important socializing influence in the Vietnamese context has been significantly transformed by the

<sup>47</sup> Nhan Dan, April 21, 1957. If correctly and appropriately used, said Nhan Dan, this custom can "create a pleasant and healthy atmosphere in the countryside" and make people more enthusiastic in their work, but "many cadres and people" are misusing the idea of "exploiting the heritage of the nation to restore backward feudal customs under the guise of freedom of religion." Ibid. It is clear from the article that the concern of the DRV leadership at that time was the re-emergence of the former village elite to a position of social influence after the land reform.

<sup>48&</sup>quot;Today many villages use the dinh as a place for worker-peasant cultural activities, or have made it into a club or village museum, etc. Many villages have taken the traditions of national heroes recorded in [historical] vestiges... to motivate political movements and initiate production 'campaigns'." Nhan Dan, April 25, 1964. One example is the communal retelling of the founding myth of a Nam Dinh village built on land reclaimed from the sea. Nhan Dan, January 28, 1960. Another is the use of the "festival" format for ceremonial occasions such as elections for the Village People's Council. Cf. Nhan Dan, March 17, 1959, which stresses that this kind of festival is different from the old "dinh dam" (assemblies) to pay tribute to the village notables.

revolution. Yet it remains an agent of socialization, a role that has been preserved and cultivated by the DRV. During the Resistance, a vogue of renaming villages after traditional heroes arose. In the early post-Liberation period, many villages were renamed with such slogans as "Determined to Win" or "Firm Resolve" (as Co Loa, an ancient capital of . Vietnam was re-designated). Recognizing that this approach cut the villages off from their past, an authoritative suggestion was made in 1961 to return to historic village names, to eliminate slogans as village designations except when they had a close connection with the history of the revolution, and not to use the names of living persons. This decision to cultivate the past, symbolized by the policy on village names, was felt to have an "important political and cultural meaning," because it reinforced the sense of community solidarity. 49

In the PRC, as noted earlier, attempts were made to circumvent the particularisms of village loyalties by revising the traditional boundaries of villages. During and after the Great Leap, the focus of local identification was an economic administrative unit, the commune, rather than the

Hoai Thanh, "Van de dat ten xa, thon, xom" (The Question of Giving Names to Villages, Hamlets and Settlements), Nhan Dan, November 12, 1961. The author proposed to the National Assembly (following a discussion of the matter in its previous session) that the Ministry of the Interior and the province and huyen administrative committees, make a systematic check on village names and "encourage each village to write up its history." "In the old days," said Hoai Thanh, "the villages of renown usually had a village register, which recorded its establishment and development, along with the customs and mores of the village. At present, in the North, through countless ups and downs, many villages still have held on to these village registers. This is a very good tradition that must be continued and developed." Ibid.

village. During the Socialist Education campaign, attention was focused on the village, but always with emphasis on the aspect of class struggle rather than on its role as an integral social unit. At that time Tachai was advanced as model of a "poor hilly village" built into a "new socialist" village." The models of local political communities were mainly poor villages with a revolutionary history that had scored achievements in the post-Liberation period as well. Selective aspects of village history were revived as a means of class education for youths. In 1965, basic level cadres were charged with "organizing youths and commune members to study the work of Chairman Mao, telling them the histories of individual villages and families in the course of class education."51 Recognizing that particularistic loyalties still had a powerful shaping influence on social and political attitudes, the PRC tried to channel these influences into acceptable directions, using villagism to fight villagism. To further stress the role of the traditional geographic units as the basic framework of ideological transformation, it was decided to align the Young Pioneer groups with the administrative village as the framework, so that their activities could be "conducted in closer coordination with social life."52 During the same period, an effort was made to reverse the policy

<sup>50&</sup>quot;A Good Example of Building the Hilly Regions in a Revolutionary Spirit," JMJP, February 10, 1964; SCMP, No. 3171, March 4, 1974.

<sup>51</sup> <u>JMJP</u>, December 14, 1965; <u>SCMP</u>, No. 3609, January 4, 1966.

<sup>52</sup> NCNA. Tientsin, May 21, 1965; <u>SCMP</u>, No. 3462, May 26, 1965.

of setting up primary schools in richer and larger villages, on grounds of administrative convenience, and to see that poorer and remote villages had schools "so that the students may enter a school near their homes, regardless of the limits of an administrative area." 53

Since the formation of communes in China, with the exception of the brief and disastrous episode of the early Great Leap, the natural social units seem to coincide with the boundaries of the new production units, particularly since 1962 when the production team was made the basic economic accounting unit. One recent study concludes that the production team is composed of from twenty to sixty families, "living in a natural village, hamlet, or neighborhood of a large village." A visitor to China in 1964 commented that:

A team consists of the workers of twenty or thirty neighborhood families. The land alloted to them is, in the main, the land that their forefathers worked, with some modifications for convenience in cultivation. Eight or ten teams are grouped in a brigade. In the plains, where villages are large, the brigade usually comprises a single village. There is emulation between brigades which enlists old village rivalries in a constructive cause. 55

But, unlike Vietnam, the village as a historic entity is only rarely

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup>KMJP, April 10, 1966; <u>SCMP</u>, No. 3686, May 3, 1966.

Benedict Stavis, <u>People's Communes and Rural Development in</u> China, p. 60.

Joan Robinson, "A British Economist on the Chinese Communes," in Eastern Horizon (Hong Kong, May 1964), p. 6 cited in Keith Buchanan, The Transformation of the Chinese Earth (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 131.

promoted as a center for villagers' loyalties. In part this seems to be due to the fact that the Chinese village historically did not have as strong a sense of identity as in Vietnam, because of the conflicting and more powerful attraction of clan loyalties.

During the Socialist Education campaign it was made clear that class solidarity was more important than particularistic solidarity:

In the old society, the 'inside' of a laboring people was very narrow, and many of them could not even find 'a place to stand'. With victories won one after another in the revolution, the 'inside' of the people has expanded to a tremendous extent. Now, their 'inside' embraces their homes, their collective, the commune, the <u>hsien</u> and province where they live, and the state. What are on the 'outside'? The outside includes imperialism, the reactionaries of various countries, the exploiting class elements in the country, in one's native place, in a village, and of one's clan, and all the influences that harm socialism, our state and our collective. 56

There were, then, limits to the extent that particularistic solidarity could be mobilized in support of the goals and values of the Chinese regime. The formation in 1964 of Poor and Lower Middle Peasant Associations, crosscutting the villages and communes signified these limits in

JMJP, No. 20, 1964; SCMP, No. 3353, December 9, 1964. The persisting strength of clan ties is noted in the article, "Which Is Closer, Clannish Ties or Class Ties?" JMJP, No. 23, 1964; SCMP, No. 3356, December 14, 1964. "Certain landlords and well-to-do peasants in one Szchwan brigade were saying that 'two huangs cannot be written with one single stroke of the pen [meaning that the Huang clan cannot be divided into two] and that 'members of the Huang clan were originally in the same family and, although their feelings for one another are not as close as before, they are still closely bound by clannish ties'. The Party branch of the brigade had to use class education to refute these 'fallacious utterances' intended to 'blur the line of demarcation of the class of poor and lower middle commune peasants'." Ibid.

concrete terms. Individual and village histories were acceptable forms of political socialization only if lessons of class struggle were portrayed.

# Models and Precepts of Socialization

Although class struggle played an important part in the Vietnamese revolution, and was especially intense during the land reform, it is strikingly absent in the literature relevant to political socialization. It is evident from interviews conducted with former participants in the DRV system that class background plays a very important role in determining educational and career opportunities and, therefore, persons from favored class backgrounds are not generally inclined to intermarry with those who are not. But the interviews also suggested that the ones who were deeply concerned with class background were mainly those from the former "exploiting classes," and even they had managed by various means to achieve acceptable career goals. 57

Throughout the period following the Land Reform, socialization policy emphasized qualities of civic spirit, patriotism, and selfless action. Some of the desirable behavior patterns for young children have been described. But even with regard to older youths, the emphasis is more on acceptable personal qualities and social behavior than on inculcating explicitly political attitudes. For children, the goals were,

As will be noted in the following section, teaching is one career that seems to have absorbed people from this background.

in Ho's words, to become "outstanding students, well behaved sons and daughters, good friends and active group members."58 For older youths, Ho wanted three "virtuous characteristics (duc tinh) instilled; loyalty, bravery, and modesty. 59 The chapter headings of the basic text on "ethics" (luan ly) for grade 7 youths (14 year olds) are indicative of the general content of explicit socialization programs, stressing loyalty to the revolution, collective spirit, patriotism, and respect for knowledge. 60 The contents of this text are primarily inspirational (and include a section on Lei Feng, the selfless PLA soldier who became a national model in China during the early 1960's). As the teacher's instructions to this text emphasize, the examples presented must be supplemented with examples of "real people and real things" -- the watchword of DRV socialization. The aim of this socialization is to develop "a regime in which man no longer exploits man, a regime in which everyone is of one accord, in which everyone develops the spirit of being in charge and of emulation in building a life of sufficiency, happiness and wholesomeness."61

<sup>58&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, September 9, 1961.

<sup>59</sup> Nhan <u>Dan</u>, September 10, 1962.

Luan ly, lop bay pho thong (Ethics For the Seventh Grade of General Education Schools) (Hanoi: Giao Duc, 1966), p. 1. The actual headings are; forging revolutionary virtues, loyalty to the revolution, the collective spirit, sense of organizational discipline, loving the native place and the country, new attitude toward work, spirit of liking science, spirit of serving the people, ideals, future career, happiness, principles of virtues in daily life, methods of developing virtues. Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., p. 6.

An important difference between the socialization processes of China and Vietnam is the extent to which traditional culture heroes, whose legendary repute is part of the lore of youth, are venerated by the regime and made to reflect its values. Vietnamese culture, traditional and modern, has been suffused with the legends of a galaxy of culture heroes whose deeds and reputation are inextricably linked with Vietnam's own national identity. Of these, the most basic integrative symbol is that of the great progenitor of the Vietnamese race, the Hung Vuong dynasty, mentioned above. In addition, the great warrior-scholars who opposed foreign aggression while demonstrating intellectual achievements of the highest cosmopolitan standards of the period, have remained unchallenged preceptors for all of Vietnamese society throughout its history. 62

The idea of a "transmitted tradition" has been central to Vietnamese political socialization for centuries. The sense of common descent and

Alexander Woodside feels that, "Modern Vietnamese populist nationalism probably acquired its definitive pantheon of historical heroes in the early 1940's," as a result of nationalistic re-evaluation of Vietnamese history conducted during that period. "Ideology and Integration in Post-Colonial Vietnamese Nationalism," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XLIV, No. 4, Winter 1971-72, pp. 498-499. Much more research needs to be done on the modern canonization of Vietnamese culture heroes. Nonetheless, the basic core of this pantheon has been held in universal regard since at least the 15th century. Nguyen Trai (15th century), himself a culture hero, noted that, "Although we have been at times strong and at times weak, we have at no time lacked heroes," and the late 18th century unifier of Vietnam, Nguyen Hue, gave a list of heroes of the preceding dynasties. Truong Buu Lam, Patterns of Vietnamese Response to Foreign Intervention: 1850-1900, pp. 56 and 64. While it is true that the pantheon was continually supplemented and revised, a basic list of national heroes has been at the center of Vietnamese national identity for centuries.

"the ardent spirit of patriotism must be manifested in gratitude to the Ancestors and the people who built up the country." There is a continuing and strong sense of an evolving tradition, which is built upon and expanded by each generation. Le Loi, a 15th century national hero "continued the tradition of Ngo Quyen, Ly Thuong Kiet, Tran Hung Dao, but creatively developed it." Ho Chi Minh is considered the contemporary embodiment and developer of this tradition.

As the threat of war increased in the early 1960's so did the DRV's emphasis on the transmitted tradition of internal solidarity in the face of foreign aggression. By 1964 the major socialization themes directed at youth stressed this tradition, and Ho as the personification of it. Ho's resolute leadership during the Resistance was recalled in a Nhan Dan editorial on "developing the tradition of heroism of our people," as the most recent example of such actions starting with Ly Thuong Kiet in the 11th century. In order to prepare youth for performing their draft obligations, three themes were recommended: recalling miseries, the transmitted tradition of armed struggle, and the need for disci-

Tran Huy Lieu, "Mot vai y nghi ve ngay gio to Hung Vuong," Nhan Dan, April 20, 1956.

Lam Thao, "Mot truyen thong vi dai va phong phu" (A Great and Rich Tradition), Nhan Dan, October 6, 1958.

<sup>65</sup> Nhan Dan, December 19, 1964.

pline.<sup>66</sup> The theme of the "tradition of heroism" was further developed during the following period of direct U.S. intervention, and overshadowed all other socialization themes during this period.<sup>67</sup>

With such deep and widespread social and historical roots, such a tradition can be an exceptionally effective vehicle of socialization if the connection between past and present is convincing and widely accepted, as it appears to be in the DRV. In China, the use of the past in educating the present generation is more ambiguous, largely because the dominant themes of China's social revolution, transformation and struggle, do not lend themselves to easy identification with China's imperial and feudal past. While the officially sponsored Vietnamese image is that of a glorious past of struggle with nature and foreign aggression, the CCP has offered a split image of China as both having a rich cultural (not political) heritage, yet somehow in a contemporary state of being "poor and blank."

If the Chinese people are "poor and blank" the view of the socialization process is writing on a <u>tabula rasa</u>, as Mao puts it, "On a blank sheet of paper free from any mark, the freshest and most beautiful characters can be written." The writers (up until Mao's Cultural Revolution)

Nhan Dan, February 27, 1964. The theme of "recalling miseries" is one which rarely appeared in the post-Land Reform period, and may have been influenced by the contemporary use of this theme in China during the Socialist Education campaign. There is no indication that class struggle themes were revised in connection with "recalling miseries" as they were in China.

The best and most comprehensive presentation of this theme is in Van Tao, Chu nghia anh hung cach mang Viet-Nam (Vietnamese Revolutionary Heroism) (Hanoi: Xa Hoi, 1972). This book connects past and present in a number of interesting analyses and analogies.

were the formally designated agents of the state in the schools, in youth and Party organizations, and in the media and propaganda. As Mao recognized in his great ideological campaigns, the force of traditional thought patterns remains strong and the "blank sheet of paper" is not entirely free of undesirable scribblings. But the image suggests that tradition must be, at the least, neutralized. Where tradition provides useful lessons it is usually either modern revolutionary "tradition" or learning from negative example. Here the recent use of the anti-Confucian campaign, which had its origins in the early 1960's attacks on Liu Chieh, is instructive. Liu Chieh held that Confucian values of humanism and love of mankind were not only compatible with socialist values but also transcended class barriers. <sup>68</sup>

The 1962-64 controversy and the 1974 anti-Confucius campaign show that Confucian influence was still regarded as pernicious and strong, and Confucius became a "teacher by negative example." In both cases

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup>Cf. Merle Goldman's discussion of this issue in "The Role of History in Party Struggle, 1962-64," <u>The China Quarterly</u>, No. 51, July/September 1972, pp. 502-509.

Ho frequently used these concepts, which were related to the DRV stress on unity; "Unity is not merely a strategic line during (periods of) struggle, but is one of life's virtues. This is because among our people 'humanity is the ideological content and the basis of solidarity, and this solidarity is the mode of expression of humanity'. This has been clearly illustrated by our past for our present." Van Tao, Chu nghia anh hung cach mang Viet-Nam, p. 16. In eliminating oppression and injustice, nhan (humanity) became dai nhan (great humanity), and Ho was the first exemplar of this. Dai nhan was able to be practiced thanks to dai tri (great wisdom), that is, the Party's line, and this raised the dung (bravery) of the Vietnamese people to dai dung (great bravery).

Ibid., pp. 59-60. This is precisely the usage of traditional concepts that led to the attacks on Liu Chieh in 1962.

the contemporary political issues were the main reasons for the campaigns. The "Confucianists" under attack represented the Party bureaucracy, and Ch'in Shih Huang-ti was clearly a surrogate for the authority of Mao. And although these campaigns were within the traditional pattern of Chinese political culture in using history for political purposes, the anti-Confucian polemic was an attack on a deeply entrenched aspect of China's history. The anti-Confucian (Maoist) side of the early 1960's debate, which played a prominent role in the Cultural Revolution and the later anti-Confucian campaign, quotes Engels saying, "Tradition is a great retarding force, is the vis inertae of history, but being merely passive, is sure to be broken down."70 In his article in Peking Review, Yen Feng said, "Confucianism, which pervaded old China for more than 2,000 years, is a tradition typical of the exploiting classes. Reactionary and moribund, it is a great brake on social development and is bound to be smashed by the on-rolling wheel of history. In modern Chinese history 'heroes' who went against its tide invariably used Confucius as a breach to open a door, but since times had changed they all failed utterly!"71

Ambiguity in the lessons of China's past creates important problems for political socialization. Mao told Andre Malraux in 1965 that,
"Thought, culture, customs must be born of struggle, and the struggle must continue for as long as there is still a danger of a return to the

Yen Feng, "Criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius Is a Great Struggle to Oppose and Prevent Revisionism," <u>Peking Review</u>, No. 16, April 19, 1974, p. 16.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

past. Fifty years is not a long time; barely a lifetime - our customs must become as different from the traditional customs as yours [in France] are from feudal customs."<sup>72</sup> Richard Solomon observes that "from the vantage point of a leader who wants to revolutionize a tradition bound society, Mao's preoccupation with passivity reveals a concern that those around him, other leaders and followers, will give in to those anxieties about criticizing established authority and custom that are the legacy of China's traditional political culture. In such circumstances the revolution would become mired down in enduring social patterns characteristic of a discredited way of life."<sup>73</sup> While tradition in Vietnam is a powerful political motivating force, tradition in China is viewed by Mao as a paralyzing influence, leading to passive political behavior.<sup>74</sup> The difficulties of reconciling tradition and revolution are particularly

<sup>72</sup>Richard Solomon, Mao's Revolution and Chinese Political Culture, p. 405.

<sup>73&</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>., p. 183.

Solomon notes that Liu was attacked during the Cultural Revolution for his "passive" leadership during the post-1945 stage of the Chinese civil war, and had drawn back from arousing the masses fully "in order to abolish feudalism." <u>Ibid.</u> During the 1974 anti-Confucius campaign, Mao was reported to have instructed that it is necessary to know "not only the China of today, but also the China of yesterday and of the day before yesterday." "Dare to Think and Do," <u>Peking Review</u>, No. 28, July 12, 1974. But only one aspect of history was to be studied, that "the current class struggle is a continuation of the class struggle throughout history." The connection between the weight of history and political passivity is again made when the "masses of workers, peasants and soldiers" are commended because "they have the style of daring to think and do and of dauntlessly going forward, and that they dare to shatter old conventions and break with traditional ideas." Ibid.

acute for China, because so much of its tradition is viewed as a threat to the goals of the revolution. Because the revolution and class struggle continue, even the hallowed revolutionary symbols are not above reproach, as Jan Myrdal's 1962 conversation with Mao reveals:

Myrdal: I lived in a village, Liu Ling. I wanted to study the change in the countryside of China. [I meant historical change; Mao seemed to understand it as just economic].

Mao: Then I think it was a very bad idea that you went to Yenan. You should have come to the big agricultural plains, Yenan is only poor and backward. It was not a good idea that you went to a village there.

Myrdal: But it has a great tradition - the revolution and the war - I mean, after all, Yenan in the beginning...

Mao: [interrupting] Traditions - [laughing]. Traditions - [laughing]. 75

This is an odd reaction from Mao, given his great concern only two years later with the problems of "poor and backward areas" both symbolized by Tachai. Yet it was not Tachai's past that interested Mao, but its present, its success in socialist transformation. Despite the domination of themes drawn from the anti-Japanese Resistance period (of which Yenan was the symbol) during the Cultural Revolution it seems that these themes were popular precisely because they were the only "safe area" in a period of rapidly changing standards for ideological evaluation of artistic themes, and that their mobilizing impact was a secondary consideration.

For Vietnam, the Resistance  $\underline{\text{was}}$  the revolution, and the evidence of

<sup>75</sup> Jan Myrdal, Report From a Chinese Village (New York: Signet, 1965), p. xxvii.

continuity with tradition. The subsequent socialist revolution and the cooperativization of agriculture were seen not as incompatible with tradition but as a way of re-integrating a society fragmented by colonial rule, as indicated by Ho's statement that the cooperative regulations were "like the old village charter." This affirmation of the continuity of past and present enabled the DRV to continue to employ the models of its historical pantheon of heroes as exemplars of the values it hoped to impress upon the successor generations. The advantages and drawbacks to the use of models in socialization in China are outlined by Richard Wilson:

Conflicting norms, or situations where norms are not clearly defined, reduce the possibility of adequate conformity, and there is a consequent strain toward elimination of conflicting values. Conformity, however, is not to some concept of abstract morality, but is behavior in terms of a specific model, living or dead. The model is conceived of as embodying the proper virtues and his actions as manifesting them. It is only by imitation that one will learn correct behavior oneself.

For group members to conform best it is desirable that there be one model, or a well defined hierarchy of models, in terms of which behavior by all members can be judged. Where two or more models of equal authority exist, divergent actions by the models would imply more than one concept of proper virtue. Modeling by group members would produce conformity by some members to one value system and by other members to an alternate value system, with a consequent lessening of group cohesion and a threat of loss of force to some segment of the group. Persons and ideas are intimately connected; no separation is possible, for to oppose someone's actions or concept of actions (his ideas) is to question his values in terms of the group's concept of proper virtue. 76

The history of China's modern revolution, and the history of the CCP itself, has been one of leadership conflict and clashing ideals. Mao

<sup>76</sup> Richard Wilson, <u>Learning to Be Chinese</u>, pp. 51-52.

has, in fact, cultivated conflict as a means to sharpen the image of acceptable and unacceptable political models. The stereotyped villainy of the growing list of anti-Party figures has immediate political uses, but is an important socializing device as well.

There is an important difference in the use of models in socialization between China and Vietnam. Ho's role as an exemplar is that of a behavior model rather than as a source of ideological guiding maxims. Mao's larger-than-life image is difficult to transform into a model for personal emulation. To be worthy successors of Mao is not to follow his personal example (for that would be impossible, and bordering on lesemajeste) but to follow his teachings. The body of political doctrine and motivation produced by Mao is much more detailed and specific than Ho's exhortatory prose. It not only sets standards of conduct, but is a guide to political action as well. Mao's desired legacy to succeeding generations lies as much in ensuring that his writings become the canonical standard of the Chinese revolution as in ensuring that succeeding generations attempt the impossible task of following his example (which, in essence, is that of a brilliantly gifted figure rising above his political enemies in civil war and intra-Party strife to a position of power). It is primarily his concern with his writings that led Mao to tell Edgar Snow that he wished to be remembered in his role as "teacher."

Ho is an exemplar - a pure model. He holds up a standard of behavior to be preserved and maintained. This standard is based on a near-universal agreement among Vietnamese on the basis of lessons of the historical culture heroes and their "tradition" of unity in the

face of adversity. Even though this represents an ideal, rather than a comprehensive and accurate summary of Vietnamese history, its tenacity and power as an ideal is beyond question. And even though it may sometimes be difficult to apply this general lesson to contemporary circumstances, the general image of heroic resistance against foreign intervention, and of the accompanying prescriptive lore of proverbs ("bringing in a snake that bites the family chicken") are easily comprehended guides to proper behavior when the distinction between "us" versus "them" is unmistakably drawn. In Vietnam, throughout the course of its revolution this line has been clear and relatively unchanging. In China, more explicitly political criteria have had to be used to make the distinction, and these criteria have changed over time.

Social conflict as a political value is best learned in group situations and explicitly political contexts. It is not an easy value to inculcate in a society whose traditional culture stresses the suppression of conflict. In China, there is thus a disjunction between the general socialization process of family life which emphasizes authority and solidarity, and the political socialization process which emphasizes conflict and struggle. For this reason, the role of family in inculcating desired regime values seems considerably smaller in China than in Vietnam, and the role of the group and of the schools considerably greater.

Mao's obsession with implanting the values of self-reliance and eliminating dependency is, as the work of Richard Solomon implies, incompatible with relying on the family, as the primary vehicle for socialization. And if these values can only be learned by experience

and "practice," it has to be the non-familial social group that provides the institutional context. The principal organizational expression of this is China's <u>hsiao</u> tsu (small group), described by Martin Whyte in the following terms:

A new conception of organization and leadership emerged which departed in important ways from the Leninist-Stalinist model. A key feature of this new conception is the encapsulation of individuals in all walks of life into <a href="https://docs.new.org/hs/4">https://docs.new.org/hs/4</a>, and then the manipulation of interactions and emotions within these groups through political study and mutual criticism. Under this new conception of society, each individual will be constantly aware of the new ideas and goals set by China's leaders and will feel that his own ideas and contributions are of value to society. He will work harder and improve his skills not simply to earn more or to avoid losing his job, but in order to earn the respect of those around him. 77

Whyte concludes, on the basis of interview data, that in general the most ambitious goal of group rituals ("to create organizational environments throughout society that are capable of transforming the attitudes and values of participants") has not been realized. As in Vietnam, the small group in China is primarily effective in providing an organizational

Martin King Whyte, <u>Small Groups and Political Rituals in China</u> (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), p. 230.

Ibid., p. 231. The author adds that, "The elite has been relatively successful in producing a unified and organized populace, but they have been less successful in transforming and unifying the varied hopes, fears, needs, aspirations, and loyalties of their citizens. At times when hierarchical political controls have for one reason or another been weakened (1957, 1960-62, 1966-1969), old and new problems and divisions in Chinese society have come to the surface. On the scale of human history the changes in the Chinese social structure and way of life have been drastic and rapid, but the creation of a true unity of thoughts and wills, a unity which does not require constant control and manipulation, will be a much longer and infinitely more difficult undertaking." Ibid., p. 235.

format for the resolution of occupation-related problems. Unlike Vietnam, the <a href="hsiao-tsu">hsiao-tsu</a> has the additional, more ambitious goal of ideological transformations as well.

The extent to which the general values in society conflict with or reinforce each other and those held by the governing authorities is, at present, impossible to determine. It is, for example, clear from the very fact of the frequency and intensity of ideological campaigns in China, and the official rationales for the campaigns, that the values inculcated in youth by the instructional process of socialization by osmotic absorption of generally held social attitudes and dispositions have not adequately supported those which CPR leaders desire to impart. The Cultural Revolution was launched by Mao because, as he told Edgar Snow in January 1965, for all anyone knew the younger generation in time might "make peace with imperialism, bring the remnants of the Chiang Kai-shek clique back to the mainland, and take a stand beside the small percentage of counter-revolutionaries still in the country." In mid-1965 Mao told Andre Malraux that "this youth is showing dangerous tendencies" and that "youth must be put to the test."

Mao's test was, of course, the Cultural Revolution. During this great political movement Mao finally put into practice the ideals of education and socialization toward which he had been moving throughout his life. For Mao, the intensified political atmosphere of mobilization and struggle was the ultimate socializing experience. Just as the first

Both quotes cited in Richard Solomon, Mao's Revolution, p. 451.

generation of revolutionaries had its political values steeped in the crucible of revolution, so the generation of "revolutionary successors" would retain the indelible imprint of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. But though Mao, like Jefferson, felt a periodic recurrence of social upheaval would be a useful counterweight to routinization and abuse of power, the educational reforms of the Cultural Revolution were the basic measures taken to institutionalize Mao's vision of society which had led to the upheaval.

For the Vietnamese, the Cultural Revolution was "the road not taken." Instead of a Cultural Revolution they found themselves embroiled in yet another struggle against foreign intervention. Had Vietnam been unified, and free to concentrate on its internal development, perhaps other policies would have been pursued. In the event, the external threat reinforced the focus on the "anti-imperialist" theme of the revolution, while China pursued the historically dominant "anti-feudal" theme of its revolution, despite the conflict with the Soviet Union and the unresolved issue of Taiwan.

The contrasting orientations are due to the different social structures and cultures of the two countries and to objective factors of size and power, as well as the difference in the relative importance of external and internal political problems. Vietnam's more compact, and therefore better integrated, society was more vulnerable to foreign pressures due to its smaller size and unfortunate geographical location. The vastness of China made it less vulnerable to outright conquest by external powers, but created a problem of integration and political

cohesion. The social origins and revolutionary experiences of the leadership in each country had an important impact on their post-Liberation outlook and policies. As social transformation continues, the socialization context will change, as will the formative experiences of the new generation of leaders. But the historical legacies that have shaped the political culture of each nation will undoubtedly continue to influence their political orientations.

It is the field of education that most directly reflects and shapes political culture. The educational policies of each country represent a systematic attempt to structure the future, and provide a reliable indication of the present state of social and economic development. It also is the most prominent formal mechanism for transmitting and inculcating desired values. The extent to which the formal system of education attempts to supplant more informal patterns of socialization is also an important indication of the compatability of widely held social attitudes and regime goals. Because the educational system is both a gauge of the present level of development, and a preview of the future, it is fitting to conclude this study with a comparative view of education in China and Vietnam.

### SECTION III

# TRAINING REVOLUTIONARY SUCCESSORS

It is in the educational systems of China and North Vietnam that past meets future. Both nations have a long cultural and political history in which scholars have played leading roles, and both currently require the services of an extensive corps of educated cadres and technicians to meet the demands of socialist development on which the success of both revolutions ultimately depends. The need for qualified intellectuals and technicians to guarantee this success is not in dispute in either country. There are, however, important differences between the two concerning the extent to which each is prepared to compromise to defer the ultimate political aims of the revolution in the interests of training the needed specialists and intellectuals to a high level of competence in the shortest time possible. Conflicts arise from the tendency of intellectuals to become "divorced from the masses" and to value expertise higher than political commitment, and from the competition between general and specialized education for the allocation of scarce resources.

The composition and orientation of a nation's intellectual and technocratic group, and its relationship with the political leadership foreshadows the future by setting the course of technical and economic development. Moreover, the structure of the educational system at all levels expresses the future aims of the current leadership in concrete terms. Schooling plays the dual role of being a mechanism for sociali-

zation, and providing the institutional context for transmitting the formal knowledge that will enable the society to function effectively and continue to develop. It is in the schools that this dual role in "training revolutionary successors" begins.

The problem of generational succession is particularly prominent during periods of consolidation after a revolutionary upheaval. By definition, revolution is a break with the past and a commitment to change. The ease with which succeeding generations are imbued with the goals and ideals of the revolution depends on the extent to which these are consonant with cultural patterns and traditional behavior. If the gap between traditional and revolutionary values is too great, the traditional agents of political socialization will not be reliable instruments for inculcating new values which conflict with those patterns. Conversely, if there is a congruence or re-affirmation of traditional ideals, the problem of socializing successor generations with desired values is easier, and can be done with greater emphasis on the family and peer groups, leaving the school system to concentrate more on imparting formal knowledge and technical expertise.

Thus the past and future of each regime is connected by a causal chain. The origins of the revolution have a decisive impact on the future of the post-revolutionary regime. The primacy of the element of class struggle in the Chinese revolution appears throughout Mao's writings, but becomes increasingly linked to the question of the very survival of the goals of the revolution as Mao began to be preoccupied with the problem of generational succession. In 1964, at the height of the

Sino-Soviet polemic, the Chinese presented the view that:

Class struggle, the struggle for production, and scientific experiment are the three great revolutionary movements for building a mighty socialist country. These movements are a sure guarantee that communists will be free from bureaucracy and immune against revisionism and dogmatism, and will forever remain invincible... If in the absence of these movements, the landlords, rich pensants, counter revolutionaries, bad elements and monsters of all kinds were allowed to crawl out, while our cadres were to shut their eyes to all this and in many cases fail even to differentiate between the enemy and ourselves, but were to collaborate with the enemy and were corrupted, and demoralized by him...then it would not take long, perhaps only several years or a decade, or several decades at most, before a counter-revolutionary restoration on a national scale inevitably occurred, the Marxist-Leninist party would undoubtedly become a revisionist party, and the whole of China would change its color. 1

These growing concerns led Mao to initiate the Cultural Revolution. This was a logical extension of the conclusion that, "Successors to the revolutionary cause of the proletariat come forward in mass struggles and are tempered in the great storms of revolution. It is essential to test and know cadres and choose and train successors in the long course of mass struggle."<sup>2</sup>

China's "three great revolutions" for building a socialist society are: (1) class struggle, (2) the struggle for production, and (3) scientific experimentation. In Vietnam, the "three revolutions" are: (1) the revolution in production relations, (2) the technical revolution, and (3) the ideological and cultural revolution. Class struggle is not

<sup>1&</sup>quot;On Khruschchev's Phoney Communism and Its Historical Lessons For the World: Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU (July 14, 1964)," text in William E. Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967), p. 349. The excerpted quote was written on May 9, 1963.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup><u>Ibid.</u>, p. 350.

specifically mentioned, though, as noted in a previous section, "production relations" is often used as a surrogate code word for class struggle. It is important to note, however, that while the Chinese stress class struggle the Vietnamese leaders take recourse in softer euphemism. Moreover, the element of class struggle is further diluted in the Vietnamese case by dividing it into two components: the "relations of production" revolution which is the economic aspect of class struggle, and its ideological and cultural aspects.

At the same time that Mao and other Chinese leaders were intensifying class struggle and moving toward the Cultural Revolution, the DRV announced that it had "basically completed socialist transformation with regard to the relations of production" and was about to launch a campaign which would be a natural and objective continuation of class struggle under "a new form." This "new form," however, stressed neither the revolution in the relations of production nor the ideological and cultural revolution, but decreed that "the technical revolution had become the core of the socialist revolution in the new period."

In his concern for ensuring the preservation of China's revolutionary achievements, Mao had stressed that socialist society covers a "very long historical period" during which class struggle between the "two roads" of capitalism and socialism still exists. The Chinese informed the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Nhan Dan, August 4, 1963.

<sup>4</sup> Nhan Dan, August 7, 1963.

Soviet leaders that, "Here a very long period of time is needed to decide 'who will win' in the struggle between socialism and capitalism. Several decades won't do it' success requires anywhere from one to several centuries." While acknowledging the continuation of struggle between the two roads during the period of building socialism, Party First Secretary Le Duan envisaged the "three revolutions" as lasting only about 15-20 years.6

The difference between these two conceptions of the future is again one of emphasis. North Vietnam envisaged a continuing struggle between socialist and bourgeois ideology throughout the period of building socialism. Yet the relatively short time span in which Vietnam's "three revolutions" were to be completed and the slight emphasis given to the ideological revolution are significant departures from the Maoist view. In order to complete the three revolutions in 15-20 years, the DRV must build up a trained body of intellectuals and technicians within a comparatively short period of time. Mao, however, is concerned more about the future political reliability of China's intellectuals and specialists than about their current level of skill.

In the DRV there appears to be unanimity on the urgency of giving priority to a rapid upgrading of the skill levels of the generation of revolutionary successors. As To Huu, the leading Central Committee

 $<sup>^{5}</sup>$ "On Khruschchev's Phoney Communism," in Sino-Soviet Relations, p. 346.

<sup>6</sup> Nhan <u>Dan</u>, August 5, 1963.

authority on educational and cultural matters observed, "we can't build socialism by sincerity alone." The split in orientation between "reds" and "experts" in China, exposed with such force in the Cultural Revolution, delimits a political fault plane between the "two lines." Class struggle not only continues, it is reflected within the Party. During the Cultural Revolution, Mao said, "I had originally intended to train some successors from among the intellectuals, but this would now appear impractical. It seems to me that the world outlook of intellectuals, including those young intellectuals who are still receiving education in schools, and those both within and outside the Party, is still basically bourgeois."

Both the "red" Maoist orientation and the opposition to it show the clear imprint of the divisive legacy of the social revolution out of which the CCP emerged. The greater DRV emphasis on expertise is due to, and made possible by, an apparently higher degree of goal consensus within the leadership. It is also a product of the attachment of the DRV leadership to the value and prestige of higher learning — a legacy transmitted from the "poor but honest" scholars who were the progenitors of the Vietnamese revolutionary movement.

#### Education and Revolution

A passion for learning is an enduring trait of Vietnamese culture.

<sup>7&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan, July 18, 1959.</sub>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>Miscellany, p. 459.

One of the first of the French colonial conquerors wrote in 1860, "We have found a people eager after education and respecting the learned."

During the air war against the DRV, great pains were taken to preserve the monuments to scholars of past generations in Hanoi's Temple of Literature from destruction. In 1960 it was observed that this site "will forever symbolize the 'love of learning' (tinh hieu hoc) of our people. In the DRV takes pride in noting that, "the Vietnamese people possess a traditional passion for learning..." and that "we have inculcated in everybody the idea that an ignorant people is a weak people, and that to make Vietnam a rich and strong country everybody must learn to read and write so as to be able later to study science and technique [technical skills]." Perhaps the most sweeping view of the Vietnamese reverence for learning is provided by Le Duan:

We all admit that the Vietnamese are eager for study. In former times, in town like in country, at the birth of an infant, its parents' two concerns were to give it sufficient food and some education so that "it might later know how to behave as a man." Naturally, to live one must eat, but that is not all. One must also know how to behave as a man. Therefore, our forefathers, however poor, did their utmost

Paulin Vial, cited in "General Education in the DRVN," <u>Vietnamese</u> Studies, No. 30, 1971, p. 127.

David Marr notes that the rows of tall steles with the names of degree holders inscribed on them were completely buried in sand to protect them against destruction from the bombing. Lecture at Cornell, February 13, 1975.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>Nhan Da<u>n</u>, February 15, 1960.

<sup>12&</sup>quot;Education in the DRV," <u>Vietnamese Studies</u>, No. 5, 1965, p. 31.

to send their children to school, not to make them mandarins, but to educate them how to live as men. It is perhaps due to the fact that they highly value humanitarianism and know how to live as men that the Vietnamese people have struggled successfully for their own existence and grown into an independent nation. Humanitarianism has largely contributed to the formation of the Vietnamese nation in the process of its formation and given it a powerful vitality which accounts for glorious pages in our history. 13

The Party First Secretary urged an improvement in the quality of instruction in schools so that "a new generation will emerge, mastering knowledge and culture along socialist and communist lines, and having the soul and style particular to the Vietnamese." 14

China, of course, took pride in a brilliant traditional culture, preserved and transmitted by succeeding generations of scholars with no less of a "passion for learning." But there were important contrasts with the Vietnamese case. Because of China's grandeur and brilliant civilization, it was difficult to accept the necessity for learning from foreign sources. The nineteenth century battles between self-strengtheners who did see the urgency of accommodating to the modern world and the traditionalists who resisted this course of action had contemporary echoes in China's post-Liberation debates on the extent to which Soviet experience and textbooks were relevant to China's needs. For Vietnam, borrowing from external sources was a necessity imposed on it because of its small size and proximity to China. Vietnam was necessarily cosmopolitan from very early times, and saw learning from and about others as a requisite of

<sup>13</sup>Le Duan, On the Socialist Revolution in Vietnam, Vol. III, p. 151.

<sup>14&</sup>lt;sub>Tbid., p. 164.</sub>

survival.

At the turn of the century, Chang Chih-tung wrote that, "Knowledge alone can save us from destruction, and education is the path to knowledge...If we do not know the (Western) principles of government, we shall be unable to practice their technology." But the results of Western education were not always positive. Y.C. Wang feels that it led to:

a steady weakening of the moral sense and an increasing dedication to professional achievement. While the international standard of Chinese scientists rose perceptibly, their attachment to the masses became increasingly more remote. As a number of them recently admitted (under Communist prodding but not necessarily insincerely), they had never even tried to further science or technology in China. Thus scholars became experts in their own fields but paid almost no attention to national needs. 16

The transformation from scholar to technician weakened the sense of social responsibility of the modern intelligentsia. As they turned away from government service, they began to fit into a new mercantile society centered on China's coastal regions and increasingly isolated from the hinterlands. A new elite, cut off from its roots was taking shape.

It was this development which led Mao to conclude that "intellectuals

<sup>15</sup>Y.C. Wang, Chinese Intellectuals and the West, 1872-1947 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966), p. 52.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 500.

<sup>17&</sup>quot;With the rise of industry and the professions they no longer had to seek employment in government service, but were increasingly susceptible to the lure of high living so characteristic of modern industrialized society. As a consequence, material gain loomed large in life, and the old habit of hiding the urge to accumulate beneath a display of public virtue completely disappeared." Ibid., p. 502.

are not as valuable as a piece of excrement." Early in his life Mao had even found himself taking on the attitudes of this elite educated group. Disdain for manual labor and, therefore the peasantry, was a part of the traditional scholar's view. In the case of the modern intellectual, however, it was intensified by a feeling that peasants were backward and not an essential part of modern China's future. Mao's suspicion of intellectuals was reaffirmed during the 1942-44 rectification movement in Yenan and the Hundred Flowers episode in which some intellectuals sharply criticized Party policies. Although his initial reaction to the Hundred Flowers expressed in February 1957 in "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People" was conciliatory, the seeds of distrust had been sown. The result was a major educational reform in 1958, which foundered in the early 1960's and was revived in more extreme form in the Cultural Revolution.

Mao's view of intellectuals was not entirely negative. In 1957, he noted that there were 5 million intellectuals in China, and concluded, "we must win them over." He advocated having one third of the intellectuals enrolled in the Party "within three 5-year plans." Even in 1964 Mao acknowledged that "intellectuals are quite important; [we] cannot do without them." At that time Mao also felt that "intellectuals are really the most ignorant." Still Mao concluded that the intellectuals

<sup>18&</sup>lt;sub>Miscellany</sub>, p. 68.

<sup>19&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>., p. 69.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 349.

<sup>21&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid., p. 338</sub>.

had "acknowledged defeat" and thought he saw a change of attitudes in the younger generation, differentiating the students from the professors. 22 By 1966, however, Mao felt that, "At present, the greater part of the universities, middle schools, and primary schools have been monopolized by intellectuals who have emerged from the ranks of the bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, the landlord and rich peasant class." 23

North Vietnam's leadership took a somewhat different view of the problem of the intellectuals, as pointed out in a previous section on political integration. Here again Vietnam's colonial period was an important cause of the distinctive transformation of its intellectuals, and of the different view toward intellectuals held by the revolutionary leaders. A former principal of a third level (senior middle) school offered the following analysis of the contrast between intellectuals in Vietnam and China:

Vietnam's intellectuals are different from those in China. In China the intellectuals belonged to the upper strata. Only the rich and sons of mandarins could become intellectuals and the peasants or working people could never rise to this upper strata. With respect to North Vietnam, when the French came in, the feudal class was changed, and the French way of thinking was brought in. Petty merchants and government functionaries had the chance to send their children to study. Because of this, in the North, intellectuals were closer to the peasants and laboring masses. The policy line of North Vietnam and China is the same, but the conditions in China are different from those in Vietnam, so each does things their own way. But with regard to China, previously their attitude

<sup>22&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

<sup>23&</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>., p. 375.

toward intellectuals was harsher, and in the early (post-Liberation) phase, they had to make more efforts to shatter the misguided way of thinking among the people, and had to crack down harder. As a result, some writings of Mao Tsetung were scornful of the intellectuals who only know how to talk but not to get anything done. But in North Vietnam many people became intellectuals who were not sons of mandarins or the rich, and many intellectuals came from the ranks of laboring people, so they were closer to them. 24

Thus, in his view, the colonial occupation had a levelling effect, and shattered the hold of the feudal class on education (while in China, the CCP-led social revolution was required to accomplish this). Whether or not this assessment is accurate, it reflects an important difference in attitudes towards intellectuals in China and Vietnam. This analysis is corroborated by Le Duan, who told the Hanoi Teachers College in 1962 that, "Under any political regime, the Vietnamese people have invariably maintained very close relations with the patriotic intelligentsia and the teachers as its best representatives. The masses have respect for them and look upon them as the pride of the nation. Patriotism and revolutionary spirit penetrated the masses through the patriotic intellectuals." In addition to being "closer" to the masses, Vietnam's intellectuals were also a somewhat larger, and hence less elite, group in society. The number of students enrolled in higher education in the DRV in 1965 was 0.14 percent of the total population, for example, while in China the equivalent figure was 0.03 percent. 26

<sup>24</sup> Interview No. 37.

<sup>25</sup> Le Duan, On the Socialist Revolution in Vietnam, Vol. III, p. 15.

The DRV had about 26,000 students enrolled in higher education in 1965, out of a total population which had reached 19,210,000 by that year. Mao's 1965 estimate for China's population was 680,000,000 and the number of students enrolled in higher education that year was 170,000.

The experience of both Vietnam and China with intellectuals illustrates the differences in the problems they faced. A substantial part of China's educational system, especially at the higher levels, had been heavily influenced by the West. In the early years the PRC nationalized foreign controlled schools and colleges. In the process numerous teachers were accused of giving "political support to the Guomindang in its struggle against the insurgent Communist Party" and "fostering a Western-oriented cultural elite, isolated from the majority of the Chinese and their problems." Serious efforts were also made to increase the percentage of students from worker-peasant backgrounds in higher education. From 19 percent in 1951-52, the percentage rose to 67 percent in 1959-60. 28

From 1949 until the late fall of 1951 (in some areas until 1953) many middle schools and institutions of higher learning still followed the Anglo-American model, that is, a liberal arts approach with teachers and students using many English and American texts (translated or in the original). From 1952 until 1958 China emulated the Soviet educational example with a heavy stress on engineering and science, a preference for the specialized and technical college, a stress on the quality of the students rather than on their quantity, the professional ideal, the use of Soviet texts, the highly centralized control over all schools, and a heavy academic burden on students. But beginning in early 1957 there was a reduction in the growth rate of higher institutions

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>R. F. Price, <u>Education in Communist China</u> (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 97. During the Great Leap Mao said, "Professors - we have been afraid of them ever since we came into the towns. We did not despise them, we were terrified of them. When confronted by people with piles of learning we felt that we were good for nothing." Stuart Schram, <u>Chairman Mao Talks to the People</u>, p. 116.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup>Donald Munro, "Egalitarian Ideal and Educational Fact," in John M. Lindbeck, ed., China: Management of a Revolutionary Society, p. 274.

and a debate on the kind of education appropriate for Chinese students at all levels. This occurred in the general hsia fang climate in which teachers were often sent to rural areas to perform labor. Matters crystallized between 1958 and 1961 when Mao, inspired by the Yenan experience, sought to apply to China at peace a model that in part was derived from guerrilla days. This meant combining education and productive labor, a stress on the quantity of students enrolled rather than on their quality, the reduced importance of academic study, the use of locally prepared Chinese texts, and decentralization. After the failure of the Great Leap, from roughly 1961 to 1964 (especially until September, 1962) there was a return to a liberalized version of the Soviet model - one more permissive of reading and discussing previously taboo subjects and foreign writings, which gave more authority to senior teachers in running the schools. In 1964 Mao began his attempt once more to control the destiny of the educational system, an attempt that reached its climax during the Cultural Revolution. The Chinese People's Resist-Japan Military and Political University (K'ang ta), of which Lin Piao was once the director, again became the model school.29

The transformation of Chinese education was, in essence, a shift from emphasis on the higher level educational institutions at the apex, to broadening the educational system at the lower levels.

# Educational Goals and Institutions

In part, this shift was due to a turning away from foreign educational models. The Western oriented educational system of the Republican period was identified with class privilege and foreign domination, and clearly unsuitable for revolutionary China. But its replacement with education along the Soviet model proved to be unsuitable for much the same reasons. Despite the considerable material and technical assistance

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup>Ibid., pp. 263-264.

rendered by the Soviet Union to China during the 1950's, a foreign observer writes that, "There is also no doubt that Soviet elitist ideas came to be seen as a threat to Mao Ze-dong's plans for 'training successors', and that this was one factor in the cooling off of relations between the two countries."

Students who had strongly criticized the application of the Soviet educational model to China during the Hundred Flowers period wanted to broaden their intellectual horizons to include Western literature and science. This while Chou En-lai criticized these intellectuals because they "oppose the Soviet Union and are not willing to learn from the Soviet Union," Mao himself came to share some of their reservations. But rather than turning outward, Mao returned to his Yenan experience. Essentially, the Yenan experience was to shift the focus of education from higher to lower levels, decentralize administration, encourage community participation and self-reliance, focus on the immediate needs of the underprivileged, and relate education to immediate rather than

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup>Price, <u>Education in Communist China</u>, p. 104.

Rene Goldman, "The Rectification Campaign at Peking University," in MacFarquhar, ed., China Under Mao, pp. 261-65.

<sup>32</sup>Chou En-lai, "Chinese Community Party Session on the Question of Intellectuals," (January 1956) in Stewart Fraser, ed., Chinese Communist Education (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1965), pp. 226-27. Chou himself remarked that, "We cannot indefinitely rely on the Soviet experts, nor can we relax our efforts in the most effective study of the advanced scientific techniques of the Soviet Union and other countries." (Emphasis added). Ibid., p. 225.

long range requirements.<sup>33</sup> The problems of using an "essentially foreign-urban education system"<sup>34</sup> in backward agricultural areas of China were obvious. A CCP review of the situation in 1944 concluded that while "national education" (mass education) was the original goal, "present education trains people for the next stage of education. Because of this, to graduate only from primary school is of no value; to graduate from middle school is worth even less."<sup>35</sup>

Mao's educational reform of 1958, based largely on the Yenan philosophy, was an effort to reconcile the political goals of providing universal primary education, and the immediate economic necessities of the moment. As one analysis puts it, "Underlying the educational questions are fundamental economic positions. The revisionist economic line maintains that true socialism will develop only in an industrialized society. It asserts that industrialization can be carried out most rapidly by giving priority to the urban sector of the economy in both allocation of resources and personnel." The "balanced development line" attempts to counteract the elitism implicit in the future oriented industrialization strategy, and tries to concentrate on the needs of the underprivileged, because "This is not only socially just, it is also economically sound, for it

A good summary and analysis of these themes can be found in Peter J. Seybolt, "The Yenan Revolution in Mass Education," The China Quarterly, No. 48, October/December 1971, pp. 656-64.

<sup>34</sup> The phrase is Seybolt's, ibid., p. 657.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid., p. 665.</sub>

puts them in a much better position to do the basic kind of economic work most urgently needed in a largely agrarian developing aconomy."<sup>37</sup> In order to reconcile the political goal of mass education and reducing inequalities, and the economic goal of strengthening China's productive capacity, Mao advocated a concentration on the junior, or secondary level school, increased emphasis on local funding and half-work, half-study schools.<sup>38</sup>

Ironically, the Maoist reform of education and break with the Soviet model came at a time when Khrushchev was moving in a similar direction.  $^{39}$ 

<sup>37&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

<sup>38</sup> An article on this subject points out that, "In expanding secondary schools in rural areas, initial efforts naturally had to be concentrated at the junior, or lower secondary level. The reasons why a special type of junior middle school was deemed necessary in these areas were primarily economic. On the one hand, the regime felt it was unable to support a general academic type junior middle school education for the vast numbers of primary school graduates then emerging in the countryside. On the other hand, it saw a great need for a vast number of young people who possessed a minimal ninth-grade general education and who had in addition some knowledge of modern scientific agricultural methods and the ability to handle farm tools and equipment." Robert D. Barendson, "The Innovation of Half-Work and Half-Study Schools," in William T. Liu, ed., Chinese Society Under Communism (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 345. The extent of the bottleneck at this level of education is illustrated by the fact that in 1957 "only 10 percent of primary school graduates could enter secondary school, and the number of secondary school graduates fell far short of the required number of entrants to the universities." Yuan-li Wu and Robert B. Sheeks, The Organization and Support of Scientific Research and Development in Mainland China (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 98.

This is discussed by Munro, "Egalitarian Ideal and Educational Fact," China: Management of a Revolutionary Society, pp. 280-281.

But while the Soviet Union was itself moving away from the ideal of the 10-year general school, the DRV remained firmly committed to that model. The 6-year primary school education in China constitutes a more comprehensive basic educational program than either the 4-year primary school program in the DRV or in the Soviet Union, which are not viewed as a complete educational programs in themselves, but as one part of a larger unit.

Only one year after assuming power in North Vietnam, the DRV amalgamated the French 9-year educational program with the 9-year system that had been used in Viet Minh controlled zones to form a new comprehensive 10-year course of general education. The government explained that, "Ten years in school will guarantee that students will have the required level of knowledge and, after graduating, can go straight into universities and professional schools. Although it is divided into three levels, the 10-year general education course is basically a unified and continuous school." Students reaching the end of the first or primary level (grade 4) and the second level (grade 7) would, however, have to pass examinations to proceed to the next level, and "only when they finished the 10th grade would they graduate."

Because of the limited material resources available for education, and the shortage of teachers, it was acknowledged that this system would have to be built from the bottom up. In 1957 the Minister of Education noted that "developing in pyramid form is a law of the development of education," but pointed to the Soviet Union's plan to achieve complete

<sup>40&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, August 31, 1956.

<sup>41 &</sup>lt;u>lbid</u>.

and universal middle school education by 1960 and thus substantially reduce the educational "pyramid." The following year, however.

Khrushchev initiated a new educational reform which envisaged increasing compulsory education from seven to eight years, after which a wide variety of vocational and secondary technical school openings would be available. The purpose was to relieve the pressures on university enrollments and more closely relate education to current economic needs.

As one foreign education expert put it, "the 10-year schools were trying to give to all an education specially suited to the needs of a minority." 43

Despite the changes in educational policy in China and the U.S.S.R. the North Vietnamese adhered to the 10-year program of general education. By 1964 the "system of the general education schools" and the "structure" of this system remained unchanged. Nevertheless there had been important changes in curriculum. Although in theory the 10-year program was a complete unit, in practice only the first or primary level approached the ideal of universal education. In 1959 To Huu noted that students in the first level comprised 7 percent of the total DRV population, students at the second level 0.82 percent, and students at the third level only .01 percent, and concluded that, "the number of students moving from one level to the next is too small." 45

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup>Nhan Dan, June 3, 1957.

<sup>43</sup>Nigel Grant, Soviet Education (London: Penguin Books, 1972), p. 92.

Nhan Dan, September 16, 1964.

<sup>45&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, July 18, 1959.

In 1964 a major effort was made to achieve universal compulsory education at the primary level, "to guarantee that upon reaching working age, the youths can have the opportunity to finish second level education (7th grade) and reach the requisite cultural and technical level."46 The basic goal of a universal 10-year general education still remained the guiding principle of the DRV policy. The only changes made were still within the general framework of the system, in the form of the first basic curriculum reform since 1956. Its purpose was to "increasingly bring first level education in closer line with the 11 and 12 year old age group," presumably as the wartime legacy of overage students was phased out. First level education would "not have the mission of preparing pupils to go out into life as before, but would become a pedagogical preparatory stage for good preparation of pupils to advance to the second level."<sup>47</sup> By 1964, every village had a first level school, while every other village had a second level school, allowing all but about 10 percent of primary school graduates to advance to the second level."48 DRV educational policy thus provides another illustration of a persistent theme in Vietnamese cultural and institutional borrowing. While in appearance the orthodoxy of the original model is preserved, in substance the workings of the transplanted institution are adapted to Vietnam's own requirements.

<sup>46&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, September 29, 1964.

<sup>47</sup> <u>Nhan</u> <u>Dan</u>, September 16, 1964.

<sup>48</sup> Nguyen Khanh Toan, <u>Xung quanh mot so van de</u>, p. 638.

Other cultural and historical factors are also involved in North Vietnam's retention of an educational system that is, in appearance, elitist. Of these the most important is the legacy of the "poor but honest" scholars. Vietnamese revolutionaries strongly attacked the colonial regime for pursuing a policy of "stupidifying" the masses (ngu dan). While the CCP in power in Yenan met peasant resistance in promoting a latinized script that would have aided mass education, the Vietnamese Communist movement expanded its influence through its leadership of a highly successful romanization campaign. The difference was that the Vietnamese had refined cultural borrowing over centuries, and found latinization an alternate, and more useful, vehicle of education than the equally foreign Chinese script. For the Chinese peasantry, abandonment of the symbol of Chinese cultural attainment and unity was a cultural shock of sufficient magnitude to force the abandonment of the latinization program.

It was, ironically, due to the fact that the DRV's program of mass education had been more successful that the Vietnamese were able to adopt an elitist educational system. In China it is estimated that it takes fifteen to twenty hours to learn the latin alphabet, while it takes one hundred hours to learn 1,500 characters, the (rural) standard for basic

<sup>49&</sup>quot;The failure of the new script campaign, then, must be ascribed to another cause; the adverse attitude of the peasants - the great mass of illiterates who were supposed to be the primary beneficiaries of the movement." Peter J. Seybolt, "The Yenan Revolution in Mass Education," The China Quarterly, No. 48, October/December, 1971, p. 654.

literacy. <sup>50</sup> Even after having attained this level, it is still necessary to devote half the study time in grades 1-4 and one-third in grades 5 and 6 to the study of the written language in order to attain a level of 4,000 characters as a basis for education at higher levels. <sup>51</sup> It was estimated that at the time of Liberation, more than 80 percent of China's population was illiterate. <sup>52</sup> In Vietnam, having learned the phonetic alphabet, the curriculum can be devoted to what the DRV terms "basic knowledge." Combined with the relatively lighter load of political education at the primary levels, this meant that a graduate of the first level already had an extensive background of "basic knowledge" that would be sufficient to launch him on the path to higher education in the second and third levels.

## Meritocracy and the Egalitarian Ideal

The basic link between mass education and higher education is the examination system. In China, the Soviet-inspired examination system came

Leo A. Orleans, <u>Professional Manpower and Education in China</u> (Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, USGPO, 1960), p. 51. By 1947 the DRV Ministry of Popular Education had worked out a method which "made it possible to teach people of average intelligence to read and write in three months." "General Education in the DRVN," <u>Vietnamese Studies</u>, No. 30, 1971, p. 96. By December 1958, 93.4 percent of the people from 12 to 50 in the delta (ethnic Vietnamese) areas had learned to read and write. Ngo Van Cat, "The Liquidation of Illiteracy and Complementary Education For Grown-Ups in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam," <u>Vietnamese Studies</u>, No. 5, 1963, p. 28.

<sup>51</sup> Leo A. Orleans, Professional Manpower, p. 33.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup>Ibid., p. 5.

under attack from both right and left during the educational ferment of 1956-58. Chou En lai asserted in 1956 that there was "really no definite boundary line between the so-called higher intellectuals and general intellectuals," but in fact the university examination system itself constituted a sharp boundary in the educational hierarchy. As the announcement of the DRV 10-year program of general education in 1956 made clear, examinations would be held at the conclusion of each level. Despite the high percentages of students passing these exams, the relative grade was clearly a determining factor in deciding which students would ascend the pyramid toward higher education. During the first major screening for university admissions in 1956 many students petitioned for exemptions from the qualifying examinations, but were told that examinations were an integral part of all educational systems (Soviet and Chinese, as well as French) and that it was necessary to "assign students according to their various capacities."

Not surprisingly this led to intense pressure to achieve good grades. By 1958 the government was concerned about the widespread phenomenon of "studying to death" (hoc chi chet) in the schools at all levels. Students, particularly those in the "test years" of the 4th, 7th and 10th grades "studied on an average of up to 11 and 12 hours a day." Everything

<sup>53&</sup>lt;sub>Fraser, Chinese</sub> Communist Education, p. 226.

Nhan Dan, September 5, 1956.

<sup>55&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan, January 15, 1958.</sub>

in order to pass" was a common slogan among students taking the 7th and 10th grade examinations, and the old phenomenon of private tutors and "crammers" reappeared. <sup>56</sup> The government recognized, but did not solve, the dilemma of reducing academic tensions in a highly competitive system. On the one hand it asserted that examinations were "not to select a number of particularly good and outstanding students, but should be done to ensure that in every classroom the pupils who study uniformly throughout the school year or throughout their level of study, and who have an average academic achievement, good conduct, and good performance in (extra-curricular) chores, can be selected for higher education. <sup>57</sup> Nevertheless, some examination boards were criticized for too liberal grading and exceeding the prescribed ratio of successful candidates. <sup>58</sup> A major concern was avoiding favoritism. But the pyramidal structure of education made it inevitable that examinations would play a decisive role in selection.

The competition engendered by this system led to paradoxical results. For some it intensified the struggle for grades, but for others, mostly peasants, the idea of struggling for educational advancement with only the prospect of returning to agricultural work led to pressure from parents on students at the second and third levels to leave schools. The phenomenon of "studying for a 3" (out of a five point system - the "gentleman's C" of the DRV) was apparently widespread, probably among those who saw

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup>Nhan Dan, January 17, 1958.

<sup>57</sup> Nhan Dan, August 15, 1958.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

Nhan Dan, December 6, 1963.

little point or little hope of advancing to higher educational levels. 60 Some experimentation with a "tracking system" for students of varying levels and motivations was done, though it is not clear how general the practice was. 61 But for many students the competition to get ahead led to an excessive emphasis on grades, at the expense of a more rounded and practical education. 62

China's educational reform of 1958 had an indirect and limited impact on North Vietnam. In that year, the PRC's educational bureaucracy was decentralized, and the format and curriculum of education diversified. The Ministry of Higher Education was abolished and, though briefly reinstated in 1964 in a counter-current to the Maoist program in education, was dissolved again in the Cultural Revolution. The idea of a standard core curriculum and rigidly centralized examinations was significantly modified, and the principle of combined work and study assumed a central position in education. The basis of this change was that (1) primary schools prepared students only for higher levels rather than productive employment, (2) at the middle school and university level there was too much stress on basic theory which had no immediate application, and (3) selective and competitive enrollments threatened the egalitarian ideal. 63

<sup>60</sup> Nhan Dan, February 25, 1963.

<sup>61&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, January 9, 1963.

<sup>62&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan, February 25, 1963.</sub>

<sup>63</sup> Donald Munro, "Egalitarian Ideal and Educational Fact," in John M. Lindbeck, ed., China: Management of a Revolutionary Society, p. 273.

"The Maoist response to that threat," says Donald Munro, "was to tamper with the procedures that insure superior quality in an educational system, to insist on substantial production labor for all students (intended to help break the barrier that exists between mental and manual laborers, and between students in ordinary schools and those in work-study schools), and to inject political indoctrination of a special kind in the schools. Purely academic study was downgraded."

In early 1958, the PRC min pan or "people-run" schools were encouraged to relieve the financial burden of education on the state budget, to promote the combining of work with study and to inculcate a spirit of self-reliance. This development was duly noted in Vietnam. Tran Luc, Nhan Dan's "China watcher," summarized the PRC experience and commented that if China could do it, "our Vietnamese compatriots can certainly do it if we try." Nguyen Khanh Toan, the leading Party authority on education, observed that, "In China labor education in the schools is going in a direction that, in my opinion, our education could draw precious lessons from." During 1958, "some people" advocated introducting specialization at the second level in complementary education courses to allow greater concentration

<sup>64&</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 273-274.

In 1964, Mao noted that it "cost the state 120 <u>yuan</u> a year to support a student attending a general middle school, but only 6.8 <u>yuan</u> a year for agricultural middle school students." Miscellany, p. 333.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup>Nhan Dan, March 25, 1958.

<sup>67&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, September 7, 1958.

on mathematics, physics and chemistry, in preparation for the middle level vocational schools. This meant de-emphasizing the general education core curriculum. In the general education schools themselves, however, the changes were gradual. The first major curriculum revision took place only in 1964. 69

The structure of the educational system is closely linked to the related questions of the class composition of students in higher education.

A centralized examination system, for example, is a meritocratic equalizer but, at the same time, a device which discriminates against students from the "basic classes." China's curriculum reform and progressive decentralization of the selection process since 1958 has been based on this recognition. In addition, the Ministry of Higher Education has been associated with a "revisionist" educational philosophy, as evidenced by its abolition in 1958, resurrection in 1964 and subsequent disappearance during the Cultural Revolution. This ministry was associated with programs of academic centralization and curriculum standardization which Mao felt engendered formalism and elitism in education.

At the outset of North Vietnam's First Five-Year Plan, the second level Bac Ly school became a model for national emulation. It signified reaffir-

<sup>68&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, July 8, 1961.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup>Nhan <u>Dan</u>, September 16, 1964.

There is an interesting discussion of the historical roots, during the T'ang and Sung periods, of the "advancement by recommendation" system that became a major element in the Maoist educational reform in Donald Munro, "Egalitarian Ideal and Educational Fact, China: Management of a Revolutionary Society, p. 294.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup>Ibid., p. 268.

mation of the DRV commitment to the 10-year general education concept, and a stage by stage implementation of it. As noted above, by 1964 only 10 percent of school age children did not advance to the second level. 72 The goal of the reform represented by Bac Ly was "it should turn out not an intellectual aristocracy divorced from realities, looking down on and exploiting the people, but the builders of socialism." The work-study principle of the 1958 Maoist reforms was employed by Bac Ly. Until the Third Party Congress of 1960:

the schools were mainly concerned with diffusing knowledge. Success was measured by the numbers of students who successfully passed the examination, and the main concern of every teacher was to ensure graduation for as many pupils as possible. For instance, the first-level (primary) school must lead a pupil to the second-level school, and later to the third-level school, which must in turn lead to a higher education establishment. 74

Given the limited financial resources of the state, self-reliance at the lower educational levels was crucial. In addition, the preparation of

<sup>72</sup> In the PRC the primary level continued to be the main preoccupation as late as 1972, and Jen Min Jih Pao criticized authorities in one hsien for their "blind optimism" in going on to stress the expansion of junior-middle schools. A work forum in Chekiang province affirmed that, "manpower, and financial and material resources allocated to the educational front by the state, should first be devoted to ensuring the universalization of five year primary education." John Gardner and Wilt Idema, "China's Educational Revolution," in Stuart R. Schram, ed., Authority, Participation and Cultural Change in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 266. In the wake of the Cultural Revolution, three years were eliminated from the combined primary and junior-middle school schedule. Ibid., pp. 268-269.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup>Vu Can and Luu Duc Moc, "The Bac Ly Pilot Secondary School," <u>Vietnamese Studies</u>, No. 5, 1965, p. 54.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

the First Five-Year Plan probably revealed that North Vietnam's capacity to absorb highly trained graduates was limited, and that the immediate need was for a rapid upgrading of the technical and managerial skills in the agricultural cooperatives. Nevertheless, the goal of a universal general education was never abandoned. It was, in fact, reaffirmed in 1965, at the close of the Five-Year Plan. By the end of the Second Five-Year Plan, universal general education at the second level was to be achieved, although the curriculum reform would enable them to have practical skills that would equip them to enter the labor force upon graduation from the second level. But "this does not mean that they have no hope of studying further." Indeed, they "could and definitely must advance to the third level by entering a regular general education third level school or by complementary on the job education."

# Reds and Experts

A related goal of the Bac Ly model was to increase Party control in education. In the absence of a Party organization in the school, leadership was exercised by the teachers in the Youth Group organization who were to "provide the backbone" of the teachers' labor union which in turn was "to provide the foundation." By 1965, 85 percent of first and second level teachers were members of the Labor Youth Group. Neverthe-

Nguyen Khanh Toan, Xung quanh mot so van de, p. 681.

<sup>76</sup> Nhan Dan, January 1, 1962.

<sup>77</sup> Nguyen Khanh Toan, <u>Xung quanh mot so van de</u>, p. 657.

less, it was felt that "for a long time the expansion of Party members among the ranks of teachers has not been given sufficient attention." 78 In the course of the expansion of both central and higher education, however, many younger teachers more committed to the values of the regime were trained. In the Polytechnic Institute, for example, by 1964, 600 of the 700 teachers were in their 30's. By 1965, the Deputy Minister of Education gave the following general assessment of the DRV's teachers:

We could sit here all day and blame them for a low educational and professional level, for their underdeveloped ideological standpoint, for their youth and inexperience, and for the fact that they are still not really "close to the real life," etc. All these general criticisms are always true, but they don't point out that a large part of the fault is due to the way we train, develop, and utilize them, which still has many problems and shortcomings. But looking at it overall, the teachers which our pedagogical schools have produced are qualitatively speaking not all that bad. The great majority of them are worthy of the title "people's teachers," particularly the first and second level teachers, most of whom teach in the rural areas, and almost all of whom have emerged from among the laboring people and the poor strata, or are children of cadres of our regime, and the great majority (85 percent) are Labor Youths. There are only a scattering of people left over from the French occupation, and only a

<sup>78</sup> Nguyen Khanh Toan, "Can thuc hien tot nhiem vu cua nganh giao duc trong tinh hinh moi" (It Is Necessary to Carry Out Well the Mission of the Education Branch in the Present Situation), Hoc Tap, No. 11, 1965, p. 30. One example of the low political level of teachers and tenuous Party control of them is the complaint that during a meeting sponsored by the Province Party Committee in the largest combined second and third level school in Thai Nguyen, some teachers in the first row casually got up and walked out of the hall. Nhan Dan, August 2, 1959. Yet the principal concern of the Province Party Secretary was that if students only "studied hard enough to become red" they "would not want to strive to become expert workers." Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> Nhan <u>Dan</u>, April 23, 1964.

few percent of all teachers are those that were left behind by the opposition (we called them "retained civil servants" during the takeover), and they are people of good quality who have taken our road. Those people who found it hard to assimilate the new education left the field of their own accord.  $^{80}$ 

Between 1960 and 1966, the number of teachers had doubled to nearly 80,000.

At a time when the Party was trying to rejuvenate itself, students were so preoccupied with studies that they were not interested in becoming Youth Group or Party members, and had no time left for organized social tasks. Reports on Bac Ly stressed that "what a number of people have said about Bac Ly being only good at manual labor" was not true, and carefully noted the high test scores of Bac Ly pupils. Social and a strengthening of political and ideological work during 1964 revealed the DRV effort to keep "red and expert" in close balance. It complained that a number of students only "dared" to strive for Youth Group membership, but did not "dare" to strive to join the Party, and also expressed dissatisfaction that they did not aspire to more than the "gentleman's 3" or strive to become scientific and technical cadres "firm in politics and in a specialty." Social tasks.

The related problems of being "red and expert" and class composition of students and teachers became especially prominent at the higher levels of the educational system. While the authorities denied a contradiction between politics and technical expertise, reports on student and teacher

Nguyen Khanh Toan, <u>Xung quanh mot so van de</u>, p. 657.

<sup>81 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 711. The total for 1960 was 44,405. <u>Vietnamese Studies</u>, No. 30, 1971, p. 161.

<sup>82&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, November 3, 1961.

<sup>83&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, April 26, 1964.

attitudes make it clear that this view was not universally shared. Some students felt that the contradictions between politics and expertise could be resolved by being "shrewd." Only by being "shrewd" could one get into the Party and "only by being in the Party could one have a voice in specialized matters." Other students felt that politics were "difficult and restricting." A student studying "abroad" sent back a letter, widely disseminated among some students, passing on the "advanced experience" that the students only need to "study well," 42 hours a week, and that the teacher must have absolute authority as illustrated by the principle that there can be no argument even if two-thirds of the class are expelled. 86

Some teachers refused to help students from worker-peasant backgrounds or expelled them for poor academic work. <sup>87</sup> In 1958, two years after the Nhan Van affair, Nguyen Khanh Toan noted the "objective reality" that "not long ago, and even at present, the main reason some people still express doubts about the ability of the working class to lead the revolution is their cultural level. They say that the cultural level of the working class is low, so how can they lead.?" <sup>88</sup>

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

<sup>85&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>

<sup>86 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>. This criticism seems to be aimed at the Soviet Union or Eastern European experience.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

Nguyen Khanh Toan, "Truong Xa Hoi Chu Nghia" (Socialist Schools)

Nhan Dan, September 6, 1958.

Several years later, articles in Nhan Dan still complained of careerist attitudes among some students at the second and third levels and technical schools who, while outwardly conforming in political attitudes during formal political training, basically sought the security of a specialization appropriate to the "missile age" and a good status position, rather than to enter fields of study that were of immediate utility to the state. These attitudes apparently persisted, and despite official efforts to eliminate them through political indoctrination, "the political level and understanding of current events and policies of many students is still superficial and low." Other students were criticized, however, for being too calculating in selecting areas of specialization, aiming for careers in fields that were under subscribed in order to be sure of continuing their academic careers and escaping a life of "getting their hands dirty" in manual labor. 91

Although these students were criticized for such attitudes, they were in many ways a logical result of the structure of the education system.

In 1959, while the Maoist work study program was being extensively carried

<sup>89</sup> Nhan Dan, March 8, 1962.

Nhan Dan, April 23, 1964. A Deputy Minister of Education complained that students were complacent about ideological and political work in the university and technical schools and, while they accepted the regime's political values in principle, they did not always put them into practice. Political work, he said, was the "weakest link" in schooling, and students were not making a sufficiently sharp distinction between socialist and capitalist ideals of specialization. Nhan Dan, August 27, 1962.

<sup>91</sup> Nhan Dan, April 23, 1964.

out in China, To Huu complained that schools had been unnecessarily disrupted by periodic campaigns. He called for an end to the "capricious opening and closing of the schools." Students sent letters to "sweethearts" to try their best to finish the third level in order to get into the university because "there is no paradise and happiness outside taking the university route."

The 10-year general education program was essentially an elitist system, and was geared precisely to producing students who could "take the university route." This is probably why it was never adopted in China, and substantially modified in the Soviet Union which was the original source of inspiration for that system. Although the DRV inaugurated a campaign, symbolized by the Bac Ly second level school, to more closely integrate academic study with manual labor and gear the schools toward a more utilitarian curriculum, the formal general education track remained the main type of schooling. And while there was brief interest in Mao's 1958 educational reforms, and the agricultural middle schools, they were not adopted on a major scale in North Vietnam. 94

<sup>92&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan, July 18, 1959</sub>.

<sup>93&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, April 23, 1964.

<sup>94</sup> Except in the minorities areas, where the formal general education program was recognized as being inappropriate to local needs. Zuy Minh and Mai Thi Tu, "The School of Young Socialist Workers of Hoa Binh," Vietnamese Studies, No. 30, 1971, p. 67. It is no accident that the model work-study school was initiated in 1958, the year of the Chinese educational reform, but it is also significant that it was established for students in minority areas and that for those students who make it to the third level, the curriculum reverts to the standard general education program for that level, and the final examinations are the same as those of regular third level schools.

An important advantage enjoyed by the DRV in employing this type of educational structure was the small size of the country. By 1964-65 every village had a level one school and every other village had a level two school. In China it was clearly not possible to have such an extensive standardized general education system in the countryside. While the PRC initiated a policy of education that was both ideologically motivated and pragmatic, the DRV did not seem disturbed about the gap between rural and urban youth. A hierarchical centralized system of general education favors urban youths who come from a more sophisticated environment and have easier access to the level three schools that are the key to higher status occupations. 95 Nonetheless, the DRV criticized the rural students for wanting to escape from the prospect of an agricultural career and warned that "if the psychology of leaving the countryside is not abolished it will lead to bad results." 96 Premier Pham Van Dong speaking at the Pedagogical University instructed that, "It is necessary to achieve a correct division of labor between rural students and urban students. In the main, students in urban areas will be directed into agricultural production." <sup>97</sup> In China, the "rural track" of education came in the form

<sup>95</sup> A principal of a level three school in a major provincial capital in the Red River delta, confirmed that there was a proportionately higher ratio of urban students in these schools. Interview No. 37. One exception to this generalization is the dramatic rise in students from peasant backgrounds in the Polytechnic University, noted below. Yet even in this special case rural students were not represented in proportion to their numbers in DRV society.

<sup>96</sup> Nhan Dan, February 16, 1963.

<sup>97</sup> Nhan Dan, September 11, 1964.

of the agricultural middle school, established as an alternative to the standard general education school, and explicitly the terminal point for those enrolled in full time general education. North Vietnam had. an implicit tracking system, since rural students clearly did not need a university education and since the standard general education program discriminated in favor of urban students.

A comparison of available figures on the class composition of students in higher education reveals a somewhat lower percentage of students from worker-peasant backgrounds in Vietnam:

PERCENTAGE OF WORKER-PEASANT STUDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION

| tage        |
|-------------|
| %           |
| %           |
| .%          |
| %           |
| %<br>%<br>% |

<sup>98</sup> Barendsen, "The Agricultural Middle School in Communist China," in MacFarquar, ed., China Under Mao, pp. 309-310.

Nhan Dan, April 25, 1964, reported that some rural students, mostly in the second level schools, left school before completing the 10-year program, often giving the reason that they were too poor to continue studying and had to help their families. Although acknowledging that this was sometimes the case, the article attributed the main cause to the idea that the purpose of study was only to become a professional. When rural students saw graduates of class 7 (second level) and even class 10 (third level) coming back to do farm labor, they concluded that continuing study was "a waste of time" and "one might as well quit school early to get some extra work points."

#### SPECIALIZED MIDDLE SCHOOLS

| P     | RC         | DI     | RV         |
|-------|------------|--------|------------|
| Years | Percentage | Years  | Percentage |
| 1950  | 56.6%      | 1956 · | 45.5%      |
| 1958  | 77%        | 1957   | 54.6%      |
| 1959  |            | 1958   | 58.2%      |
| 1964  |            | 1959   | 71.1%      |
|       |            | . •    |            |

#### ORDINARY MIDDLE SCHOOLS

| PRC   |            | DRV   | Ţ          |
|-------|------------|-------|------------|
| Years | Percentage | Years | Percentage |
| 1950  | 51.3%      | 1956  | Not avail. |
| 1958  | 75.2%      | 1957  | ff         |
| 1959  |            | 1958  | 11         |
| 1964  | 75.%       | 1959  | ti         |

These statistics 100 unfortunately do not reveal the breakdown between workers and peasants. As a consequence of the Cultural Revolution, the number of students from peasant backgrounds in higher education in China is certainly considerably higher at present than in the DRV. Even in the most desirable fields, class background appears to be less important than academic ability. In the Polytechnic University incoming class of 1962-63, only 97 of 1,500 new students came from a worker background. At the same time 700 or nearly half of the new enrollment belonged to the Labor Youth, indicating that even political status was not a direct result of class background. Nevertheless the Polytechnic University, as the most prestigious educational institution, appears to have had

The figures for China are compiled by Donald Munro, "Egalitarian Ideal and Educational Fact," p. 274. The Vietnamese figures are from Nam nam xay dung kinh te va van hoa xa hoi chu nghia, p. 226.

<sup>101&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, August 26, 1962.

special attention devoted to changing the class composition of its students. By 1964, the percentage of non-worker-peasant students had dropped from 70 percent in 1957 to 29.3 percent in 1964. By 1965, the students of worker-peasant origin comprised 25-30 percent of the total enrollment in DRV secondary schools, and 60-75 percent in secondary technical schools, while worker-peasant youths in China were, as the above chart shows, comprised nearly three quarters of all students at these levels. 103

Class background, however, was more important in some fields than in others. In both the DRV and in China, the surest road to higher education for those with unfavorable class backgrounds was in the field of teaching. Despite the great importance that both regimes placed on the political reliability of teachers, critical personnel shortages in this crucial field

 $<sup>^{102}</sup>$ "Education in the DRV," <u>Vietnamese</u> <u>Studies</u>, No. 5, 1965, p. 102. The breakdown was as follows:

|                      | <u>1957</u> | <u>1964</u> |
|----------------------|-------------|-------------|
| Worker family        | 5.4%        | 9.6%        |
| Peasant family       | 24.5%       | 52.5%       |
| Poor strata of urban | ı           | 8.6%        |
| population           |             |             |
| Other social strata  | 70.1%       | 29.3%       |

The main change is an increase in rural students, though it is not clear that they are all from poor or lower-middle peasant backgrounds. More-over, interviews suggested that the changes in classification were obtained by many students (legally or otherwise) to improve their educational opportunities.

The DRV figures are from Nguyen Khanh Toan, <u>Twenty Years' Development of Education in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam</u> (Hanoi: Ministry of Education, 1965), p. 43.

Made it possible for these people to enter the pedagogical institute. 104

Although teaching was a high status profession in the DRV, it was - paradoxically - not a desirable occupation because of the intense demands of time and energies it required. Calling it a "peddling your lungs" (ban chao phoi) profession, one third-level instructor (from a landlord background) said that it was considered more desirable to be a worker because of the fixed hours and minimal psychological demands of a manual occupation. Moreover, while in North Vietnamese society the teacher remained, as in traditional times, a respected and revered figure, the status of workers had been elevated both by the establishment of a "workers' state" and by the feeling that it was a "modern" occupation in sharp contrast to farming. 106

Moreover, the official view on education reinforced the role and status of teachers. In 1962, on the occasion of "international charter for teachers' day," the DRV called for "developing the tradition of a

In the interview sample, for example, there were several cases of students from landlord backgrounds receiving training as middle school teachers. This was overlooked in their cases, and one even became a Party member.

<sup>105</sup> Interview No. 37.

In a speech to students at the Hanoi Teachers' Training College, Le Duan said, "I wonder why many among you still regard teaching as a 'career without prospects'. Such a view is at variance with out national history and the cherished aspiration of our people, and runs counter to the very fundamental requirement of the revolution at the present stage."

On the Socialist Revolution in Vietnam, Vol. III, pp. 155-156. The middle school principal noted during the interview that "if you don't have pull (than the), you can't get to be a worker." Interview No. 37.

'passion for studying, and respect for teachers'" (ham hoc, trong thay).  $^{107}$ The following year, a Nhan Dan editorial wrote, "The decisive factor in whether or not the school carries out the inculcation of virtues in the students is the role of the teacher." A 1964 editorial in Nhan Dan criticized "many schools" for devoting too much time to labor tasks, meetings and other non-academic pursuits. The article re-affirmed that "all general education schools need to continue to regard strongly pushing forward teaching and studying as their key task, striving all out to teach really well, study really well, and ceaselessly raise the overall quality of education." 109 The continuing emphasis on the authority and prestige of the teacher runs counter to the Maoist impulse, reflected in Mao's July 1964 directive that it was necessary to "concentrate on cultivating and training the ability to analyse problems and solve them; one must end the constraint of having to run after teacher." Here again, the DRV has followed a "Catholic" approach, while Mao has attempted to introduce a "Protestant" mentality into China.

In some cases the result of this stress on the quality of education in the DRV was a reversion to the old methods of "skull stuffing" (nhoi so) and an excessively formal method of instruction. Ho found it necessary

<sup>107&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan,</sub> November 21, 1962.

<sup>108</sup> Nhan Dan, February 28, 1963.

<sup>109&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, February 29, 1964.

Cited in Donald Munro, "Egalitarian Ideal and Educational Fact,"

China: Management of a Revolutionary Society, p. 270.

to re-affirm that the content of education must be related to the needs of daily life. He called for "raising the spirit of self-reliance" and observance of the slogan "the school is linked with society, studying must go hand in hand with actions." On balance, however, the North Vietnamese leaders attached great importance to raising the quality of education and the professional level of teachers, and opposing diversions from the principal task of imparting a comprehensive formal program of education to as many students as possible.

In Vietnam, teachers in the Pharmacy School were worried about a possible lowering of standards and claimed that "whatever else can be said, the children of the bourgeoisie are smart and quick to understand." One area in which students from worker-peasant backgrounds were specially favored in Vietnam was in studying abroad. Interviews suggest that it was extremely difficult for students from undesirable class backgrounds to compete for a coveted foreign education. But the successful record of DRV students in the Soviet Union and elsewhere shows that they were not

Nhan Dan, August 13, 1963. Ho criticized the current teaching program for tending to be too "heavy" and "skull stuffing" and advised teachers to avoid the parroting method of study. He humorously recalled the words of one young student, trying to create a good impression by using meaningless, flowery, Sino-Vietnamese terms. The student told Ho, "The preceptor [Ho] has come to help the nephews refurbish the direct implements of instruction." Ho laughingly recalled that he was baffled by this stilted language, and advised students not to use foreign words when a Vietnamese term is available. Ibid.

 $<sup>\</sup>frac{112}{\text{Nhan}}$   $\underline{\text{Dan}}$ , January 17, 1960. Prejudice concerning the learning abilities of workers and peasants was evidently shared by some teachers in China. Cf. R. Price,  $\underline{\text{Education}}$   $\underline{\text{in}}$   $\underline{\text{Communist}}$   $\underline{\text{China}}$ , p. 170.

selected on the basis of class background alone but were superior students as well.

In the PRC the sharp attacks made on prominent bourgeois intellectuals in the early years of the regime and the precarious position of teachers from undesirable class backgrounds made their status more ambiguous. The rectification campaign of 1957 and the Cultural Revolution brought to the surface suspicion and repressed hostility toward the teachers. As suggested earlier, this was not due to any widespread societal hostility toward educators, but was aimed precisely at the tendency to accord them too much respect, based on the traditional view, which reinforced the intellectual elite whom Mao saw as a threat to social and political integration in China. More desirable occupations, such as engineering and scientific professions were, in principle, reserved for those with proper class credentials. But while no comprehensive statistics on the class composition of students in these areas are available, it seems likely that students from more favored backgrounds had an edge in competing for these positions.

During periods when expertise was in demand, class background was presumably less important in student selection. In China, the revisionist backlash from the Great Leap period led to a new emphasis on expertise and academic quality. In mid-1961, Ch'en Yi said that while, "During the early period of liberation, it was absolutely necessary for the Party and

<sup>113</sup> Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, "The Reorganization of Higher Education in Communist China; 1949-61," in Roderick MacFarquhar, ed., China Under Mao: Politics in Command, p. 298.

the government to stress political training in education," it was now "necessary to emphasize specialized training so as to cultivate large numbers of specialists to transform our country into a great socialist state, with a modern industry, a modern agriculture, and a modern scientific culture... This is our greatest political mission."114

### The Scientific Estate: Self Reliance and International Standards

The view expressed by Ch'en Yi contained two elements that were potentially incompatible. The goal was self-strengthening to reinforce China's independence. But the means of achieving this end suggested by Ch'en Yi was to cultivate an elite corps of specialists, which had potentially adverse internal political consequences and would probably necessitate a heavy reliance on Soviet aid, advice, and technical assistance. China's desire to free herself from Soviet tutelage was evident as early as 1955 when Kuo Mo-jo cautioned that although educational progress in the PRC had been made possible by Soviet scientists and specialists, China needed a "strong army of scientists of its own." In 1958, Nieh Jung-chen said, "It is obvious that if we cannot conduct our research

<sup>114</sup> Ibid. The PRC 12-year Science Plan, inaugurated in 1956, called for the training of 2 million high-level technical experts and 10,500 senior scientists by 1967. Wu and Sheeks, The Organization and Support of Scientific Research and Development in Mainland China, pp. 91, 94. Some authorities doubt if this goal was achieved. Ibid., p. 104. The DRV produced 20,000 "scientific and technical cadres" with a university education between 1955 and 1965. Nhan Dan, August 25, 1965.

<sup>115</sup> John M. Lindbeck, "The Organization and Development of Science," China Under Mao, p. 347.

independently and creatively, if we cannot fight for our own rejuvenation, it will be eternally impossible for us to catch up with the advanced scientific level of the world." A clear rejection of this dependency status was evident during the summer of 1960 when Soviet technicians were recalled from China and the flow of Chinese students to the Soviet Union diminished.

China's self-strengthening methods were not entirely compatible with its self image. Although Mao acknowledged in 1956 that "in respect of modern culture the standards of the West are higher than ours" and that "we have fallen behind," by 1964 he had concluded that "We cannot follow the old paths of technical development of every other country in the world, and crawl step by step behind others." Mao's optimistic Great Leap predictions of catching up with the industrial countries of the West (overtaking England in 15 years in industrial production) gave way in 1962 to the view that since "China has a large population [and] our resources are meager, and our economy backward...it will be impossible to develop our productive power so rapidly as to catch up with and overtake

<sup>116</sup> Ibid., pp. 347-348.

<sup>117</sup> Stuart Schram, Chairman Mao Talks to the People, p. 87.

<sup>118</sup> Mao, December 1964, in <u>ibid</u>, p. 231. Schram notes that while Mao seems to have rejected the idea of "Chinese learning as the substance, Western learning for practical application" in 1956, by 1965 he reversed his position. "This volte-face reflects, of course, a change in Mao's evaluation of that particular form of Western learning known as Marxism. By 1965, this no longer constituted a universal and immutable 'fundamental theory', but merely one more contribution from the West which must be digested critically and made to serve China." Schram, Chairman Mao Talks to the People, p. 36.

As the goal of "catching up" receded in prominence, the importance of laying a firm foundation for development and of solving China's immediate and distinctive problems grew.

It was difficult for China to accept a tutclary relationship with an outside country, but difficult to avoid it if international standards of excellence were to be achieved. It was in the field of science and technology that these universal standards were most important to China's development, and most easily identified and measured. But it was also in the area of science and technology that the dangers of creating an intellectual elite with foreign connections were most acute. Although distinguished Chinese scientists in critical specialities were invited to return home, 120 the PRC's main efforts were directed toward building up facilities, instruments and research materials to establish a program adequate for the training of specialists within China. 121 The Central Committee guideline for dealing with "scientists, technicians, and ordinary

<sup>119</sup> Ibid., pp. 174-175.

Kuo Mo-jo in 1959 termed this "one of the most important methods" of meeting immediate manpower needs. Lindbeck in China Under Mao, p. 346.

This is the clear implication of the high percentage of scientific funds spent on basic construction of training facilities, on plants manufacturing scientific instruments and, in particular, the 9 million dollars expanded on the purchase of Western scientific books and periodicals in 1956 and 1957 (evidently larger than the equivalent sums spent by the Soviet Union as well as Japan and India during these years). Ibid., p. 343. The probable purpose was to diversify China's sources of information and reduce dependency on Soviet training materials.

members of working staffs" at the outset of the Cultural Revolution made it clear that specialists were not to be discriminated against "as long as they are patriotic, work energetically, are not against the Party and socialism, and maintain no illicit relations with any foreign country." This is, however, a catalogue of the potential problems with specialists that a decade earlier led Mao to admit that "many of our comrades are not good at getting along with intellectuals, lack respect for their work, and interfere in scientific and cultural matters in a way that is uncalled for." 123

It is probably no accident that the two Chinese officials with the closest regular contact with North Vietnam were Ambassador Ho Wei (1957-63) who became the Minister of Education in 1964 and Yang Hsiu-feng, the Chairman of the China-Vietnam Friendship Association, who headed the Ministry of Higher Education from its inception in 1952 to its first dissolution in 1958. He was Minister of Education from 1958 until 1964, and then returned to the post of Minister of Higher Education. Yang was among the first of the education officials purged in the Cultural Revolution. Playing its historical role of cultural exemplar, China made sure that its dealings with Vietnam were conducted by men of standing and prestige in the area that the Vietnamese had traditionally looked to China for inspiration - education. The PRC leaders were clearly in a position to gauge the DRV views on the goals of education, and it seems permissible

<sup>122</sup> Cited in R. Price, Education in Communist China, p. 163.

<sup>123&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>.

to conclude that the "revisionist" attitudes of Ho Wei and Yang Hsiufeng were congenial to the DRV. Moreover, as the Minister of Higher Education and his Ministry were crumbling in the face of Macist attacks, the DRV was engaged in setting up, for the first time, a Ministry of Higher Education under the urbane leadership of Oxford trained Ta Quang Buu in October 1965.

Despite these contacts with China's prominent educators, the DRV looked to the Soviet Union in the field of higher education. "If we want to advance quickly in the area of modern science and technology," said a prominent member of the DRV scientific establishment, "we should learn from the Soviet Union because it is the center of modern science and it is necessary to study the Russian language. At the same time, it is necessary to study the Chinese language, because China is the closest to us." 124 This statement reflects a philosophy of diversified borrowing from foreign experience which is implicit in DRV policy. Although science and technology, and its supporting educational institutions have been oriented toward Soviet experience and advice, the DRV has also paid close attention to China's experience in maximizing the efficiency of its more limited technostructure. 125

Bui Cong Trung, in Nhan Dan, June 26, 1959. Trung repeated in 1960 that "in science and technology we must learn principally from the Soviet Union," but added that relevant experience in capitalist countries should not be overlooked. Nhan Dan, February 18, 1960.

The Deputy Minister of Education noted that, "China is a country whose technological level is not that much above ours, and yet their production has far surpassed any of the previous forecasts, making the technology which we consider advanced (chinh qui) lag behind." Nguyen Khanh Toan, Kung quanh mot so van de, p. 420.

But although the DRV initially looked to China for assistance in translating the Soviet model in scientific and technical organization into Asian terms, as the PRC began to move away from that model in 1958, North Vietnam requested direct advice and assistance from the Soviet Union. Ta Quang Buu recalled that, "In order to develop science and technology in time to meet the requirements of the revolution during and after the socialist reconstruction, from 1957 our Party selected a group of leading cadres and scientific cadres to visit fraternal countries in order to look into matters related to organization and leadership in science and technology. Particularly significant was the reception by the Chinese Academy of Science of a group of our scientific cadres led by comrade Ha Huy Giap on a visit to China in late 1957, and the delegation of the Soviet Academy of Science who came to help us set up a plan for science in early 1960." 126 The transfer from China to the Soviet Union in the area of advice on science and technology probably reflected a disenchantment by the DRV with the Great Leap policies in science and education, which were not followed by North Vietnam. By October 1958, Ha Huy Giap was politely referring to the Great Leap as illustrating the power of the masses, but pointing to the "necessity of studying the experience of the Soviet Union." 127

 $<sup>^{126}</sup>$ Ta Quang Buu, "Hai muoi nam khoa hoc phuc vu san xuat va chien dau" (Twenty Years of Science Serving Production and Combat), Nhan Dan, August 25, 1965.

<sup>127.&</sup>quot;Buoc tien dau tren duong Truong Dai Hoc Xa Hoi Chu Nghia" (First Step Along the Path to Building a Socialist University), Nhan Dan, October 28, 1958. And Nguyen Khanh Toan referred to a "leap forward like comrade Khrushchev talks about." "Truong Xa Hoi Chu Nghia" (Socialist School), Nhan Dan, September 6, 1958.

In order to proceed with socialist construction, according to Premier Pham Van Dong, "you need to be very expert, and in order to be expert you must study, and we have very precious teachers — that is, the socialist countries." Dong added that, the DRV had its own special characteristics, history, and conditions as well as its own revolutionary struggle and traditions, and that socialism must be built upon this base. Since the DRV leadership felt that socialism could not be built "by sincerity alone," great stress was placed on modern technology and on training a corps of experts to use it. A group of peasants in Hung Yen province produced a revealing slogan to characterize the DRV's socialist development. China had its "surging advance" (tien vot), North Korea had its "Thousand League Horse" (Thien Ly Ma), and Vietnam would have its "guided missile" (ten lua). We will ride a missile right into the Five-Year Plan," they said. 131

A major goal of the Five-Year Plan, reaffirmed in the LDP Central Committee's 7th Plenum, was to carry out the technological revolution by mechanization and semi-mechanization, in order to "zealously prepare the preconditions for being able to absorb the <u>newest</u> achievements in science and technology." The DRV's chief economic planner, Le Thanh

Nhan Dan, September 6, 1958.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid.

 $<sup>\</sup>frac{130}{\text{Nhan}} \frac{\text{Dan}}{\text{Dan}}$ , April 6, 1961. The newspaper comment was that this was an "appealing image."

<sup>131</sup> Ibid.

 $<sup>\</sup>underline{\underline{\text{Nhan}}}$   $\underline{\underline{\text{Dan}}}$ , October 29, 1962. (Emphasis added).

Nghi, urged using both the available technology to the fullest and relying on foreign aid from socialist countries to "advance directly to mechanization and automatization." The goal, he said, was to apply the most modern technological and scientific discoveries in DRV economic development and "bring our country's economic, scientific and technical level up to the level of the world's advanced countries." 134

Since the Soviet Union was more advanced in most scientific and technological fields than China, the DRV turned to them for assistance and training. The Soviet Union helped establish scientific and technical institutes in the DRV, including the Polytechnic University. Soviet academicians had an important influence on the State Scientific Commission which was set up in late 1958 in connection with the decision to prepare for the First Five-Year Plan, <sup>136</sup> and revitalized after a three week visit

<sup>133</sup> Ibid

<sup>134&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>

<sup>135</sup>Cf. Nguyen Khac Vien, "The Hanoi Polytechnic," in <u>Vietnamese</u>
Studies, No. 5, 1965. Vien notes that in 1962, "visiting Soviet specialists, after studying the students' graduation projects, made this comment: 'These projects have in the main attained the level of Soviet higher technical schools'." <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 89. However, Vien also writes that at the end of 1965, the Party organization at the University concluded that, "the quality of the teaching...in spite of continuous progress, still remains below the standard required by socialist production." Ibid., p. 82.

<sup>136</sup> The PRC transformed its Scientific Planning Commission into the Scientific and Technological Commission, a body with more comprehensive powers, in November 1958. Cf. John M. Lindbeck, "The Organization and Development of Science," in MacFarquhar, ed., China Under Mao, p. 354. One author points out that, "Polytechnical education is rejected by Maoists because the emphasis is on learning the theory of production processes (hence the polytechnical stress). Maoists emphasize more heavily labor as a 'great furnace' for molding men's attitudes, and thus a single production activity will suffice." Donald J. Munro, "Egalitarian Ideal and Educational Fact," in China: Management of a Revolutionary Society, p. 281.

by Soviet academicians in March 1960, prior to the Third Party Congress and the First Five-Year Plan. 137 The importance attached to the State Scientific Commission is evidenced by the fact that it was headed by Truong Chinh (1958-1960), then Vo Nguyen Giap (1960-1963), and Nguyen Duy Trinh (1963-1965) - all members of the Politburo. 138 The DRV leadership recognized that its limited resources would not allow it to aspire to a formal Academy of Sciences, though the PRC had set one up at the time of Liberation. Because of their historical experience with cultural and institutional borrowing, a necessity for a small state attempting to buttress itself against powerful outsiders, the Vietnamese had neither embarrassment nor pretentions about their reliance on outside aid and advice in the fields of science and technology.

The DRV put great emphasis on raising the level of technical competence of state and Party cadres. Resolution 14 (November 1958) determined that within a 10-15 year period, cadres working in economic branches must have a university degree or specialized secondary education, so that young, well educated cadres could replace the older generation of cadres." 139

<sup>137</sup> The delegation from the Soviet Academy of Science was working with the State Scientific Commission of the DRV and exchanging ideas "concerning scientific organization work and research work in Vietnam." Nhan Dan, March 24, 1960.

<sup>138</sup> Tran Dai Nghia, a non-Central Committee figure who had headed the Viet Minh war industries during the Resistance was appointed in 1965, as his three predecessors concentrated on more vital higher level functions. In the PRC, Nieh Jung-chen, the head of the State Scientific and Technical Commission (1958-65) was not a member of the Politburo and ranked 26th in the PRC 8th Central Committee.

<sup>139&</sup>lt;sub>Nhan Dan</sub>, May 27, 1960.

The First Five-Year Plan (1961-65) envisaged expanding university enrollment to 5,000-10,000 students for each incoming class, and 15,000-30,000 students for each class entering specialized middle level schools. 140 During the First Five-Year Plan, the Hanoi Polytechnic Institute alone graduated over 4,000 students, 141 and the university enrollment had doubled to over 22,000 students, and the specialized middle level students to well over 50,000. 142

Much of the PRC's adverse reaction to foreign educated intellectuals came from a feeling of deep suspicion about the possibility of "illicit relations with foreign countries." This feeling must have been due in part to the important role foreign trained intellectuals played in China's defense industries and nuclear research, as well as their critical position in the economic management of the country. But it was the linkage of this threat to the problem of internal revisionism that aroused the deepest suspicions in Maoists. And, beneath these explicitly stated fears

 $<sup>140</sup>_{
m Nhan}$  Dan, October 5, 1959. The number of students entering universities in 1959 was 4,160 - or twice the number in 1958 and 80 percent of all students enrolled in the 1958-59 academic year. In 1959, 6,000 students were enrolled in specialized middle level schools. <u>Ibid</u>.

<sup>141&</sup>quot;Education in the DRV," Vietnamese Studies, No. 5, 1965, p. 102.

Nguyen Khanh Toan, Xung quanh mot so van de, pp. 637, 640, notes that this expansion put great strain on the limited university facilities. The Polytechnic University had 8,000 students in a physical plant designed for only 4,000-4,500, and the Faculty of Pedagogy was overcrowded with 4,000 students. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 639.

was the deeper cultural resistance to accepting the superiority of foreign ideas and technology that had hampered Chinese self-strengthening efforts since the nineteenth century.

As Donald Munro points out, the Maoist version of Chinese social and political organization has been sustained by his "egalitarian ideal" which has many positive features, such as stressing problem solving, innovation, self-reliance, and modern pedagogical techniques of making education relevant. He notes that Maoist policy was geared to the countryside and cites evidence that even during the Cultural Revolution there were "overt statements... that the Maoist educational revolution seems more applicable to rural than urban areas." And, he remarks that, "A certain ethnocentrism shines a bit too clearly through the harping on the 'experience of the liberated areas'," and "manifests itself in attacks on Liu Shaoch'i for saying that China could learn from some of the achievements of Western Europe, England, America, France and Japan." It was Mao, too, who pushed the break with the Soviet Union.

Vietnamese historical annals vividly illustrate their cosmopolitan attitude toward culture and education by the zestfully told anecdotes about Vietnamese ambassadors vying at the Imperial Court with Koreans and even Chinese to demonstrate literary prowess in the Chinese idiom. The title of "doctorate of two countries" (luong quoc trang nguyen, e.g., China and Vietnam) was considered a crowning achievement for a Vietna—

<sup>143&</sup>lt;sub>Munro</sub>, in China, <u>Management of a Revolutionary Society</u>, p. 300.
144<sub>Ibid</sub>.

mese official. 145 Yet this was merely the external layer of a dual cultural personality. The core was Vietnamese and it could not be penetrated by outsiders, even conquerors, because it was a close-knit and esoteric culture which the more powerful foreigners rarely bothered to investigate in detail. Unlike China's universal culture, which by definition had to set a standard which could be emulated throughout the empire, Vietnamese culture was that of a small and linguistically unified ethnic group, with its own inaccessible idiosyncrasies. To protect it, it was swathed in an outer wrapping of the culture professed by the dominant external forces of the time.

Ho was fluent in at least six languages, while Mao knew only Chinese. Foreign study was a mark of distinction in Vietnam, but a potential demerit in China. Both foreign advice and foreign aid were avidly sought by the DRV as a means of supplementing its own limited resources in teachers and institutions by sending students to receive a higher education abroad. This no doubt helped to keep the state budget expenditures for education quite low in Vietnam, despite the high priority placed on formal education. In China, the percentage of state budget expenditures on education was considerably higher in spite of the greater reliance on community funding at the primary and secondary level. 146

 $<sup>^{145}</sup>$ See, for example, Ho Ngu Thuy,  $_{145}$ 

The percentage of the PRC budget devoted to education ranged from 6-9 percent during the 1955-60 period, while in the DRV it was around 3-5 percent of the budget during 1955-63.

As suggested above, this seems to be due to an expensive effort to attain complete self-reliance in the scientific and technical sphere, and in all higher education. The number of students from China and North Vietnam receiving advanced degrees in the Soviet Union since 1962 show clearly the contrary trends in the development of their respective revolutions.

Vietnamese and Chinese Recipients of Advanced Academic Degrees in the U.S.R.R., 1962-1972<sup>147</sup>

| Chinese       |                        | Vietnamese         |   |
|---------------|------------------------|--------------------|---|
| Kandidat Nauk | Doktor Nauk            | Kandidat Nauk      | Doktor Nauk   |
| 218           | 1                      | 9                  | 1   |
|               | Ţ                      | /                  | 0   |
| 77            | 0                      |                    | 3   |
| 30            | 0                      | 42                 | 0   |
| 24            | 0                      | 33                 | 0   |
| 6             | Q                      | 36 ·               | 2 ·   |
| 4             | 0                      | 50                 | 2   |
| 8             | 0 ,                    | 130                | 0   |
| 4             | 0                      | 124                | 0   |
| 1             | 0                      | 134                | 0 .   |
| 1             | 0                      | 80                 | 0   |
|               | 218 223 77 30 24 6 4 8 | Nauk   Doktor Nauk | Kandidat Nauk         Doktor Nauk         Kandidat Nauk           218         1         9           223         1         7           77         0         35           30         0         42           24         0         33           6         0         36           4         0         50           8         0         130           4         0         124           1         0         134 |

<sup>147</sup> Zvi Halevy, "Vietnamese and Chinese Recipients of Higher Academic Degrees in the U.S.S.R., 1962-1972," Southeast Asia, Vol. 11, No. 3, Summer 1973. The figures for 1972 only cover the period from January to the beginning of April. The degree of Kandidat Nauk (Candidate of Science) is equivalent to the U.S. doctorate. Ibid., p. 340. Doktor Nauk (Doctor of Science) is a higher degree. Halevy gives the total of North Vietnamese students with a U.S. doctorate equivalent trained in the Soviet Union from 1962 to 1972 as 680. Ibid., p. 344. Another 150 are estimated to have been trained in Eastern Europe during this period. Ibid., p. 345. He concludes that, "There is no other country in Southeast Asia with such a highly trained cadre of scientists and engineers. We can see the scientific and engineering strength of North Vietnam when we compare it with that of other countries in Southeast Asia. In South Vietnam the total number of scientific and engineering personnel in 1966 was 945." Ibid., p. 344.

While no similarly comprehensive figures on undergraduate education of Chinese students in the Soviet Union are available, it is probable that the general trend paralleled that of the higher degree candidates. A rough estimate would be that during the 1949-70 period, about 3.5 percent of higher level graduates in China received their education in the Soviet Union, while between 1955 and 1965, 20-25 percent of North Vietnamese higher education graduates were trained outside the DRV. Moreover, the DRV sent large numbers of students to study in East European countries and, of course, China. In two decades, from 1950 to 1970, the total number of Chinese students trained in the Soviet Union was 61,000 (36,000 up to 1959 and the surprising total of 25,000 after that year).

The DRV advocated sending as many students abroad as possible to do

 $<sup>^{148}\</sup>mathrm{The}$  20-25 percent figure for the DRV can be found in Nguyen Khanh Toan, Twenty Years' Development of Education in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, p. 39. The figure presumably is the percentage of the 100,000 technicians (including those from secondary level technical schools) and 20,000 engineers, economists, agronomists, doctors, architects, and secondary teachers. Ibid., p. 41. The Chinese figure is based on taking the number of students trained in the Soviet Union after 1949 (61,000) (Price, Education in Communist China, p. 103) as a percentage of the total graduates of higher education (1,700,000) (ibid., p. 161), of which one third were engineers, one quarter graduates in education, and about 6 percent graduates in natural sciences. There are, of course, problems in using his figures. The Chinese percentage does not include secondary technical education, while the Vietnamese figures apparently do. Thus the percentage of higher level students in the DRV trained abroad might be even higher. The Chinese figures only include students who have studied in the Soviet Union but do not include students trained in other socialist countries, or the 4,500 university graduates from the U.S., Japan and other countries. Ibid., p. 161. Thus, the Chinese total of foreign trained students in higher education may also be somewhat higher. The difference in the rough order of magnitude, however, is revealing.

<sup>149 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>., p. 103.

research in advanced countries," with priority given to "the branches of basic theory and complex technology for which our country does not yet have the requisite material and technological base or experienced instructors." While China aimed principally at scientific and technical training adapted to its own immediate needs, the DRV attempted to lay a broad foundation for its future development. Ta Quang Buu advised that,

In selecting dissertation topics for the doctorate or subdoctorate (pho bac si), we should not be too cautious. Naturally we have to keep our own requirements in mind and base ourselves on the general orientation of our scientific research in choosing topics, but we also have to take into account the situation of the person guiding the dissertation. If we only select topics that are 100 percent Vietnamese and the thesis director does not have the requisite conditions to thoroughly and accurately understand them, then it will only cause difficulties for the teacher and restrict our primary objective, which is importing into our country a solid fund of knowledge and sure-fire techniques with a tight control and supervision. But on the other hand, we should avoid topics like, "The Position on the Word '0' in Russian Literature," which we should leave for our Russian friends to handle. 151

The different approaches of China and the DRV were aimed at the same goal, achieving self-reliance. The major difference is that the DRV wanted to accelerate the process by rapidly building up a sophisticated corps of scientists fully grounded in advanced theory, which could later be applied to Vietnam's problems, while China focused on extending technical education as widely as possible in society, and directed it toward solving immediate problems of production.

<sup>150</sup> Nhan <u>Dan</u>, April 11, 1963.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid.

The probable cause of this difference in emphasis is the Vietnamese view of their future as a modern, technologically advanced state on a world standard, and the Chinese desire to simultaneously avoid the creation of an intellectual elite detached from the masses and from production, and the demonstration of a distinctive Chinese contribution to modern science and technology. North Vietnam's view of its future is implicit in its frequent use of the phrase "learning from advanced countries," and its leaders see the path of advance as fundamentally similar to those who have already taken it. The Deputy Minister of Education said that the DRV would have to do in 20-30 years of economic development what normally takes countries 50-70 or even 100 years. "With the help of the fraternal countries," however, "we won't have to take the long route, but in many fields can take the shortcut." The compatibility of external advice and models with Vietnam's developmental aims is evidenced by Ta Quang Buu's observation that North Vietnam had not reached the stage of "advanced countries" where industrial enterprises had a functional distribution of responsibilities among managers and specialists which ensures optimal utilization of expertise and resources. Although in the DRV's present state of development, non-specialized political cadres and "long time" workers played the key role in managing the scientific and technical resources of their plants, this was in his opinion a transitional state of affairs.  $^{153}$  In the future, he implied, the tech-

<sup>152</sup> Nguyen Khanh Toan, Xung quanh mot so van de, pp. 665-666.

<sup>153</sup> Nhan Dan, May 29, 1963.

nicians would play the principal role in industrial management.

The Vietnamese, like the Chinese, are well aware of the problem of adapting advanced theoretical knowledge to a backward country. To Huu, a leading Party figure in the ideological and cultural field, points out that failure to keep up with the advances of modern science can be an obstacle to development, but that although "the world's advanced science can be applied to the specific conditions of our country, it cannot answer all the problems that come up in our country. Modern science has utility only if we know how to use it in the specific circumstances of our country and to integrate it into the traditional experience of our people." This is precisely the concept that led Mao to reorient China's basic education to inculcate a problem solving, experimental mentality among students, and to concentrate on developing China's own higher education facilities so that foreign developments in science could be learned in a Chinese context.

This policy resulted from Mao's later view of the Chinese revolution as a struggle against revisionism and for egalitarianism. For the Vietnamese, the struggle was primarily directed against powerful external forces. As in traditional times, the Vietnamese had to be acutely aware of what was happening in the world. But there is a genuine cosmopolitanism among the Vietnamese leadership, stemming from their own background and education and respect for knowledge, whatever its source. This cosmopolitanism is based

Thau suot duong loi cua Dang, dua su nghiep giao duc tien len manh me, vung chac (Fully Grasp the Party Line and Advance Education Strongly and Firmly) (Hanoi: Su That, 1972), p. 93.

on a desire to show that a small and peripheral country like Vietnam can compete intellectually on international standard -- a standard which it recognizes because it has no chauvinistic pretensions. 155

Mao's vision of the future stresses the egalitarian ideal because it is consistent with the aims of the Chinese social revolution, and necessary to prevent the social gaps which led to the revolution from re-emerging. For Vietnam, the vision of the future is of a well-educated corps of technical cadres who will lead the way in breaking Vietnam's cycle of poverty and keep abreast of external developments. While Mao stresses the cultural revolution, the DRV leaders hold to their view that of the three "revolutions" (in production relations, in culture and ideology, and in technology), the technological revolution is the most important. The retention of the educational pattern that has been rejected by China as elitist is a reflection of this view, as is the DRV warning against allowing leftist "class-ism" to become the guiding criteria for educational selection.

With a meager base of physical resources, the DRV must use to the fullest its most valuable human resources, the skills and ingenuity of

<sup>155</sup>A good case in point, though somewhat later than the time period under consideration here, is the Vietnamese participation in the International Mathematics Competition held in East Berlin in 1974 (at which the PRC was not represented). The Vietnamese contestants impressed their Soviet counterparts by their diligence in spending a week's preparation in the USSR. A Vietnamese student finished among the top winners in the contest and was given prominent attention in the DRV press.

its talented people. 156 Although this may lead to inequities in the distribution of preferred occupations, the relatively greater opportunities for advancement within the educational system of a small country like the DRV tends to offset this problem. For a country as large as China, access to educational advancement is inevitably more problematic, making it difficult to ensure against the formation of a self-perpetuating privileged elite. Thus the power of decision concerning educational advancement has been decentralized, and the educational system diversified to meet local needs. Even in the smaller administrative scale of the DRV, the matching of educational plans and economic requirements through centralized planning has encountered problems. 157 Numerous official statements attest to a desire to increase the political awareness of students formerly discriminated against in the traditional educational system, improve access of regional and social groups, and to remedy the low ratio of students from worker backgrounds in higher education. 158

This appears to be widely understood in the DRV. A Village Deputy Committee Secretary, for example, who was himself an illiterate at the time of the August 1945 Revolution, said in 1967 that "land reform and agricultural cooperativization have certainly been at the origin of great changes in our land. However, we think that at present it is education that constitutes the key to higher productivity and a better life, i.e., socialism. Without neglecting the other fields of activity, we have concentrated our main efforts on education." "General Education in the DRVN," Vietnamese Studies, No. 30, 1971, pp. 103-104.

<sup>157</sup> A 1967 report on education deplored the lack of long range planning and lack of coordination between the products of the educational system and the economic requirements of the DRV. To Huu, "Nam vung nhung quan diem," in Le Duan, et.al., Thau suot duong loi cua Dang, pp. 85-86. The wartime situation was certainly a major factor contributing to this problem.

<sup>158</sup> For example, <u>ibid</u>., pp. 83-84.

However, the major concern is not with the class background but with the educational level of the cadres produced by the DRV's school system. Fifteen years after the Geneva Agreements, key village cadres generally had a first level education, and <a href="https://www.numer.nu

As a result of the Cultural Revolution, China's educational system is "now seen as an instrument for the abolition of the 'three major differences' between town and country, worker and peasant, and mental and manual labor... It aims to destroy existing values, attitudes and expectations regarding education, which see it as a means of joining the elite; and to replace them with a concept of education as a universally

To Huu, July 1971 speech in Le Duan, et.al., Thau suot duong loi, p. 111.

<sup>160</sup> Nhan Dan, March 12, 1973.

available prerequisite for useful participation in a modern economy."<sup>161</sup>
The "revisionist" model of formal academic curriculum and competitive selection up the educational ladder has been rejected.

For Vietnam, the Maoist revolution in education is "the road not taken." They have adhered to principles of education that are, in the Chinese context labeled "revisionist." But such a label has little meaning in the Vietnamese context. Different history, different resources and different revolutionary tasks explain why what is suitable for one context is dysfunctional in another. It may be when the Vietnamese revolution turns from combatting the external forces that have threatened it from its inception to its own internal problems that its policies will move closer to the Maoist formulas. But history and social realities leave an adhesive residue on the future. And the further the progress down the road, the more difficult it is to turn back.

John Gardner and Wilt Idema, "China's Educational Revolution," in Stuart R. Schram, Authority Participation and Cultural Change in China, p. 261.

## CONCLUSION

From poor-but-honest scholars to socialist intellectuals, the Victnamese revolution has been guided by leaders who have endorsed and exemplified the traits of great cosmopolitanism and fervent patriotism. These potentially contradictory orientations have been woven into a mutually reinforcing pattern by Vietnam's revolutionary leaders. The assistance and advice from external sources has been selectively employed to strengthen the independence of a small country in a hostile world dominated by great powers. Throughout its history, Vietnam's survival has depended on a keen awareness of the external environment, which enabled it to neutralize threats to its independence by guile, diplomacy and, as a last resort, military resistance. The adoption of Chinese imperial institutions in traditional Vietnam strengthened it against the domineering encroachments of its powerful northern neighbor, and the intellectual prowess of Vietnamese traditional rulers legitimized their leading role in war and in peace.

China's modern revolutionary transformation was largely directed against the debilitating weight of the past, which impeded its search for a position of "wealth and power" in the modern world. The legacy of the past was, ironically, rejected in the name of upholding the traditional view of China as the "middle-kingdom" whose indigenous ideologies and institutions were sufficient to its own needs and a model for others. Although China became increasingly obsessed with the potential threat of the Soviet Union, the external environment played a far less important

role in influencing its internal development than in the DRV. The mixture of nationalism and cosmopolitanism was therefore different in China than in Vietnam, and the PRC increasingly stressed self-reliance as the key to its own development and as an example for others. Although attaining "wealth and power" demanded a high level of technical specialization and expertise, the achievement of this goal was only valuable if done in a distinctive Chinese way.

These contrasting developmental paths are illustrated in the attitudes of each regime toward external models of development. The North Vietnamese continued to regard the Soviet Union as the ultimate expression of its own future, and actively sought Soviet advice and assistance. Yet the DRV's leaders were able to skillfully deflect Soviet political pressures, and to pursue policies which they saw as vital to Vietnam's independence and national interests. As committed Marxist internationalists, they regarded Soviet aid not as a favor but as an international obligation. As Vietnamese nationalists, they viewed the aid as prerequisite to preserving their country's independence by strengthening their institutions and economy. The Maoists came to see Soviet assistance as aimed at ensuring China's perpetual dependency on the Soviet Union, and concluded that continued acceptance of such aid would cause China to "lag behind others forever." This was not compatible with Mao's image of China's place in the world, and what was at first seen as overbearing behavior by an ostensible ally was later viewed as a serious threat to China's security.

Preoccupation with the anti-imperialist aspect of its revolution

absorbed the energies of the DRV leaders. Unity was imperative if this aspect of the revolutionary struggle was to be successfully concluded. Whatever differences of view existed among the leaders on Vietnam's problems of socialist development paled in comparison to the immediate problems of independence and unification. Thus differences in development strategy did not become issues of political power. In China, the priority on internal problems that had characterized its modern political transformation since Sun Yat-sen, has continued up to the present. The struggle between the two lines became a question of political power because Mao chose to make it one. His views on the relative priority of external and internal problems were dramatically illustrated by the act of launching the Cultural Revolution at a time of escalating military threat in Asia.

In spite of these contrasts, the Maoist policies and those of the DRV leaders are aimed at the same goal - revolutionary re-integration. But Mao wished to accomplish the re-integration of China's society through revolution, and stressed "permanent revolution" as a necessary guarantee of a non-revisionist China. The DRV leaders saw themselves compelled to achieve their priority aim of independence and unification by revolution, and viewed revolution primarily as a means to this end. Mao's perception of the threat to China's integration was Sun Yat-sen's image of a "loose sheet of sand." China's unity through the centuries had been undermined by regional and class divisions. Unity and cohesion could only be achieved through revolutionary struggle. The Confucian ideal of a superficial harmony through avoidance of conflict only concealed the real

nature and seriousness of the problem. Mao analyzed these conflicts as reflecting "the struggle between the two lines." His fundamental strategy of political integration, "unity-struggle-unity," was offered as a way of regulating social conflicts, which he saw as inevitable, in a constructive way.

For China, unity had typically been the product of a unifying ideology and the administrative skills of strong imperial rulers. In Vietnam, unity was a necessary response to foreign threats. Vietnam's historical record of cohesion in the absence of an external threat is not as impressive (though the centrifugal forces contributing to its pre-modern civil strife were to an extent the by-products of rapidly expanding frontiers that outstripped Vietnam's social and institutional resources of the period). The Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions succeeded because the goals articulated by the revolutionary leaders were congruent with the felt needs of their societies, and elicited the strong response that ensured revolutionary victory in the face of initially overwhelming odds.

The lasting success of the momentous social transformations of China and Vietnam's twentieth century revolutions depends upon the ability of "revolutionary successors" to respond to the felt needs of future generations. Mao's strenuous efforts to avoid the creation of a technocratic elite, "cut off from the masses," and to ensure a fair distribution of the fruits of socialist development stands in contrast to the DRV's de-emphasis of class struggle, and its stress on hierarchy, meritocratic selection, specialization and a "short cut" along the developmental path by aiming at the highest levels of modern equipment and technology. The

DRV goal is to solve the problem of distributive justice by rapid economic development. Vietnam's relatively small size can magnify the effect of technological inputs, which in the larger setting of China would have a lesser impact on economic development, while contributing to short-term social and regional inequalities.

However great the effort to avoid inequalities in the course of development, both leaderships acknowledge that they will continue to exist for the foreseeable future. Perhaps the ultimate problem of development is how to maintain a high level of political integration in the face of inevitable inequities. The Maoist approach implicitly placed less confidence in the ability of the legitimizing afterglow of the CCP's triumph in revolutionary civil war to continue to weld China's disparate social and regional groups together during the long and arduous period of socialist development. The DRV leaders have apparently concluded that the accumulated fund of political legitimacy that has accrued from their epic struggle against foreign domination will provide a cushion against the dislocations of rapid economic development. In view of the heavy cost at which this legitimacy was earned, one can only wish them well.

## APPENDIX

## I. <u>BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON EARLY LEADERS OF THE</u> INDOCHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

This data is compiled from numerous sources, including Nhan Dan,

Thong Nhat, Su Dia (Saigon), Nos. 17-18, 22 and 25, Luoc truyen cac tac

gia Viet Nam (Hanoi: Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi, 1972), Vol. II, and various

pamphlets and biographies. It is not intended to be a complete biography

of the individuals listed, or a complete roster of all the important leaders, but to give supporting evidence on two important points made in the

analysis. The first is the prominence of early revolutionary leaders from

a "poor-but-honest" scholar background, and the relative homogeneity of

this group, with the notable exception of the revolutionaries from the

South, who generally came from quite different social backgrounds. The

second is the frequency with which the catalytic events of the mid-1920's,

most notably the funeral observances for Phan Chu Trinh, are mentioned in

their biographies as key factors in their decisions to become active revolutionaries.

(1). NGUYEN DUC CANH. Recruited Hoang Quoc Viet into the Thanh Nien Party in 1928. Helped set up first two groups of Communist Youths in Vietnam in Haiphong in 1929. Was in charge of the Haiphong chapter of the Thanh Nien Party in 1928. Was sent to the second unification conference by the Thanh Nien.

- (2). HOANG HUU CHAP. Born in 1916 in Quang Tri province. First participated in student movement when only 12 years old. Engaged in secret revolutionary activities in 1930 and served as liaison agent. Was one of the leading cadres of the ICP in the Quang Tri Province Party Head-quarters. Led the uprising in 1945 to seize power in Khanh Hoa province. Arrested and killed in 1946 in Nha Trang.
- NGUYEN VAN CU. Born in 1912 in Bac Ninh province. Father was a (3). poor scholar who had to leave native village and move elsewhere to teach for a living. Maternal grandfather took charge of his education and sent him to school. Attended Truong Buoi High School in Hanoi on a scholarship. Took part in the movement to mourn and honor Phan Chu Trinh, and was expelled. Joined the Thanh Nien Party very early. After formation of ICP was sent to Hon Gay and Uong Bi to set up revolutionary cells among coal miners. Arrested and sent to Poulo Condore where he was taught in revolutionary doctrine by militants like Ngo Gia Tu. Assigned to North Vietnam Region Party Committee after release in 1936. Then joined Central Committee. Went to Hoc Mon (South Vietnam) in 1937 as the representative of the North Vietnam Region Party Committee where he met Le Hong Phong and Ha Huy Giap. After Ha Huy Tap's arrest in 1938, he became Party Secretary General. Went from Hanoi to Saigon in the fall of 1939 to set up the Anti-Imperialist Front with Le Duan. Arrested in 1940 and executed in 1941.

- (4). TRAN VAN CUNG. Born in Nghi Loc district, Nghe An province. Was an outstanding student at the College de Vinh, and recruited into the Vietnam Revolutionary Party, a forerunner of the Tan Viet. Sent to Canton in 1926 for revolutionary training, and returned in early 1927. Broke with the Tan Viet in 1927 and became a Thanh Nien leader in Vinh. He was arrested with Vuong Thuc Oanh, the son-in-law of Phan Boi Chau, and deported to Lao Bao. Expelled from Party group in jail for passive behavior. Released after 7 years, but did not again become active in revolutionary work, and was suspected of connections with the French Surete. Regained Party membership in 1945, and was later elected to the National Assembly.
- (5). NGUYEN CHI DIEU. Born in Thua Thien province. Attended Quoc Hoc school in Hue in 1926. Participated in school strike to mourn and honor Phan Chu Trinh and was expelled from school. Went to Saigon and joined Tan Viet Party. After the ICP was set up, he was assigned as Secretary of the Saigon-Cholon City Party Committee at the age of 22. Arrested and sent to Poulo Condore. Released in 1936. Returned to Hue and became Secretary of the Central Vietnam Region Party Committee. Joined the Party Central Committee in 1937. Died of tuberculosis in 1939.
- (6). TRAN THI DAY. Born in 1910 in Cao Lanh. Mother was very patriotic.

  Joined the ICP in 1930. Replaced Le Van Luong as Secretary of the Nha

  Be Party Chapter after Luong's arrest in 1931.

- (7). TRAN THI HAN. Born in 1911. Daughter of Tran Phuoc Dinh, a patriotic scholar and notable (chi si) in Vinh Long province. She was a teacher. Participated in Phan Chu Trinh funeral in 1926. Organized Liberation Women's Association while still studying in school. Joined ICP in 1930. Worked for Shell-Socony in Nha Be. Arrested in 1931, and released in 1936. Returned to Vinh Long to organize revolution. Died in 1940 of tuberculosis.
  - (8). LE THE HIEU. Born in 1894 in Quang Tri. Taught for a living. Because of opposition to superior mandarins, was constantly transferred from place to place. Resigned and went home. Joined the Thanh Nien Party in 1926. Founded the Hung Nghiep Hoi Xa (Restoration Society) in Quang Tri in 1928 to obtain finances for the Thanh Nien Party. Joined the ICP in 1930. Arrested and sent to Lao Bao, released in 1936. Subsequently was arrested again in 1939 and jailed until 1945. After the August Revolution he became Chairman of the Quang Tri Province People's Committee. Before a outbreak of Resistance war, served as Chairman of the National Liberation Committee of Trieu Phong District, Quang Tri province. Killed in a French operation in 1947.
  - (9). TO HIEU. Born in 1911 in Hung Yen Province. Became politically conscious while still attending elementary school in Hai Duong. Took part in movement to mourn Phan Chu Trinh. Joined VNQDD. Then after joining ICP, went to Saigon in 1930 to operate. Arrested and sent to Poulo Condore. Released in 1934. Served as member of Standing Committee of

North Vietnam Region Party Committee in 1936. Assigned ICP Committee Secretary for Haiphong in 1939. Arrested in the same year and sent to Son La where he became Secretary of the prison Party Chapter. Died in 1944.

- (10). QUANG TRONG HOAN. Vietnamese of Chinese descent. Poor family background. Father was a barber. Joined the Party in 1930. Member of South Vietnam Region Party Committee, and Secretary of Inter-Province Party Committee for Hau Giang (Lower Mekong area). Directed preparations for Nam Ky uprising (Southern Insurrection) but halfway through was arrested in Can Tho. Escaped from jail and returned to Lower Mekong delta. After failure of Southern Insurrection, headquarters of inter-province Party Committee was surrounded. He was shot and arrested. Executed in Saigon by the French.
- (11). NGUYEN THI MINH KHAI. Born in 1911 in Vinh, Nghe An province.

  Father was a functionary. Became politically conscious when 16 years old. At that time there was a student and worker movement in Vinh. Tran Phu was her teacher and introduced her to revolutionary activities. Was sent to Truong Thi factory to mobilize workers, and led struggles for higher pay. Introduced into Tan Viet Party in 1927. Was sent to Haiphong in 1929, and then to HongKong to work in Asia Section of the Comintern Liaison Office in HongKong. Was chosen to attend unification meeting of ICP in 1930. Arrested by Special Branch in HongKong. Released in 1934. Went to Soviet Union. Sent back to Vietnam in 1936 and assigned to South

Vietnam Region Party Committee. Served as Secretary of Saigon-Cholon
City Party Committee. Led peasant struggles in the areas of My Tho, Soc
Trang, Hoc Mon. Arrested and sentenced to death in 1941 and executed.

- (12). PHUNG CHI KIEN. Came from Nghe An province. Spent over ten years in China, spending time in the guerrilla base in San Dau and studying at the Red Army University in the soviet areas. Member of the "Resistance Reserve Youth Force Association" set up by the Party to assemble patriotic youths overseas. Served as Company Commander in Chinese Red Army in 1939.
- (13). PHAM HUU LAU. Born in 1905. Father was a lacquer worker in Sa

  Dec Province. Organized commemorative services for Phan Chu Trinh in

  1926. Joined the Thanh Nien Party, and was assigned to Saigon. Joined the ICP right after its formation and was elected to ICP Central Committee. Went to North Vietnam in 1930 to attend 1st Central Committee Plenum, was arrested and sent to Poulo Condore. Released in 1936 and joined Xu Uy

  Nam Bo (South Vietnam Region Party Committee). Arrested again in 1939 and sent to Poulo Condore. Released after August Revolution and was active in the South. Died of lung disease in 1959.
- (14). CHAU VAN LIEM. Born in 1902 in Can Tho province. Came from a family of poor farm laborers. Obtained scholarship to attend Ecole Normale in Saigon. Read Phan Boi Chau's patriotic writings and Nguyen An Ninh's La Cloche Felee while in Ecole Normale. Took part in commemorative services for Phan Chu Trinh in 1926. Was one of the founders of the

Viet Nam Cach Mang Phuc Quoc Party (Vietnam Revolutionary Restoration Party). Joined Vietnam Thanh Nien Cach Mang Dong Chi Hoi in 1927. Was appointed to the Nam Ky (Southern Region) Headquarters of the Thanh Nien Party. Attended 1929 Thanh Nien Congress in HongKong where he met Pham Van Dong. Organized Annam Cong San Dang Party (Annamese Communist Party) on return. Attended ICP Unification Congress (was one of its 7 founders), and met Ho Chi Minh. Set up the Ban Chap Uy Lam Thoi Mien Nam (Provisional Command Committee For South Vietnam). Shot and killed in 1930.

- (15). PHAN DANG LUU. Born in 1902 in Nghe An province. Came from an area with tradition (truyen thong) of patriotism. Studied Chinese characters until 1917. Called by Le Duan a "model revolutionary intellectual." Attended Cao Dang Tieu Hoc school in Hue, and the Agricultural School in Tuyen Quang. Participated in commemorative services for Phan Chu Trinh. Joined Phuc Viet Party which later became Tan Viet Party. Assisted Tran Phu when in Vinh in 1925. Became member of South Vietnam Region Party Committee in 1939. Died at age 39.
- (16). HO TUNG MAU. Born in Quynh Luu district, Nghe An province. His father (Ho Tung Linh) who held a Cu Nhan degree, had been sent to Lao Bao for opposing the French, and died in exile there. Mau was accomplished at Chinese characters, and knew French. He went to China to join Phan Boi Chau in revolutionary activities, and later joined with Nguyen Ai Quoc (Ho Chi Minh) to set up the Thanh Nien organization. He assisted Ho as an instructor in Canton and helped edit the newspaper Thanh Nien. Jailed in Ban Me Thuot from 1931-45. Killed in Thanh Hoa in 1951.

- (17). <u>VO VAN NGAN</u>. Born in 1902 in Cho Lon province. The brother of Vo Van Tan (see below). Joined the ICP in 1930. Won the support and trust of both the peasants and the "intellectuals," including some teachers in Duc Hoa. "His calm and refined voice and his reasonable words won people over." Upon returning from the First Party Congress in Macao in 1935 where he was elected to the Central Committee, he went to Gia Dinh province and took charge of the movement in adjoining Saigon-Cholon. He dressed as a worker when he "lived in the workers area, and dressed up in proper style when he met with the intellectuals." He was active in leading the Indochina Congress movement in 1936. He died of illness in 1939.
- (18). NGUYEN NGHIEM. Was one of a number of students from Quang Ngai studying in Hanoi who joined the Phuc Viet organization, which later became part of the Tan Viet Party. Nghiem and Nguyen Thieu were also members of the Cong Ai (Love of Justice) group in Quang Ngai. Along with Nguyen Thieu, organized the Thanh Nien Cach Mang Dong Chi Hoi in Quang Ngai in 1927. By 1929 it had disintegrated. In April 1930, the ICP sent a representative from Nghe An to contact Nghiem, and the former Thanh Nien group was reactivated under ICP leadership. Nghiem was betrayed by an informer in 1931, and executed.
- (19). NCUYEN VAN NGUYEN. Born in 1910 (?) in the South. Was a very famous writer. Member of South Vietnam Region Party Committee in 1937.

  Jailed with Pham Van Dong and Nguyen Duy Trinh.

- (20). NGUYEN THI NHO. Born in 1908 in Vinh Long province. Came from a petty bourgeois family. Taught school, and participated in commemorative services for Phan Chu Trinh. Joined Viet Nam Thanh Nien Cach Mang Dang in 1927, and then the ICP in 1930. Died in 1946 from illness caused by severe beatings in jail.
- TON QUANG PHIET. Born in 1900 in a scholar family in Vo Liet district, Nghe An province. From the time he was a student in the Ecole Normale Superieure, he was influenced by the student anti-French movement. In 1925 he was the head of the Phuc Viet Association in Hanoi. Phiet publicly demanded the release of Phan Boi Chau in 1926 and exposed the clandestine Phuc Viet Party which was required to change its name to Hung Nam. The same year he was selected to go overseas to engage in revolutionary activities, but was arrested on the way. Released in 1927, he joined the predecessor of the Tan Viet Party. He was again arrested in 1929 and given a 3-year suspended sentence. In 1930 he joined the ICP, and was arrested for the third time and deported to Ban Me Thuot until 1934, when he was released and placed under house arrest. After this, he taught in private schools in Hue and Vinh, and was active in the Association for the Propagation of the Romanized Script, and the Indochina Congress Movement. Phiet became the Chairman of the Thua Thien People's Revolutionary Committee in 1945, and in 1946 became a member of the National Assembly, where he later played an important role. He died in 1973.
- (22). <u>LE HONG PHONG</u>. Born in 1900 in Hung Nguyen district, Nghe An province. After completing his brevet elementaire, he had to quit his

studies because he came from a poor family and had to go out to seek work. He went to Vinh and got a job as a clerk in a Chinese shop. He then met Pham Hong Thai who was at that time a factory worker. Thai introduced him to become a machinist apprentice. In 1924 Phong and Thai went to Kwangtung, and with Ho Tung Mau and Le Hong Son set up the Tam Xa, "a revolutionary organization with communist tendencies." In late 1924 he was introduced to Marxism-Leninism by Ho Chi Minh.. In 1926 he graduated from Whampoa, and was selected to go to the Soviet Union, where he studied in the Air Force Academy, and was given the rank of lieutenantcolonel. He studied at the University of the Toilers of the East and, in 1932, went to China where he became the head of the ICP "overseas Headquarters." In July 1935 he attended the 7th Congress of the Comintern and was elected an alternate delegate to its Central Committee. Soviet Union he met and fell in love with Nguyen Thi Minh Khai. Phong was sent back to Vietnam in 1936 as the Comintern's representative to the ICP. In 1938 he was arrested by the French in Saigon and jailed until the Fall of 1939. Released, he was arrested again and sent to Con Son, where he died of dysentery in 1942.

(23). TRAN PHU. Born in 1904 in Quang Ngai province. Son of a patriotic scholar from Ha Tinh province. Father passed the doctorate exam as First Laureate (giai nguyen) and was appointed District Magistrate in Duc Pho, Quang Ngai province. He was a mandarin famous for his integrity. Tran Phu studied at the Quoc Hoc School in Hue. Taught school in Vinh, and Nguyen Thi Minh Khai was one of his students in 1922. Joined Phuc Viet

Party in 1925, and then the Tan Viet Party in 1928. Took part in commemorative services for Phan Chu Trinh in 1926. In 1930, he joined the Dong Duong Cong San Lien Doan (Communist League of Indochina). Was selected to go to Canton to meet Ho in 1926. Elected First Secretary of ICP at 1st Plenum in Canton in July 1930. Investigated situation of workers in Nam Dinh, Hai Phong, and Hon Gai. Went to Saigon to join Standing Committee of Central Committee, then headquartered in Saigon. Arrested in 1931, and died the same year.

- (24). HOANG DINH RONG. Born in Cao Bang. Tay ethnic background. Member of the Overseas Leadership Committee in 1932-35. Attended 1st Party Congress in Macao as a representative of the Dang Bo Bac Ky (North Vietnam Party Headquarters). Member of Central Committee in 1935. Died in 1947 in an ambush while going back to North from South where he was Commander of Zone 9.
- (25). NGUYEN PHONG SAC. Intellectual from Hanoi. In charge of revolutionary movement in northern part of Central Vietnam in 1931. Met Nguyen Duy Trinh in Nghe An in 1931.
- (26). NGUYEN SI SACH. Born in a scholar family in Nghe An. His father was a holder of the <u>Tu Tai</u> (Baccalaureate) degree and taught Chinese studies in native village. Sach studied Chinese classics, and then went to the province school and switched to French-Vietnamese studies. He passed the entrance exam into the Quoc Hoc school in Vinh. Joined Phuc

Viet Party in 1922. Taught school in Ha Tinh in 1925-26. His house became headquarters of Vietnam Cach Mang Dong Chi Hoi, which became the Tan Viet Party in 1928. Sach was sent to Kwangchou to discuss unification with other parties. He was sent back to the country by the Headquarters of the Viet Nam Thanh Nien Cach Mang Dong Chi Hoi to operate. He was arrested on return to Vinh. The French liquidated him in the Lao Bao prison camp in 1929.

- (27). <u>LE HONG SON</u>. Born in Nam Dan district, Nghe An province. The son of a <u>Tu Tai</u> degree holder. Studied Chinese characters, and went to China to engage in revolutionary activities in 1920. Assassinated a Vietnamese defector and two French officials. In 1925 he directed an attempt against the life of the French Governor General of Indochina in Canton. He was the first revolutionary to join Ho Chi Minh upon Ho's arrival in China. Joined the Chinese Communist Party, and in 1931 was arrested by the French in China. Was sentenced to death and executed in the market place of his native village in 1932.
- (28). NGUYEN SON (LT. GENERAL). Born Vu Nguyen Bat in 1908 in Bac Ninh province. "Enlightened" student (hoc sinh giac ngo). Joined Thanh Nien Cach Mang (Revolutionary Youth) in 1925. Was in China from 1925 to 1945 and became a member of the CCP. Joined the Red Guards and Long March in 8th Route Army. Was a member of the leadership committee of the Viet Nam Cach Mang Dong Minh Hoi (Vietnam Revolutionary League) since his days in Liuchou. Became Chairman of the South Vietnam Resistance Committee.

Commander and Political Officer of Inter-Zone IV during the Resistance.

Member of Executive Committee (Ban Chap Hanh) and Deputy Party Secretary

of InterOZone IV. Died of cancer in 1956.

- (29). <u>VO VAN TAN</u>. Born in 1894 in a poor family in Cho Lon. Grandfathers on both sides of the family fought against the French and were killed. His family being very poor, Tan had to go to Saigon-Cholon and work as a rick-shaw puller to earn a living. Joined Viet Nam Thanh Nien Dang (Vietnamese Youth) in 1926, and then the Annam Cong San Dang (Communist Party of Annam) in 1929. Replaced Lam Quang Sung as Cholon Province Party Committee Chairman. Joined the Central Committee of the ICP in 1937. Arrested in Hoc Mon in 1941 and killed.
- (30). HA HUY TAP. Born in a poor scholar family in Ha Tinh province. Parents made efforts to give him a French education. Taught school in Vinh. Joined the Phuc Viet Party in 1926, and then the Tan Viet Party. Took part in commemorative services for Phan Chu Trinh in 1926. Went to Kwangchou with Pham Huu Lau in 1928 when there was friction between the Thanh Nien and Tan Viet Parties. Studied at Toilers of the East University for three years. Mer Le Hong Phong in 1934, and was appointed to Overseas Leadership Committee. Became Party First Secretary in 1935. Arrested in 1938. Executed in 1941 in Hoc Mon (near Saigon).
- (31). <u>LE THE TIET</u>. Born in 1900 in Trieu Phong district, Quang Tri province. Studied at the Quoc Tu Giam School in Hue in 1916. Joined Tan

Viet in 1926. Joined ICP in 1930. Became first Party Secretary for Quang Tri province in 1930. Arrested in 1939, and beaten to death in Lao Bac prison camp in 1940.

- (32). NGO GIA TU. Born in a revolutionary family in Bac Ninh province. His father had been jailed for anti-French activities. Tu set up first Communist cell in Vietnam in 1926. Attended Thanh Nien unification congress in 1929. Elected to Executive Committee of Party Central Committee. In charge of Trung Uong Cuc Nam Ky (Central Office For South Vietnam) from 1929-30. Arrested in 1930. (Met Hoang Quoc Viet when Viet first came to the South in 1929).
- (33). LUONG KHANH THIEN. Born in a family of poor farmers in 1903 in Ha Nam province. Passed So Hoc (Elementary School) exam and then studied at the Polytechnic School in 1925 (with Hoang Quoc Viet). Took part in movement demanding the release of Phan Boi Chau from detention. Worked in textile mill in Nam Dinh and then in Haiphong. Viet introduced him into Thanh Nien Party when they met again in 1928. He was admitted into the first chapter of the communist party in Haiphong. Became member of North Vietnam Region Party Committee after release from jail in 1936. Chairman of Haiphong City Party Committee in 1940. Arrested in 1940 and executed in 1941.
- (34). <u>NGUYEN THIEU</u>. Member of Cong Ai Dang (Love of Justice) Party in Quang Ngai province. Returned from Kwangchou at the end of 1927 with

regulations, program and organization information on Thanh Nien Cach Mang Dong Chi Hoi, and succeeded in attracting many revolutionaries in Quang Ngai province into the Thanh Nien Party. Ho Chi Minh returned from Thailand in December 1929 and convoked another unification conference. The An Nam Cong San Dang (Communist Party of Annam) sent Chau Van Liem and Nguyen Thieu to attend.

- (35). HOANG VAN THU. Born in 1906 in Lang Son province. Tay ethnic background. Went to China in 1926. Worked as metal worker in Kwangsi.

  Attended Le Hong Phong training class. Admitted in ICP in 1930. Member of the North Vietnam Region Party Committee in 1938, and then became Chairman of this Committee. He was also a member of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee as of 1941. Arrested in 1943 and executed by the French in 1944.
- (36). LE VIET THUAT. Born in Nghe An province. His father, who was a worker in an electrical plant, was arrested by the French and tortured, and became paralyzed as a result. Thuat was the Secretary of the Central Vietnam Region Party Committee and was directly in charge of the Nghe Tinh movement. Nguyen Duy Trinh met him in jail in Saigon. Committed suicide during imprisonment to avoid giving information to the French.
- (37). LY TU TRONG. Born in 1914 in Siam. His father was a poor peasant from Ha Tinh province who fled from the oppression and exploitation of the French and the rich in his village, and moved to Thailand when he was

only 19 years old. His mother came from a family with a tradition of anti-French activities, and the family fled to Thailand to escape French repression. Ly Tu Trong was selected by the revolutionary organization of Vietnamese residents to attend the cadre training school in Phichit. Then he studied at the Sun Yat-sen school in Kwangchou. Ho Chi Minh met him at the headquarters of the Vietnam Thanh Nien Cach Mang Dong Chi Hoi in 1927 and made him a liaison agent. He was sent back to Vietnam in 1929 with other cadres to operate (he was then only 15 years old). Joined the Doan Thanh Nien Cong San (Communist Youth League) in 1930. Shot French police chief Legrande in 1931. Executed in 1931.

- (38). HAI TRIEU (NGUYEN KHOA VAN). Dam Phuong nu si, his mother, wrote extensively on "family education" and was an influential female journalist of the 1920's and 1930's. Hai Trieu became a member of the Tan Viet in Saigon in 1929, and the ICP in 1930. He was also an influential journalist during the Fopular Front period, and played a leading role in attacking the "art for art's sake" viewpoint. He wrote "Basic Marxism" in 1937, which was republished in 1945 and was "a contribution to the spreading of Marxism" in Vietnam, "particularly among the youth of the period." Played an important role in Party relations with intellectuals in Central Vietnam during the Resistance. Died in 1954.
- (39). TONG VAN TRAN. Born in Phong Doanh district, Nam Dinh province about 1905, in a scholar family with an anti-French revolutionary tradition. He studied at the Ecole Normale in Hanoi and, upon graduation, returned to

his native district to teach. He was moved to political action by the arrest of Phan Boi Chau, the return to Vietnam of Phan Chu Trinh, and the attempted assassination of Governor General Merlin. Nam Dinh had the biggest demonstration in North Vietnam following the death of Phan Chu Trinh, and Tran organized observances at his school. He was recruited into the Thanh Nien in 1926. In June 1929 the Thanh Nien became the Communist League of Indochina. Arrested during a demonstration in 1930. As a young student in Nam Dinh, Le Duc Tho followed his trial. Tran was sent to Con Son in 1930, and escaped in 1934. He was shortly thereafter arrested on his way from Saigon to Central Vietnam and beaten to death by the French Surete.

## II. <u>BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON LAO DONG PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS</u> (UP TO 1945)

The following brief biographies of the early revolutionary experiences of the full members of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee are primarily compiled on the basis of DRV sources, such as Nhan Dan, Vietnam Advances, and various published memoirs. In several instances in which no authoritative data were available, these have been supplemented by the U. S. State Department publication Who's Who in North Vietnam, though the information in this compilation is of very uneven quality. These biographical sketches are intended to illustrate the backgrounds of the post-Liberation DRV leadership, their early revolutionary experience, the past personal associations within the leadership, the prominence of the prison experience in this group, and their roles in the August Revolution.

- (1). HOANG ANH. Born in Central Vietnam. Took part in August Revolution. Chairman of Viet Minh Unification Committee for Thua Thien-Hue (1945).
- (2). <u>LE QUANG BA</u>. Born in Cao Bang province. Tay ethnic background. First introduced to Communism in 1926-27. Joined ICP in 1932. Member of first Party cell in Ha Quang district. Met Ho in China in 1940. Attended 8th Central Committee in Pac Bo in mid-1941. Along with Giap organized first unit "Propaganda Detachment of the Vietnam Liberation Army." Took part in August Revolution.

- (3). NGUYEN LUONG BANG. Born in 1905 in Thanh Mien district, Hai Duong province. At age 20, went to work on French warships at Shamien. Introduced to Ho Tung Mau and Ho Chi Minh in China. Mau took him into Revolutionary Youth League. Attended training class conducted by Ho and Mau. A year later Ho sent him back to Haiphong. In April 1927, worked aboard "Chambord" ship and smuggled documents into Vietnam. Uncovered and fled to Thai Binh, and then to Saigon where he met some comrades from Canton days. Early in 1929, North Vietnam branch of Thanh Nien ordered members to proletarianize themselves. Bang worked as rickshaw puller in Haiphong. Mid-1929: Central Bureau of Thanh Nien ordered Bang to do liaison work between Hong Kong and Canton. Admitted to Annam Communist Party in October 1929. Went to Shanghai where he was arrested in 1930 for spreading leaflets and was deported to Haiphong. Sentenced to life imprisonment, and incarcerated in Hanoi with Le Duan and Nguyen Tao. Escaped but was again arrested and sent to Son La prison camp where he met Truong Chinh. Escaped in 1943 with Tran Dang Ninh, contacted Hoang Van Thu in Ha Dong, and worked with Truong Chinh on outskirts of Hanoi. After Hoang Van Thu's arrest, Truong Chinh and Hoang Quoc Viet gave Bang responsibility of doing work among soldiers and to take care of Party finances. Early August 1945 went to Viet Bac to attend Tan Trao conference. Bang asked to be assigned to Viet Minh Front and took charge of Party finances. Went to Hue with Cu Huy Can and Tran Huy Lieu to accept Bao Dai's abdication.
- (4). <u>DUONG QUOC CHINH</u>. Born in North Vietnam. Took part in August Revolution.

- (5). TRUONG CHINI. Born in Nam Dinh in 1907. Son of a teacher. Family was active in nationalist cause. Expelled from school for political agitation (1925-26). Went to Hanoi in 1928 where he completed secondary education and later studied at Hanoi School of Commerce. Joined Thanh Nien in 1927, and then ICP in 1930. Arrested in 1931 and sentenced to 12 years of detention, but was released in 1936. From 1936 to 1939, helped in the foundation and consolidation of the Indochinese Democratic Front, and edited many Party newspapers. Became Secretary General of ICP in 1941 (and retained this post until 1956). Active in the Red River Delta in the early 1940's, and took charge of Party organization in the delta (with head-quarters set up near Hanoi). Was in Hanoi with Ho in 1945-46.
- (6). NGUYEN CON. Comes from Nghe An province. Took part in August Revolution. Was Chairman of People's Revolutionary Committee of Thanh Chuong district, Nghe An province, in August 1945.
- (7). <u>LE DUAN</u>. Born in 1907 in Quang Tri province. Joined Thanh Nien Party in 1928, and ICP in 1930. Member of North Vietnam Region Party Committee in 1931. In same year, was arrested by the French and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. Was detained in various jails in Hanoi, Son La, and Poulo Condore. Released in 1936. In 1937, became Secretary of Central Vietnam Region Party Committee, and in 1939 member of the Standing Committee of the ICP Central Committee. As representative of Central Vietnam Region Party Committee, convoked a meeting of top cadres in Quang Tri province and organized Party to go underground in

- 1939. Was in Saigon in 1939 to preside over 6th Plenum of Central Committee, and replaced Democratic Front with Anti-Imperialist National United Front. Arrested again in 1940 and sentenced to ten years imprisonment and deported to Poulo Condore. Released by August Revolution of 1945. In 1945, became Secretary of South Vietnam Region Party Committee and in October 1945 attended its conference held in My Tho province which adopted policies concerning Party leadership of the Resistance in the South.
- (8). TRAN HUU DUC. Born in 1904 in Quang Tri province. After meeting with Le Duan and other cadres from Quang Tri, devoted full time to revolutionary work. End of 1939, was sent to Ninh Thuan by Central Vietnam Region Party Committee to build up movement and set up Chien Thang (Victory) magazine. Arrested in 1941. Released from Ban Me Thuot prison camp in March 1945. Led preparations for August Revolution in Quang Binh province in May 1945. Member of Central Vietnam Region Party Committee in 1945.
- (9). <u>VAN TIEN DUNG</u>. Born in 1917 in Co Nhue (a suburb of Hanoi). Worked in a textile mill. Became politically active in 1936, and joined the ICP in November 1937. In May 1938, was a member of the Hanoi City Party Committee and at the same time Secretary of the Hanoi Workers' Union. Arrested twice by the French in 1939, he was condemned to two years at hard labor. In September of the same year, while being transferred from Son La prison to the Hanoi Central Prison he escaped. July 1943: helped set up Party base organizations in Ha Dong and Bac Ninh provinces. In 1944, he became Secretary of North Vietnam Region Party Committee.

Arrested again by the French in 1944, he was sentenced to death but escaped from prison. In March 1945, he was a member of the Standing Committee of the Revolutionary Military Committee of the North. Entrusted with the organization of the Quang Trung military zone (in the Viet Bac), he led the armed insurrection against the French and Japanese there.

- Born in 1906 in Quang Ngai province. Son of Di-(10).PHAM VAN DONG. rector of Cabinet for Emperor Duy Tan. Studied in Hue and Hanoi, and took part in students' strike in 1926. Watched by French Surete, he fled to Canton where he met Ho Chi Minh who took him into the Thanh Nien and enrolled him in Whampoa. Sent back to Vietnam by Ho to set up Communist cells. But after a few months, he was arrested by the French in July 1929 and condemned to six years at hard labor in Poulo Condore. Released in 1936, he was kept under strict surveillance by the colonial police. Participated in the Democratic Front from 1936 to 1939, and edited newspapers. Fled to China in 1940. Returned to the China-Vietnam border region in 1941, and helped set up bases there. At the People's Congress in Tan Trao in August 1945, he was elected to National Liberation Committee, which was to become the Provisional Government of the DRV following the August Revolution.
- (11). VO THUC DONG. ICP member at least by 1933.
- (12). HA HUY GIAP. Born in Huong Son district, Ha Tinh province. Involved in famous May 1933 trial of revolutionaries in Saigon, along with

Nguyen Chi Dieu and Le Van Luong. Taught cultural classes for prisoners in Poulo Condore in 1934, along with Pham Van Dong (Le Duan wrote for the clandestine prison newspaper in the same period.) Member of South Victnam Region Party Committee in 1945. Represented the South Vietnam Region Party Committee at a conference held in Bien Hoa following August Revolution to stabilize the situation and set up a Party Committee for the province.

VO NGUYEN GIAP. Born in 1911 in Quang Binh province, from an educa-(13).ted but poor family. Father had participated in anti-French resistance in the late 1880's, and had the respect of the peasants in the village. His father taught him Chinese characters and later sent him to Quoc Hoc School in Hue in 1923. Giap was dismissed from school for agitation in connection with the arrest of Phan Boi Chau and the funeral observances for Phan Chu Trinh. He met Phan Boi Chau in Hue, and worked for Tieng Dan newspaper of Huynh Thuc Khang. Taken into Tan Viet Party by close friend Nguyen Chi Dieu. Organized student demonstration in Hue in solidarity with Nghe Tinh Soviets in 1930. Joined ICP in 1930. Arrested and sentenced to three years in jail, but was released after a few months. Giap went to Hanoi and studied at the Lycee Albert Sarraut, and enrolled in Law School from which he graduated in 1938. Taught history at Thanh Long private school to support himself while attending school. In 1936, wrote for newspapers Le Travail, Notre Voix, and En Avant. Co-authored the study The Peasant Question with Truong Chinh in 1938. Went to China in 1940 and met Ho in Kunming. Built up Viet Minh base in Cao Bang area after Pac Bo conference in 1941. In 1944 he was given the task of organizing Armed

Propaganda Detachment For the Liberation of Vietnam, the first nucleus of the Vietnamese People's Army. In June 1945, he became a member of the Central Committee, and member of the National Committee For Insurrection and of the National Liberation Committee which was to become the Provisional Government of the DRV after the August Revolution.

- (14). SONG HAO. Secretary of Party Branch in Cho Chu prison camp. Escaped in 1944. Assigned to Nguyen Hue region (Thai Nguyen-Lang Son) in 1945. Took part in August Revolution.
- (15). HOANG VAN HOAN. Born in 1905 in a middle peasant family in Nghe An province. First went to China in 1926. Graduate of Whampoa. Was active in Thailand in 1928. Member of Thanh Nien. Along with Ho Ngoc Lam, organized the Association For Vietnamese Independence in Nanning in 1935. One of the founders of Viet Minh in 1941. Head of Viet Minh diplomatic mission to China in early 1940's. Deputy Minister of Defense in 1945.
- (16). TRAN QUOC HOAN. Born around 1910 in Quang Ngai province. Imprisoned in Son La in 1940, but escaped. Was in Hanoi with Giap in 1945-46.
- (17). PHAM HUNG. Born in 1912 in Vinh Long province. Joined Thanh Nien, and then ICP in 1930. Led first overt demonstration in My Tho in 1930. Arrested along with Le Van Luong and sentenced to death. Sent to Poulo Condore in 1934, and released in September 1945.

- (18). TO HUU. Born in 1920 in Hue, of bourgeois background. Studied at Khai Dinh School, and joined ICP while in school. Arrested in 1939 and sent to Lao Bao, but escaped. Escaped to Thanh Hoa in February 1943 where he convoked Province Party Committee conference to discuss plans to initiate struggle movement. Became Province Party Committee Secretary at beginning of 1944. Arrived in Hue on 13 August 1945 and became Chairman of Insurrection Committee in Hue.
- (19). NGUYEN KHANG. Born in Thai Binh province. Came from a Catholic background. Member of Hanoi City Party Committee's Standing Committee until captured in 1941. Elected member of North Vietnam Region Party Committee's Standing Committee in March 1944, and led the movement in Hanoi and neighboring provinces. Served as liaison between Hanoi City Party Committee in August 1945, and brought insurrection orders from this Committee to the Hanoi City Party Committee. Member of Revolutionary Military Committee organized to seize power in Hanoi. Met Phan Ke Toai in August 1945 to discuss cooperation. Addressed rally of functionaries in Hanoi on 17 August 1945 and appealed to them to take part in insurrection. Led march on Residence Superieure on 19 August 1945. In charge of North Vietnam People's Revolutionary Committee set up on 20 August 1945.
- (20). <u>UNG VAN KHIEM</u>. Born in 1910 in Long Xuyen province. Son of a school teacher. Revolutionary activities dated from 1928 when he took part in school strikes. Joined ICP in 1930. Jailed several times by the French. Went to Tan Trao conference from the South in 1945. Follow-

ing the conference of notables and intellectuals in Can Tho (after March 1945), he met with Huynh Phu So and secured the cooperation of the Hoa Hao. Took part in August Revolution.

- (21). NGUYEN VAN KINH. Born in Cholon in 1916, probably of bourgeois background. Participated probably as ICP member in August Revolution in Saigon-Cholon as leader of a students' contingent.
- (22). NGUYEN LAM. Born in 1922.
- (23). <u>LE VAN LUONG</u>. Born in 1910 in Hung Yen province. Originally a worker in Nha Be in Saigon. Worked in Khanh Hoi with Hoang Ouoc Viet and Ngo Gia Tu in 1929. Close friend of Ly Tu Trong. Secretary of Nha Be Party Chapter in 1931. Arrested at age 19 for leading a strike. Sent to Poulo Condore. Released on 23 September 1945.
- (24). TRAN LUONG. Born in 1913 in Ha Tinh province. Participated in Nghe Tinh Soviet in 1929-30. Arrested and deported to Son La. In 1944, the Committee For Revolutionary Mobilization in Ba To assigned Tran Luong and two other cadres to lead power seizure in the countryside. Tran Luong was in charge of southern Quang Ngai and was in liaison with provinces further south. Member of Quang Ngai Province Provisional Party Committee in May 1945. Organized and led guerrilla movement in Ba To.
- (25). LE HIEN MAI. Born in 1915 in Son Tay province. Nung ethnic back-

ground. Joined ICP before 1945. Jailed in Cho Chu prison camp in 1944, but was freed by Chu Van Tan.

- (26). CHU HUY MAN. Born in Nghe An province in 1920. Took part in August Revolution.
- (27). <u>DO MUOI</u>. Appears to have been born near Haiphong. In charge of Ung Hoa district, Ha Dong province after March 1945. Took part in August Revolution.
- (28). LE THANH NGHI. Born in 1911 in North Vietnam. From 1927 to 1930, worked as electrician in Hong Quang mining district and carried out revolutionary activities among the miners. Joined Thanh Nien in 1929. Arrested in 1930 and sentenced to hard labor for life. Deported to Poulo Condore. Released in 1936. Member of Hanoi City Party Committee from 1936 to 1937, and helped set up solidarity associations of workers, trade unionists, and Party cells. From 1938 to 1939, he was a member of the Party Bureau in charge of region covering Haiphong and the provinces of Hai Duong, Kien An, Quang Yen and Hong Gai. Appointed member of North Vietnam region Party Committee at the end of 1939. Arrested again in early 1940, sentant to five years imprisonment and sent to Son La. Escaped from Son La in early 1945, and was appointed member of Standing Committee of North Vietnam Region Party Committee. After Japanese coup of March 1945, Central Committee gave him leadership of revolutionary movement in Viet Bac Liberated Zone. As a member of the Revolutionary Military Committee for

North Vietnam, he was in charge of Region II, and took part in the liberation of Bac Giang, Vinh Yen, Phuc Yen and Thai Nguyen provinces.

- (29). HA THI QUE. Born in 1921 in Bac Giang province. Joined ICP in 1939. Active in Yen The in the early 1940's, and led a plateon to seize post at Yen The. Was member of the Bac Giang province Revolutionary Committee in charge of military affairs in August 1945.
- CHU VAN TAN. Born in 1908 in Phu Thuong village, Thai Nguyen (30).province. Came from peasant family of Nung ethnic background. Father had fought in army of De Tham against the French. Tan attended primary school in Thai Nguyen town, but had to leave school in 1929. Admitted to ICP in 1934, he was given responsibility of organizing movement in Vu Nhai area of Thai Nguyen Province. Appointed to command staff of Vu Nhai-Bac Son War Zone following Bac Son uprising of 1940. Appointed to command staff of Army For National Salvation after its formation in 1941. Joined North Vietnam Region Party Committee in the same year. Led his unit through eight months of severe French repression in Bac Son-Vu Nhai base. Took his unit to China in March 1942, and returned to base area after French forces withdrew. Expanded this base until it linked up with the one in Cao Bang province in March 1945. Joined Central Committee in the same year. Appointed to Leadership Committee to direct uprising of 1945.
  - (31). BUI QUANG TAO. Born in Phu Tho province. Arrested in Yen Bay in

- 1942. Was assigned by North Vietnam Region Party Committee to lead My Duc district in May 1945. Took part in August Revolution.
- (32). PHAN TRONG TUE. Born in 1917 in Son Tay province. Worked in a shipyard near Saigon from 1929 to 1935 when joined ICP. After a brief stay in Vientiane, Laos, he returned to North Vietnam where he was arrested in 1935. Was Party Secretary of Ha Dong province at end of 1942. Captured at meeting of Standing Committee of Central Committee held in Ha Nam in February-March 1943 to decide on enlarging Viet Minh Front. (Tue was a member of the North Vietnam Region Party Committee at the time.)
- (33). HOANG VAN THAI. Born in Thai Binh province in 1906. Came from a peasant family. Joined revolution in 1930 and was active in Bac Son-Dinh Ca area. Went to China in the early 1940's. Headed students' group newly returned from China. Member of Bac Son Zone Command Staff in 1942. Took part in August Revolution.
- (34). LE QUOC THAN. No information available on early career.
- (35). TON DUC THANG. Born in 1888 in Long Xuyen province, in a middle peasant family. Took part in protest movement of students and workers. In 1910, worked as a mechanic in Saigon, and set up a friendship association and mutual aid organization which were the first workers' organizations in South Vietnam. Went secretly to France in 1912, and enlisted in French Navy in 1914. In 1918, after October Revolution in Russia,

his unit was sent to Sebastopol. With ship crew, protested orders to attack Soviet forces and hoisted the red flag on warship "Paris." Returned to Vietnam in 1920. Arrested by French in 1929, sentenced to twenty years of hard labor and deported to Poulo Condore where he joined ICP. Released by August 1945 revolution. Attended meeting of South Vietnam Region Party Headquarters along with Le Duan and Hoang Quoc Viet in 1945. Became Chairman of Viet Minh Committee of My Tho after August Revolution.

- (36). NGUYEN CHI THANH. Born in 1914 in Thua Thien province in a poor peasant family. In 1930, when 17 years old, struggled against the exploitation of the rich in his village, along with other young tenant farmers. Joined ICP in 1937. Elected Secretary of Thua Thien Province Party Committee in 1938. Arrested in 1939. Escaped from jail in 1941. Arrested again in 1943 and jailed until 1945. Elected to Central Committee in August 1945 and at the same time became Secretary of Central Vietnam Region Party Committee.
- (37). NGUYEN THI THAP. Born in 1908 in My Tho. From 1930 to 1936, she was active among the peasants in My Tho, among workers at the Phu Xuan oil depot, and among workers in Saigon. Member of Executive Committee of South Vietnam Region Party Committee. Took part in leading Southern Insurrection of 1940. Husband and son were killed by the French. Active in Saigon and Gia Dinh from 1944 to 1947, consolidating Viet Minh organizations. Took part in August Revolution.

- (38). LE DUC THO. Born in 1912. Came from a "good, educated and honest" family in Nam Dinh. Joined revolutionary movement in 1928, and then the ICP in 1930. Arrested in 1930 and sentenced to 10 years in Poulo Condore. Released in 1936 and returned to Nam Dinh to engage in semi-open activities. In charge of Party press and propaganda. Jailed in 1939 in Nam Dinh, and then sent to Son La until released in late 1944 by French authorities.
- (39). XUAN THUY. Born in 1912, in Ha Dong province. Joined Thanh Nien in 1926. Arrested twice in the 1920's. Imprisoned in Son La in 1939 and edited Suoi Reo, a prison newspaper. Released in late 1943. Headed propaganda department of the Viet Minh, and became editor-in-chief of underground paper Cuu Quoc. Was one of cadres in charge of building up movement in Ha Dong after March 1945. Planned uprising in Ha Dong with other comrades in May 1945. Alternate member of North Vietnam Region Party Committee in May 1945. During period of preparations for August Revolution, he was a member of the North Vietnam Provisional Revolutionary People's Committee in charge of propaganda.
- (40). NGUYEN VAN TRAN. Born in 1916 in Saigon area. Imprisoned in Son La in the 1940's. Member of Provisional People's Revolutionary Committee for North Vietnam in August 1945, and was in charge of administrative affairs.
- (41). NGUYEN DUY TRINH. Born in 1910 in Nghe An province. Father was a

scholar. At the end of 1920, "as the last shot of the Van Than movement was still echoing," Trinh was a student in the French-Vietnamese school. Saw soldiers leading a revolutionary away, and this made a strong impression on him. He later wrote in his memoir, "Though later when we grew up, and there was a new movement and our generation moved gradually toward proletarian revolutionary consciousness, our patriotism and our opposition to the imperialists had sprung from the influence of the Van Than movement when we were growing up. People in my area knew by heart the poetry and literature written by members of the Van Than movement." Trinh had studied Chinese characters when he was small. He was a student of Tran Phu in Vinh in 1924. In 1927 he took part in the student movement in Vinh, and joined the Tan Viet Party in 1928. Arrested in 1929 and condemned to 18 months in prison for his revolutionary activities in Saigon. Joined the ICP in 1930. Was District Secretary of Nghi Loc, Nghe An province, and was involved in Nghe-Tinh Soviets. Arrested at the end of 1931 and condemned to 13 years at hard labor. Exiled to Poulo Condore in 1935, and in 1942 was transferred to prison camp in Kontum. While in Poulo Condore, he was Secretary of the Party's cell there from 1936 to 1941. Organized insurrections at Vinh and Hue in 1945. Became member of Central Vietnam Region Party Committee in the same year. Nominated Vice-President of the Central Vietnam Administrative Committee after the August Revolution.

(42). HOANG QUOC VIET. Born in Bac Ninh province in 1905. Father was an urban manual worker. Entered Practical School of Industry in 1922.

In 1926, after Phan Boi Chau's arrest, Viet and students in the school tried to present petition to Varenne to ask for amnesty for Chau. French retaliated, and students went on strike to protest. Viet left school and got job in coal mine. Propagandized workers about Phan Boi Chau's trial, Phan Chu Trinh's funeral, and Nguyen An Ninh's movement in the South, and Nguyen Ai Quoc in Russia. Returned to Haiphong in 1928 and got job in a factory. Introduced into Thanh Nien Party by close friend Luong Khanh Thien through Nguyen Duc Canh. Discharged from factory in 1929, and carried out underground activities. Was sent South to operate. Worked with Ngo Gia Tu and Le Van Luong in Khanh Hoi. Was dispatched to France by Party to contact French CP. Returned to Saigon in 1930 and learned of unification of communist groups at conference in Hong Kong. Was sent to the North with Pham Huu Lau to attend first meeting of Central Committee. Met Tran Phu upon arrival in Haiphong. However, Viet was arrested shortly thereafter by Surete. Sentenced to life imprisonment and deported to Poulo Condore. Released in 1936. Returned to Hanoi; was assigned to semilegal group and put in charge of Party newspapers along with Truong Chinh. Went South for second time in 1937 to attend conference of Party Central Committee at Hoc Mon, Ba Diem, as representative of North Vietnam Region Party Committee. Returned to Hanoi. Went to visit Truong Chinh who was then hospitalized (1937) and discussed the fact that Party books and newspapers were not reaching workers and peasants in great numbers because they were illiterate. They decided to ask Nguyen Van To to get permission to set up the Association For the Propagation of the Romanized Script. After Viet was expelled from Hanoi by the French in 1938, Chinh suggested

that he go to the countryside and set up bases. Viet went to Bac Ninh and Bac Giang provinces. Went underground in 1939 when French repression started. Hoang Van Thu contacted him and suggested that he go to the Viet Bac area to operate and put him in touch with Chu Van Tan. Viet returned to the delta after the French surrender, and operated with Truong Chinh expanding Party organizations in Ha Dong, Hung Yen, Ha Nam and Thai Binh. Met Ho Chi Minh at 8th Plenum in Pac Bo. Stayed in Viet Bac after Pac Bo conference to provide political training for Chu Van Tan's unit. Met with Truong Chinh again around Tet 1944 to discuss setting up administration in villages controlled by Viet Minh in the delta area. Was in Hanoi just prior to August Revolution, and left for South Vietnam on the eve of 19 August.

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